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The Kashmir movement for azadi, or freedom, from India is rooted in pre-Partition 
mobilisation, but has evolved over time. With the end to the violent resistance throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, a predominately nonviolent resistance has taken hold. The 
azadi movement has been redefined by predominately young activists with Kashmiri roots 
who have adopted strategies of other ‘new’ transnational social movements. This has 
broadened the support base from ethnic Kashmiris to include a demographically diverse 
range of activists and extends the framing of the conflict from identitarian-based to human 
rights-based.  
Drawing upon Kashmir Studies literature and social movements literature, this thesis re-
contextualizes identitarian motivations for the azadi movement. A combined theoretical 
framework aims to better understand how identity influences the movement and how 
transnational movements influence identity. This is best demonstrated through social 
movements framing processes. 
Work with Kashmir Solidarity Movement (KSM) in the United Kingdom through participant 
observation, qualitative interviewing, and analysis of online social media corresponding 
to the groups has led to a better understanding of how identity motivates participants to 
support an independent Kashmir. In-group activists, or those with a direct stake in the 
conflict are motivated primarily by an affiliation to Kashmir; however, out-group activists 
are primarily motivated by identifying themselves as having some non-ethnic bond to 
Kashmir, such as being a part of a self-perceived minority group or active in a cause or 
campaign that challenges existing power structures. Legal advocates, activists, and 
academics have worked in tandem to raise awareness for the Kashmir conflict and 
recommend solutions. Using a rights-based discourse, activists frame independence as 












There is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan called Kashmir. Kashmir is 
actually a part of a larger body of territory known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K), which was once under the rule of a Maharaja – a sort of king – while the British 
occupied and ruled much of the South Asian Subcontinent. Although India and Pakistan 
have been claiming J&K for 
themselves since British 
withdrawal from the 
Subcontinent in 1947, many of 
the people of Kashmir would 
like to be independent of either 
country. The map here shows 
the current international 
boundaries as well as the 
disputed boundaries, known 
as the Line of Control (LoC) 
which has only ever shifted 
slightly after ceasefire 
agreements over the years 
since Partition. 
 There is quite a lot of literature that already exists that describes the history of the 
region and which focuses on the bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan, which as 
this map shows, territorial disputes also include China. This thesis reviews some of these 
accounts and offers referencing so that the reader may delve more deeply into subjects 
of more interest to them. The key contribution that this thesis is that it does not focus so 
much on the India-Pakistan conflict, but that it tries to look at the conflict through the eyes 
of the Kashmiri who desires freedom, or azadi. Other literature has questioned why 
Kashmiris would like to separate from India and/or Pakistan, but have often looked at it 
as an ethnic, national, or religious conflict of interest. Many Kashmiris I have met during 
a visit to Indian Kashmir, as well as during events and meetings held in the United 




Kingdom prefer to see themselves as resistors to occupation, or as activists for human 
rights or the self-determination of a people. It is in this manner that I have chosen to tell 
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This PhD thesis explores the contemporary Kashmir freedom movement through the lens 
of transnational activism. Over the course of history and especially in the lead up to the 
Partition of Indian and Pakistan, a Kashmiri identity has emerged. This identity has 
emerged in response to oppression of a primarily Muslim and ethnically and culturally 
Kashmiri populace by the Dogra rulers up through the 1930s (Zutshi, 2004). The call for 
an independent Pakistan from India also encouraged movements for other regions, 
including the Kashmir valley, to strive for independence after British withdrawal from the 
Subcontinent. As a Kashmir identity had emerged, it was assumed to be a driver of the 
freedom, or azadi movement from India post-Partition when initial attempts to gain 
independence failed. An emergent, Kashmir identity is an identity marker that is salient 
in response to events such as the arrest of rights activists and the firing on protesting 
crowds, rather than a monolithic signifier (Rao, 1996; Aggarwal, 2008). Although rooted 
in historical precedence, this thesis focuses on the contemporary azadi movement which 
has gained traction as a transnational social movement. 
 This thesis draws attention to the issue of naming the azadi movement as an 
identitarian movement based on identity or religion as it is sometimes referred to in 
literature (Ganguly, 1997) or in Indian media (Ali et. al, 2011). The notion that the Kashmir 
freedom movement is a human rights movement whereby self-determination is 
expressed as a human right has emerged as evident in the eyes of activists. It is through 
the lens of human rights that this new azadi movement is expressed. I would argue the 
evidence of human rights abuses against civilians in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK), 
is far more compelling an argument for conflict asymmetry than a continuation of militant 
insurgency which was at least in part sponsored by Pakistan. The current phase of azadi 
is not. It is students holding placards and stone throwing youths versus well-equipped 
security forces. It is a demand for more rights and to end impunity, torture, abuses, and 
to account and atone for the disappeared and murdered Kashmiris found years later in 
mass graves.  
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 Human rights is the narrative behind the contemporary azadi movement. Kashmiri 
freedom activists are framing their movement in terms of human rights through their 
accounts of victimization, but also through their demand for justice. The youth of Kashmir 
deemed the ‘children of conflict’ have grown up with debilitating curfews and being 
witnesses to violence. They are also rather transient. These transient Kashmiris have 
helped to facilitate the internationalization of the freedom movement by establishing 
university-affiliated groups abroad. This project follows two groups: The Kashmir 
Solidarity Movement affiliated with the University of Edinburgh in Scotland (KSM 
Edinburgh) and the Kashmir Solidarity Movement affiliated with the University of London’s 
School of Oriental and African Studies (KSM SOAS). In the case of both these societies, 
neither has enough of a Kashmiri population to sustain a movement. Instead, the 
societies rely on support from non-Kashmiris to grow their movement. In fact, the KSM 
groups expressed as its primary goals to raise awareness for the Kashmiri cause. They 
desire to bring to light the atrocities witnessed by Kashmiris and the everyday rights which 
have been violated. They express themselves in a more universal language of human 
rights rather than a insular language of self-identity.  
 These findings were emergent rather than clear upfront. In my initial encounter 
with KSM Edinburgh, I witnessed heterogeneity and support for a myriad of campaigns 
within the group. The ethnic diversity was great as well as the diversity of organizations 
that see to be openly affiliated with the KSM. I wanted to understand what drove people 
affiliated with the KSM to engage in a campaign for a free Kashmir? Were they engaging 
in KSM because of some identitarian appeal for a free Kashmir or do they engage for 
different reasons? As it appeared that this was a transnational social movement, I opted 
to explore these queries through the application of social movement frames. 
Observations led to an understanding that the overall appeal to be affiliated with KSM 
was the framing of the issue around an overarching human rights frame. However, 
branching out from this human rights frame are more nuanced variations of framing 
processes, which are explored further in this introduction and at more length throughout 
the thesis.  
 This introductory chapter first explores my personal inspirations for conducting 
this research as well as my contributions to the broader literature of Kashmir Studies and 
social movements theory. I then delve deeper into social movements frames and framing 
processes as this sets the stage for my approach to the research. I refer to general 
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literature on collective action frames, used as a tool to define a problem and outline 
solutions for the problem. I then consider the human rights framing as a sort of 
‘metapackage’ which encompasses a broader set of sub-frames such as framing the 
specific issue of human rights around legal or injustice issues, for example. I end with a 
basic outline of the structure of this thesis. In brief, the first chapter outlines the historical 
precedence of the azadi movement and offers literature on the competing narratives of 
identity in the movement. The second chapter on research methods reflects upon my 
approach to research and my data collection strategy. The third chapter examines the 
new azadi movement and how it has led to a new generation of activists to seek freedom 
in more contemporary ways such as through using social media and modern art forms or 
through the expression of women’s rights as human rights. Women’s rights as human 
rights is one of the sub-frames of the master frame of human rights as it offers a 
compelling argument which asserts that women experience sexual violence as a result 
of occupation and calls for demilitarization of Kashmir. Azadi for Kashmir is equated with 
azadi for women against a patriarchy. The fourth chapter looks into some of the literature 
on diaspora on how the movement has becomes transnationalized. The fifth chapter 
departs from traditional diaspora literature to understand how the azadi movement works 
in solidarity with other movements in order to bring about stronger bonds between 
campaigns. Specifically, this looks at how the KSM acts in solidarity with other campaigns 
for people who are minorities or have a perceived subaltern status, thus representing a 
further sub-frame of human rights. The sixth and seventh chapters are more of a case 
study of my time spent with the KSM chapters, exploring the groups’ origins, participants, 
and core issues and strategies. The eighth chapter explores the subframe of 
victimization. The victimized Kashmiri, however, is compelled to reclaim agency through 
acts of resistance, therefore representing the final subframe of resistance. Intersectional 
identities are explored here which aim to understand the overlapping and overarching 
identities which may be identitarian but also that of a resistance movement that is both a 
a Kashmiri and as part of a broader liberal identity. As a transnational social movement, 
legal advocates and activists work together to frame the azadi movement in terms of 
injustice, or what I call ‘legal framing.’ This last type of frame offers an avenue within 







Thesis Inspiration and Contribution 
 
The contribution of this thesis is to the Kashmir Studies literature, but it is also to literature 
on social movements more generally. My research is based on ethnographic methods 
whereby I have positioned myself as a participant observer in two Kashmir Solidarity 
Movement (KSM) bodies in the United Kingdom. Both groups are affiliated with the 
university as a society and the two university groups I chose to work with were the 
University of Edinburgh KSM (KSM Edinburgh) and the University of London School of 
Oriental and African Studies KSM (KSM SOAS). My research findings are based on 
observations at the groups’ meetings, interactions with the participants, and semi-
structured interviews. I have further used their Facebook groups as a valuable resource 
for disseminating and promoting events and circulating information on what is happening 
in Kashmir, forthcoming KSM events, and affiliated group events and seminars. I also 
draw from interviews in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) in what was meant as a pilot 
study but turned out to be an intense, but short period of interviews. These interviews 
and encounters with locals have helped to focus my pilot investigations into the new 
Kashmir freedom movement and the more nuanced values of Kashmiris in their everyday 
lives.  
I was unable to complete a longer period of research in (IAK) due to restrictions 
on accessing the region. Nevertheless, it was useful and influenced my research further 
towards breaking with nationalism or conflict studies and focusing on social movements 
instead. This was in 2013. Since this time, rather organically, social movements had 
become the key theoretical strand in understanding this new freedom movement. In 
particular, literature on transnational social movements organizations (TSMOs) was 
critical in better grasping the KSM and the contemporary azadi movement in general. 
Further, in breaking from more traditional literature on diaspora studies, social 
movements help to understand the way that self-determination movements may be 
disseminated and framed to an international audience in an effort to better promote one’s 
cause. In the case of Kashmir, this has been done through the framing of the conflict in 
Kashmir as one of occupation and as an issue of human rights and justice (or lack thereof) 
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in Kashmir. Echoes of this are in Palestine, which is a big influence on protest tactics and 
dissemination to a wider audience. However, as seen through a microcosm in KSM, the 
group does not insulate itself from working with other groups. In addition to coreligionists 
in Palestine and Kurdish territory, the KSM has also expressed interests in supporting 
(and been supported by) movements for self-determination in Scotland, Tibet, and West 
Papua New Guinea. It could, therefore, be inferred that tactics of framing used in KSM 
are quite probably used in other self-determination movements in an effort to reach a 
wider international audience, rather than simply promoting their cause to coreligionists or 
to other ethnic kin in the diaspora.  
In addition to understanding the framing tactics used and to extend social 
movements literature, this thesis also points to the gap in literature on diaspora 
mobilisation. Comparative literature on transnational diaspora offers insights as to how 
migrant communities, expats, and exiled or displaced groups can become a diaspora 
community with enhanced ethnic ties to a homeland (see Lyons and Mandaville, 2012 or 
Orjuela 2012). The only problem with this literature is that it can lead to the misconception 
that the diaspora is an insular or homogenous community. Sokefeld and Bolognani (2011) 
in their work with the Kashmir community in Britain found that the connections to 
homeland were less a consequence of a homogenous ethnic community than a response 
to events that occurred in the homeland and to the will to identity oneself as not from 
Pakistan or India. When not in relation to political mobilisation, someone from the 
‘Kashmir’ diaspora may just as likely say they are from Mirpur, with more nuanced 
localized identities becoming more prominent (Ballard, 1991). Behera (2006), for 
example, warns against viewing Kashmiris as a monolithic group (104).  Upon initial 
observations in the community, it was evident that the Kashmir freedom movement 
abroad was not homogenous. The movement did not fit with interpretations of diaspora 
mobilisation which required connection to a singular, or even an umbrella of communities. 
Vertovec (2009) does note the emergent ‘hybrid communities’ which form a sort of 
syncretic version of their ethnic heritage with their adopted homeland (7). The focus of 
this literature is on interpreting how mobilization of diaspora populations may occur in 
relations to events, or how their identities may fluctuate while living in exile. How diaspora 
is formed and re-shaped is not a key contribution of this thesis so much as how a 
seemingly diaspora problem becomes a campaign of significance to a multi-faceted 
alignment of divergent transnational communities. Some of the processes of diaspora 
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mobilisation were noted while working with Kashmiris living abroad, however, to label a 
small handful of Kashmiris as ‘diaspora’ would be dubious. Many of those active in KSM 
were only living abroad for the duration of their studies, and those that have lived in the 
UK for a longer duration were very much in the minority of the populations with which I 
interacted.  
As far as working with a more representative Kashmir diaspora population abroad, 
this was already done by Ballard (1991), Ellis and Khan (2001; 2003) and Sokefeld and 
Bolognani (2011). It was not in my interest to repeat this research. What I was witnessing 
during my pilot observations and interviews was clearly not homeland politics in the way 
that it has been previously depicted. There is a dearth in literature that connects literature 
on TSMOs with that of diaspora mobilisation. This thesis also hopes to bridge that gap, 
again through looking at the way KSM reaches out to an international audience rather 
than focusing specifically on mobilising diaspora communities. It at once demonstrates 
the fluidity of causes and campaigns as being more about overarching issues about 
justice and rights and also recognizes that support of an international community of a 
broad spectrum of allies may be a better way to achieve their goals than turning inward 
towards their own ethnic communities for support. The chapter will further explore social 
movement theories in more depth, with a look into some of the crossover literature on 
transnational mobilisations. The literature specifically on mobilisations in the Kashmir 
diaspora will be addressed in more depth in a later chapter.  
 
 
Introducing Research Questions 
 
My research on Kashmir began with my wanting to understand the new Kashmir freedom 
movement. Like many other researchers, I was exposed initially to the ethnonational 
literature and general Kashmir Studies literature. This literature does not always analyse 
the situation in Kashmir as an asymmetrical conflict, which I had begun to come to see it 
as when looking through the eyes of the Kashmiri freedom activist. I initially wanted to 
know more about why Kashmiris were still trying to accede from India after so long, but 
this question becomes irrelevant if you perceive their cause not as one of secession but 
as a human rights movement. Having a deep interest in transnational social movements 
compelled me to attend the inauguration meeting of Kashmir Solidarity Movement 
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Edinburgh (KSM Edinburgh) in October of 2012. After seeing the variety of participants 
and viewing the BBC Channel 4 documentary Trails of Torture which documented human 
rights violations of Kashmir, my research shifted from exploring identitiarian-based claims 
of Kashmiris to the right-based claims of Kashmiris. Furthermore, I wanted to understand 
how they brought in so many non-Kashmiris and people with no affiliation to South Asia 
to promote their cause.  
 
What drives people in the KSM to engage in a campaign for a free Kashmir?  
 
Already I have conceded that the azadi movement appears to be less based on 
identitarian claims than on human and legal rights and that the transnational movement 
sees itself as a vehicle in the fight for justice for Kashmiris negatively impacted by 
occupation. What is of further interest analytically is how freedom activists are mobilising 
and convincing others to mobilise. The KSM was not only easily accessible as a way to 
explore how freedom activists were mobilising but also in the tactics used to persuade 
others to support their cause. The KSM was the Kashmir freedom movement in a 
transnational microcosm. From them I would learn from asking the question: 
 
Do they engage because of the identitarian appeal of a free Kashmir or do they 
engage for different reasons? 
 
Kashmiris are certainly driven by a goal to raise awareness for their cause to an 
international audience. Being Kashmiri is a driving force behind participating in events as 
well as setting up branches of KSM societies. However, most respondents are actively 
involved in other campaigns other than Kashmir, which leads me to believe that they are 
interested in some of the bigger liberal causes than on Kashmir alone. Many are active 
in the Palestine movement, for example, or have volunteered in their communities, or 
helped raise humanitarian aid.  
 
How are Kashmir freedom activists framing their movement in an effort to increase 




Framing tactics are important for understanding the methods and tools used to promote 
the azadi movement to an international audience as well as a transnational and transient 
Kashmir community. These would be analysed closely through attending events and 
analysing social media posts and flyers. Successes and setbacks could be measured 
through attending KSM meetings where you hear from a core group of members where 
they set goals and give indications on what they will do to achieve those goals and reflect 
upon what works and what doesn’t.  
 As an international audience may not have a direct stake in the outcome of any 
final solution for the territory of an independent Kashmir, I had hypothesized that there 
may be some reframing of messages in an effort to relay the Kashmir struggle in terms 
that activists working on other campaigns could understand or relate to. This is an 
interesting point to consider because the way that campaigns are framing and reframing 
their messages is a valuable point of knowledge not just for understanding the Kashmir 
movement but for understanding transnational movements more generally. My 
conclusion for this point is that it is most probable that campaigns reframe their 
messaging in an effort to reach a larger audience, but that this mainly happens to those 
campaigns which are ideologically aligned. This could be seen in a microcosm from KSM 
events and joint events with other groups. Widely represented were groups that are 
generally affiliated with the left of the political spectrum: Anti-war groups, groups against 
racism, promotion of diversity, women’s rights, workers’ rights, socialists, other self-
determination groups, and groups that fought or raise awareness for human rights such 
as Amnesty International. This spoke to a generalizing of how liberal campaigners work 
together, but it also points to an important feature of the contemporary azadi movement: 
it is undoubtedly a left-leaning, liberal movement. Does the fact that KSM campaigns 
alongside left-leaning movements have an impact on the extent to which KSM is liberal 
ideologically? Or, perhaps, it was always a liberal movement which sought out a wider, 
liberal audience. This thesis does not and cannot specifically address this last question, 
but it can and does speculate about the significance that this finding has on how the 
Kashmir freedom movement is perceived. It cannot be perceived as an ethnically or 
linguistically exclusive movement as it extends to those who may not be native speakers 
of Kashmiri, or Koshur. It cannot be seen as simply a militant movement inspired by 
Islamic fundamentalists as it cannot be perceived as religiously exclusive because it does 
include other religious backgrounds as its conception of who is Kashmiri – Sikh, Kashmiri 
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Pandits, and any other historically underrepresented minority in the Kashmir region. The 
new Kashmiri freedom movement is one that emerges as progressive and generally 
liberal-oriented in its perception of the rights of minorities and women and in the roles 
allocated to women in its organization and leadership. Although the contemporary 
movement certainly has its roots in previous social organizations in the Valley against 
oppression, the contemporary movement emerges as one that is against the postcolonial 
violence of occupation as well as everyday violence of patriarchy. The connections 
between self-determination of Kashmir and the reclaiming of agency for Kashmiri women 
is also a consequence of the rejection of occupation. These themes are further outlined 
in the thesis structure at the end of this introductory chapter. The first chapter outlines 
the genesis and transnationalization of Kashmir’s freedom struggle. Although this is not 
a history-based thesis, a background of the Kashmir conflict is necessary here in order 
to contextualise the contemporary movement, which is the main focus of this research.   
The activists and political entrepreneurs of Kashmir’s azadi movement have 
framed their cause as one that is for the promotion of justice, for the ending of human 
rights abuses, and for the reclaiming of autonomy for Kashmir and for the women of 
Kashmir from violence – some directed by the state apparatus and others by a patriarchal 
authority. The key ways in which Kashmir freedom activists have framed these messages 
in such a manner in the contemporary freedom movement sets it apart from the previous 
movements for autonomy under an Indian state or a violent resistance is more deeply 
analysed in the third chapter of this thesis, following the methods chapter. For now, this 
introduction will turn to more generalised theory used in this research on social 




Social movements is a key theoretical framework for this research on the contemporary 
Kashmir freedom movement. To frame this research in terms of social movements 
research, I turn to some key definitions and explanations of what social movements are 
before explaining in more detail the use of a social movement frame to solicit support for 
a cause. Social movement scholars Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007) have defined 
a social movement as ‘a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated 
performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and 
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solidarities that sustain these activities’ (8). Contentious politics, on the other hand is 
described by Tilly and Tarrow (ibid.) as involving claims making on another actor, usually 
a governmental entity. All contentious politics involves coordinated efforts of collective 
action, but social movements, they argue, are sustained efforts as well as an ‘array of 
public performances’ and ‘repeated public displays of worthiness’ (ibid.: 8). In this 
manner, contentious politics can be any singular act of resistance, whereas a social 
movement signifies more of a series of sustained acts of resistance. In a previous work 
of Tilly’s, he further provides what may be a more lay definition of a social movement as 
articulated by an editorialist in the Zimbabwe Harare Daily which asserts that social 
movements are  
‘inclusive organizations comprised of various interest groups…[comprising] the 
significant strata of society such as workers, women’s groups, students, youths and 
the intellectual component…These various interest sectors of society will be bound 
together by one common grievance which in most cases will be the commonly 
perceived lack of democracy in a specific setting…’ (Tilly, 2004: 1).  
 
This is an interesting complementary definition as it reiterates the notion of sustained 
mobilisation, but emphasises that a social movement will comprise a ‘significant strata of 
society.’ This is an important point of reference to note when challenging identitarian 
motivations for resistance in the case of Kashmir, but also in the case of other self-
determination movements which have become transnationalized including the movement 
for a free Palestine or Tibet. 
A social movement is a sustained series of mobilisations which comprise a cross-
spectrum of society and, according to Meyer and Tarrow (1998), can be defined as 
‘collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with 
common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and 
authorities’ (4). To unpack this further, a social movement then is also a challenge to 
authority or to the status quo. Diani (1996) also notes that social movements have been 
understood as an attempt to challenge the system. Diani asserts that social movements 
represent a ‘peculiar type of collective action, characterized by identity, solidarity, and the 
attempt to break the limits of compatibility of a given system’ (1996:6). All of these 
definitions together, have similar elements. Notably, they all reference some kind of 
power struggle against an existing authority, regime, or status quo. Implicit in these 
definitions is a diverse sample of society, probably from a perceived subaltern segment 
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of who feels they are being subjugated in some way who act collectively in ‘solidarity’ to 
oppose a ruling faction. From an interpretive perspective, the KSM, which expresses itself 
as a ‘solidarity movement,’ would very much be considered to be a social movement by 
most definitions.   
Contemporary developments in international activism have spurred the new 
social movements body of literature which highlight transnational collective action as 
assessed by Della Porta and Tarrow (2005), Tarrow (2005), and Oleson (2011), to name 
a few. Della Porta and Tarrow define ‘transnational collective action’ as ‘coordinated 
international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, 
other states, or international institutions’ (2005: 2). Della Porta and Tarrow, in their 
analysis, link social movement studies to the contemporary form of global politics 
observed today by purporting that in order for a social movement to become a 
transnational social movement, other factors beyond political opportunities and mobilizing 
structures are at play. These would be the more strategic processes which permit, for 
example, the diffusion of social movement strategies from one campaign to another or 
the emergence of an overarching aim that connects movement actors across a spectrum 
of campaigns. The strategies for extending a movement beyond its immediate 
benefactors is utilized through social movements framings. The framing process is a 
necessary part of how a social movement transforms itself from a domestic movement 
into a transnational one. The adoption of a larger set of frames and a larger support 
network was key for Cunningham’s (2000) study of the Sanctuary movement in the United 
States in transforming itself from a movement that could be perceived as applying only 
to one organization’s role in countering one country’s immigration laws to larger questions 
of human rights and the justification of defying a government’s laws on a moral basis. 
Cunningham observed that the religio-politico Sanctuary movement aimed at helping 
refugees in the U.S. gradually became more secularized while developing a transnational 
identity. The organization expanded its ‘constituency of activists [and] utilized a 
globalization rhetoric…’ (2000: 584). Social movements are reflexive and evolving 
entities. Working with KSM, I noticed a particularly marked distinction. When I began work 
with the group in 2012, the discourse of wanting a ‘plebiscite’ as promised by India 
changed in 2013 to ‘referendum,’ as the Scottish referendum for its withdrawal from the 
UK was omnipresent in the media. This, in turn, granted the movement support from other 
organizations and groups even if they were only tenuously linked. The KSM, it would 
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appear, have participated in this process of alignment to other causes they perceive as 
having at least some tenuous link to their own cause. Likewise, other societies and 
campaigns, although ascribe to their own specific aspirations, have not shied away from 
aligning itself, at least tenuously to some aspects of KSM and to the larger azadi 
movement in general.  
Transnational politics can evolve and be reflective upon events, political 
conditions, and the will of supporters. Some of these events can spur a process of 
diffusion, internationalization, and externalization which are enhanced by international 
campaigns (Benford, 1997: 4-7). In his research, Benford looks at diffusion processes 
from one movement to another in an effort to understand the conditions necessary for 
collective action frames to ‘transcend cultural and geographical barriers’ (1997: 416). In 
general, whether by a process of diffusion of mobilization campaigns in one part of the 
world to another through sympathetic ventures or the awareness raised by successful 
internationalization campaigns, we can see transnational movements in much of the 
Western and non-Western worlds – bringing the global north and south together. Orjuela 
frames this assertion in the following way: 
‘Political opportunity structures in the host country shape [diaspora] activism and 
determines its efficiency, and in some cases may reframe diaspora, homeland or 
immigrant politics as struggles for separatist goals or as human rights causes…’ 
(2012: 95).  
 
Although some diaspora groups may mobilise specifically in regard to a Kashmiri 
issue as was the case in the Kashmir Identity Campaign, diaspora groups can mobilise 
in conjunction with other groups with similar interests as Kashmir Workers’ Association 
did when the group affiliated with Labour in order to achieve demands for workers’ rights. 
There is no reason to suspect that identity politics plays a role in diaspora mobilisation, 
however there is no reason to assume that diaspora politics cannot align itself with 
organizations such as Amnesty International in order to protest against human rights 
abuses in Kashmir. Likewise, Kashmiris in the diaspora may work in conjunction with 
others seeking liberation: Tibetans, Palestinians, etc. This leads into closer examination 





Frames and Framing Processes in Transnational Activism 
 
Given the ‘new’ azadi movement’s relatively nonviolent approaches that reflect upon 
modern transnational social movements, there is clearly some convergence and some 
contrast with prior theoretical perspectives that have been taken for granted. In order to 
better understand the salience of identity narratives in the contemporary transnational 
movement, I aim to extend factors of shifting framing processes of transnational social 
movements to previous perspectives of identity-based motivations for supporting the 
azadi movement. The findings of this study are unique, as it bridges the gap between 
previous scholarly contributions on Kashmir as well as extending social movement 
framing processes to the transnational movement. Re-conceptualizing the Kashmir 
movement as a transnational social movement is indeed another contribution as although 
the non-violent aspects of the Kashmir freedom movement has often been addressed in 
scholarly literature, it is a small focus. Much more ink has been devoted to reiterating 
violent resistance in Kashmir instigated by Pakistan1. Blaming Pakistan for the 
insurgency thus runs the course of Pakistan versus India rather than highlighting the 
infractions of India and Pakistan on Kashmir. Research on violent and non-violent 
resistance within Kashmir or transnational links have been tied to the Jammu Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) or specific pockets of diaspora in the United Kingdom, especially 
Birmingham (Ellis and Khan, 2001; Bolognani and Lyon, 2011; Sokefeld, 2016). Youth 
mobilization within and out-with Kashmir, although omnipresent in news reports, remains 
underrepresented in scholarly works. Working with the KSM offers a nuanced, albeit 
relatively representative way to engage with Kashmiri freedom activists who operate 
transnationally. It is not unique necessarily for youth movements to operate on a 
transnational level which activates not only diaspora representation but reaches across 
campaigns and causes to recruit participants. This is, perhaps most notably seen in the 
growing Palestine solidarity movements. It does, however, remain understudied. Long-
term studies on transnational Kashmir youth solidarity movements are non-existent. This 
research, therefore, could progress the study not only of the transnational azadi 
 
1 A prevalent observation that Indian administrations are reluctant to negotiate with Pakistan to 
resolve the Kashmir dispute is that Pakistan does not do enough to prevent terrorism. This is a 
controversial issue as it is often highlighted that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) created 
the foreign hand in Kashmir’s insurgency, without which, the full extent of violence would not have 
been seen (Schofield, 2010: 176).   
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movement, but help to understand how other non-Western movements are adapting their 
repertoires and frames in an effort to raise awareness for their cause and bring in more 
participants.  
Key to analysing the contemporary Kashmir freedom movement is an 
understanding of the framing techniques and tactic used in order to reach a wider 
audience of interested activists, many of which I have referred to as ‘outsider’ activists. 
These outsiders are not directly involved in the Kashmir conflict. They do not live in 
Kashmir nor have families in Kashmir. Neither are they directly impacted by territorial 
concessions. These may be legal advocates, human rights activists, or other interested 
parties working on other campaigns, for example, that are perceived to be similarly 
aligned. In order to frame disparate campaigns or movements as being similarly aligned 
is what, in a nutshell, framing does. Kaufman et al. (2013) provide a rather succinct, if 
simplistic description of how frames are used:  
‘We create frames to name a situation in which we find ourselves, to identify and 
interpret specific aspects that seem key to us in understanding the situation, and to 
communicate that interpretation to others.’  
A ‘frame’ is a term ‘borrowed from Goffman…to denote “schemata of interpretation” that 
enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life 
spaces and the world at large’ (Snow et al., 1986: 464). The term can be constructed as 
one which denotes an individual cognitive perception; however, as Benford et al. (1986) 
and others have interpreted the concept, frames can also be used in a collective sense, 
to mobilize constituents to action. Indeed, whether consciously constructed or not, 
Benford et al. argues that ‘frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement 
participation’ (1986: 464). Two campaigns may be working towards completely different 
ends but may be articulated or framed as having similarly aligned goals. Likewise, two 
TSMOs may have different goals but both see their aims as being self-determination. 
This is evident in campaigns, for example, for a free Palestine or a free Tibet or a free 
Kashmir. Through aligning one cause in close proximity to another causes, it bridges the 
two causes, allowing for the potential of not only more supporters and larger protest rallies 
but can also be perceived as having more clout that a cause standing alone. 
Of further importance for this study on the transnational azadi movement is the way 
in which frames play a strategic role in the escalation, de-escalation and overall 
intractability of a conflict. This can be a conscious effort by political entrepreneurs, or it 
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may be a consequence of years or media framing, state and non-state rhetoric and 
propaganda, or even played out in popular culture references such as in the popular 
Bollywood movie Mission Kashmir (2000). Kabir (2009) offers vivid analysis of 
representational framing of Kashmir in her book Territory of Desire (2009). The work is 
very poetic – offering juxtapositions of the fabled beauty of Kashmir with pictoral 
representations of the suffering of the Kashmiri. Kashmir, according to Kabir, is India’s 
‘territory of desire’ (2009: 33), framed as a sort of romantic fantasyland as well as a site 
for populist national discourse to emerge. The author uses Mission Kashmir (2000) to 
‘extract from Bollywood’s Kashmir obsession, the relationship between Indian popular 
cinema and the mobilisation of national desire’ (Kabir, 2009: 32). The film follows Altaaf, 
a young boy who loses his family in a crackdown and grows to want vengeance on the 
man responsible for the slaughter, Inayat Khan. He goes off for training in the militant 
camps after he discovers that his adopted father is the target of his rage and become a 
supporter of Kashmir freedom. When he returns, he becomes romantic with an old friend 
and here the film juxtaposes the main love interests’ contrasting responses to the Valley 
of Kashmir’s beauty with the violence that the region has faced. Sufi, his love interest, 
sees the beauty of Kashmir, whereas Altaaf relives his tragic past (Kabir, 2009: 37). This 
is poetic imagery that is often replicated in works about Kashmir – between beauty and 
despair. What the film does for nationalist tensions, according to Kabir, is to explicate 
Altaaf’s ‘desire for azadi as his anger with Inayat Khan…’ however ‘once that anger is 
defused…the film portrays the prevailing happiness of Indians and Kashmiri living 
harmoniously.’ (ibid). Mission Kashmir’s mission seems to be to relay that hatred for India 
will not bring happiness. The movie brings the audience to a sensible conclusion of letting 
go of old sorrows and coming to live harmoniously with Indians despite their differences 
to Kashmiris, and despite old grievances.  
Whereas throughout the 1960s, the ‘decolonized nation [was] refashion[ed] into the 
postcolonial playground of cinema’ (Kabir, 2009: 56), Kashmir photography offered 
imagery of occupation and resistance. These are photographs of round-ups and 
checkpoints, of corpses, buildings reduced to rubble, injured men, mourning women, and 
unformed men cocking their guns or overlooking the dead, uncaring (Kashmir, 2009: 57). 
These photographs, unlike the happy cinematic endings bear witness to tragedy and acts 
as memorialization which are stuck in an unhappy time. Kashmir is at once a land of 
fabled beauty and a destination of tragedy.  
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The focus of the study is from the perspective of the Kashmir freedom activist and 
how they perceive their movement, how they interpret their world; indeed, how they frame 
their grievances, the other actors, their goals, and their identities. For Kashmiris, Kashmir 
is home and has happy memories as well as tragic ones. The idea behind this project is 
to understand the framing and reframing of the Kashmir azadi movement. It is useful, 
however, to understand how Kashmir itself has been framed in the past as somewhere 
between tragedy and beauty.  
Frames and framing tactics are powerful tools that can force us to zoom in on a 
specific aspect of identity. For Kaufman et al., writing from the perspective of frames used 
in conflict management, one of the key framing techniques is framing along identity lines. 
Identity frames, as the authors describe, is the way that 
‘[d]isputants view themselves as having particular identities in the context of 
specific conflict situations. These identities spring from the individuals’ self-
conception and group affiliations…The more central the challenge to one’s sense 
of self, the more oppositional one is likely to act. Typical responses to threats to 
identity include ignoring information and perspectives that threaten the core 
identity, reinforcing affiliations with like-minded individuals and groups, and 
negatively characterizing outsiders’ (2013). 
A cursory glance at the language used regarding the Kashmir conflict sees the usage of 
identity frames from all actors involved in the conflict, whether it be the media, the 
respective governments involved, or the activists and supporters in their presentations 
and as found in blog commentary. This is almost an expected consequence of a conflict 
- that it is presented by all sides in a value-laden way. However, as Kaufman et al. (2013) 
purport in their essay on conflict framing, or Sreedharan (2009) argues in his thesis on 
news framing, the reframing of how a conflict is portrayed can lead to a more conciliatory 
tone which is more conducive for conflict de-escalation and resolution.  
 
Whereas some social movement analysis strategies may present an either-or 
justification for mobilization, (i.e. someone is motivated by rational choices or the 
presence of a mobilizing structure or identity politics,) framing can be ‘useful for 
rationalizing self-interest, convincing a broader audience, building coalitions, or lending 
preferentiality to specific outcomes’ (Kaufman et al. (2013). Framing, in a sense, is a 
means by which we have ready-made interpretations of a given situation. This 
interpretation as we perceive it can then be disseminated to others. Knowing what types 
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of frames are in use and how they are constructed allows one to draw conclusions about 
how they affect the development of a conflict and can be used to influence it. Thus, 
analysing the frames actors use in a given conflict provides fresh insight and better 
understanding of the conflict dynamics and can be useful in tracking a conflict’s 
development (Kaufman et al., 2013). As with many theories, social movement theories 
have evolved from viewing popular movements as ‘long-lasting panics or crowds’ (Oliver 
and Johnston, 2000) to a move for a greater understanding of political entrepreneurs and 
opportunity structures (including resources available), to trying to theorize why people 
mobilize from a rational-choice or collective bargaining perspective. Framing theory, on 
the other hand integrates ideological connections into what may be perceived as a more 
comprehensive strategy for understanding the linkages between ‘ideas and social 
construction of ideas with organizational and political process factors’ (Oliver and 
Johnston, 2000: 1).  
Transnational social movement studies have continued to research the political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes of movements, but have 
begun to take a closer look at the transformation of these factors in trying to understand 
the growth in international activism. ‘Qualitative frame analysis lends itself to certain 
theoretical questions, such as strategic framing by SMOs, consciousness raising (which 
is a reframing activity), building collective identity…and fostering collective solidarity 
through strong mobilizing frames’ (Johnston, 2002: 75). McDonald traces the shifts in 
structures and cognitive frames with reference to the G8 protests which garnered a 
massive following seven years after the G7 protests in London in 1991. Although the 
actors had different motivations for participating, he recognized certain recurring themes: 
‘…the shift from hierarchy to network; the personalization of the commitment; the move 
from long term to short term; the shift from organization to project; the critical importance 
for the media…for the mediation of action; the shift from the organization to the event’ 
(McDonald, 2006: 70). McDonald reviews the growing importance of identity in the study 
of social movements by the mid-1980s: ‘Identity increasingly became understood as a 
resource that could be mobilized (Tilly, 1993: 4), or a factor that reduced the costs of 
mobilization (Tarrow, 1998), it was the way movements “transform their members into 
political actors” (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 104)’ (McDonald, 2006: 26). He attributes this 
shift to the changing political environment in America. Growing research on identity 
politics led to an increasing discussion of the role of collective identities being used as a 
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political resource (ibid.). Politicizing identities implies that identities are socially 
constructed, and therefore able to be changed. West highlights the role of identity in 
strategic framing processes of social movements by highlighting: 
‘The socially constructed nature of identity also has consequences for the strategy 
and tactics of identity politics. In the first place, identities are strategic and transient 
rather than permanent and essential, because as the very notion of identity politics 
implies, the political status of particular identities is not fixed for all time’ (2013: 97). 
 
Johnston (2002) describes several properties of how frames influence social 
movements: ‘…frames orient our expectations based on past experience…a frame is a 
cognitive structure, or schema…’ and ‘…like other ideational factors that shape human 
behaviour, frames are both individual and social’ (63-4). Whereas frames may be treated 
‘…as fixed structures captured in a moment in time…’ framing ‘…describes important 
activities in movement development, especially as contemporary movements 
concentrate on marketing themselves via frame alignment processes’ (ibid: 66). Framing 
alignment, in general, is the orientation of movement frames in particular contexts. 
‘Movement entrepreneurs…fashion them at the intersection between a target 
population’s culture and their own frames and goals’ (Tarrow, 1998: 110). Tarrow 
describes framing alignment as a process whereby the cultural symbols representing a 
movement go from incremental changes to ‘bridging’ cultural symbols to particular issues, 
to expanding ‘…the boundaries of a movement’s primary framework to encompass 
broader interests or points of view…’ (ibid). Just as Cunningham describes the 
transnationalism of a movement as a transformative shift in activists’ cognition (2000), 
Tarrow notes that the cumulative process of frame alignment is ‘frame transformation’ 
(1998: 110). Transformation is the framing processes that can serve to both garner 
support for a movement, as well as to alienate more hard-line factions of a movement. 
Movement leaders, therefore, selectively choose which cultural symbols and frames they 
use to enable participants to act, often by giving ‘…an emotional valence aimed at 
converting passivity into action’ (Tarrow, 1998: 112). Olesen (2011) further connects this 
framing process with opportunity structures.  Olesen asserts that ‘…transnational framing 
always unfolds within a transnational discursive opportunity structure’ (2011: 2). In 
essence, the framing processes of international activists corresponds to shifts in 
transnational discourse. Using recognized transnational discourses can effectively lend 
legitimacy to actors’ moral claims. Activists communicating in this vein create ‘…global 
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public awareness…which constitutes the particular parameters of advocatory 
movements’ ‘power’ (ibid.: 3).  
This study pays particular attention to Kashmir organizations in the United 
Kingdom, however it is highly likely that up and coming affiliate organizations take a cue 
from previous attempts at raising international awareness on the Kashmir issue in an 
effort to raise global public awareness. The World Kashmir Awareness Forum, a non-
profit organization based in Ohio in the United States, claims have been ‘established to 
educate the international community, particularly in the West on the real nature of the 
Kashmir issue’ and also claims that its ‘organization intends to reach wider audience 
around the world through the electronic media to publicize the Kashmir cause’ 
(kashmirawareness.org). During KSM meetings, the council has expressed that its 
primary purpose is also ‘to raise awareness.’ Echoing this is the University of 
Birmingham’s Kashmir Awareness Society, formed shortly after KSM Edinburgh. Even 
where committee members or organizers from one site of activism – virtual or physical – 
may not interact broadly with another site, there still exists obvious linkages. These 
linkages which come in the form of utilising common discursive techniques and strategies 
are what creates a sense of the Kashmir freedom movement as a global campaign based 
on similar grievances. How these grievances are shaped and disseminated to a global 
audience can be conceived as collective action frames, explained in the next section. 
 
The Human Rights ‘Metapackage’ 
 
In order for a movement to transcend the domestic realm to become transnationally 
relevant, it is necessary to re-package group goals in a manner more relatable to a wider 
audience (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Further, in order for the frames to resonate with 
the greatest number of constituents possible, it is important to appeal to personal 
experiences as well and individual and group identities. Della Porta et. al. stress the 
importance of constructing a symbolic collective subject, e.g. ‘the working class, the 
people, the nation, environmentalists, women…’ and integrating them into a somewhat 
structured mobilization unit (2006: 61). The idea is convincing the new collective to act 
as a unit based on the assumption that the broader ‘movement’s claims are “fair” and that 
the status quo is “unjust” (ibid.). Symbols must extend beyond the scope of a singular 
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community in order to reach out to an international or transnational audience. The use of 
symbols and metaphor are used in what Gamson and Lasch (1983) describe as 
interpretive packages which have a ‘core consisting of an overall frame and position that 
define it…’ and also ‘suggests a central organising idea for understanding events relating 
to the issue…’ (399). This certainly seems to be a succinct way to conceptualize the 
human rights frame as advocated by so many transnational groups. Oleson’s work 
describes how activists may develop a ‘solidaristic metapackage,’ based on the presence 
of particular frames rooted in human rights-related activism (2009: 9). These 
interpretative packages have a more universalistic character which translates to a wider 
group being able to empathize or create bonds with the target group. Recent work in 
other contemporary movements has noted the transformation of separatist or freedom 
movements into transnational social movements. One such case also looks to Twitter to 
understand support for the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Ireland and the UK (Abu-
Ayyash, 2014). Using Twitter feeds, a frames analysis approach is used to identify master 
frames in the Palestinian movement for self-determination. The movement, which has 
become much better known and publicised in recent years, demonstrates the 
heterogeneity and appeal the case for a free Palestine has for non-Palestinians, non-
Arabs, and non-Muslims. A thorough analysis of key activist Twitter accounts reveals that 
the most frequent way to discuss the Palestinian movement is to discuss it in a human 
rights frame. Abu-Ayyash demonstrates this through analysis of the types of articles 
shared and the comments made on the article. The human rights frame, he purports, is 
what has the potential ability to mobilize people to action – or at least to publicly 
demonstrate support for the Palestinian cause. This analysis, I would argue, is 
incomplete, however. It is a great starting point in understanding motivations for 
‘slacktivism’2 but lacks depth in understanding sympathizers’ mobilization efforts.  
 Collective action frames, according to Benford and Snow (2000), are constructed 
and re-negotiated with regards to who or what is to blame. In the Palestinian conflict, as 
the previous example illustrates, the diagnosis is that the Palestinian people are suffering 
with blame usually attributed to Israeli security forces, and the prognosis leading to an 
 
2 ‘Slacktivism’ is often used when referring to acts on the Internet such as sharing an article or 
signing an online petition. The extent to which this represents true advocacy or elicits tangible 




end to suffering is a free and independent Palestine. The motivation for action, it would 
appear is having empathy for the people suffering human rights abuses and possessing 
the will to fix it. As is often the case, however, and is argued in social movement literature, 
simply being opposed to human rights abuses is not enough to promote action. What is 
curious is the growth in support and interest in the Palestinian and Tibet movements, but 
the lack of human rights framing techniques to work observably in Kashmir – at least not 
to the same extent. This may be because India is such a big power militarily, 
economically, and culturally. Perhaps further research can help to identify what is 
different about these movements in order to allow better mobilizing by outsider activists 
on behalf of the outlying cause.   
Although representing a very small engagement with much broader literature, 
Polletta and Jasper (2001) and countless other social movement scholars appreciate that 
the call to collective action is a constant push and pull between collective and individual 
identities – which are malleable and salient. This makes it very difficult to make any 
generalizable assumptions or typologies of SMOs, however, the breadth of work on the 
subject does offer hope in uncovering particular trends, such as understanding better the 
frames used by social movement organizers. Noakes and Johnston (2005) echo previous 
works by McAdam, et al. (1996) and others who purport that the reasoning for activists 
mobilizing always contains some subjective component. In my work with KSM, I have 
found that although in-group activists share some common ethnic or regionally ethnic 
identity (Kashmiri or other South Asian), out-group activists tend to share a subjective 
bond based on their own experience of perceived subjugation or oppression. For others 
still, it is their dedication to working with or perhaps a general or academic interest in 
disadvantaged minorities or victims of torture or human rights abuse. This is, of course, 
not always a neat line. There is room for overlap between in-group/out-group. As a 
researcher unaffiliated with Kashmir through kin, I would be initially considered to be an 
outsider; however, the bonds that I have made during my time working with the group 
and the connections I have made to Kashmiris does not make mean I have no stake in 
the conflict. Any attachment to Kashmir would give an outsider some affiliation even if the 
immediate outcome of territorial resolution would not directly impact one’s life. Having to 
draw the line somewhere, however, I have deemed outsider activists as those who like 
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myself may have an affiliation but no direct connections (through family, marriage, or 
property) in Kashmir.  
The use of framing is an important means for exploring answers to the research 
questions posed at the outset of this chapter. The initial question which asks if the new 
azadi movement is identitarian-based. This is more of a rhetorical question as I have 
immediately outlined from initial observations with KSM that, assuming the KSM is 
representative of the transnational azadi movement that it is most certainly based on 
more than simple identitarian claims. The second part of the question asks if it is not 
based on identity motives, then what is it based on? It is clear that one’s identity and 
belief influence one’s decision to sympathise or mobilise for a cause, but by fixating on a 
homogenous representation of ethnicity, national identity, or religion does not explain the 
complex, often intertwining of salient identities. These identities become not so much 
based on ‘objective’ signifiers such as one’s ethnic identity but may be based on more 
abstract signifiers. Expressing the contemporary movement as one that is based 
predominately on ethnonational identities is clearly not how Kashmiri activist perceive to 
be the purpose or intent of organizations such as KSM. The second question assumes 
that a more abstract set of identities may be more relational to contemporary 
transnational movement thinking. This question asks how Kashmiri activists are framing 
their movement to bring in an international audience. This is a more useful line of enquiry 
as it moves to understanding the more abstract processes of social movement 
mobilization. By analysing the framing of narratives as expressed by participants and 
found in leaflets and on virtual sites, we can gain a richer understanding of the processes 
and strategies through which movements such as Kashmir’s azadi movement attract a 
broader constituency of supporters. How activists diagnose problems in IAK and offer 
prognostic solutions further aids in understanding the processes of collective action 
frames in contemporary movements seeking a broader audience.  
Identitarian motivations to participate in the azadi movement can also be 
assessed through the use of frames analysis, but with the full awareness that no human 
being is two dimensional. One may be motivated to support a free Kashmir through them 
being a Kashmiri, a Muslim, a campaigner for human rights, or because they empathize 
with Kashmiris as a perceived minority in their own state. Analysing interviews and 
observations of meetings can help to identify how much influence these factors have on 
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the movement, or as I discovered during the course of investigation, how these factors 
influence the re-framing of the movement. In a cyclical matter, identities are explored as 
a means to understand how actors frame the movement and further how they frame the 
movement is explored in order to assess how their own cultural identities are being 
reinterpreted and redefined. It is a complex interaction, but strategies such as meta-
packaging provides a way to answer, at least speculatively, how much influence other 
movements have on the Kashmir movement and how framing of the azadi movement 
may fluctuate in response to affiliate campaigns which may interact or at least impact 
Kashmir activists’ strategies and narratives. Frames help us to understand and to 
articulate our world. They are malleable and constantly re-defined, but this does not mean 
they are not useful in capturing the essence of a movement during a phase. A picture 
captures a static set of images within a frame. We can speculate from looking at that 
picture what may be going on adjacent to the image. Similarly, this is the strategy of 
frames analysis.  
It is with this that I have opted to infer based on my work with two KSM groups 
how the transnational azadi movement is able to bring on outside supporters and sustain 
their movement. Human rights is the common denominator for collective action. However, 
it is expressed in more nuanced ways. These are explored further in this thesis. The 
human rights frame, as I explain in chapter two, is akin to a tree. Sub-frames are branches 
from that tree which account for various facets of human rights that are being called for. 
Those sub-frames I have identified through the course of this research are: victimization, 
minority, injustice, women’s human rights, and resistance frames. Although there is 
overlap between these, these have been the most commonly used ways to frame the 
contemporary freedom movement to an outside audience as well as a common way to 
engage with one’s own experiences as a Kashmiri.  
 
Thesis Structure  
 
Chapter One 
The Genesis and Transnationalization of Kashmir’s Freedom Struggle   
This chapter provides an overview of the Kashmir freedom movement from pre-Partition 
mobilisation against the Dogra regime to the establishment of pro-freedom political 
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parties in the post-Partition era. It continues with a look into how the freedom struggle 
turned to a violent insurgency in response to lack of political space given as well as in 
response to human rights abuses afflicted on Kashmiris. From there, the struggle is 
traced to the contemporary era where the militancy no longer received support from 
Pakistan and is thus reliant upon nonviolent strategies of resistance. Connections are 
made between the contemporary movement and previous strategies of resistance. From 
this historical overview, the review of literature turns to competing narratives about 
Kashmir’s freedom movement. These stem from looking at the conflict in Kashmir as a 
bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan and how the rationale for ethnic and 
nationalist-motivated conflicts arise in post-Partition literature, especially during the 
period of insurgency and immediately after in an effort to explain the insurgency. Woven 
into these narratives are more contemporary framings of the conflict which view the 
ethnonationalist element of mobilisation as much more nuanced. This review looks at 
how the Kashmir identity has evolved and can be perceived as not only an ethnonational 
identity but as an evolving political and cultural identity. Looking at the Kashmir freedom 
struggle through the lens of a sophisticated social movement helps to relate to a broader 




Research Methods: An Interpretive, Qualitative Approach  
The methods chapter will elaborate on the field sites and sampling strategies. It will also 
discuss the research questions and different forms of qualitative data used and the 
strategies for analysis and interpretation of the data to answer those questions. A 
reflection is made on how personal experiences of interviewing allowed for the evolution 
of the research questions and aims. I also discuss some of the difficulties I had during 
field research and access and where my approaches went rather well. This chapter 
reflects upon the introduction’s social movement frames with a discussion of master 
frames, with an overarching human rights master frame uniting the diverse actors in the 







New Kashmir Azadi Movement 
This chapter follows the Kashmir movement post 2008 and highlights efforts within and 
outwith Kashmir to mobilize on behalf of freedom. Rooted in historical precedent of 
collective mobilization, the new generation of Kashiris have been gifted with the tactics 
and strategies of their predecessors but have expanded and evolved these. Women, 
although always active in Kashmiri mobilisation have taken more leadership roles in the 
new movement, formed organizations within and out-with Kashmir, and have helped to 
expand the cause of azadi to an international audience via transnational organizations 
as well as via documentaries, writings, and speaking engagements with international 
audiences. The new generation of Kashmiris have been leading a shift in cultural 
consciousness which has involved popular arts such as protest songs, photo exhibitions, 
poetry, and graffiti art. Some of this is done in conjunction with other campaigns or 
movements in a show of solidarity.  
 
Chapter Four 
Internationalization of the Struggles for a Free Kashmir 
This chapter, as it suggests, follows the development of the Kashmir freedom movement 
from a domestic issue to one of international importance with a transnational solidarity 
network. The internationalization of the Kashmir freedom cause began with Kashmiris but 
were quickly taken on by other people in South Asia and other people out-with South 
Asia. The chapter examines diaspora movements of Kashmiris from both the Indian and 
Pakistan Administered sides and notes the rise of mobilization outside of Kashmir. 
Attention here is paid to the sort of mobilization campaigns I witnessed during my field 




Transnational Activism and Movements: Identity Transformation and Solidarity  
The chapter looks more closely at how KSM members and affiliate activists respond and 
interact with affiliate campaigns such as the case for a free Palestine. It expands beyond 
this, however, to look at linked solidarity efforts on such campaigns as minority rights 
which has been an active part of the transnational movement. The interpretation of 
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oneself as a subaltern vis-à-vis a majority influence has the capacity to connect in-group 
and out-group activists by a unique bond or kinship that extends beyond mere sympathy 
for a cause or campaign.  
 
Chapter Six 
KSM Edinburgh: Origin, Participants, and Core Issues 
This chapter acts as a sort of case study for the fieldsite KSM Edinburgh. In it, I discuss 
how the society came to form and how I came to be a participant observer with the group. 
I discuss who the participants are for core meetings and events and how they came to 
be involved in the society. I further examine the core issues and strategies of the group, 
such as broadening their support base through solidarity efforts with other campaigns 




KSM SOAS: Origin, Participants, Core Issues 
This chapter, like the previous chapter, showcases KSM SOAS, how the society has 
formed, and how I came to be a participant observer with the society. Although there is 
some comparison to KSM Edinburgh, I try to use this chapter as a case study of the 
London group. As in the previous chapter, I also discuss the participants drawn to the 




Human Rights and Political Issues 
This chapter explores the use of legal framing and the adoption of tactics and language 
from other campaigns as a means to more effectively spread awareness for the azadi 
movement and garner a broader spectrum of supporters through terms that they can 
understand and relate to. It presents human rights issues in IAK through the lens of a 
small sample of respondents in the valley, but it is also reflexive of the narratives that 
transient activists abroad rely on to tell their stories or to drawn upon as evidence of these 
abuses in their homeland. This is also reflective of the use of the victimization frame as 
a means for relating their cause to outside participants and sympathizers. This chapter 
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explores this and other everyday issues of living under occupation that lead to the desire 
for azadi and explores an emergent identity of resistance which aims to reclaim agency 
and overcome victimization.   
 
Conclusion: What Transnational Solidarities can do for Kashmir as a Freedom and 
Justice Cause  
The conclusion aims to sum up all of the evidence and points to the transformation of an 
apparently domestic freedom movement into a transnational activist movement which 
extends to a broader constituency than immediate stakeholders. This chapter will explore 
options for conflict resolution through engaging in dialogue with grassroots SMOs such 
as KSM. The conclusion will further elaborate on how this rather small movement may 
link to the wider freedom movement and what this means for the evaluation of other 

























The Genesis and Transnationalization of Kashmir’s 
Freedom Struggle 
 
Having located this thesis in the theory of social movements in the Introduction, the first 
chapter begins with the contextualization of the Kashmir azadi, or freedom movement by 
offering a historical overview. By looking at the beginnings of the azadi movement, we 
can better understand the significance of the contemporary movement for freedom of all, 
or part of Kashmir. The azadi movement has moved through several phases and as such 
the analytical framings of the movement as one of secession, freedom, self-
determination, an identitarian insurgency, a move for autonomy, and a human rights 
movement have all been cited in various contexts. As one of my respondents argued at 
a meeting at the Kashmir Solidarity Movement in Edinburgh (KSM Edinburgh), ‘This is 
not a secession movement. Kashmir never belonged to India.’ The circumstances for 
which Kashmir is framed as a secession movement is certainly not agreed upon by the 
activists in support of a free Kashmir. These nuances will be explored more as well when 
exploring the historical contexts of the azadi movement.  
 From the historical context, this chapter then moves to a section on competing 
narratives. This section looks at how throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s it 
became common to view the Kashmir freedom movement as a movement inspired by 
identitarian claims, e.g. nationalist, ethnic, linguistic, and religious claims. Despite the 
concurrence of violent and non-violent resistance against the Indian government and the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the movements were both viewed in terms of 
identitarian claims rather than as acting in resistance to an oppressive force guilty of 
human rights violations. This had given Kashmir’s freedom movement a taint of terrorism 
that may have been perceived as fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism rather than a human 
rights movement against the murdering of and the violation of innocent bodies, now 
widely documented. The new azadi movement, however, is one that from a western 
perspective looks more like a social movement ought to look like. There is a blanket 
rejection of violence by most activists, despite the continued violations by security forces 
and although Kashmiris have always participated in open protests, now there is verifiable 
41 
 
proof of this happening in news as well as social media. The new Kashmiri movement 
has marked similarities as well as differences from the way its previously operated, but 
the most significant different is perhaps in how the movement is perceived rather than 
how it acts. There will be more analysis of this in the methods chapter and the following 
chapter on the new azadi movement. 
 For now, this chapter will turn to the historical background of the freedom 
movement. My aim is to understand the contemporary movement; the historical 
background helps to locate how the preceding generations mobilised for azadi and how 
this has inspired the new generations of activists. It also helps to locate the motivations 
for seeking azadi which may or may not be identitarian-based. The way the movement 
has been framed historically can help to understand the contemporary movement by 
understanding where it distances itself from the past and where it engages with a 
contemporary understanding of universal rights. 
 
Historical Background of the Kashmir Freedom Movement  
 
The Preface of this thesis outlines the origin of the azadi movement in Kashmir to roughly 
the 1930s. Although there has been development of a Kashmiri identity including 
Kashmiri traditions, taboos, language and a syncretic form of Islamic religion since before 
Mughal rule half a millennium ago, Kashmiriyat or Kashmiri-ness as a political identity 
was only emergent in the lead up to Partition, as argued by Rao (1999). This section 
explores the rise of mobilisation by Kashmiris pre-partition. It is then exposed that the 
Kashmiri identity is one made of solidarity between a plurality of actors and the movement 
for an autonomous or independent state of J&K was one that evolved from and collective 
of progressive, liberal movements such as for student, worker, and labourer rights. These 
progressive, liberal movements set the tone for Kashmiri freedom activists throughout 
Dogra and Indian rule. Context is provided through looking at key historical events in the 
lead up to Partition and post-Partition calls for autonomy and independence, but the 
theoretical framework of this thesis is also highlighted in the special attention made to the 
assortment of movements and the tendency towards liberalism that define the 




Pre-Partition Azadi Movement 
 
Pre-Partition India was ruled by the British, however certain regions, or ‘Princely States’ 
were given autonomy in exchange for loyalty to the British crown, including the use of 
troops should the British require them. In 1846, nearly one hundred years before Partition, 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir was formed through an agreement struck between the 
British and Gulab Singh, who colluded with the British against the threat of Sikh power in 
the region (Bose, 2003: 15; Behera, 2006: 14). Singh, who already claimed Jammu and 
parts of Ladakh and Baltistan was also granted authority over the Kashmir Valley and 
regions of Gilgit not already under his control (ibid). The Treaty of Amritsar granted these 
territories in exchange for ‘750,000 pounds…in recognition of his services to the British 
crown.’ (Akbar, 1985: 220; Behera, 2006: 14) and for an annual sum of ‘one horse, twelve 
perfect shawl goats…and three pairs of Kashmir shawls’ (Bose, 2003: 15). The bargain 
was struck that would lead to the plural princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with 
a majority Muslim population, but significant Hindu, Buddhist and other minorities. In 
addition to religious pluralism, the state also hosted a plethora of linguistic and ethnic 
cleavages, but they did not all have equal rights or access to benefits. 
 Although many peasants under the Dogra regime had a rough time, the Kashmiri 
Muslims were the most affected by discriminatory policies which prevented them from 
having fair access to education and to jobs, especially those in the administrative 
services. The Dogra were often given the best opportunities with the Kashmiri Pandits 
also faring well under Dogra rule. Thus, during the 1920s and 1930s while Kashmiri 
Muslims were mobilising against the regime, the Pandits continued to support the ruling 
Maharaja at that time, Hari Singh. And even with a sustained movement against the 
regime, sectarian divides and ethnic cleavages meant it was difficult to have a united 
front against the Dogra. Two organizations emerged during these times in the decades 
leading up to the Partition of 1947: Reading Room Party in Srinagar and the Muslim 
Young Men’s League in Jammu (Behera, 2003: 15) which would have a great impact on 
the direction of the Kashmir freedom movement. 
 The Reading Room was established by young Kashmiri intellectuals who had 
gone abroad or to good universities in other parts of India and then returned to Kashmir. 
Although several notable Kashmiri freedom or autonomy advocates emerged, the most 
famous name was Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who joined the Reading Room in 1930 
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after returning to Kashmir from studying (Schofield, 2010: 18). Kashmir activism was 
already heightened by this time as there were several groups with their own nuanced 
political agenda. Comprised of laborers, peasants, traders, artisans, students and other 
underrepresented segments of society, they advocated for better access to education, 
jobs, better working conditions, and fair access to state administration careers which were 
dominated by Dogra and Pandits (Behera, 2006: 15).  
By the time the British were preparing to leave, the grievances of the Muslims 
were long-standing. They faced exorbitant tax rates, could not own any of the land they 
tilled, and generally lived at ‘mere survival’ level (Malik 2005: 25). Although the 
grievances the Muslims had were against the Hindu Dogra ruler and not Hinduism, the 
seeds were sown for communal violence along religious lines in the lead-up to Partition. 
Up to this point, Hindu-Muslim clashes were largely unheard of in Kashmir, although they 
took place in other parts of British India. The Muslim bourgeoisie took advantage of these 
clashes and turned a class-based conflict into one with more religious overtones; where 
the Muslims were perceived as being oppressed and the Hindus were viewed as 
exploitative (Malik 2005: 38). By 1931, the tensions rose to a critical point. The Muslim 
Young Men’s League in Jammu who were engaged in underground activities eventually 
‘exploded in a massive Muslim agitation …which the Muslims call a religious war’ 
(Behera, 2006: 16). In Kashmir, the spark was lit in July 1931 when Abdul Qadir ‘made a 
fiery speech calling for the people to fight against oppression,’ (Schofield, 2010: 18). After 
being arrested, a crowd amassed outside the jail in Srinagar in protest. Several arrests 
were made but it was the firing on the crowd, killing twenty-one people (ibid) that 
produced Kashmir’s first martyrs. In contemporary times, 13 July would be celebrated as 
martys day in commemoration of those killed during the protests, but also for those who 
lost their lives fighting Indian security forces in later decades (Schofield, 2010; 202). 
Martys’ Day would have a significant impact for the ‘new’ Kashmiri freedom movement 
as well. Further, it was the 1931 uprisings that for the first time saw how essential women 
were to the movement, as they ‘came out of the confines of their households and were 
visible in overwhelming numbers in public’ (Misri, 2002: 14). 
What may be the most significant mark of the birth of the azadi movement was 
also marred with communal tensions in the Valley and beyond. After the firing, the twenty-
one casualties were paraded through the centre of town, which stoked a backlash. In 
retaliation for the Dogra ‘unleashing a rule of terror’ (Schofield, 2010: 18) shops owned 
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by Hindus were looted. More arrests were made, including Sheikh Abdullah. Later that 
year, Hari Singh established the Glancy commission in order to explore reforms, but the 
result was a legislative assembly which only solidified the maharaja’s autocratic rule 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s (Bose, 2003: 20). The first political party in J&K was 
formed as a means for pressing for social and political change in 1932, the All-Jammu 
and Kashmir Muslim Conference, or just know as the Muslim Conference (Bose, 2003: 
20). The Muslim Conference was established primarily by political leaders detained as a 
result of the events in July, including Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulan Abbas (Scofield, 2010: 
18). The party was supported by ‘Muslim intelligentsia, clergy, tradespeoploe…industrial 
laborers, artisans, and peasants’ alike and among their demands was a ‘bigger share in 
the civil services for educated Muslim youth, land ownership, lower land revenue…better 
working conditions…and recruitment of Muslims into the army’ (Behera, 2006: 16). 
Despite the presence of Muslim in the name, progressive Hindus and Sikhs were also 
part of the party, and throughout the 1930s, the party began to take on more secular, 
national, and socialist objectives (Behera, 2006: 16). The Kashmir Youth League, 
established in 1936 and the Kisan Sabha, or Farmer’s Union are examples of secular 
organizations which promoted unions and other labour rights and working conditions for 
labourers, weavers, tonga drivers, and other underrepresented members of the working 
classes. Behera, in her analysis of these movements refers to them as ‘progressive and 
liberal’ (2006: 17) and asserts that this helped  
‘political leaders, especially the young and popular Sheikh Abdullah, see the conflict 
in a different light, no longer focusing on its religious roots but rather on the 
exploitative nature of the state’s political and economic structures.’ 
 
The progressive, liberal, youth-driven movements would be a recurring feature of the 
azadi movement. It also set a precedence for the secularization of the movement. Rather 
than continue to be referred to as the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, it was 
agreed in 1939 by an overwhelming number of delegates that the name should be 
changed to simply All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, or the NC for short 
(Bose, 2003: 20). As most social movements, the move was not welcomed by everyone 
and the secularization served to alienate those who feared the NC would be cosying up 
to the Indian National Congress (INC), the party that was mobilising against British rule. 
This was in direct conflict with the All India Muslim League who passed the ‘Pakistan 
Resolution’ in 1940 (ibid: 21). An invitation by Abdullah to Kashmir in 1940 extended to 
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the INC’s leader, Jawaharlal Nehru - who would become India’s first Prime Minister – 
solidified these fears for NC’s dissidents (ibid.). Abdullah and Nehru found 
companionship politically and personally over the years, embracing socialist objectives 
such as land reform policies and more rights for the peasants and working classes (Bose, 
2003). Despite being co-religionists to Kashmiris, a more socialised form of politics was 
not well-received by land-owning elites in parts of the Punjab who had no interest in 
socialist land reform policies which were likely to cede to Pakistan (Akbar, 1985). Political 
leanings in other parts of pre-Partition India were important factors in Abdullah’s decision 
to support a secular India beyond religious ideology. Not everyone was turned away due 
to the threat of socialist policies. The religious leader Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah withdrew 
support from Abdullah due to sectarian differences (Behera, 2006: 17). As sectarian 
divides and political cleavages became more apparent, the case for an independent 
Pakistan deepened. While the INC increased its mobilisation against the British rule in 
their Quit India campaign, the Muslim League was pursuing its campaign for Pakistan. In 
1944, the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, visited Kashmir. Instead 
of courting Abdullah’s NC at this time, the Pakistan advocated instead chose to align 
himself with the Muslim Conference, further distancing its movement from the secular, 
socialist Abdullah (Bose, 2003: 22), while solidifying the bond between the INC and the 
NC. 
While the state of Jammu and Kashmir became more important strategically for 
the Muslim League and the INC, the Dogra regime continued its crackdown on 
opposition. Zutshi (2004) purports that it is in this context that mobilisation around a 
Kashmiri Muslim identity had really taken root. In the lead up to partition, in the context 
of the 13 July shootings, the denial of equal rights, the arrests and clamping down on 
opposition of the Dogra regime served to create a solidarity among those actors in 
opposition to the autocratic rule of Singh.  
Kashmiriyat, or Kashmiri-ness, is a frequently visited contentious concept of an 
overarching Kashmiri identity that seems to overcome linguistic, religious, ethnic and 
other barriers. However, as Rao points out, prior to Partition, the term did not emerge as 
a rallying point for political mobilization in the Valley (1999). It was only just before 
Partition that a Kashmiri identity as a political identity had emerged, and this should be 
taken in context of not only a Muslim call for a homeland with an independent Pakistan, 
but several other self-determination movements that were pressed in the lead-up to 
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partition – especially once it became clear that Jinnah’s call for an independent Pakistan 
stood a chance at success. In September 1944, a manifesto ‘Naya (New) Kashmir’ was 
adopted, outlining J&K’s future under a democratic state (Bose, 2003: 25). This document 
would be an important document laying the groundwork for more autonomy within J&K 
but also from either independent Pakistan or India. The document envisioned a  
‘National Assembly and a cabinet government, and it calls for decentralized 
governance based on devolution of decision-making and administrative 
responsibilities to districts, tehsils (subdivisions of districts), towns and villages’ 
(Bose, 2003: 25). 
 
Furthermore, a Naya Kashmir would use Urdu as a lingua franca for the State. The 
reasoning for this would be due to the plurality of language use in J&K. Kashmiri, or 
Koshur, had been and still is widely used on in the 
Kashmir Valley today but not widely used in other 
parts of the State. The Naya Kashmir manifesto 
was important not only for formalizing demands for 
how Kashmir ought to be government, but in that is 
adopted a socialist stance. It was, according to 
Bose, influenced by ‘a Jacobin conception of 
popular sovereignty, augmented by 
a…Bolshevism…inspired by the Soviet model…’ 
(2003: 26). When the mass agitation against the 
Dogra regime, the Quit Kashmir movement was 
launched in April 1946, Abdullah called for the 
tearing up of the Treaty of Amritsar (ibid.). Naya 
Kashmir was a radical call for land to the tiller, land 
redistribution, rights for women’ and rights to work 
in professions otherwise blocked for Muslim 
peasantry (Whitehead, 2007). To highlight the connection between socialism and 
women’s liberation, Whitehead, at a Kashmir Solidarity Movement in London in early 
2016, showed the cover of a pamphlet from the era which depicted a woman waving the 
flag of Sheik Abdullah’s National Conference party. The pamphlet, argued Whitehead, 
featured the flag which was ‘deliberately designed to look like a hammer and a sickle…’ 
and included a translation of Stalin’s manifesto. Krishna Misri also highlights the change 
Figure 1:1 Propaganda depicting Kashmiri 
woman holding sickle and hammer flag in 
red, Andrew Whitehead, 2007 
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from seeing Kashmiri women as having a limited role in a New Kashmir to taking a more 
empowered position for the first time (2002: 3-4).This sort of empowerment and ability to 
engage in public spaces for women was unique in all the Subcontinent, and also 
unfortunately short-lived (Misri, 2002: 4).  
Aside from being inspired by previous movements for self-determination such as 
the Jacobins or Bolsheviks and a socialist framework, early Kashmir freedom activists 
were also influenced by other movements in the lead-up to Partition for self-
determination. Wolpert (2010) for example cited early calls for a Greater Bangladesh 
which would have included Bengali-speaking parts of modern-day India including 
Kolkata. Likewise, Schofield (2010) points out disputes over the would-be allocations of 
important Sikh shrines across the new border as one reason for precipitating the 
Khalistan movement. The historical oppression of the Dogra, the influence of socialism 
and other self-determination movements, the success of the Pakistan movement and 
growing demand for independence from other regions of the Subcontinent were all 
reasons behind the early-riser azadi movement. The events that unfolded on the eve of 
Partition and the immediate aftermath would serve to further enforce the early demands 





The Quit India movement, due not only to effective mobilisation tactics but also to the 
severe losses Great Britain sustained during the Second World War, was successful at 
making the case for Britain to withdraw from the Subcontinent. The case for Partition of 
India into a secular India and Islamic Pakistan upon the withdrawal of the British also 
came to be accepted. The last viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, gave the edict to divide 
the portions under direct rule from Britain into Muslim-majority sections which would cede 
to Pakistan and Hindu-majority areas which would become part of the new India (Ganguly 
2001: 15). The princely states would have the option of acceding to one or the other. It 
was the assumption that the autonomous states would base their decision on geographic 
location and demographic makeup. In fact, most of the states did accede in this manner, 
but there were a few exceptions. The exceptions were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and 
Jammu and Kashmir. For Hyderabad and Junagadh there was a Hindu majority but a 
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Muslim ruler. When the Muslim ruler of Junagadh opted for Pakistan, the Indian 
government resisted the position and demanded a plebiscite (Behera 2005: 62). Not 
surprisingly the Hindu-majority voted for India. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was 
reversed. Although there was a substantial minority of Hindus (and other religions), 
Muslims were – and still are -  in the clear majority. Given these circumstances, and a 
general will to retain power for as long as possible, the maharaja of J&K decided to remain 
independent of either India or Pakistan for as long as possible. So it was that even after 
15 August 1947 when India would be independent, the fate of J&K was still undecided. 
 In the Spring of 1947, people from the Poonch district, now a part of Azad 
Kashmir, mounted a no-tax campaign and the Maharaja responded by strengthening his 
garrisons with Hindus and Sikhs and confiscated all weapons in the Poonch district in 
July of that year (Schofield 2010: 41). Ex-soldiers who formerly comprised the majority of 
the British Indian forces in J&K from Poonch and Mirpur districts procured weapons from 
tribes in what was formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP). Believing 
that the Maharaja had passed an order to ‘massacre the Muslims’ the former soldiers 
organized an army of 50,000 and led a revolt against the Dogras (ibid). The Maharaja 
attributed the revolt to infiltration from the newly-formed Pakistan, and although rumours 
of genocide against Muslims led to the entrance of Pathan (or Pashtun) tribesmen from 
the NWFP, the revolt was essentially home-grown, and not a direct state-sanctioned 
action. Meanwhile, in Jammu, about 500,000 people –practically eliminating the Muslim 
population- died or fled to West Punjab in the wake of Partition. Those who fled the 
violence claimed that the atrocities had been perpetrated not just by ‘uncontrolled bands 
of hooligans’ but also by ‘organized units of the Maharaja’s army and police’ (Schofield 
2010: 43).  
A conservative estimate of a quarter of a million people died as a result of 
partition-related violence and a further estimation by the Indian Constituent Assembly of 
33,000 Hindu or Sikh women abducted by Muslims and an estimation from Pakistan of 
50,000 Muslim women abducted by Hindu or Sikh men (Kleinman et. al.,1997: xv).3 
Given the scale of brutality involved, various precautions were made to ensure the safety 
of the civilian population. Andrew Whitehead’s blog documents the story of Krishna Misri  
 
3 This may be a low estimate. Elsewhere, Veena Das cites as an early estimate of abducted 
women from both sides of the new borders as ‘close to one hundred thousand’ (1997: 67) 
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(now a professor) who in her 
youth had joined the Women’s 
Self Defence Corps (WSDC) as a 
teenager in 1947. Misri recounts 
how her exposure to progressive 
female role-models was an 
empowering experience that 
would shape and influence her 
future endeavours. She explains 
that the WSDC, a wing of the 
Jammu and Kashmir National 
Militia, formed in response to the 
brutality of jihadi invaders into Kashmir, was unprecedented in not only the training of 
female cadets, but also in the way that women of many different castes, classes, and 
religious creeds bound together as a unit ‘to serve the common mission of defending their 
honour and dignity, by bearing arms’ (Misri, 2013). Misri described the tribal invaders 
from Pakistan’s former NWFP as ‘looting their way across Kashmir, set upon taking 
Srinagar, sparing not even the convent of St. Joseph from murder and rape’. Fearing the 
worst, the Maharaja fled to Jammu leaving Abdullah left to call for ‘volunteers to resist the 
aggression and defend the mother land’ (ibid). Misri describes the Jammu and Kashmir 
national militia as having rudimentary weapons and that they were trained in order to fight 
the invaders until Indian security forces arrived upon the signing of the Instrument of 
Accession. The women’s wing, Misri asserted, was formed in order for women to defend 
themselves in the event of Srinagar’s fall. The role of the women’s militia was to be trained 
in weaponry for military support, but also to provide community support to displaced 
families and to women refugees who were trauma survivors. Beyond this still, Misri claims 
that the WSDC was an engine for change that ‘set into motion a transformative process 
by opening up new vistas for women’s emancipation and empowerment.’ Women 
affiliated with the WSDC, or purportedly influenced by the new role of women in an 
otherwise patriarchal society, came to prominent leadership positions in NGOs and as 
part of the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement. 
Throughout the chaos, Pakistan and India were both trying to secure Kashmir for 
their respective countries. Seeing the revolt in the districts were being exasperated by 




infiltrations from not only tribesmen but from Pakistani soldiers on leave, the Maharaja 
finally decided to seek military aid from India (Ganguly 2001: 16-17). Threatened with a 
rebellion on the state’s eastern frontiers and with the invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan; 
the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed the now hotly-contested  
Instrument of Accession in October of 1947 agreeing to join India in exchange for Indian 
troops to reclaim the territory. Claiming that Pakistan was responsible for an invasion of 
territory rightfully belonging to India, Jawaharlal Nehru (first Prime Minister of India) 
decided to take the dispute to the United Nations. Although even the United States 
accepted the validity of the Instrument of Accession at first, they soon rescinded and left 
India feeling like it had been treated as being on the same level as whom it thought was 
the aggressor state, Pakistan (Schaffer 2009: 17). Eventually hostilities were ended 
between the two newly independent states with a ceasefire established January 1, 1949 
(Ganguly 2001: 17). Three wars later, the ceasefire line remains virtually intact and is 
known as the Line of control (LoC). Today the state is divided between Indian 
Administered Kashmir (IAK) and Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). The state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in IAK is comprised of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. PAK is 
comprised of the Northern Areas and Azad, or Free, Kashmir. 
 
Post-Partition Azadi Movement through the Insurgency (1947-1987) 
 
With the Maharaja Hari Singh’s hopes to remain peacefully independent shattered, he 
and his family fled in late October 1947 seeking the Government of India’s assistance 
with restoring peace on 24 October (Schofield, 2010: 53). On 27 October boots were on 
the ground in Kashmir. As preluded to previously, the signed accession of the state of 
J&K over to India has been hotly contested. The request for military assistance was at 
the clear cost of accession to India, and as thus it has been argued that the accession 
was signed under duress. Schofield notes Sign as writing, ‘Naturally, they cannot send 
the help asked for by me without my state acceding to the Dominion of India. I have 
accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by 
your government’ (2010: 54). Historians such as Alistair Lamb (1993) disputed the 
timetable given by the Indian defense committee members pressing for accession 
documents. Witnesses have conflicting stories of impossible journeys and essentially 
being in two places at once. How could the maharaja have signed the accession papers 
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on 26 October when he was busy fleeing Srinagar at the time? Prem Shankar Jha (1993) 
provides a response based not on eye witnesses but on declassified documents by 
suggesting that the Instrument of Accesssion was actually signed on 25 October 1947 
before Hari Sign fled Srinagar for Jammu, thus proving the document’s legality. 
Unfortunately regardless of which version is true, for Indian troops to be on the ground 
and ready on 27 October, as Lamb argues, troops were already in place (1993; Schofield, 
2010). By November 1947 regular troops from India and Pakistan were fighting for 
territory gains and the dispute eventually went to the United Nations Security Council on 
1 January 19487 (Ganguly, 1997: 11). The Instrument of Accession is disputed today not 
only on grounds that it was acquired under duress, but also by Kashmir freedom activists 
that Kashmir never belonged rightfully to Sign at all and therefore the legality was in 
dispute.  
 Over the coming months, several statements and resolutions were adopted which 
would have significant impact on the azadi movement going forward. First, Nehru had 
already pledged to give the people of Kashmir a fair referendum to determine their future, 
which would become a resolution in the form of a mandated plebiscite agreed to as of 5 
January 1948 (Bose, 2003: 38; Habibullah, 2008: 21). Second, Abdullah, the interim Chief 
Minister of J&K expressed his lack of desire to join with Pakistan (Abdul, 1984; 
Habibullah, 2008: 20). As previously state, by this time, Nehru and Abdullah had become 
closely aligned, with Pakistani leadership claiming he had ‘been purchased’ with 
Congress money (Bose, 2003: 38). The third important factor to be pointed out was that 
despite the alliance Abdullah had with Nehru and his ideological difference with Pakistan, 
he soon promoted a third option for the state of J&K: independence. 
 A ceasefire line was finally drawn up after a truce in January 1949, and it was 
expected at the time for the UN resolution of a plebiscite and troops withdrawal to take 
place shortly thereafter. When neither of those things happened, a growing demand for 
a plebiscite with the independence option was being made in the Valley. By 1956, it 
became clear that the plebiscite would not happen when the suggestion was made by 
Indian leadership to make the ceasefire line a permanent state border (Bose, 2003: 42). 
This request would continue to be rejected by Pakistan leadership and be unpopular with 
Kashmiri freedom activists, regardless of desire to join Pakistan or to become an 
independent entity. Abdullah, despite being openly pro-India was also courting US 
interests to support an independent Kashmir covertly (Schofield, 2010: 77; Akbar, 1985). 
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Although this was never popular with either the governments of India or Pakistan, both 
sides of the now Line of Control (LoC) did offer autonomy to the regions they were 
governing. In Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK), a special status was proposed in the 
Indian Constitution in October 1949, Article 370, which accepted that the state of J&K 
would not completely merge with the Indian Union until it was ready to do so (Schofield, 
2010: 78). The Article provided for a Constituent Assembly of 100 seats which would be 
independent from the Indian government except for matters of defense, foreign affairs 
and communications (Behera, 2003: 38). In addition, the State would have permission to 
fly its own flag and use for its Chief Minister to awarded a title more culturally significant, 
wazir-e-azam ibid.). Although autonomy for Kashmir was accepted, it became clearer 
that independence never would. This was especially made clear when Sheikh Abdullah 
was arrested in August of 1953 on grounds that he was promoting secession from India 
(Behera, 2003: 41).  
What remains a quiet period for the history of Kashmiri opposition to Indian rule 
was actually a time when, Malik (2019) argues, women’s resistance in Kashmir shone. 
Inshah Malik (2019) in her book Muslim Women, Agency, and Resistance Politics, she 
aims to understand the ‘historical and deliberate nature of women’s agency in the 
resistance politics of Kashmir, in which women are not merely accidental victims but 
conscientious resisters’ (3). She aims to bring to light women’s resistance as it also helps 
to engage with ‘local history of resistance in Kashmir’ (ibid). In a sense she does for 
Kashmiri women what subaltern historiographers have done for underrepresented 
historical actors. After the incarceration of Abdullah, his wife, Akbar Jehan, became a 
political leader for the Plebiscite Front and was instrumental in encouraging women’s 
activism, even if it was disproportionately targeting the upper classes (Malik, 2019: 40). 
The ideals of the azadi movement appealed to Kashmiri women and they took on roles 
of protecting male separatists in public spaces, for example, leaving them at home while 
they went out to protest. Although the intention was to save their men from being 
captured, killed or disappeared, women also suffered through being beaten and 
incarcerated (Malik: 2019). In this manner, lower caste women would demonstrate 
without the safety net offered to their upper caste counterparts. Zaine, in an interview 
discussing women’s roles in resistance during the 1950s and 60s recalled that whereas 
men might have been more vulnerable, women were empowered (Malik, 2019: 46). Zaine 
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claimed that ‘[M]any a time we asked our men to stay indoors while we went out to protest 
against the state administration and police forces’ (ibid). 
Abdullah was still in promotion of the plebiscite implementation despite being 
perceived as corrupt and his predecessor, Bakshi Ghulam Muhammed ‘The Builder’ was 
put into power in his stead. Under Bakshi, the Constituent Assembly formerly ratified 
J&K’s accession to India in 1957 (Schofield, 2010: 94). During Bakshi’s reign, India faced 
a devastating defeat at the hands of the Chinese until the Chinese declared a unilateral 
ceasefire in October of 1962 (Schofield, 2006: 97). India and Pakistan were drawn into 
bilateral talks at the nudging of the United States, but shortly after Abdullah (during his 
short stint of freedom) had convinced the two Prime Ministers to meet, Nehru died 27 
May, 1964. The new Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was busying himself with 
consolidating his new power base quickly re-incarcerated Abdullah and without a firm 
support base the talks soon went sour (Schaffer 2009: 104). 
With Pakistan and India both failing at their UN mandated requirements to 
withdraw troops and to implement a plebiscite, and with the growing distrust in INC 
granting independence or even permitting continued autonomy for the State, the 
Plebiscite Front (PF) was formed. Abdullah’s right-hand man, Mir Afzal Beg, had 
launched the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front (Akbar 1985: 252). A similar 
movement was also launched in Azad Kashmir, but with a division on whether Kashmir 
should be independent or join Pakistan. It was from this movement that the armed wing, 
the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front was formed in 1965 by Maqbool Butt 
and Amanullah Khan, to be modelled after Algeria’s successful armed struggle against 
the French (Schofield, 2010: 114).  
A combination of the above listed events led to the calculations of Pakistan 
President Ayub Khan and the foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to infiltrate Kashmir in 
1965. The most important event, however, was the disappearance of a holy relic, the Hair 
of the Prophet, from the Hazratbal Shrine in 1963 (Behera 2006: 42). The Action 
Committee was formed to recover the relic and after its mysterious reappearance to 
confirm its authenticity. The Committee originally united the Muslims that wanted 
independence or autonomy with those that wanted to join Pakistan, but it eventually split 
off with Mirwaiz Farooq (successor of Yusuf Shah) taking the name Awami Action 
Committee (Malik 2005: 111). The theft of the relic led to increased political activity among 
the Muslims and the agitation after the incident led the Pakistani leaders to believe that 
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the Kashmirirs were ripe for rebellion (Malik 2005: 121). Knowing that India had increased 
their military capability, the military strategy of Pakistan was to infiltrate several thousand 
men into Kashmir, distribute arms and encourage an armed revolt of the Kashmiris who 
have mobilized along religious lines and were generally fed up with the oppressive Indian 
rule (Ganguly 2001: 40). From 1962, Pakistan was training young men for guerrilla 
warfare at militant camps (Bose, 2003: 83). Meanwhile, Butt, the force behind the militant 
J&K National Liberation Front, covertly infiltrated IAK and began to set up sleeper cells 
and trained locals in sabotage (Schofield, 2010: 115). He was arrested in 1966 but 
managed to escape his death sentence two years later by being helped back to Azad 
Kashmir (ibid).     
The Pakistan administration’s assumptions that anti-Indian sentiment translated 
into pro-Pakistani sentiment were greatly miscalculated. In fact, instead of welcoming the 
infiltrators, the Kashmiris were mostly either indifferent or outright hostile (Malik 2005: 
122). The Indians were quick to launch a counter-offensive and Pakistan was quickly 
defeated. Ayub Khan never recovered politically and was overthrown. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
was similarly alleviated of his position and later executed after his defeat from India in the 
1971 war which made Bangladesh an independent state and by the signing of the highly 
unpopular Simla Agreement which made the ceasefire line a more or less permanent 
Line of Control (Ganguly 2001: 79).  
What was achieved during this time, was establishing underground activity by 
militant outfits as well as activists in protest of the brutal suppression of protesters, the 
rigging of elections, and the water-down state of ‘autonomy’ the state of J&K had. These 
would all weigh heavily on the future movements in the Valley – those violent and those 
nonviolent movements. Security force oppression and laws passed to strip prisoners of 
their rights during the decades leading up to the insurgency would also set a dangerous 
precedent for how India would handle uprisings.  
 
The Rise of the Militant Insurgency through the New Azadi Movement 
(1987-2008) 
 
Sheikh Abdullah did not return to power until after Indira Gandhi called for fresh elections 
in 1977 after the long state of emergency (Akbar 1985: 273). His administration was once 
again marred by corruption, cronyism and authoritarianism. Press censorship and a lack 
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of concern for parts of the state outside of the Kashmir Valley led to widespread riots in 
Ladakh and Jammu, where eight demonstrators were killed (Malik 2005: 148). Before his 
death in 1982, he appointed his son, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, as his successor. In relatively 
fair elections, the younger Abdullah won by a landslide and in trying to separate himself 
from his father’s reputation rejected an electoral alliance with Congress in an effort to 
retain the Kashmir identity of the National Conference (Dasgupta 2005: 249). However, 
after being deposed he found the only way to be restored to power was through a National 
Conference-Congress alliance. He was re-elected in 1987 through rigged elections which 
alienated the new coalition of pro-Muslim parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF). People 
became disillusioned with the electoral process and when the MUF saw themselves as 
cheated of victory, they splintered off into militant groups (Dagsgupta 2005: 250).4  
 The rigged elections of 1987 saw the arrest and torture of polling agents. One 
such polling agent was Yasin Malik who led the militants of Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) (Peer, 2010:14). The resentment over their treatment, led several 
young men and boys to take up arms. In December 1989, the new JKLF was responsible 
to the kidnapping of the daughter of the home minister of India, Rubaiya Sayeed, in 
exchange for the release of their friends (Peer, 2010: 14; Schofield, 2010: 147). Many of 
Kashmir’s disaffected youth during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s received 
militant training in camps in Pakistan or secret locations within Kashmir. Without the 
proper democratic channels to voice their discontent, the Kashmiri youth resorted to an 
armed insurrection to obtain their dream of azadi, or freedom, from India (Kazi 2009: 84). 
With the help of and the inspiration of the successful mujahedin who fought against the 
Soviets a decade earlier in Afghanistan, a sustained militancy was fomented (Dasgupta 
2005: 251). Pakistan had already stepped up its efforts in Kashmir by retaining its 
mujahedin in militant training camps that it could use to infiltrate Kashmir. “The 
disillusioned Kashmiri youths who crossed over the Line of Control after the 1987 
elections found that arrangements were already in place for training, arming, and 
financing a militant movement” (Dasgupta 2005: 251). Armed with Kalashnikovs, 
grenades, and rocket launchers, the Kashmiri militants were able to overwhelm the state 
police. The assassination of NC leaders, terrorizing of the people who tried to vote and 
 
4 Although there was rigging of elections, the perception of the outcome of the elections led 
people to believe that there was a greater discrepancy than actually was the case.  
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the subsequent Governor’s and President’s rule brought the democratic process to a 
standstill. 
 1989 marked the real beginning of the insurgency (Schofield, 2010; Peer, 2010) 
or as Ganguly puts it ‘the rise of violent ethnoreligious sentiment in Kashmir’ (1997: 14). 
Using the term ‘insurgency’ is, of course, contentious and it only frames the conflict from 
an ethnonationalist perspective. This perspective will be looked at more critically in the 
next section. It is important to note that during this phase of the azadi movement, there 
are a lot of different narratives coming forward. First, there is the narrative of the 
‘democratic deficit’ put forward by Ganguly (1997) and Bose (2003) that the insurgency 
only happened as a result of there being a lack of space to voice dissent democratically. 
Given no other perceived alternative, Kashmiris, with the assistance of Pakistan-backed 
arms and training sought to fight for independence through violent rather than non-violent 
means. There is another angle, however, to this narrative and that is the human rights 
perspective. Not only are Kashmiris fighting for freedom to self-govern, but they are 
fighting for freedom to live without threat of torture or violence at the hands of security 
forces. This latter version, the fight for not only freedom but for human rights – for 
protecting lives would be used to justify both violent as well as nonviolent means of 
resistance. 
 Unable to contain the situation that was getting out of control in Kashmir, the 
governor, Shri Jagmohan, resigned in July 1989, only to be reinstated six months later 
after the kidnapping of Sayeed led Delhi to desire a tougher approach against the 
resistance in Kashmir (Schofield, 2010: 146-147). Under his reign there were already 
gross violations of rights, indefinite imprisonment and an explosion of militant wings to 
counter the attacks on civilian, both physically and democratically. Furthermore, it was 
believe that Jagmohan hated Muslims (Peer, 2010: 15; Schofield, 2010: 147). With 
pressure from V. P. Singh’s new government and hard-line BJP supporters, the 
crackdown on Kashmir was particularly cruel. On 19 January 1990, three hundred people 
were released in a house-to-house search (Schofield, 2010: 148). The next day, a large 
demonstration of unarmed protesters gathered on Gawkadal Bridge to protest the 
unscrupulous house searches and arrests. Trapped on a bridge with nowhere to go, 
paramilitary troops opened fire from both sides, indiscriminately killing over one hundred 
people (Schofield, 2010; 148). Basharat Peer reported on the aftermath of the massacre. 
He claimed that Kashmir was unusually silent, the shops were closed and told of people 
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shouting slogans heard today in the resistance movement, especially Hum Kya Chahte? 
Azadi! (What do we want? Freedom!’ (Peer, 2010: 16). The Gawkadal bridge killings 
served not to deter the azadi movement, but to spur it on. Retaliatory violence, hartals 
(strikes), curfews, militant violence, paramilitary violence, all would become the norm over 
the next decade.  
Like those that started the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement against the Maharaja, these 
militants were primarily educated but unemployed Kashmiri youth nationalists (Behera 
2006: 145). This new generation of Kashmiris was far removed from the Indian struggles 
for independence from Britain, but associated with contemporary liberation movements, 
especially the rather successful movements against the USSR in Eastern Europe, the 
emancipation of Afghanistan from the Soviets, and struggles for freedom in Central Asia 
(Behera 2006: 146). They were also caught up in the Pan-Islamic movement and the 
resurgence of Islam. Pakistan still wanted the state to cede to it as opposed to becoming 
an independent entity, and to this end it began to defer assistance from the 
independence-motivated militants to sponsor irredentist groups which supported the 
Kashmir accession to Pakistan (Behera 2006: 150). In fact, Chandran asserts that the 
Hizb-ul Mujahedin was created by Pakistan to sustain the conflict in Kashmir, rather than 
to work towards resolution (2006: 50). The secular JKLF were also mobilising around 
Islamic themes in order to gain political support and funding. Behera claims that the JKLF 
was ‘the main force behind the expulsion of the minority Pandit community, with many of 
its cadre implicated in the brutal killings of Kashmiri Pandits’ (2006: 151). This paved the 
way for the HUM and other militant groups which advocated terrorism and violence as a 
means to an end in a holy war (ibid). The JKLF and other secular secessionist movements 
were further eclipsed by the formation of pro-Pakistan groups such as the Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which were supported by Pakistan’s 
regimes and whose numbers were overwhelmingly Pakistani (Chandran 2006: 50). 
Increasingly, the makeup of the militants were foreign, and whether due to the lack of 
support the foreign jihadists got from the local population or for a new wave of Indian 
military and paramilitary personnel, the militancy was essentially contained by 1995. 
Because the foreign terrorists were less scrupulous and indiscriminating against civilian 
targets than their home-grown Kashmiri counterparts, support for the militancy waned 
and made it easier for the Indian security forces to contain (Dasgupta 2005: 253). Despite 
the differences of opinion as to whether or not Kashmir should accede to Pakistan or be 
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an independent state, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) for some time united 
the various separatist organization under the singular theme of fighting Indian rule (Kaur 
2006: 22). Formed in 1993, and still in operation today, the APHC split off into two groups 
in 2003 with a more moderate Mirwaiz-led group.  The split was formed after Sayeed 
Geelani protested the fielding of candidates in state assembly elections by a faction of 
the APHC (Kaur 2006: 23). 
During this period of conflict, several laws were in force which facilitated the 
erosion of law and justice protections for those accused of being militants and civilians 
alike. The International Commission of Jurists, who conducted investigations in Kashmir 
in 1993 labelled some pieces of legislation as ‘draconian’ (Schofield, 2010: 170). 
Constitutional legitimation of long-term detention without charge was enshrined in the 
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) (ibid.: 171). TADA, or the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was in force until 1995 and permitted for the 
detention of those engaged in acts or speech that supported or questioned the legitimate 
‘sovereignty or territorial integrity of India, or which is intended to bring about or supports 
any claim for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from 
the Union’ (ibid.). The third popularly-referenced act is the Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act, or AFSPA. This legislation is particularly notorious because it provides purported 
impunity for security forces active in the state, granting them special legal protections. 
The PSA and AFSPA are legal protection for security forces still in use today and is cause 
for activist backlash.  
The period of militancy did begin to die down in the late 1990s and by 2002 there 
were very few militants still active in Kashmir. In 1996, state assembly elections were 
held for the first time in nine years and although the NC had won the elections, the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the secular opposition to the NC 
(Dasgupta, 2005: 255). Fear from militants attacking voters and those disillusioned with 
the political process skipped voting, however, and those like many other elections in 
Kashmir were perceived as not legitimately reflecting the people’s will. As a means of 
appearing to represent the people of Kashmir, the political parties have been running on 
the platform not in opposition to secession, but merely as a necessary step to better 
governance and stability in the Valley (Chowdhary 2009: 11). By the time the 2002 
elections rolled around, people voluntarily voted because it was in their best economic 
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interests to do so, but they continued to support and attend protests organized by the 
APHC.  
 
The Contemporary Movement for Azadi (2008 – 2014) 
 
The contemporary movement for azadi has been largely peaceful. Although the militancy 
has all but petered out, the people of Kashmir have participated in massive protests, 
much like what was seen in the 1990s. The Amarnath agitation over the transfer of land 
to the Shrine Board to facilitate a Hindu pilgrimage site in IAK quickly evolved into a 
renewed call for azadi in 2008 (Tremblay, 2009). The warmer months of 2008 has been 
claimed as the ‘most widespread and sustainable mass uprising in over a decade’ (Roy, 
2011: 57). These protests, argue Arundhati Roy, have been in response to ‘years of 
repression in which tens of thousands had been killed, thousands had been disappeared, 
and hundreds of thousands have been tortured, injured, raped and humiliated’ (2011: 57). 
The significance of the events leading up to 2008’s protests are fondly remembered by 
eyewitnesses that I have interviewed who claimed that ‘everyone’ was in the streets and 
one respondent claimed that he thought that freedom for Kashmir was assured. Despite 
the significance of the events of 2008 for local activists, however, I would argue it was 
the 2010 protests and the social media campaigns that spread awareness of the azadi 
movement internationally.5  
In 2010, nearly two decades after the insurgency, the new generation of youths 
have defied curfew orders and came out to protest en masse, and pelt stones at security 
forces that had responded with gunfire (Polgreen 2010). After more than ten years, Indian 
military forces flooded the streets of Kashmir’s summer capital, Srinagar, to combat stone 
pelters who had been protesting with force after a 17-year old was killed by a tear gas 
 
5 Arundati Roy (2011) and Reeta Tremblay (2009) highlight the significance of the 2008 protests 
from a scholarly perspective while several respondents highlighted the 2008 mobilisations in the 
Valley as personally significant. However, from an international perspective it was the protests of 
2010 and the prominence of activists on social media and international television and news outlets 
that brought the uprisings more broadly to an international audience. Examples of these are ‘Stony 
Ground’ and ‘A Cyclical Problem’ (2010) The Economist; Polgreen (2010) ‘Indian Forces face 
Broader Revolt in Kashmir’ The New York Times; and several articles appearing in CNN during 
the period by Ahmad, M. such as ‘Death Toll in Kashmir at 105 as four die Sunday from injuries.’ 
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shell on 11 June 20106. During what has been donned the ‘summer of unrest,’ curfews 
(some 24 hours) and political shut-downs in the Valley were commonplace. The APHC 
leader, Geelani, had been organizing protests and strikes by issuing protest calendars 
(Geelani Releases Fresh Protest Calendar, 2010). This wave of the Kashmiri freedom 
movement is marked by protests, demonstrations, Facebook posting, blogging, YouTube 
videos, independent journalism, and even stone pelting. Some basic demands for this 
new call for azadi have been highlighted by the JKLF and the more prominent APHC, 
such as the repealing of laws which protect security forces from being tried for their 
actions. Beyond basic human rights claims and the demands for justice, however, there 
is also an equal demand for azadi from Indian occupation. Organizations such as KSM 
seem to present a message advocating for an independent Kashmir, while presenting the 
documented human rights abuses to an international audience. 
New Kashmiri voices emerged during these times such as in Fahad Shah’s (2013) 
edited book Of Occupation and Resistance which is one of the first books to come out 
post 2010 to shine light on the new movement from the perspective of Kashmiris. It also 
very clearly outlines some of the human rights abuses that have occurred during the 
protests. Shah claims that since 2008, Kashmiris have been ‘reclaiming the streets’ 
during the summer months, ‘coming out in massive demonstrations, sometimes hundreds 
of thousands strong…’ (2013). With the help of social media, Kashmiris were organizing 
themselves like never before and were managing to enforce the protest calendars and to 
give regular updates via social media feeds on where shutdowns were happening and 
when protests were happening, and also when someone was martyred or injured. Despite 
coming out armed with stones, the Indian security forces, argues Shah, were prepared 
to fight a militant insurgency. Crowd control measures were cruel and when they could 
no longer get away with using live rounds they moved to pellet guns and sling shots 
(Shah, 2013). Shah describes the brutality of these new tools:  
 
6 As reported in several news articles in and beyond South Asia, a 17-year old student returning 
from school was reportedly struck with a tear gas cannister in the head and instantly killed. The 
student, Tufail Matoo, was purportedly a bystander in an exchange of stone throwing and armed 
uniformed personnel. See Jamwal, B.A. (2010) ‘Fueling the Rage in Kashmir’ Economic and 
Political Weekly); Kaul, S. (2011) “An’ You Will Fight Till the Death if It…” Social Research; 
‘Kashmir Burns Again as India responds to dissent with violence’ (2010) The Independent for more 
background on the clashes during the 2010 ‘summer of unrest.’   
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‘They were loading catapults with a vicious charge of glass marbles, and this 
abomination led to permanent damage to the eye and sometimes even blindness 
for scores of young protesters’ (2013). 
 
This type of asymmetrical conflict has been typical of the Indian response to protest 
and assembly in Kashmir.  
There have been other developments in India and in the Valley during these 
years. The main opposition to J&K’s National Conference, the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) won the most seats in the 2014 elections, resulting in Mehbooba Mufti 
becoming the first female Chief Minister in the state (BBC News, 2014; Bukhari and 
Masroor, 2016). Immediately, she was placed in the precarious position of forming a 
coalition government with the BJP, who also made a strong showing in the elections 
(ibid). In elections to determine the Prime Minister in India, Modi beat the Congress 
Party’s Rahul Gandhi (Laughland and Weaver, 2014). With the PDP and BJP at odds 
in the state and Modi at the helm of the central government, this has caused much 
trepidation in J&K over the BJP stance to eradicate any special provisions in the state, 
including the abrogation of Articles 370 granting some forms of autonomy such as the 
state’s own flag and constitution and 35A which bars non-residents from owning 
property and other nuanced provisions (NDTV, 2019). These developments and the 
continued dominance of the BJP has led to increased tensions in the state. 
 Scholarly literature on Kashmir has begun to shift from foreigners writing about 
Kashmiris to Kashmiris writing about their own experiences. In one such work, Kaul 
and Zia (2018) ‘Knowing in Our Own Ways: Women and Kashmir,’ the intention is 
explicit in bringing to light Kashmiri female scholars who are actively engaged in 
research which connects the political dispute with the gendered aspects of the conflict 
(33). The work, although written by female Kashmiri scholars brings to light not only 
the gendered dimensions in an academic tone, but also actively reclaims voices in 
Kashmir that have been sidelined. Like Malik’s (2019) contribution to restoring 
women’s agency in the history of the conflict, the works bring to bear how important 
the role of women has been for sustaining the movement for independence. They have 
changed the narrative surrounding occupation and militancy and on seeking justice for 
human rights abuses. Female activists and lawyers along with their male counterparts 
have contributed to works such as the document which brings to light the use of 
systematic torture in Kashmir, Alleged Perpetrators (2012), discussed further in 
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chapters seven and eight of this thesis. Other reports such as the United Nations 
‘Report on Human Rights in Kashmir’ calls out both Pakistan and India for human 
rights abuses and calls for accountability for violations, past and present (OHCHR.org, 
2018). Although calling for more transparency on both sides, the report focuses on 
IAK where armed forces used excessive force during demonstrations from 2016 
through 2018 (ibid). Kaul and Zia (2018) assert that despite this evidence, these 
reports are rejected and subject to criticism in the Indian media, sowing doubts about 
the truths surrounding violence against civilians in Kashmir. In light of this, grassroots 
activists and professional legal advocates have had an extremely important role in the 
contemporary freedom movement. Contemporary activist developments and the 
increased role of women in the azadi movement will be discussed further in the third 




The following section first identifies the roots of the literature on ethnonationalism, 
especially as they pertain to the Kashmir conflict. This briefly explores the competing 
meta-narratives of the creation of Pakistan and India as this is often a reflective starting 
point for analysis of the Kashmir freedom movement. From here, there is a general review 
of the literature on ethnonationalism and the ways that this literature I applied differently, 
and perhaps unfairly in different circumstances, such as the highlighting of Islamic 
fundamentalism at the expense of the growing rise of right-wing Hindu ideology. From 
here there is an analysis of an overarching Kashmir identity as one that is reflexive to 
current events and often on the defensive as it is viewed as a subaltern identity. A new, 
or perhaps more nuanced Kashmiri cultural identity is viewed as emerged and salient in 
the context of contemporary transnational movements is then analysed.  
 
Ethnonational Identity in the Kashmir Conflict 
 
A nation is generally referred to as a group of people which identify a common birthplace 
or origin and that this nation is the ‘central principle of political organization’ (Heywood, 
2007: 143). Common features of the nation are the perception of a shared common 
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culture, which may not only be a common birthplace, but also include a common 
language, religion, and/or history (Heywood, 2007: 148). The roots of nationalism’s 
evolution into a term with political overtones can be traced back to Rousseau, who 
deemed it the right of nations to seek self-determination; to be masters of their nation’s 
political destiny (Ozkirimli, 2010: 12). The ‘invention’ of India and Pakistan and the states’ 
divergent raison d’être is a theme pronounced in propaganda as well as scholastic 
literature. India’s narrative has been one based on secularism. In this narrative, one state 
can incorporate all faiths, and a Muslim-majority Kashmir is integral to the idea of a 
secular India. For Pakistani nationalists, Pakistan was ‘incomplete’ without the inclusion 
of Muslim-majority Kashmir (Ganguly, 1997: 8; Paul, 2005: 9). Although these narratives 
are repeated throughout literature on India-Pakistan relations and on the Kashmir 
dispute, they could largely be perceived as idealized rhetoric of realpolitik. Scholars such 
as Paul (2005) and Chacko (2012)7 view the Kashmir conflict through a realist 
international relations lens and thus it endangers essentializing the conflict as a bilateral 
India-Pakistan dispute. Since so much text has been written that interprets the Kashmir 
dispute as a territorial dispute between two rival nations with very different ideas of 
national identity, it comes as no surprise that nationalism should be at the heart of many 
texts written on the Kashmir conflict. It is, perhaps, for this reason also, that at the onset 
of insurgency, it would be attributed to nationalistic goals, or to a pro-Pakistani sentiment 
borne out of the dominant Islamic religion in the valley. Nitasha Kaul, a long-time scholar 
on Kashmir made explicit that the conflict in Kashmir ‘is not just an India-Pakistan issue, 
it is certainly not a Muslim-Hindu issue…’ (2001: 42). She suggests that Kashmir is more 
a victim of geopolitics than of competing nationalisms, and those that suffer the most are 
the people of Kashmir who have had to live the everyday realities living in the shadow of 
violence’ (ibid: 44). Some Kashmir scholars have framed their analyses of the freedom 
movement as a separatist movement (see Ganguly, 1997: 1-2, for an explicit example). 
The concentration of identity-linked factors in assessments of the self-determination 
movement of Kashmir – although not untrue – risk a conflation of the struggles for 
 
7 Chacko’s (2012) and previous (2011) arguments are more nuanced in the sense that she argues 
that Indian foreign policy is driven by an anti-colonial struggle, pointing to the non-alignment 
movement and more recent decisions to become a ‘peaceful’ nuclear state. The emphasis on my 
argument is that it is essentially a nuanced form of IR perspective which does emphasise centre-
state relations.  
64 
 
freedom and justice with an Islam-centric insurgency against India. These are separate 
issues, even if some of the motivations for violent or non-violent resistance are similar.  
Benedict Anderson assesses the nature of a national imagining, which can be 
linked to both the Kashmiri and the Indian nations. Anderson proposes that a nation ‘…is 
an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ 
(1983: 6). If indeed the essence of an ethnic national community is inherently sovereign, 
then it would follow that nations would seek autonomy and independence in some 
fashion. Thus, nationalism, or ethnonationalism, is quite frequently analysed with regards 
to a purported Kashmiri separatist mobilisation. There is tension then as to what sort of 
national imagining belongs to India and whether this can contain the nation of Kashmir 
harmoniously within its borders. The term ethnonationalism can incorporate a wide range 
of elements, but there is no singular definition. However, Walker Connor, one of the 
leading theorists on ethnonationalism offers this widely accepted definition: 
Ethnonationalism ‘…denotes both the loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the 
loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state, particularly where the latter is 
conceived as a ‘nation-state’’ (Conversi, 2002: 2). Many scholars on Kashmir have 
argued that the separatist movement in the region have been influenced by identity 
factors such as nationalism and religion. The literature which regards the Kashmir conflict 
as ethnonational (Ganguly, 1997; Behera, 2000; Malik, 2005); however, also invariably 
point to other factors for collective mobilization. Behera (2006) points to the inability of 
the central government for dealing with its periphery and its minorities; Ganguly (1996) 
points to the rise of militancy due to the lack of opportunities for democratic participation 
and the government’s interference with provincial governments, especially via election 
rigging; and, Malik (2005) suggests that ethnic and regional identities are exacerbated 
due to political entrepreneurs taking advantage of the differences and politicizing them.  
Coming from a South Asian perspective, Baruah suggests that ethnonationalism ‘…refers 
to a wide range of political phenomena including what may be called nationalism, 
separatism, secessionism, subnationalism, ethnic insurgency, ethnic militancy, or 
sometimes simply regionalism’ (2010: 1).  
The sustainability of the azadi movement has been deemed, in part, to a lack of 
opportunities to express demands in a democratic forum. Kohli points to multiple causal 
variables in the continuation of the Kashmir conflict, but in his overall summary of 
separatist movements in India, he purports that, ‘Given an institutional state, however, if 
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some…demands are not accommodated, the sense of exclusion and injustice may well 
turn demanding groups towards militancy’ (1997: 344). In this view, ethnic nationalism 
may be something that arises out of a sustained period of perceived injustice. Bose 
(2003) and Madan (1998) duly note that Kashmir’s separatist movement has been fought 
as often on the purported grounds of Kashmiriyat as well as Islamic identity; pro-Pakistan 
as well as pro-freedom – with some militant groups such as Hizbul Mujahedin proclaiming 
on alternating occasions a fight for Kashmiri freedom, for Islam, and for accession to 
Pakistan (Ganguly, 1996). Ganguly asserts that ethno-nationalist arguments for the 
Kashmiri insurgency (as experienced through the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s) 
are, at best, a partial explanation for the events that have led to the separatist movement, 
and for violence in particular. He argues that ‘…political mobilization and institutional 
decay…best explain the origins of the insurgency in Kashmir (Ganguly, 1996: 8). Bose 
(2003) argues against the case of Kashmir as a ‘conflict of antagonistic nationalisms’ and 
instead asserts that the Kashmir issue ought to be addressed in terms of ‘democratic 
politics and statecraft’ which can potentially be resolved through ‘…real and relevant 
methods of democratic institutionalization’ (7). One of the critiques made by academics 
against ethnonationalism defining Kashmir or other conflicts is because the term asserts 
that a ‘..dichotomy is  set between ethnic and civil forms of nationalism based on 
assumptions of ethnic being natural, violent and retrograde and civil being democratic, 
rational and cosmopolitan…’ (Ellis and Khan, 2001: 171). What is deemed to be a nation 
is a broad concept, however two camps have emerged which define the right to self-
determination of a nation. The first, primordialism, ‘is the belief that nationality is a natural 
part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight, or smell, and their nations have existed 
from time immemorial’ (Ozkirimli, 2010: 49). In the primordial view, ethnic attachments 
are natural and instinctive phenomena of human existence (Malik, 2005: xv). The second, 
instrumentalism, prefers to view nationalism as less instinctive and more a consequence 
of behaviors. To the instrumentalist, a nationality is not a consequence of biological or 
genetic diversification from other groups, but more of a sociological concept. In either 
case, the concept of race or ethnicity may be used as ‘a tool constructed to gain material 
political or other advantage’ (Malik, 2005: xv). Belief in a common heritage can be a great 
source of mobilization by political elites whether by Islamic or Hindu nationalists. 
While some of the militant factions in support of Kashmir accession to Pakistan 
were being demonised for their support for Islamic terror, there was a growing threat of 
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Hindu nationalism that was equally if not more virulent than Islamic nationalism. The 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has demonstrated anti-Muslim sentiment and fuelled 
communal conflict during the 1990s in Kashmir as well as in other parts of India. The 
BJP, born in the 1980s is the political arm of the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS). The BJP came into power for the first time in 1991 in Uttar Pradesh with 
the largest showing of seats in the state with the support of upper caste Hindus initially, 
but later made in-roads with lower castes (Bates, 2007: 244). The purpose of the RSS 
was to impose Hindu rule over India.  
The BJP gained popularity because they were agitating for a temple to be built in 
the fabled birthplace of the god Ram at the site of a Muslim mosque in Ayodhya (Haynes, 
1998: 175). Radical supporters of this idea destroyed the historic Babri mosque in 
December 1992 (Behera, 2006: 238). Offshoots of the RSS marched on the mosque, 
which was located in the BJP-dominated state of Uttar Pradesh (Bates, 2007: 274). With 
the BJP in charge of the government there, no attempt was made to prevent the 
demolishment. The destruction of the mosque was viewed with pride by Hindu 
nationalists with violence against Muslims carried out accompanied by a slogan that 
‘Muslims belonged properly in either ‘Pakistan’ or ‘qabaristan’ (the graveyard)’ (Metcalf 
2005: 221).  
During the initial phases of militancy, over 200 Kashmiri Hindu (Pandits) were 
killed by ‘militants and unidentified gunmen’ (Shah, 2013) Jagmohan, the governor of 
J&K during the Gawkadal massacre was a BJP man and blamed for facilitating the 
exodus of Pandits, which Shah (2013) purports was fuel for retaliation so that ‘an iron fist’ 
could be used against the Muslims. Although (Shah, 2013) recognises that there had 
been steady migration of Kashmiri Pandits since before Partition, Hindutva forces used 
the plight of the Pandits and their inability to return – despite calls for their return by 
Kashmiri Muslims – as a rallying point for mobilising young Kashmir and other Hindus in 
India (Kaul, 2011: 50).  
In a later development of communal tensions, Hindutva forces with direct ties to 
the BJP were blamed for anti-Muslim riots in the BJP-dominated state of Gujarat in 2003 
in retaliation for the alleged burning of a train by Muslims of Hindu pilgrims returning from 
the reclaimed site at Ayodhya (Bates, 2007; Hansen, 2011). As with the destruction of 
the mosque, not only were no attempts made to stay the anti-Muslim mobs from murder 
and destruction of property, but there have been active reports of state and local 
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government-level encouragement (Bates, 2007: 304-5). Narendra Modi, current Prime 
Minister of India since 2014, was head of the Gujarat government at the time when 
between one and two thousand Muslims were killed (ibid). The rise of Hindu nationalism 
in India has indeed antagonised communal tension. Nitasha Kaul (2011) points to the 
sensationalized hypernationalism of the Indian media and hinduization of India in general 
as salient factors in communal tensions, or as structural contributions for normalizing 
attacks on the ‘other.’ In the right-wing Indian political landscape, the ‘Other’ such as the 
Muslim or other minority is blamed for structural inequalities for common people that are 
not alleviated by support of populists such as Modi (Kaul, 2017). In fact, the ordinary 
person’s circumstances may instead be exasperated as these populists continue to 
support business elites at the expense of others (Kaul, 2017).  
Virulent nationalism, communalism, and the rise of populism in India (and 
elsewhere) are contributing factors to a subsequent defensive stance for Kashmiri 
freedom advocates. However, rather than turn en masse to a second militant movement, 
I would argue, that Kashmir freedom activists have instead side-lined the hardliners in 
order to embrace liberal democratic values and strategies of the left. More on these 
developments will be analysed in the third chapter, but it is important to note that it is not 
just communal or nationalist identity that has been simmering since 2008, but an identity 
that is very much connected to contemporary liberal social movements. Without the 
dominance of a full-scale insurgency, we are able to better distinguish the social 
movement processes inherent in the contemporary azadi movement, that may until rather 
recently been degraded to an orientalist depiction of backwards people mobilising on 
identitarian claims alone.  
 
 
Emerging Identities in the New Freedom Movement 
 
Robinson (2013) worked with refugees from Jammu and Kashmir who were displaced to 
Pakistan to live in camps or to re-settle, often in Azad Kashmir. There she reflected upon 
the transformations of those advocating militant actions into a ‘humanitarian jihad.’ In 
response to the influx of organizations providing earthquake relief after the region was hit 
in 2005, former and would-be militants began to re-shape their cause into a humanitarian 
one (Robinson, 2013: xvi). Years of fieldwork with refugee and displaced Kashmiri 
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jihadists led to her witnessing the transition of a fundamental focus on the sovereign 
territory of Kashmir to a focus on the sovereignty of the Kashmiri body; from a defence of 
a territory to the defence of victimized Kashmiris (ibid:4). This transition is widely 
recognized in IAK as Kashmiris seemed to reject militancy altogether and opted instead 
for protest strategies, rallies, and hartals, or strikes.   
‘This story, thus, reveals a surprising convergence: Kashmiri Muslim refugees 
adopted the language of human rights and humanitarianism to rethink their position 
in relationship to wider regional, transnational, and global communities. In doing so, 
they forged a notion of “rights,” as a hybrid of Islamic and global political ideas and 
practices, and reformulated the Kashmir Jihad as a project legitimized by the need 
to protect the bodies of Muslim people against torture and sexual violence’ 
(Robinson, 2013: 4). 
 
Here Robinson clearly demonstrates the connections through her work with those in 
support of perpetrating violence in order to end violence for victims they seek to protect. 
However, she also points to similarities in organizing militant organizations as social ones 
and identifies that social and political affiliations can be overlapping as well as seemingly 
contradictory. Robinson also points out that supporters may join associations more for 
the infrastructural support they offer, rather than as an endorsement of a particular 
position or view. Thus, constituents can join the Kashmir Workers Association because 
they are Kashmiri, because they are socialist, because they are seeking to meet other 
Kashmiris, or because they want to promote their own pet cause, campaign or 
organization.  
Whether due to village or traditional mentalities or inspired by religious tenets, 
workers’ movements and socialist leanings have been omnipresent for postcolonial 
diasporas. In Kashmir, we see the populist leader Sheikh Abdullah aligning himself with 
the socialist-leaning Nehru as opposed to the Muslim ‘brothers,’ often views as 
landowning Punjabi elitists (Akbar, 1985: Schofield, 2010). In the diaspora, we see 
Kashmiris align with Labour and with the Indian Workers Association (Sokefeld and 
Bolognani, 2011); Sikhs aligning themselves with the left-leaning Greens and Scottish 
National Party (Tatla, 1999). Sayigh reveals how similarly, displaced peasants in the 
cities formed labour movements when, in pre-Mandate Palestine absentee landlords 
began selling land to Jewish settlers who would not employ Muslims (1979: 45). ‘In 1925 
the first workers’ union was founded in Haifa, some of its first actions being against 
Palestinian industrialists. Not much later socialist and communist parties were formed…’ 
69 
 
(1979: 53). She also purports that, ‘It was inevitable that a Palestinian workers’ movement 
would become part of the nationalist struggle, rather than confine itself to purely economic 
goals’ after the Arab Palestinian Workers’ League (A.P.W.L.) was assassinated in 1947 
(1979: 53) – not long before the Disaster of 1948.  
Just as Sayigh (1979) studies the transition of Palestinian peasants into 
insurgents, Robinson (2013) studies the transition of displaced Kashmiris in Pakistan as 
refugees into militant insurgents and then their transition into humanitarian activists. 
There seems to be quite a lot of cross-pollination of strategies and interpretations of 
events, especially when comparing Kashmir to Palestine. Palestinians offered support for 
their coreligionists in Kashmir as evidenced by graffiti that supported Kashmiris in their 
quest for freedom (Kak, 2017). Various encounters in art, song, and in everyday 
discussions about Palestine and Kashmir confirm the similarities in the minds of activists. 
There is a common thread by Palestinians and Kashmiris that Israelis and Indians 
respectively were skewing demographics in their regions which would erode the only 
claim to power either has in their fights for freedom: being a quantitative majority. Sayigh, 
in her work with Palestinian refugees, expressed a common theory that Jewish settlers 
purposively bought up land in a strategic manner ‘aimed at winning the confrontation that 
the Zionist movement’s military arm had begun to plan’ (1979: 39). Cause for alarm over 
demographic shifts through these land acquisitions did have merit, as they did and still 
do threaten to alter the demographic landscape in Palestinian territories. When a large 
chunk of Kashmiri land was transferred to a Hindu shrine board in order to facilitate the 
popular Amarnath yatra (pilgrimage), Kashmiris became alarmed and protested in large 
numbers as they feared it would mark the beginning of a government attempt at altering 
the demographic composition in the Valley (Tremblay, 2009).   
Kashmiriyat, or Kashmiri-ness, is a frequently visited contentious concept of an 
overarching Kashmiri identity that seems to overcome linguistic, religious, ethnic and 
other barriers. However, as Rao points out, prior to Partition, the term did not emerge as 
a rallying point for political mobilization in the Valley (1999). It was only just before 
Partition that a Kashmiri identity as a political identity had emerged, and this should be 
taken in context of not only a Muslim call for a homeland with an independent Pakistan, 
but several other self-determination movements that were pressed in the lead-up to 
partition. Kashmiriyat could be viewed as an emergent political identity rather than a 
primordial identity that has existed since time immemorial. As a political identity it is one 
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which is fluid and takes shape over time and in relation to events. Bolognani similarly 
confirmed during her field research with Kashmiris in the diaspora in the United Kingdom 
that a Kashmiri identity as a political one has rarely emerged (2011:121). This does 
emerge, however, in relation to particular events such as the Kashmir Identity Campaign 
which pushed for the recognition of the Kashmir identity as opposed to being tied to 
choosing either Pakistan or India as a nationality when filling out census forms in the UK 
(Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011). Campaigns such as this, or reactional protests in the UK 
against the killing of protesters in IAK throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s serve to 
politicise a Kashmiri identity in the diaspora. However, in other circumstances, it may be 
apparent that one identifies with a more regional affiliation or identity such as Mirpuri. 
More on the personal and selective distinction of identity among the diaspora will be 
analysed in the fourth chapter.  
When introducing and analysing the distinct, however malleable and salient 
identities of Kashmiris active in the freedom movement, it is important to note that it is 
not only a political identity that takes form in response to shared trauma or campaigns, 
but a cultural identity which emerges. The ‘political’ as opposed to the ‘cultural’ identities 
and sense of belonging to the Kashmir community are important distinctions in this 
research. In my own research, several respondents who have spent the majority of their 
lives in the UK did not feel they had a stake in Kashmir’s territorial resolution and did not 
feel so passionately about whether the territories of Jammu and Kashmir should go to 
either Pakistan or India, but were passionate about Kashmiris given the option to choose. 
Kashmir freedom activists also tended to be active participants in other campaigns and 
causes that could be located on the left of the political spectrum – anti-war, feminism, 
anti-racism, supporting self-determination and even supporting socialism to some extent. 
The overarching cultural-political identity that was uncovered in both direct conversations 
and observations and in literature surrounding KSM and affiliate events was this culture 
of resistance. This culture of resistance is explored more in-depth in chapter four of this 
thesis, but it is important to note here that it is a slightly more nuanced take on the 
politicized identity.  
The large Pakistan Kashmiri diaspora have certainly done much to unite in a 
cause for a reunited and independent Kashmir in terms of second and third generations, 
but, root mobilisations were planted in labour movements and workers’ campaigns 
(Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011). Transnational protest movements from British Kashmiris 
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earlier on were aimed at protesting the construction of the Mangla Dam which flooded 
Mirpur and caused further mass migration to the UK from PAK in the 1950s (ibid: 116). 
Evidence from Roger Ballard (1991) suggests that migration from the Kashmir and 
especially from the regions of Azad Kashmir such as Mirpur have seen chain migration 
for many decades before Partition. These migrations began in order to find better 
economic opportunities and eventually led to the large diaspora of Mirpuri Kashmiris in 
the United Kingdom. The Mangla Dam incident exasperated the exodus of Mirpuris. 
Faulting Pakistan policies for the destruction of their homes for a dam benefiting other 
regions of Pakistan, they lost faith in Pakistan. This, along with campaigning from 
Kashmiris from other parts of the region who fought to reclaim their identities as Kashmiris 
– as opposed to Indians or Pakistanis – most probably had impact on Mirpuris attempts 
to reclaim their identity as distinct from Pakistan. This identity, I would argue is one that 
is both cultural as well as political. It is cultural in the sense that Mirpuris saw their regional 
identities as distinct from other parts of Pakistan and other parts of Kashmir. It is political 
because support for an independent Kashmir by the Mirpuri community was not as 
prominent prior to the Mangla Dam incident nor the contemporary mobilisations of 
Kashmiris in the United Kingdom.  
The Kashmiriyat identity is one that has been in development over time and does 
not necessarily reflect the pluralism of identities in Kashmir, let alone in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir Valley alone is home (or traditional grazing location 
for nomadic tribes) to Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, and Muslims of 
various sectarian traditions (Behera, 2006).  Behera (2006) and Puri (2000) have 
asserted that regional divisions within the state of Jammu and Kashmir has and continues 
to cause friction in the state, which raises the question of how much of an overarching 
Kashmir identity has emerged? The National Conference could not hope to provide 
representation for every minority in Kashmir, but what was, perhaps, more contentious 
was the lack of representation the NC offered to Buddhists in Leh. Throughout 1989 while 
there was tension and communal violence between Muslims and Hindus there was also 
violence between Buddhists and Muslims in Ladakh, who feared rule from Kashmir and 
had campaigned to be freed from Srinagar rule (Schofield, 2010: 144). While political 
leaders had a hard time uniting the state, separatist leaders would also have a 
challenging time speaking for the multitude of minorities in the state. Homogenized 
narratives of communalism and nationalism have always been normative problems for 
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political and separatist leaders alike and continue to be part of the reason for a stalemate 
over resolutions in Kashmir. Bradnock, in Chatham House-supported research, had 
reported on the findings of a survey on both sides of the LoC to seek answers to whether 
the people of J&K would prefer to cede to India, Pakistan, or to remain independent 
(2010). The report demonstrated that there would be no easy territorial resolution should 
the plebiscite be implemented today – even with the option of independence on the table. 
The plural realities of Kashmir and of the state have complicated the emergent 
overarching Kashmiri identity. Despite this, however, I would argue that for Kashmir 
freedom activists, a sense of a heterogeneous Kashmiri identity has emerged. This 
identity can be emphasised in various contexts as more political, more cultural, or even 
perhaps ethnonational. A more nuanced analysis of emergency identities is provided in 




This chapter began with an overview of the historical contexts of the azadi movement. 
Tracing the movement from pre-Partition India helps to locate the grievances against 
regimes in the state of J&K and the response to oppression by Dogra followed by Indian 
governance. The historical precedent of mobilization against oppression helps in the 
development of a culture of solidarity and resistance to oppression which manifests in the 
contemporary azadi movement. Moving on from this history is the competing narratives 
that arise from those analysing and those experiencing the azadi movement. Assertions 
of the azadi movement as being an ethnonational movement does not accurately relate 
to the reality of lived experiences of Kashmiris who have experienced an asymmetrical 
conflict. This chapter reflects upon emergent identities in the freedom movement that 
become salient, yet overarching identities. Kashmiriyat is then perceived as not simply 
an identity based on ethnic, national, or religious background, but an identity that binds a 
wider, heterogeneous community. This community is further extended beyond the 
borders of Kashmir through reflection and affiliation on other self-determination and even 
other human rights campaigns. Thus, the Kashmiri identity becomes a more fluid abstract 
identity rather than an identity comprised of concrete ‘objective’ identities. This fluidity 
allows for the re-interpretation of Kashmiri identity and the broadening of the movement 
to outsider activists who would not normally identify themselves as being Kashmiri. The 
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next chapter follows this development of an emergency Kashmiri identity focusing on 
more cultural identity connections than a strict sense of homogenous ethnic connections, 





























Research Methods: An Interpretative Approach 
 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, I introduced the research questions of this thesis, 
aims of the research and potential contributions to the fields of transnational social 
movements. In this chapter I will re-visit those research questions and elaborate further. 
This research, which focuses on the contemporary post – 2008 Kashmiri freedom 
movement distances itself from diaspora studies by looking more at the heterogenous 
nature of transnational movements rather than a homogenous diaspora mobilisation. 
Through investigation of the KSM, this thesis looks more generally at understanding how 
transnational solidarities across a variety of actors, campaigns, and causes manage to 
form and collaborate. I explore this through looking at how disparate campaigns frame 
their messages to in-group and out-group activists through looking more specifically at 
how this is done in the contemporary Kashmir freedom movement, again by looking more 
specifically at how this is done through observations and interviews of Kashmiri freedom 
activists abroad. Although focused on activists abroad, this thesis also draws from 
interviews conducted in IAK to get a sense of their perspective and how it aligns with 
those activists abroad.  
Framing or social movement framing processes are discussed at length in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis but are referenced here in order to locate the context 
of the use as an analytical strategy in this chapter. Chapter one of this thesis gives an 
overview of the historical context of the Kashmir freedom movement by detailing more 
specifically its genesis and evolution over time. This chapter further develops the 
theoretical strands of competing narratives surrounding why the Kashmir conflict 
continues to this day. Ethnic national interpretations are often found in literature that pre-
dates the 2008 Amarnath land row. However, these interpretations of the movement falls 
short when contextualized within the historical precedents of a nonviolent transnational 
movement. Moving on from this narrative is the narrative developing (or redeveloping) 
that in the new Kashmir freedom movement, the term Kashmiri is quite fluid and not 
necessarily devoted to one ethnic, religious, or linguistic group. The new Kashmiri is a 
socially conscious identity and in the new Kashmir freedom movement it is just as likely 
to support liberal causes such as rights for women, ending human rights abuses, ending 
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war, denuclearization, demilitarization – as well as those movements for self-
determination for Kashmir and others such as for Tibet, Palestine, and even Scotland. 
 This chapter continues from these theoretical foundations by discussing the 
methods used for researching the new Kashmir freedom movement. I begin by revisiting 
the research questions which are developed further. I then examine how these questions 
contribute to the literature on diaspora and social movements more generally, through 
looking at the specific case of KSM. I further emphasise my epistemological approach to 
research as being rooted in constructivism. Framing processes in general are based on 
the notion of social constructions and cannot be fashioned into a positivistic 
epistemological stance. This research has then relied on theoretical interpretivism, that 
is, in understanding people’s own perceptions of their own activities (Hussey and Hussey 
(1997). Keeping this in mind, when asking the research questions I have asked, it has 
always been the intention of mine to understand the concerns of those I have been 
researching and the questions have been adapted over the course of the research in 
order to better reflect not just what I want to know about them but in how the movement 
is understood by them. Naturally, it could be argued that the results are how I understand 




What drives people in the KSM to engage in a campaign for a free Kashmir?  
 
KSM has become a transnational social movement which sees itself as a vehicle in the 
fight for justice for Kashmiris. What drives people in KSM to engage in the campaign for 
azadi is a mixture of personal identitarian motivation and collective identitarian 
motivations. Individually, one may be motivated by personal affiliation as a stakeholder 
in the conflict. Collectively, one may be motivated if they are part of other human rights 
campaigns or part of an affiliated cause such as self-determination or human rights for 
another group or minority subgroup. How KSM and its participants have framed their 
movement in terms of human rights and other sub-frames such an women’s rights and 
minority rights leads me to infer that people in KSM are motivated through more than 
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personal identity affiliations. This is particularly true of those participants who hold no 
personal identity affiliation as a Kashmiri or South Asian. 
 
Do they engage because of the identitarian appeal of a free Kashmir or do they 
engage for different reasons? 
 
Kashmiris are certainly driven by a goal to raise awareness for their cause to an 
international audience. Being Kashmiri is a driving force behind participating in events as 
well as setting up branches of KSM societies. However, most respondents are actively 
involved in other campaigns other than Kashmir, which leads me to believe that they are 
interested in some of the bigger liberal causes than on Kashmir alone. Many are active 
in the Palestine movement, for example, or have volunteered in their communities, or 
helped raise humanitarian aid.  
 
Could it be possible that the KSM represents a broader Kashmir transnational 
activist movement? 
In practice, I knew this question could probably only be more of a supposition than a 
research question that could directly be researched by one PhD student. I would argue, 
however, that there is no reason to assume that it does not represent a broader 
movement not should it not be able, at least to an extent, explain how other transnational 
activist movements may operate. By the time I settled on the right question to ask, I was 
very much interested in how the KSM represented a TSMO, or at least the beginnings of 
one. This also led to me asking if indeed the KSM was representative of a much larger, 
broader Kashmir freedom movement, perhaps moulding itself after the Palestine 
solidarity movements. As a network approach would be very timely, I opted instead to 
home in on KSM meetings and events rather than looking in on all of the activities KSM 
activists were involved with. The findings could tell me something about the broader 




What role does identity have on actors’ motivation to participate in the transnational 
Kashmiri freedom movement? How much influence do ethnic, national, and religious 
motives have on the cultural framings and interpretations of the movement? 
Assessing the role of identity in the Kashmiri freedom movement could assist in 
ascertaining to what degree ideational constructs influence support for the azadi 
movement. This case study, however, can lead to enhancing theoretical understandings 
of the role of identity in freedom movements that have largely been attributed to 
ethnonationalist motivations. Ganguly (1997) links ethnic and religious national 
sentiments to institutional decay in IAK, or the lack of political opportunities in relation to 
the rise in violence as a means to effect change in Kashmir. Thus, identarian framings 
have been assessed in the separatist movement already in relation to changes in 
opportunities and mobilizing structures, and more so in response to globalization 
processes. The contemporary realities of the transnational Kashmiri freedom movement 
– the presence of a mobilized diaspora as well as other transnational activists – is not, 
however, accounted for in available research on the Kashmiri movement, other separatist 
movements that have taken on a transnational dimension, nor located in the research on 
transnational diaspora. This research acts at bridging this gap by using the novel 
approach of extending social movement theories on framing processes to the role of 
identity in the movement.  
 Researching identity of actors in the azadi movement was not as easy task as the 
population was heterogeneous and activists came from various campaigns and with 
various grievances or reasons for attending events and meetings. In order to make sense 
of all of this information, a strategy of identifying how activists framed their reasons for 
participating was deployed. Initially, this was done in an effort to understand how much 
influence popular movements have had on the azadi movement. Although I came to 
answer this in some ways, as I was working closely with a smaller set of individuals, 
instead the question turned to: 
How are Kashmir freedom activists framing their movement in an effort to increase 




The total number of Kashmiris affiliated with the University of Edinburgh would not be 
enough to start a university society there (which needs twenty signatures just from 
students) nor would it be enough to start a sustained movement. How would KSM ever 
get off the ground if it relied solely on Kashmiris? The answer is, of course, that it could 
never rely solely on ethnic or national Kashmiris in order to begin a movement. Kashmir 
freedom activists needed to frame their movement in an effort to increase support from a 
broader constituency. I needed to investigate how this was being done. 
In order to address this line of inquiry, a frames analysis approach was used. Master 
frames, which could roughly coincide with identitarian framing could be uncovered in 
order to understand not just which identity factors are most salient in mobilising actors, 
but which frames are more salient in mobilising actors, or, in the least which frames are 
most salient in gaining support for azadi? 
Does the framing of the movement fluctuate, and if so, how and in what ways?  
In presentation to an international audience and recruiting more supporters, participants, 
and sympathizers to the movement, are the goals and motivations implicitly or explicitly 
being adapted to a wider audience? How salient are diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames? How and when do they shift? Does this shift facilitate discord or 
cooperation among activists? 
The development of transnational identities and international solidarities which 
have been attributed to the transnationalization of social movements have been observed 
by such scholars as Cunningham (2001) and Della Porta and Tarrow (2005). Until now, 
literature on Kashmir and its freedom movement have been rather limited to the 
experiences of Kashmiris abroad and how they mobilize in workers’ associations or 
campaign to be recognized as their own ethnic groups, separate from India or Pakistan 
(Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011). Littered throughout this literature or samples of how 
Kashmiris stand in solidarity with, for example, Sikhs (Tatla, 1999). It is only recently that 
the influences of Palestine’s movement for independence are being fully recognized by 
scholars, however (Osuri, 2016). Activists and artivists have been articulating this 
connection for some time, however, and Kashmiris are inspired by Palestinian activists, 
and likewise, Palestinian activists support azad for Kashmir. Understanding the role 
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solidarity plays in connecting individual activists and disparate campaigns and TSMOs 
can be achieved through the sort of closer examination I have achieved during my 
research. 
Interpretive Approaches to Research 
 
Initially aiming to understand how the Kashmir movement had evolved from an 
ethnonational movement to a social movement, I soon discovered that the actors did not 
perceive their movement to necessarily be identity-based but more human-rights based. 
This discovery was essentially made through using an interpretivistic approach to 
research. At the outset of my research, I did not assume a deductive or positivistic 
perspective, but rather one of inductive reflection. According to Strauss,  
‘Induction refers to the actions that lead to discovery of an hypothesis – that is, 
having a hunch or an idea, then converting it into an hypothesis and assessing 
whether it might provisionally work as at least a partial condition for a type of event, 
act, relationship, strategy, etc.’ (1990: 11-12). 
Determining how international actors and those Kashmiris in the diaspora represent 
Indian Kashmiris deductively could skew interviews and bias observations. While 
acknowledging that certain theories, such as ethnonationalism, may offer partial 
explanations for attitudes and behaviours, it would not be plausible to propose that this 
is at a motivating factor for international activists (nor many Kashmiris as the literature 
review would reflect). A more inductive approach then has been adopted, led by 
hypotheses, but revised throughout the course of the research project, in a cyclical 
process. The autoethnography subsection of this chapter situations my positionality and 
the research process more clearly in relation to this approach theoretically to research. 
Fundamentally, my approach to research has been rooted in theoretical 
interpretivism. Any given action, policy, narrative, or event can be interpreted in a vast 
number of ways. As Ayoob (2001) articulates, it is not necessarily in the academic 
community’s best interests to ‘prove’ a hypothesis or to put forward a grand theory that 
hopes to sum up in its entirety any given problem. The academic’s goal, Ayoob argues, 
is about developing alternate ‘perspectives.’ Perspectives, he purports are not set in 
stone, but rather, fluid and dynamic. Not only may alternate perspectives be utilized, but 
several perspectives may be utilized to create a more holistic understanding of the ground 
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realities of conflict. This distinction in the discourses and narratives often leads to 
negative perceptions.  
 
In order to carry out research of this nature, one which aims to uncover the 
perspectives of respondents, methods were drawn from ethnographic research. Although 
a long-term ethnography in IAK was not possible, participant observation and attendance 
at meetings and events in the UK proved to be a good approach to conducting research 
on Kashmir activists. Many authors describe ethnographic analysis as a cyclical process 
which involves periods of data collection, analysis, reflection, more data collection, more 
analysis, etc. Oberhuber and Krzyzanowski discuss the difficulties in analysing the data 
after the collection period by pointing to the fact that ‘…ethnography is not a linear 
process that would either start with or lead to theories and hypotheses’ (2008, 190). 
Ethnography gurus Hammersely and Atkinson confirm that the best way to go about 
ethnographic analysis is to achieve a ‘…close interaction between analysis, research 
design, and data collection…’ (1998: 206). Given that the core of my data collection is via 
ethnographic methods, I have taken an inductive approach to my research. Ethnographic 
methods and multiple field sites have been deployed to uncover a deeper understanding 
of the role identities have on the construction and adaptation of movement framings. 
Duschinski (2009) and Duschinski and Hoffman (2011) have deploying ethnographic 
methods in Kashmir through participant observation and qualitative interviewing. Van der 
Molen and Bal (2011) conducted interviews and focus groups for a three-month duration, 
aimed at contextualising the new azadi movement through a contemporary ‘peasant 
resistance’ and gendered lens. The highly regarded Kashmir studies academic, Zutshi, 
proclaims that the best scholarship on Kashmir goes beyond repeating ‘…policy solutions 
without adding anything substantial to this narrative’ (2011: 3). She asserts that the best 
scholarship comes from ‘…political scientists and anthropologists who carry out intense 
fieldwork in Kashmir and produce people-centred narratives that also make a contribution 
to larger discourses within their fields’ (ibid.). Qualitative field work has indeed led to a 
more nuanced understanding of narratives surrounding the contemporary azadi 
movement.  
As detailed further in the data collections section of this thesis, at times I was 
more participant and at other times I was more observer. This was in relation to my own 
sense of in-group/out-group dynamic. I was a part of the group at sometimes more than 
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others, posing for photos, invited for dinners, etc.; and, at other times I was ignored when 
requesting interviews or excluded from meetings as an outsider and as an academic. 
Working with an organization like KSM offered the potential to witness firsthand an 
emergent transnational organization. However, it also meant that I was limited in my 
analysis more to groups of those who could afford higher education abroad, as not every 
respondent was on scholarship. This is perhaps especially true in London where it is 
assumed that most respondents had the means or scholarship substantial enough to 
afford living in London – a feat that I as an unfunded PhD student found to be an 
extremely difficult time financially. In response to the natural critique that this may skew 
the research in favour of an elite group, I will defend that although there were students 
coming from a background of means, there were also many who were on scholarship or 
who had worked professionally for some time before returning to education, which was 
especially true for the postgraduate students. I cannot assume that every one of my 
respondents came from a prestigious background simply because they were studying in 
the UK, otherwise the same logic would hold for myself, which is not the case.  
I have inserted this opinion here in order to locate my own perspective on 
interpretivism. Just like many other identity markers, socio-economic status and self-
perceptions about influence and power are matters of social construction. And, like other 
identity markers they may be attributed to someone or self-defined. From an interpretivist 
perspective, the researcher can aim to understand that a self-perceived place of privilege 
does not implicate that traumatic experience is less qualified or that one’s cause is less 
just simply because they had the luxury of studying elsewhere when there was violence 
in their homeland. Many of these respondents hold connections to their homeland 
through kin, friendship, and previous work or study.  
As identity markers can be socially constructed and malleable, this also lends to 
a constructivist approach to research. The grounded theorist, Charmaz, takes a 
constructivist angle, asserting that, ‘a constructivist approach…sees both data and 
analysis as created from shared experiences and relationships with participants and other 
sources of data’ (2006: 130). Charmaz further contends that, ‘Constructivists study how-
and sometimes why-participants construct meanings and actions in specific situations’ 
(ibid.). More social scientists outside of anthropology have been deploying methods of 
ethnography for gaining greater insight into the situation on-the-ground. As a social 
scientist who has accepted that identities are socially constructed, this general definition 
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aligns with my own epistemological stance as an interpretative researcher. Generally, 
Charmaz describes interpretive theory as a more ‘imaginative understanding of the 
studied phenomenon’ which ascribes to ‘assume emergent, multiple realities; 
indeterminacy; facts and values as inextricably linked; truth as provisional; and social life 
as processural’ (2006: 126-7). Those theoretical frameworks that have been put forth by 
scholars previously, such as ethnonational interpretations of the Kashmir conflict and 
research on Kashmir diaspora have inspired my research, but my research advances 
these findings with the application of social movement theory more generally on the 
contemporary Kashmir movement. Also, in terms of generalization, this research 
enhances theories of social movements by stressing the importance actors have on 
international solidarities and supporting similar campaigns. Perception is a critical 
element in understanding how frames have emerged to locate the freedom movement 
not as one of separation from India but as the human right to self-determination from an 
occupying force. It is for this reason that while being reflexive in my own position as an 




This project has been explored by participant observation and qualitative interviewing in 
the UK in conjunction with a collection of samples from social media pages. There is also 
reference to a short duration trip to IAK which was partially facilitated by members of KSM 
Edinburgh which I had interviewed previously. Although a longer-duration study was 
initially planned, it was not possible. The findings of the short-term study, however, did 
provide with important interviews which does in some ways connect the transnational 
movement to the domestic one. Methods of data collection have been observations of 
meetings and events with KSM branches affiliated to the University of Edinburgh in 
Scotland and the KSM branch affiliated with University of London’s School or Oriental 
and Asian Studies, currently the most prominent branch in London. Herein, the first site 
will be referred to as KSM Edinburgh and the second KSM SOAS.8 Qualitative interviews 
were also conducted with individual activists in the UK affiliated with KSM and several 
meetings with respondents in IAK were also drawn upon. Work with KSM Edinburgh 
 
8 A table listing meetings and events attended are located in Appendices  
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informally began in October of 2012 and carried over into 2013 whereby KSM became a 
source of pilot investigation and a few interviews were conducted as a part of coursework. 
This initial affiliation led to contacts within IAK where a short-term investigation was 
conducted with a compiling of several interviews and field notes to be used as a pilot 
study for the PhD project. Although it was eventually discouraged to conduct a longer-
term investigation in IAK, this period was informative for the PhD research as well as an 
invaluable source of rapport-building for further, more formalized work with KSM. Since 
permission was granted to extend these interviews to the PhD research, they are drawn 
upon. The most structured collection of interviews in Edinburgh were gathered between 
2014 and 2015. The sample of meetings and events drawn upon range from 2012 
through 2015. Since participation and activity at University societies ebb and flow with 
the academic calendar, graduations, and deadlines, most of the notes taken during 
meetings have been utilized for optimal analyses. During most of the academic year of 
2015/16, participant observation was conducted at the KSM SOAS site. A similar number 
of semi-structured interviews were conducted at that site. Given the shorter duration of 
the stay in London to Edinburgh, in addition to KSM meetings and events and active 
supporters, more information was gathered by affiliated causes, with some interviews 
conducted with people that may be more active in another group, but for whatever reason 
came to a KSM meeting or event. Given that there were not large numbers of members 
of the society, my sampling strategy for interviews was simply to ask all that I could for 
an interview. My sampling strategy for my visit to IAK was meant to be a pilot and 
therefore was reliant on a snowball method. Participant recruitment was not strategic but 


















with IAK ties 
4 5 8 16 
Respondents 
with PAK ties 
1 1 Unknown 2 
Other South 
Asian Ties 
3 1 Unknown 4 
**Respondents 
not identifying as 
South Asian 
2 1 N/A 3 
     
Identify as 
Muslim 
8 5 ***Unknown 13 
Identify with 
other religion, no 
religion, or 
chose not to 
answer 
2 2 Unknown 4 





IAK (less structured) Totals 
Male 7 3 8 18 
Female 3 4 0 7 
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Total number of 
respondents  
10 7 8 25 
*One respondent identified as living on both sides of the Line of Control, or, both India and 
Pakistan sides.  
**These are respondents who did not identify as South Asian by ethnicity. Several respondents, 
although claiming to be from South Asia may have identified as ‘British Indian’ or ethnically 
Kashmiri, but that their nationality was the UK. As there are several nuances, this is not 
represented here. 
***As the meetings with respondents in IAK were unstructured and I was trying my best for all 
respondents to remain anonymous, this information was not systematically collected. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured for both KSM sites, but for the period of 
investigation in IAK, they were more investigative and exploratory. I also was reticent to 
have an interview schedule and clipboard out and about as it was not practical given that 
I was only in IAK on a tourist visa and not technically permitted to be actively researching. 
I also knew the circumstances of the people in IAK would make it challenging to 
investigate with such accoutrements due to the sensitive nature of the questioning.  
Social media sites of Kashmir student groups in the UK was also used to harness 
information about the group and in order to infer more broadly about the nature of the 
transnational azadi movement. Given the lengthy duration necessary to conduct research 
beyond the scope of KSM-affiliated sites, it would not be practical to engage a third site 
in order to engage specifically with other pro-freedom groups, or with the discourses of 
those not necessarily affiliated with any pro-freedom group. It is for this reason that only 
those social media sites which are directly related to the university-affiliated Kashmir 
movements which have been used. This includes analysis of several KSM Facebook and 
Twitter feeds, in addition to sampling the feed of the Kashmir Students Campaign UK, 
which serves as a de facto connecting point for the growing network of KSM societies 
across the UK. More on the use of social media in this thesis is presented in the following 
chapter on the new Kashmir freedom movement. The following reflections are on my 
personal experiences and strategies conducting participant observation with the KSM 




Reflections on Collecting Data – Autoethnography 
 
I began my research on KSM just after the group formed in October of 2012, while 
working on a research Master’s degree at the University of Edinburgh. The KSM launched 
their group after showing a BBC Channel Four documentary Trails of Torture. The 
viewing attracted a crowd of around 30 participants. The organizers were a female 
Kashmiri student from London and a young British man who was affiliated with the 
campus Palestine society. It was the first time I had seen any footage of Kashmir that 
was feature length and did not dwell on the high politics of India v. Pakistan. At the time, 
I was more interested in how Kashmiris in India used social media to advertise their 
movement for azadi and connect to the wider world, especially since this was highlighted 
in the Arab Spring of 2011 but not for Kashmir’s ‘summer of unrest’ of 2010. I was also 
interested in undertaking a longer-term doctoral research more focused on confidence-
building measures, people to people and track II and III diplomacy. The desire to focus 
on alternative conflict resolution measures led to the possibility of social movements to 
provide a more nuanced angle than previously explored in my own research and the 
research I was initially referred to on Kashmir. 
 Going with the social media focus but having an open mind about the direction of 
my future PhD, I interviewed two Kashmiris from IAK studying in Scotland and affiliated 
with the newly formed KSM. These interviews were very lengthy and broad. The use of 
social media didn’t seem to be a particularly important point of interest other than it was 
expressed that media in all forms in Kashmir was highly censored, journalists and others 
who spoke out publicly against India have been targeted and detained. Also, it was here 
that I learned that SMS messages were banned. How was I to do a project on the use of 
social media to advertise to an international audience when the media was so highly 
censored, and it was unclear who had access to the internet and cell phones to begin 
with. Clearly social media was important as my respondents at those early stages and in 
later stages were all uneasy relying on traditional, mainstream media sources. From their 
perspective, Indian media was very biased and local Kashmir media sources were 




 In May 2013, I went to India on a tourist visa for easier access than attempting to 
apply for a research visa for the initial pilot study. Wary about traveling alone, I skipped 
the Jammu portion of my itinerary and spent two weeks in the Kashmir Valley where I 
was met by a friend I became acquainted with through KSM. Security was very tight 
despite the rather peaceful state of things in the area during that time. I was prepared 
with specific tourist sites to say I was visiting but more importantly I was there to visit and 
to stay with an old college friend who was already waiting to pick me up from the airport. 
It was easy enough and I was not questioned too much. Even though I was a university 
student my degree program was ‘South Asian Studies’ so I could defensively argue that 
I had an interest in language, religion, history, or any number of less contentious lines of 
inquiry than the Kashmir freedom movement which I was sire would earn me a seat on 
the next flight leaving the country.  
 Once in I did get to work the very next day where I learned rather quickly that 
interviews were not set up in the same manner as they would be in the UK. I did not call 
ahead or schedule an interview with a leading professor at a University of Kashmir but 
was sat in front of him unceremoniously. I had outlined my research, but it must not have 
been done very well because the man only relayed a history lesson to me as opposed to 
discussing anything related to social media or the contemporary freedom movement in 
Kashmir. I had only expected to schedule a meeting and was instead called out for lack 
of preparation. I learned to always have with me a notebook with semi-structured 
questions handy for whoever my contacts wanted to sit me in front of next.   
Whatever plan I may have had initially shifted to whatever plan my hostess and 
contact had for me. I followed their lead and adopted a snowball approach that was not 
selective. I had only two weeks and I wanted to make the most of it. Unfortunately, this 
did mean than my sample in Kashmir was limited to those they thought I wanted to speak 
with – journalists and professors. However, from those journalists did come access to two 
university students who were jailed after appearing at a protest. Another encounter with 
a non-professional was at the Bemina Rehabilitation Centre. On my own while awaiting 
takeout, I overheard a man speaking with tourists about the Kashmir conflict and joined 
in. I also managed to have a brief impromptu conversation with an Indian police officer 
over soup one evening. It was looking to be a good start.  
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My contact in Kashmir did set up an interview with a separatist leader, he was 
arrested on that day and my interview was cancelled. This sort of blocking of an interview 
drove home the need for caution when working in Kashmir. 2013 was a relatively peaceful 
year for Kashmir but there were still troops present all over Kashmir, from city streets to 
rice fields in the country. With text messages being banned, it seemed as though all of 
Kashmir had a cell phone glued to their ear. My hosts were no different and on one 
occasion I overheard them speaking about my interview with a ‘separatist leader.’ Shortly 
after, we were approached by two members of the security forces who requested to check 
my passport and were asking me questions. I looked the part of the tourist at all times. 
My notebook and pencil were tucked away in a shopping bag I carried, and I wore shalwar 
kameez matched with jeans for a comfortable, casual look. My host explained I was 
visiting a college friend and enjoying the beautiful scenery of Kashmir. All true, of course. 
I do not know whether or not they overhead my scheduled interview or not, but they let 
us go quickly after a few questions on the street and we both breathed a heavy sigh of 
relief. The next day, however, was when we found out about the arrest of my would-be 
respondent. It was usual to have preventive detention of separatist leaders during certain 
days of protest or strike. It was still cause for concern and proof that I – and whoever was 
assisting me – ought to be careful. 
I left Kashmir with nearly a dozen interviews, several encounters, and very 
confident in my ability to meet in the future with more grassroots activists and ‘average’ 
Kashmiris from the universities and perhaps rural communities. I greedily wanted to 
understand in depth what Kashmiris truly thought about freedom, the Indian presence 
and resolutions that they would bring forth for peace. Further, the newfound confidence 
would mean I would focus on a balanced sample of men and women, professionals and 
non-professionals. I knew it would be challenging to find a good cover for myself but 
contacts with the University would help prepare my research visa application, or 
alternatively I was prepared to sign up for language classes and even had an interest in 
seeking out volunteering opportunities in order to facilitate a legal, longer-term stay in the 
Valley. 2013 was a peaceful year and I also knew I may have limited time. It was my 
intention to travel again for a more extended period in 2014 which would have focused 
more on human rights activists than journalists. However, after an ethical review by my 
university, I was prevented from conducting longer-term field research in IAK due to 
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security concerns. I was recommended to try focusing instead on the diaspora community 
in the UK and therefore was once again brought back to the KSM. This also brought me 
back to the problems that I raised in the previous chapters – that the KSM were not a 
homogenous diaspora community. The meetings were easily accessible, and the 
respondents would seem to be easily accessible. But, in practice I struggled to get as 
many one-on-one interviews in the two years working with KSM than I did in the two 
weeks I spent in Kashmir. The good news is that it provided a much more balanced male 
to female ratio than in Kashmir.  
 
Field Site Specifics 
 
Access to KSM meetings was easy as most were open to the public and my research 
interests in Kashmir were welcomed openly by committee members. The Edinburgh KSM 
was the crucial element for my access to a greater understanding of the transnational 
Kashmir freedom movement. In particular, the committee members were welcoming and 
happy for me to observe during meetings. As Reeves (2010) said of gatekeepers, ‘These 
people can help or hinder research depending upon their personal thoughts on the validity 
of the research and its value, as well as their approach to the welfare of the people under 
their charge’ (316). It was very important for me to be open about my research, even if 
some of my future findings would not be agreeable for all actors. I was given express 
permission by committee members to attend meetings and I quickly found myself to be a 
staple of the group. Along with the committee members and a few other dedicated 
individuals active in campaigns with a link to Kashmir such as Amnesty International and 
Palestinian right to self-determination, I was regarded as simply another interested party 
whose presence and occasional participation were welcomes. Utilizing gatekeepers for 
access to field sites has been a tool in the ethnographic researcher’s toolkit. Mater (2016), 
for instance, while researching Palestinians in Britain gained access to interviews 
‘…through personal contacts and a snowballing method’ (1030). I have, since the autumn 
of 2012 at the inauguration of the group, gained access to KSM and subsequently to 
interview participants through establishing rapport with the group, networking and making 
contacts via the ‘snowballing method.’  
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Access issues working with KSM have been nominal. Most of the meetings are 
open to the public at either the Edinburgh or London sites considering the group’s explicit 
intent was to ‘raise awareness’ for the situation in Kashmir, my presence was welcome 
and encouraged at events and meetings. As the attendance at meetings varied from 
semester to semester, any ‘body’ in a chair was welcome. In fact, at the end of year 
meeting for KSM Edinburgh in 2014, a major complaint was inability to recruits and 
maintain members who actively engaged with the group. In other words, the committee 
member stating this was upset that people seemed happy to attend events, but that KSM 
needed better strategies for repeat attendance and, perhaps more importantly, more 
eager activists willing to organize and contribute in more ways than simply coming along. 
Access to participants for one-on-one interviews was a more precarious matter. 
Interest in giving interviews did come in the form of intrinsic interest in the study itself, but 
I believe interest was also a matter of empathy for me as another student. Several of the 
participants were relatively advanced in their studies as undergraduates or postgraduates 
themselves so there was a sense of empathizing with the need to get their dissertations 
completed. The most difficult thing was not finding interest in giving an interview, but in 
the scheduling of that interview. It was difficult at times to gauge whether someone was 
genuinely very busy or simply avoiding my email requests to schedule an interview. 
Having previously been in sales, I did not let this rejection put me down, but simply offered 
no more than two gentle reminders to schedule an interview with me before I quit asking. 
The number of one-on-one participants thus was not as robust as I would have hoped it 
would be. However, considering the small number of people that regularly turned up to 
meetings every month, it was arguably representative. The next section discusses my 
approach to field work with KSM. 
 
 
Kashmir Solidarity Movement (Edinburgh) 
 
If a social movement is joined for many different factors as Tarrow (2005) indicates: 
‘motivational, ideological, and cultural,’ then those members of Kashmir Solidarity 
Movement (KSM) may perceive themselves to be members of a movement for: freedom, 
democracy, Islam, Kashmiris, separatist movements, and more nuanced campaigns for 
human and women’s rights more generally. The phenomena of globalizing a social 
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movement almost inherently widens the circle of potential participants. For Kashmir, 
although the globalization of the post-insurgency movement really had its footing in the 
massive protests of 2008 and 2010, these events only became crucial to the 
internationalization of the Kashmiri movement after the release of BBC’s documentary 
Kashmir’s Torture Trail in 2012. Although scores of reports and books portray the human 
rights abuses and widespread torture of Indian Kashmiris, this documentary gave easy 
access to credible information regarding the situation. Perhaps more importantly, the 
showing of the documentary led to the formation of KSM Edinburgh in September 2012. 
The KSM is an open group of activists of varying levels of interest and a plurality 
of motivations for involvement. The group has only formed recently in October 2012, and 
has attracted students, sympathetic members of the public, and general activists involved 
in other movements. The group conducted regularly scheduled planning committee 
meetings and held events aimed at raising awareness such as documentary screenings, 
vigils, and somewhat more ‘culturally-centered’ events with food and poetry. The group 
also sent letters to government officials, press releases, updated their Facebook page, 
and encouraged delegates to attend activist ‘training’ sessions and seminars for better 
efficacy as well as networking opportunities. The primary strategic goal of KSM appears 
to have been raising awareness about the Kashmir issue and the group had devoted 
much of its budget to that effect.  
I began attending meetings of the KSM since its inaugural showing of the 
documentary. Afterwards, I continued to actively participate and observe, piloting several 
interviews and fieldwork observations for research methodology courses. I have drawn 
from a sample of meetings and events since September 2012, but specifically targeted 
the period between January 2015 and May 2015 for one-on-one interviews with activists. 
The activists ranged from those attending twice over the course of a few months to those 
more active for a longer duration including committee members. The demographics, as 
outlined previously, were a mixture of Kashmiri, other Asian, and non-Asian ethnicities 
and have been active in a variety of causes besides KSM. As of this writing in 2019, the 
society is no longer active and the group’s Facebook page was taken down. I have saved 
a selection from their activities from 2012 through 2016 and have used these for 




Field Site Two: Kashmir Solidarity Movement (SOAS) 
 
The first two university-associated Kashmir groups in the UK were located in Birmingham 
and Edinburgh, however since then several groups in London have formed. One of the 
committee members for KSM Edinburgh had direct links to the society which formed at 
the University of London’s School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). This was 
already active in 2014 when I was planning on conducting a research trip the following 
school year. The period for fieldwork with KSM SOAS group was from late September 
2015 through mid-February 2016 to coordinate with the what I anticipated to be the most 
active time of the semesters for the group. This time period has included observations, 
attendance at meetings and events, and qualitative interviews as with the first site. Being 
an unwaged student also limited my duration of field study and further constrained me to 
commute to the SOAS campus rather than try to venture further to Luton in any attempt 
to reach out to the diaspora This would perhaps be more practical for a funded study. 
Being a site for a much larger diaspora population I suspected that I would have greater 
access to the diaspora. I assumed incorrectly that the larger diaspora population would 
be participating in KSM and attending their events. Although some of the events held did 
attract those in the South Asian diaspora, it was difficult to approach people in large 
events to discover their heritage and interest in the group. The students were more 
approachable and easily accessible, and it became apparent that those youth activists 
should be the focal point of my study as it reflected upon youth activism and university-
affiliated campaigning in Kashmir itself.   
London provides a forum for collective action from not only student and workers’ 
associations, but is an active site for protests, lobbying, and other activist activities. There 
are marches, rallies protests, and numerous opportunities for collaboration with other 
universities. During the time I was participating and observing the KSM SOAS activities, 
Kings College London (KSM KCL) also formed and collaborated for a week in February 
2016 with KSM SOAS. 5 February marks Kashmir Solidarity Day and thus, during one 
week in February it is common for KSM groups to have a Kashmir Solidarity Week in 
February. The groups’ outreach activities are heightened and thus the reason behind 
staying in London until this time. I ran into similar problems conducting interviews here 
as I did at the other site. I managed to speak with quite a few of key people involved in 
the organization, but some had little time for a one-on-one interview, which was probably 
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a mixture of genuine lack of time and disinterest in speaking to me about their involvement 
in the society. Another difficult task was getting people who were outsider stakeholders 
to sit with me for an interview. There were more Kashmiris and South Asians in 
attendance at KSM SOAS events than at Edinburgh and the group was less reliant on 
finding outsider participants. There were some, but in addition to being busy writing 
dissertations themselves, they also did not see themselves as an expert and may have 
been reluctant to voice their opinions because of this.  
 
A Note on Web Collection 
 
Initially, there was an intention to draw from a sample of websites out-with the university-
affiliated movement in order to better identity the impact social movement frames have 
on the contemporary azadi movement. However, it has proven of little use to analyse the 
contemporary azadi movement as a holistic, if loosely organised movement. Rather, 
there are many different factions of the contemporary movement. For example, the JKLF 
has been active within Kashmir as well as in the diaspora sometime. However, given that 
my primary source group were young Kashmiris who tended to not be involved in the 
JKLF or other more established diaspora organizations, it would be difficult to infer from 
such a targeted study the impact KSM might have on an organization such as this. It 
would be an interesting path to take for further research that perhaps worked closer with 
an established community of Kashmiris rather than a transient and largely mobile youth 
movement. Thus, the sample drawn for analysing in order to assess the variable use of 
frames has been focused solely on KSM. I would argue, however, that this is probably a 
fairly representative material considering that many members of KSM do have direct links 
to Kashmir, with many members who return for holiday visits or more permanently then 
reporting on developments in Kashmir as events unfold, in a manner not dissimilar to 
amateur journalists. If they do not report on their own experiences, they are quick to share 
articles and petitions which are rapidly distributed either through group websites or 
personal feeds. Furthermore, there is a dominance of youths present in the visible protest 
movement within the IAK. The older generation may be defined rather differently than the 
current formation of Kashmir youth and solidarity networks that are dominant in this 
transnational activist space.  
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 Specifically, I took a sample of Facebook posts for the duration of affiliation to 
either group. For KSM Edinburgh this was over a longer period of time from 2012-2016; 
however, there is significantly more data in the way of postings and events between 2013 
and 2015 than when the group was just beginning to when the group began to fade out. 
For KSM SOAS, I copied the Facebook page on 27 May 2016 and utilized material from 
its inception in 19 November 2014. I primarily used material from the Facebook sites for 
the duration of the time I was undergoing participant observation with the respective 
groups rather than attempt to go through and code individually each segment. The 
Facebook group Kashmir Students UK was more active prior to the new KSM groups 
forming in London. This site was used mainly due to the cross-referencing from KSM 
Edinburgh. I generally limited myself to social media sites that were cross-referenced by 
the KSM sites as going beyond this would widen the scope of the project to beyond my 




For the first pilot interviews conducted in 2012, written consent was requested, and an 
audio recording was taken and transcribed. This was after participants were issues a 
participant information leaflet (PIL) which outlined the initial research project. As those 
participants were located in the United Kingdom, the ethical consent was nominated a 
level 1 and the respondents were anonymized. This was done despite a request from the 
initial interviewees to not remain anonymous. Since they are both students coming from 
IAK, I believed it would be better, however, to keep my sources confidential, especially in 
the event of using this information for any publications. The consent forms used for these 
interviews were largely based on those found on the UK Data archive website.9 The initial 
method of requiring written consent was satisfactory in the beginning, but for a further 
early interview conducted in 2013, it was requested that the person not be recorded. As 
recording and written consent would be tricky to obtain in IAK during my visit later in 2013, 
I decided in an effort to make all interviews in a relatively similar format, I would not audio 
record them. For privacy and safety concerns, I opted to not request written consent 
 




during the pilot trip to IAK. Instead, verbal consent was granted for the respondents there, 
on condition of anonymity. In most cases, all names have been given pseudonyms. Some 
pseudonyms were requested by the interviewees; others were nominated by me. Initially 
I referred to some respondents with only a first initial, but this was later changed to a 
pseudonym. Psuedonyms were chosen randomly from a list of male and female names 
that may correspond to the region. As Kashmiri names may be derived from names used 
in South Asia as well as the Middle East, I used a list of popular Muslim names compiled 
from these sources.  
While conducting a mini-ethnography of KSM in 2013 as part of the course 
requirements for my course on ethnography, I found written consent to be more of a 
liability than an asset. Although the meetings have a ‘core’ group of attendees, the 
participants change from week to week. For events such as the KSM vigil or large events 
co-hosted with other groups, it would be impossible to obtain written consent from 
everyone involved and announcing to a large room of people that I am a researcher may 
only prove to be disruptive. Consent for interviews have generally been written, however, 
consent for observations of meeting and events have been obtained with KSM committee 
members which have acted as gatekeepers.  
KSM Edinburgh, in general, was very open to my attendance and would ask about 
the research. I was invited on a few occasions to present a background on Kashmir, and 
I did give one presentation on human rights abuses in IAK. Throughput this time, I would 
always refrain from discussing my personal views on territorial resolution which included 
careful framing of my own messages, such as using ‘Administered’ as opposed to 
‘Occupied’ Kashmir. But being unbiased is often an illusion in ethnographic research, as 
no person is without bias and no research can be conducted without formulating an 
opinion. This is one issue raised by Howard Becker in his 1966-7 essay ‘Whose side are 
we on?’ This essay, in particular addresses some ongoing concerns raised in my own 
research such as general sympathy for the populations I have worked with and 
specifically the issue of disproving ethnic or national mobilizations simply because the 
KSM thinks of itself as a social movement. These have all been difficult to address, during 
the period of field work and during the time of writing up. Although I will remain true to my 
decisions to not address what, in my opinion, would be the best territorial resolution, I will 
attest to growing sympathies for the Kashmir people and their fight for a more democratic 
society. I am certainly not the first Western researcher to work with South Asian 
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populations and it will be difficult to nullify the impact my own background has had on my 
opinions during the research, or the extent of ‘taking sides.’ For Hansen (2001), whose 
work involved research on communal tensions in Mumbai, he found it particularly 
challenging not to take sides when his own experience as a researcher identified an 
asymmetrical division in conflict, i.e., the right-wing Hindu groups had more power and 
resources and suffered less in real terms than the Muslim populations. In the case of 
Kashmir, it is challenging not to sympathize with the stories of unarmed Kashmiris who 
have been beaten or otherwise abused by well-armed and provisioned military personnel. 
Thinking reflexively upon my own involvement in the KSM, I was initially certainly 
more of an observer than a participant. I quickly got the impression that I was seen as 
standoffish, rather than a neutral observer. Instead I began to gradually participate more, 
offering to speak at events and baked cookies for raising donations for the floods and the 
group. I eventually became more comfortable with my picture being taken with the group 
rather than trying to avoid pictures as I had previously done. This definitely helped my 
rapport as a researcher to let go of the notion that I was only an uninterested observer. If 
I were disinterested or disengaged, I would never have sought Kashmir as a topic for a 
PhD. Despite my attempts at being closer to the group, I was still very much an outsider. 
Most of the participants were well younger than myself and they occasionally did speak 
their native tongues if I was the only non-South Asian in the room or at the table. My 
experiences with a family in Kashmir was the highlight of my PhD experience and I will 
never forget their incredible hospitality or helping to facilitate interviews. I would be hard 
pressed to say that this has not changed my view on the Kashmir conflict. I have muddled 
my own definitions of an outsider-insider activist, but I believe this makes the research 
richer and more invested that detracts from its rigour.   
Interpreting Results 
 
The use of social movement frames was not inherent in the initial research design, but 
emerged with the onset of practical fieldwork, as inferenced in the section on 
autoethnography. Literature on frames analysis is extensive and there are a great many 
ways in which to analyse frames for social movements research. How I chose to use 
frames analysis in my research was a method of interpreting overarching, or master 
frames that emerged from data sampled. It was particularly useful to use the strategy of 
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finding master frames by deploying semi-structured rather than structured interviews. As 
I was interested in people’s perceptions of their grievances and their perceptions of the 
azadi movement, it was important to not lead their answers too much. I did ask questions 
that corresponded to my research questions, but instead of asking respondents how KSM 
framed their message to outsider activists, for example, I would ask ‘Describe in your 
own words what KSM’s message is.’ Questions such as this and ‘What have you learned 
by attending KSM events?’ permitted for the inference of framing tactics used by KSM. 
This further permitted for the separation of frames used, perhaps strategically, by KSM 
organizers and the identity of individual activists. To understand identitarian motivations 
by individual activists, I used a combination of demographic questions and would also 
ask those who were from the region if this did have an impact on their decision to 
campaign for a free state. Despite the strong motivation for Kashmiris and those coming 
from other parts of South Asia feeling like their heritage impacted their decision to 
campaign, the discussions surrounding KSM itself and the grievances were strongly 
connected to frames which emerged from the discourse. Asking questions or probing 
responses to clarify grievances or individual motivations for participating always led to a 
handful of master frames, of which, human rights acted as the solidaristic ‘metapackage’ 
for reasons to mobilise. As in-group and out-group activists alike reflected upon these 
master narratives, it became the most critical element in interpreting the results of this 
research. For this reason, the next section offers a discussion of master frames and 
further outlines those frames which resonated the most with activists. 
 
 
Collective Action Frames: Getting people from the balcony to the 
barricades 
 
Stepping back momentarily from the master framing technique and the more specific sub-
frames that branch from a human rights metaframe, I now introduce the more theoretical 
foundation of framing in terms of how it serves to collectively mobilise. Subjective 
elements such as ideological beliefs help to inform decisions about whether or not to 
support a cause or campaign, and indeed whether or not to participate more actively in 
movements, however it is useful to gain a somewhat objective sense of what is wrong 
and who is to blame. Collective action frames essentially do just that – they help to create 
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an almost objective rationale for mobilising by providing sympathizers and would-be 
activists with a ready-made way to assess the situation and assert blame. Benford and 
Snow (2000) assert that:  
‘Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate 
a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as 
in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate 
an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect 
change’ (615) 
Benford and Snow (2000) refer to ‘diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing’ and 
‘core framing tasks’ whereby movement actors agree on interrelated problems which 
‘fosters action, moving people from the balcony to the barricades’ (ibid). Simply put, 
diagnostic framing identifies the problem, attributing blame – often to someone or some 
group. This can be the purported human rights violations in general or a more specific 
problem perhaps relevant to current or pressing issues.  
For much of the year 2016, KSM focused on the problems associated with the 
firing of pellet guns onto protesting crowds which caused cases of permanent scarring 
and full or partial blindness.10 At close range, they can be lethal (Singh, 2016). In 
prognostic framing, advocates or social movement organizers recommend solutions to 
the identified problem. For the problem of blindness, for example, it has been suggested 
that the pellet guns should not be used in crowd-controlling measures. Lobbying for 
discontinuing use of pellet guns would be a concrete legal manoeuvre. The use of pellet 
gun also tends to sharpen cries for azadi and promotes a renewed cycle of protest. In 
this respect, legal advocates and activists may work together towards concrete goals 
which often seem like reasonable accommodations for out-group activists. This is not 
meant to imply that Kashmir activists drop the call for the use of pellet guns and instead 
protest for azadi. Both are being done. However, an outsider activist may not perceive 
the goal of azadi as a concrete endeavour and may be more inclined to participate 
actively in a campaign to end the use of pellet guns. It is easy to garner sympathy from 
non-Kashmiris, especially for those who may have also experienced complications while 
protesting or assisting in a protest. Although an immediate resolution or prognosis may 
 
10 Pellet guns, purportedly a non-lethal means of crowd dispersal, were used extensively against 
demonstrations in 2016. These not only cause scarring, but eye injuries, including blindness (Tamin, 2016 
Al Jezeera; Waheed, 2016 The Guardian) are example news stories during this period.  
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be suggested, both in-group and out-group activists will further conclude that the solution 
for the human rights violations, including blindness by pellet guns, is an independent 
Kashmir – or as it is often phrased, an ‘end to Indian occupation of Kashmir.’  
The third framing alignment process is motivational framing. This is a rationale to 
action. Now it may initially seem that the call to action would be similar for in-group and 
out-group activists. However, as previously explored, in-group activists identify with being 
Kashmiri, South Asian, or having some other connection (such as marriage) to Kashmir 
as a reason for attending and/or organizing events. A sense of belonging is certainly 
evident in constructions of the Kashmiri freedom movement when there are events where 
the Kashmir culture is highlighted, for example, when there is Kashmiri chai, food, dance, 
or poetry. However, a sense of pride in being Kashmiri is not enough to risk persecution 
by having one’s name affiliated with Kashmir Solidarity Movement, especially when one 
intends to return to Kashmir. One explanation for this is the expanding legal advocacy 
and NGO network domestically and internationally for Kashmiris that offer some hope of 
protection from detention. For example, some people involved in SOAS KSM have been 
or are currently involved in legal work which seeks justice for women who have been 
abused and/or raped by Indian security personnel. These legal advocates perceive 
themselves as treading on thin ice, but are nevertheless emboldened to action, probably 
since female activists – unlike their male counterparts – have historically been less likely 
to face internment or to be disappeared. The motivations for a call to arms for out-group 
activists seem less clear. On the one hand, most out-group activists have little to fear in 
the way of being imprisoned or abused, although there have been incidents of academics 
and NGO workers deported from India. On the other hand, out-group advocates have 
very little to gain beyond the satisfaction of being altruistic. So, what is the ‘call to arms’ 
for these activists? Other than the bond formed between those they perceived as also 
suffering, I argue that legal advocacy and paths to promote justice offer the sort of 
concrete evidence for plausible success that out-group activists need in order to offer 
their own support. If the Kashmir azadi movement is not framed in a manner which 
concretely identifies plausible successes via proof that tenuously linked causes have 






The multi-sited ethnographic approach along with online and offline document analysis 
have provided triangulation in the findings in order to more accurately reflect upon the 
dynamics of the framing processes in the transnational Kashmiri movement. For analysis 
of this research, manual exploratory coding was initially used in order to find general 
themes. As this was a generally inductive strategy, I permitted themes to emerge, 
although some dominant themes emerged rather early on in the period of investigation 
which allowed for the consideration of social movement framing as the preferred 
technique for evaluation of individual and group narratives. Of these themes, the most 
prevalent ‘master’ collective action frame was (human rights) quickly became apparent. 
Within the human rights master frame, however, more nuanced sub-frames emerged. 
There is overlap here, explained more in-depth below and throughout this thesis. For 
now, it is worth noting that how one identifies as an individual and how one relates to the 
movement which one belongs is not mutually exclusive, but salient in relation to the 
collective action. Collective action framing can lead to the relation as being part of a 
collective group of aligned causes and campaigns.  
Individual identity or ideological belief may not always be reflected in the 
individual’s motivation for supporting a cause, however. According to Oliver and 
Johnston, ‘[i]deology is of central importance in understanding social movements and 
other political formations, and it is trivialized when it is seen only as a frame’ (2000: 1). 
These authors further argue that both ideology and concepts of frames are necessary in 
studying mobilization. To aid to their argument, Oliver and Johnston drew from the pro-
life and pro-choice movements in the United States from the 1970s. They purport that 
although in opposition on ideological grounds, both camps used the master frame of the 
civil rights movement, with the one side stressing the foetus’s right to life and the other 
side stressing the ‘right of the woman to control a fundamental aspect of her life’ (Oliver 
and Johnston, 2000: 2). Similarly, freedom of speech frames are used to both vindicate 
and to vilify hate speech in the media and in propaganda. Women’s rights are referenced 
to both ban and to justify wearing the burqa, hijab, or other politicized female garment. 
Discourse on Kashmir can be similarly muddled between ideology and framing 
perspectives. It is my contention that much of what can be found in literature on Kashmir 
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studies too often relies on ideological interpretations of motivations behind the 
movements. It is further my contention that in the case of the KSM, the way they have 
framed their movement more accurately reflects their ideological motivations that vice 
versa. By listening to the narratives and stories of individuals and through understanding 
what their grievances are based on, we can understand the motivations for framing the 
movement in terms of, for example, self-determination as a human right as opposed to 
self-determination as a right of a particular ethnic group. This does not mean, however, 
that all supporters have the same ideological view of what is and what is not considered 
a human right. For the contemporary movement, as I explore at length in the following 
chapter, women’s rights are human rights, but naturally the ideological belief in gender 
equality may not be shared equally among all participants even if all participants agree 
that women’s rights are generally human rights and choose to frame sexual violence 
against women in Kashmir as a women’s human rights issue. 
The narratives of the respondents and those narrating their struggles in meetings 
and through poetry or art are powerful representations of how the movement has become 
framed. It has been why qualitative gathering of respondents’ stories were so important 
for this research as well as important for the movement more broadly. Narratives can be 
defined loosely as ‘constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time 
and place…’ (Tavory and Timmermans, 2009: 249).  Narratives can be framed 
theoretically in a macro-perspective. To explore the questions in as systematic a way as 
possible, I have deployed coding techniques via the qualitative analysis software Nvivo. 
According to Richards, qualitative coding is meant to aggregate the data record into 
categories as a means of reducing the data into manageable segments you can work 
with (2005). Nvivo 10 is an excellent tool in managing large swathes of data from multiple 
internal and external sources such as literature, codes, memos, interviews, observations, 
websites, etc. For my research specifically, I have used interview data, participant 
observation, documents, and information from the web sphere analysis. One issue of 
using Nvivo for analysis of data is a more nuanced reflection on the epistemological 
underpinnings of the research being undertaken, juxtaposed with the drive for a 
‘systematic’ or ‘structured’ approach to data analysis that seems by and large a product 
of deductive logic. Hammerseley and Atkinson reflects the unique qualities of 
ethnographic analysis ‘…[f]ormerly, it starts to take shape in analytical notes and 
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memoranda; informally, it is embedded in the ethnographer’s ideas and hunches (1998: 
205). In deploying am extended case method approach, Burawoy argues for constant 
reflexivity as necessary in the conducting and analysing of ethnographic research (1998). 
Software can assist in numerical frequencies as well as developing an understanding of 
‘master frames,’ and frame hierarchy. Triangulation can account for anomalies and 
variations and lead to an observation of causal links that can be explored further in order 
to identify the role of identity in the transnational Kashmiri azadi movement.   
Some of the more sophisticated functions of Nvivo were not utilised for the 
purposes of this project. Word frequencies to target specific themes could be misleading 
as expressions may be taken out of context. The queries function was used in order to 
explore hunches emerging from the data. As some of the data were in picture or pdf form, 
such as fliers or graffiti, it was beyond my technical expertise to make use of the graphing 
or modelling features of the program. At the end of exploratory coding, I found that much 
of the codes were overlapping themes and found myself referring to hand drawn charts 
for visual analysis that would be too messy to reproduce. The cumulation of data collected 
is in one place, however, which could make further exploration of more specific questions 
or deductive analysis possible. For the time frame of this project, exploratory coding for 
themes was the primary objective of the software, and for that, the purpose was served 
well.  
Deploying these techniques, I have uncovered master frames from exploring 
narratives in discourse. These overarching frames correspond to the chapters in this 
thesis. The ‘rights’ frame, as asserted by Oliver and Johnston (2000) serves to link 
movements together. Specifically, master human rights frames act as an anchor for other 
ways in which to refer to the freedom movement. Human rights is both a way to solicit 
more sympathy for the Kashmir cause as well as an identifying characteristic of the 
individual activist. In other words, someone who self-identifies as a promoter of human 
rights, or as a human rights activist, they will be more likely to be drawn in when these 
frames are articulated. Even self-determination is framed as a human right, according to 
activists. Even where disparate groups have a variety of motivations for mobilisation, 
framing the reasons for supporting azadi as a right to self-determination, serves as a 
consistent way for expressing support. The human rights master frame represents the 
overarching frames that binds in-group and out-group actors together, but these are 
broken down into subthemes, or sub-frames which link itself to the identity of the actors. 
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For example, the injustice frame, as recognised by Gamson et. al. (1982), has been 
discovered to be a highly salient means for mobilising in the Kashmir freedom movement. 
It also connects to the identity of the actors as agreeing on specific injustices lead to 
strategies for resistance. In Gamson et al (1982) findings, the injustice frame was 
uncovered as a framing technique for mobilizing workers and student movements alike. 
The injustice frame is a method which connects movements, but it is also a tool for 
motivating activists to take a stand against an unjust authority. Again, however, it is the 
recognition that demonstrations, speaking freely on campus about political beliefs or 
workers organising for improved working conditions are essentially attached to the notion 
that workers and students have rights to begin with. 
Injustice and ‘legal framing’ of the issues become critical in bridging a gap 
between activists and advocates that can work together to achieve campaign goals. I 
speak at more length in chapter eight on human rights and political issues regarding the 
use of legal framing tactics. Discourse from activists involved in Kashmir’s freedom 
movement alternate between narratives of victimhood, survival, and resistance. The 
framing changes as well from praise for non-violent forms of resistance to praise for more 
disruptive and violent forms of resistance. The roles of those who resist in the Kashmir 
freedom narrative is complex and fluid, subject to emerging events and individual actors’ 
and subsidiary groups’ perceptions of the actions taken in relation to emerging events. 
Reports such as Alleged Perpetrators (2012) and documentaries such Kashmir’s Trails 
of Torture (2012) serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the communal, social suffering of 
Kashmiris and appealing to outside activists in order to gain sympathizers with the 
victimized Kashmiri. Digging deeper into the development of the human rights frame, we 
can identify the more abstract constructions of the trauma experienced that leads to 
victimization. This then must lead to the mobilization of a popular movement to construct 
an appeal for resisting the victimization. Without broad appeal, there would be no 
acknowledgment of the oppressed peoples. The human rights frame offers a ready 
conduit with which to make suffering known to a wider public. Chapter eight examines 
how legal advocacy is used to confer the ideals of azadi and justice in a manner that 
helps outsiders perceive the freedom movement as a human rights movement.  
Oliver and Johnston (2000) discuss other master frames as arguably important 
methods for clustering movements together. Some of the more generalizable frames 
noted in their paper are oppositional frames, antisystemic frames, revitalization frames 
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and inclusion frames (2000: 12). The use of these frames may have various purposes. 
Some may be used more in order to increase appeal to outgroup members, for example. 
For the purposes of this study, I have accepted that a rights frame holds the other frames 
together, like the trunk of a tree. If human rights were indeed the trunk of the tree, then 
there would be subsidiary master elements branching out such as framing the movement 
in terms of injustices. The tree analogy works well for depicting the ways activists become 
involved in movements. I would assert that one would probably find a rights master frame 
as key for linking activists together across a spectrum of campaigns. There are other sub-
frames used in order to solicit support as well, which are found in subsequent chapters. 
These frames are more defined in order to resonate more personally with an extended 
network of activists, such as framing the Kashmiri as a victim. Framing Kashmir 
oppression by painting a picture of a subjugated minority being attacked by a majority 
permits for those who support movements such as Black Lives Matter or campaigns 
against the implementation of legislation that targets minorities. This brings in people who 
not only sympathize with Kashmiris, but those who can empathise as also struggling as 
part of a minority group. Another branch on the framing tree would be to frame the 
Kashmir conflict in terms of supporting women’s human rights. Again, this frame helps to 
resonate the Kashmir struggle with feminist struggles for equality and prevention of 
sexual abuse. Whereby Oliver and Johnston (2000) refer to antisystemic frames, I believe 
the new azadi movement frames their opposition to the powers that be in terms of 
resistance, which becomes a very powerful frame within which to relate their movement. 
The analogy could continue, with smaller branches growing out of larger ones. Like the 
tree, the social movement is a living entity. Part of the movement grows or branches off 
into certain areas while other parts may be deemed as less important over time, wither 
and die like autumn leaves. Although there is overlap and mutability of this tree, the 
largest branches identified were: 
 
• Victimization frames 
• Subaltern/Minority frames 
• Women’s Human rights frames 
• (Culture of) Resistance identity frames 




The main findings of this study have been in understanding the ways in which in-
group and out-group activists have become motivated to participate in Kashmir’s freedom 
movement transnationally. In-group, or ‘insider’ activists, those which have a direct stake 
in any permanent territorial resolution, are more inclined to participate or become 
motivated due to their direct affiliation with the region and direct stake in the conflict. Out-
group, or ‘outsider’ activists are those who do not have a direct stake and whose lives 
would not be directly impacted by any territorial resolution. Insider and outsider activists 
may not agree on the territorial resolution, but they find common ground, or solidarities 
within which to support one another. There may be some overlap between insider and 
outsider activists. The concept of outsider and insider activists is fluid like many other 
social science constructions. The parameters I have set out on those having a direct or 
those having an indirect or no stake in the outcome of the conflict are useful but not static 
parameters. What is useful is that regardless of where one perceived themselves on this 
spectrum of insider-outsider, finding common ground is key to understanding the insider, 
if indeed you perceive yourself as an outsider to the conflict. This common ground may 
vary as the diversity in affiliations of activists may vary, but common ground is often found 
based on one or more of the following, with ‘shared belief of suffering of Kashmiris’ always 
present: 
• Participation in similar campaign or cause 
• Shared belief in suffering of Kashmiris 
• Regional interest (in South Asia/Kashmir) 
• Perception of being a minority or subaltern 
• Lack of opportunity to express self on other platforms 
• Professional development or networking 
• Socializing opportunities/networking 
• Desire to fight oppression/be a resister/challenge hegemonic power 
 
As the common ground is a shared belief that Kashmiris are suffering, this determines 







This research began with a desire to understand how puzzling it was that so many non-
Kashmiris seemed to be in support of an independent Kashmir state. The KSM vigil 
outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh, Scotland in 2013 demonstrated that there 
could be an active transnational diaspora even where there was not a large diaspora 
population. But unlike traditional literature on transnational diaspora activism, a new trend 
in global activism relies on a flourishing activist community rather than a diaspora 
community for sustaining some transnational movements abroad. As a divergence from 
ethnonational literature which revolves around a shared sense of ethnic and national 
community, the Kashmir freedom movement abroad seems to revolve around a shared 
sense of subjugation or the perception that Indian Kashmir is under a military occupation. 
In this narrative, Kashmiris are not separatists, but activists seek to end an occupation 
and an end to oppression of a minority by the current hegemonic power. With pilot 
interviews and observations conducted in 2012-13 and participant observations between 
2014 and 2016, the puzzle of why there could be such an extensive interest in azadi for 
Kashmir was resolved – but only by viewing the KSM as part of a broader transnational 
social movement. This chapter reflected upon the strategies used for collecting and 
interpreting data across field site, including social media. The use of frames analysis was 
key in order to decipher how activists negotiated with their own identities and how this 
impacted their connections to the azadi movement. This further allowed for a greater 
understanding of how insider and outsider activists alike could be motivated for 
participating in the Kashmir freedom movement. What emerged from my work with 
activists was the use of several major ways to frame the movement. These frames are 
used often in conjunction with one another, but always anchored to the notion of a master 
human rights frame. I used the trunk and branches of a tree as an analogy for how these 
frames relate to one another, as a reflection of how this is done in discourse of activists 
and organizers alike. As a rights-based discourse is paramount in uniting insider and 
outsider activists, it is used to reaffirm a solidarity based on the common depiction of a 
suffering peoples. This is relatable to activists who are both familiar and unfamiliar with 
the Kashmir situation and thus provides a firm common ground for utilising tactics used 
in other campaigns. The call to action and tactics used are thus more universal in nature 
rather than relative to a homogenous ethnic or national group.  
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 This remainder of this thesis will look into the new Kashmir freedom movement 
and how it seeks to portray an image distinct to the azadi movements of the past, but 
also how it links itself to these movements. Chapter three continues from chapter one’s 
historical context by focusing on the azadi movement from 2008. There are linkages here 
to women’s resistance as women’s human rights becomes an analogy for the self-


















The New Kashmir Freedom Movement 
 
The Kashmir freedom movement has its roots in demonstrations and calls for India to 
‘Quit Kashmir’ from since before 1947 and through to today’s renewed calls for a 
referendum to be to uphold Kashmiris’ right to self-determination. Throughout this time 
there have been cycles of violence attributing calls for independence from India. These 
movements have been sustained due to the misuse of power by Indian soldiers and their 
enjoyment of impunity from legal retribution in many cases. The azadi movement has 
been sustained due to the high levels of concentrations of military personnel in Kashmir, 
the bunkers lining the streets, the checkpoints, and curfews which contribute to the feeling 
of being under foreign occupation. The calls for azadi will not end when the excuse for 
the occupation, militarization, and laws granting impunity to security forces are in place 
because India affirms it is necessary to combat militancy and terrorism. This affirmation 
continues despite the decimated numbers, lack of weaponry available to carry out a 
sustained insurgency, and lack of support from Pakistan and their intelligence apparatus 
to train and fund militancy. Until recently (‘Kashmir Attack,’ 2019) there have been sparse 
militant attacks on Indian security forces and those that have taken place during the 
majority of my research period have been by Kashmiris themselves who have often 
experienced being beaten and/or tortured by Indian security forces. Unlike the new azadi 
movement marked by largely nonviolent protests and grassroots mobilisation, the ‘old’ 
azadi movement was one involving Pakistan’s ISI and foreign militants aiming to impose 
strict visions of Islam onto Kashmiris (Behera, 2006: 150-155; Mahmud, 2012).  
 This chapter explores the new Kashmir freedom movement, with an effort to 
capture the perspective of the Kashmiri activist, who feels they are an occupied people. 
I will begin this chapter by exploring the period after the 2008 Amarnath land row which 
marked a huge demonstration and march that recharged the new Kashmir freedom 
movement for the new generation as a nonviolent means to combat Indian government 
rule (Tremblay, 2009). From there, I move to the summer of unrest of 2010 and the fluent 
use of social media which gave the azadi movement a truly transnational perspective. I 
bring it back to reflect on the role militarisation has had on human rights abuses with 
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special attention paid to the role women have had in the azadi movement. Women’s rights 
are analogous to the rights of Kashmiris and are expressed here in terms of those sub-
frames explored previously: victimization, women’s human rights, and resistance frames 
are particularly explored in the sections on militarization. Following this, I draw attention 
to the contemporary freedom struggle with reference again to women’s renewed roles, 
but also to explore the new generation’s overall approach to resistance against Indian 
occupation and how they relate their case for a free Kashmir to an international audience. 
 
A New Azadi Movement for a New Generation of Kashmiris  
 
More than ten years after a full-scale insurgency dwindled to a handful of fighters, Indian 
military forces flooded the streets of Kashmir’s summer capital, Srinagar, to combat stone 
pelters who had been protesting with force after a seventeen year old was killed by a tear 
gas shell on 11 June 2011. During what has been donned the ‘summer of unrest,’ curfews 
(some 24 hours) and political shutdowns in the Valley were commonplace. The APHC 
leader, Geelani, had been organizing protests and strikes by issuing protest calendars 
(Geelani Releases Fresh Protest Calendar, 2010). In response to predominately 
nonviolent resistance, the military in Kashmir has responded with quick deployment of 
battalions onto the streets unleashing lethal force (Kak, 2011). Sanjay Kak (2011) reports 
that sixty cases of bullet wound injuries were ‘inflicted by security forces in the first 
fortnight of August alone’ of which all were ‘young men in their late teens or early twenties’ 
(35). Not all the victims were in their teens or young adults, however. On 3 August 2010, 
it was reported that a boy of eight was beaten to death after raising slogans for azadi by 
members of the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) (Kak, 2011: 29). Altogether, Kak 
reports that the summer of 2010 left 110 killed and thirty-five blinded (ibid).  
  Demands for azadi are reinforced in the context of an asymmetrical conflict 
between groups of young people protesting, some with stones and the 600,000 strong 
army stationed in IAK equipped with lethal weaponry. The youth of Kashmir are better 
educated than their parent’s generation and technologically savvy. They have responded 





struggles against occupation and for the restoration of human rights. Some basic 
demands for this new call for azadi have been highlighted by the JKLF and the more 
prominent APHC, such as the repealing of laws which protect security forces from being 
tried for their actions. Organizations such as KSM present a message advocating for an 
independent Kashmir, while presenting the documented human rights abuses to an 
international audience. 
 
Social Media as a Driver of the Transnationalization of the New Kashmir 
Freedom Movement 
 
During the summer of 2010, I was working on my dissertation for a graduate program in 
international conflict. I was witness to the rise of Facebook as a means to connect with 
an international audience as well as to understand how Kashmiris were using social 
media for organizing mobilizations. It was clear that social media was a valuable resource 
for coordinating strike action and promoting and circulating protest calendars issued by 
the APHC. During this time, there was also an online Kashmiri identity mini campaign 
that echoed earlier campaigns to make the Kashmiri national identity officially distinct 
from Pakistan or Indian national identity (Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011). Here, the 
campaign was for Facebook permitting the use of claiming to be a Kashmiri when signing 
up for Facebook rather than India or Pakistan as the only options. The most critical 
element of all of this activity was that most of it was conducted in English. This meant 
that it was not just other Kashmiris or others in South Asia that were intended to receive 
these messages. Clearly, activists were interested in reaching out to an international 
audience in a growing international forum where, for a change, they could have a voice 
against an oppressive growing superpower.  
 The online activity was not without its divisions. As we see in today on Twitter as 
well as Facebook, online activism from one side results in online aggression from another 
side and vice versa. Facebook group sites such as Frontline Kashmir (2010) were 
constantly getting hacked into and received abuse from supporters of India. Likewise, for 
many pro-freedom Kashmiri group site there were pro-India group sites and pro-Pakistan 
group sites. Starting out in my research, it proved problematic to harness them all 
strategically. I did take the opportunity to interact with Frontline Kashmir’s site as most of 
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the posts were in English and the group seemed happy to interact with me. Although not 
a part of any research project, I did pilot a survey where only around a dozen responded. 
Due to a such a small response rate and the inability to verify that the same few people 
were not answering more than once, I opted to not use the results. The survey did verify 
identity assumptions without asking specifically whether Kashmiris would like to be part 
of India or Pakistan. It instead asked whether people using the site identified with being 
Indian, Pakistan, or Kashmiri and asked what religion they affiliated with and whether 
they believed in a separation of church and state – that religion should not be a part of 
politics. Should Kashmir become independent, how much influence would Islam have on 
everyday politics? This last question was inspired by how seemingly indistinguishable 
pro-freedom slogans were alongside support for Islam. It was only much later that I 
understood ‘Inshallah’ could be a reverent ‘God willing,’ as much as it can mean ‘let’s see 
if I get around to it’ in everyday parlance. The results of the pilot were generally as follows: 
Muslim Kashmiris which identified with Kashmir and Pakistan were generally positioned 
towards Islam having a greater role in politics than Hindu Indians were of having Hindu 
playing a major role in state politics. With the rise of Hindu nationalism since 2014, 
however, it would be interesting to see if this view has changed dramatically.  
 I did not want to jump to conclusions about the role of Islam in the pro-freedom 
movement. As naturally, religion can be an important and salient element of everyday life 
not just for Kashmiris but for people all over the world who believe in gods and goddesses. 
This turned my attention towards trying to understand how these processes are framed 
in social media. The summer of 2010, however, was responded to with a crackdown in 
social media (Jammu and Kashmir state government censors, 2017). Given the extensive 
use of censorship in India, the arrests of young people posting pro-freedom slogans on 
Facebook, and the frequent cutting of the Internet in IAK, I could not rely completely on 
social media, especially those sites originating in IAK. Like Frontline Kashmir, many azadi 
supporting groups were hacked into or taken down just as their popularity began to 
spread. These sites in the past have been a valuable source of information not only for 
soliciting support for the azadi movement in general but for coordinating protests and 
strikes and reporting on areas to stay away from. They were the news that was not 
censored. Users reported on whether shops were closed in their areas in support of a 
strike or whether there was a protest, for example. I further observed that they reported 
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on incidents in their areas like a gunfight or looting or stone throwing and if the security 
forces were using force and what kinds of force, how many were injured and if anyone 
was dead.  
 Group sites are constantly being taken down, the names being changed, and the 
general ebb and flow of activity makes them difficult sites for conducting research. As 
reflected in the methods chapter previously, I have instead chosen to only take data from 
Facebook group sites affiliated with the student activist groups for a free Kashmir in the 
United Kingdom. This leaves out a lot, but as I am looking at the ‘new’ Kashmir freedom 
movement, these sites and affiliated activity such as articles shared on these sites are 
important facets of the groups and therefore largely representative of group activities, 
alignments, framing of messages and the general tone of the approach to advocacy for 
azadi abroad. Social media becomes inextricably linked to activity in our everyday lives 
and rather than being seen as a disjointed facet of the movement, I perceive it as 
integrated with the movement. Certainly, it is through social media that one not only 
promotes their cause, but also coordinate events, meetings, and combine the political 
with the banal which is a part of everyday life. This is part of the general cultural turn in 
the new Kashmir movement.  
Fahad Shah in Of Occupation and Resistance (2013) describes this new wave of 
resistance as one that involves ‘protest through music, art, literature and social 
networking sites’ which have ‘great reach, are viable, attract people, and make then 
conscious about the cause’ (2013: location 90). Free speech, which Shah cites as being 
not only ‘crushed’ but ‘illegal’ found a new home on the internet. Unfortunately, this was 
not a safe space for voicing dissent. Just like attending street protests can target a 
protester for police questioning, so too can Facebook protests. Faraz, a student of 
Kashmir University reports being arrested and incarcerated for ‘days of continuous 
questioning, involving physical and psychological torture’ simply for posting pro-azadi 
slogans on Facebook (Shah, 2013: location 120). Whereas social media became a site 
for snooping on activist activity, it also became an invaluable tool for activism. Online 
campaigns such as ‘freewaqar.org’ were created to help secure the release of a student 
arrested for stone throwing with Amnesty International taking an interest in the case 
(Shah, 2013: location 129). Shah also reports how online campaigning helped to secure 
the release of a 14-year-old boy after suffering two months’ detention (ibid).  
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KSM groups also participate in online campaigns through the circulation of 
petitions to try to get the release of people in custody or to stay an execution order as in 
the case of Shafqat, a young man coerced into signing a confession after being abused 
by security forces on the Pakistan side of Kashmir (reprieve.org.uk: 2014). Carrying on 
from previous mobilisations which have been ‘passed onto younger generations,’ this 
new Kashmiri movement is very much a facet of modernity and uses contemporary 
tactics, often fused with more traditional approaches to protest. Advocates share videos 
and post events, but also raise traditional slogans, make placards, march in 
demonstrations, and raise flags. One of the most important influences of the new azadi 
movement is the role of women. As the historical context chapter previewed, women have 
always been active in resistance but rather than having a more supporting role, they have 
become lead actors in the new Kashmir movement.  
 
The Role of Gender and the Militarized State 
 
An analysis of the Kashmir freedom movement as a social movement takes a more 
holistic approach over an equation of military strength as equivalent to power and those 
wielding this type of power as the only actors that matter in a conflict, as may be perceived 
in literature on the Kashmir conflict that does not give great emphasis on non-military 
struggles. The rise of Sheikh Abdullah as a figurehead who dominated the Kashmir 
movement against an oppressive Dogra regime marked a time in Kashmir’s history where 
the ideals of socialism would impact ideas of equality on class and gender issues alike. 
In 1944, the Naya Kashmir manifesto was adopted by the National Conference which 
stressed the future of Kashmir as a ‘secular, socialist state committed to the eradication 
of communalism and the rights of women’ (Butalia, 2002: x). Just like there is a common 
thread of linkages between independence movements and anti-imperialism, the rights of 
women are often depicted as coinciding with socialism and a sort of secularism that 
transforms the image of a weak Muslim woman into an agent of resistance.  
Historically, women have been seen as representing a nation rather than being 
an integral part of shaping that nation’s future. Nira Yuval-Davis, author of Gender and 
Nation (1997) emphasises the importance of women as representations of the nation 
‘biologically, culturally, and symbolically’ (3). Despite being the symbolic representation 
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of a nation, Davis writes that women are often not included in the discourse of the nation 
as they are perceived to be part of the private, rather than the public sphere (ibid). This 
is consistent with the arguments laid out by those panellists speaking at KSM events on 
the gendered aspects of the ongoing conflict. Many of the speakers on these panels have 
theoretical foundations in feminism but extend this literature to South Asia and more 
nuanced conceptions of gender and nation. Histories of colonialism on the Subcontinent 
draw parallels to the struggle for independence with the struggle for agency. Attacks on 
the Hindu male in British propaganda or as sexually weak vis-à-vis Muslim men is an 
example of the way the men of a community may be perceived to be under threat by an 
‘other’. The threat of being effeminate vis-à-vis an other has also been attributed to the 
reclaiming of masculinity (Hansen, 1999), and arguably of reclaiming a male community’s 
agency. It is also through attacks on the bodies of the Muslim, Hindu, or Sikh women that 
is in turn an attack on Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and their nations. The weak and oppressed, 
whether a nation or a woman, may be seen as contending with a patriarchy endorsing 
strength through militarization. 
 
Militarization and Patriarchy  
Cynthia Enloe (1984) makes the connection between militarization and patriarchy by 
exposing ‘the ways in which structures of male privilege and women’s oppression cause 
militarism’ (2). This theme of connecting seemingly local issues of patriarchy and 
women’s oppression to global issues of sustaining militarization runs throughout her 
works. Enloe’s (2016) Globalization and Militarism tries to make sense of our militarised 
world through a rather holistic approach of understanding the globalization of 
militarization, a process that has gone unabated and is inextricably linked to the 
acceptance of violence including violence against non-masculine types. Militarism, 
according to Enloe, is a concept that fosters ‘military values in both military and civilian 
affairs’ (2016: 11). This includes the justification of military priorities in ‘cultural, economic, 
and political affairs’ (ibid). Enloe outlines the ideas that are a part of militarism, which in 
brief are:  
‘…the belief that men are natural protectors…that soldiers deserve special 
praise…that hierarchies of command are a natural part of society…that it is natural 
to have enemies…physical force [is valued] over other forms of human interaction 
115 
 
to solve differences…that any state without a full military is not a fully “mature” state’ 
(Enloe, 2016:11). 
Militarism relies on the desire to be perceived as masculine. Strong militaries are 
necessary in this view, as well as ensuring that hierarchies including gendered 
hierarchies are intact. Upholding the view that national security means the prioritization 
of militarization makes it extremely difficult for proponents of demilitarization to be 
successful. Enloe asserts that national security decisions happen in particularly 
masculine spaces whereby ‘anyone imagined to be feminine does not seem to belong’ 
(2016: 13). Political decisions require the implementation of militarisation but they do not 
adequately take into account the impact these decisions and subsequent militarizations 
will have on everyday life for those affected. A feminist account is often not sought when 
considering these decisions which can in turn reflect unstable peace or further continue 
a spiral of oppression led by patriarchy and militarization. Militarization need not be a tool 
for cisgendered men alone and patriarchal concepts are perpetuated and enforced by 
cisgendered women as well.   
 Kaul and Zia (2018) also address how ‘war and occupation is an exercise in 
gendered hyper masculine power in the context of a conflict zone’ (35). Their edited work 
on women and Kashmir highlights the negative influence of militarism on Kashmiris. Alliya 
Anjum (2018), in her article, argues that militarism is more valued than civilian life in 
Kashmir (47). Here, she points to the visibility of armed forces in the streets, bloated 
military budgets, and immunity laws for soldiers in Kashmir (ibid). Writing during a time 
where full-scale militancy was still very fresh in the minds of Kashmiris, Seema Kazi 
reflected on the role the militarised state of Jammu and Kashmir has had on the domestic 
experiences of civilians (2007). More succinctly, her work draws from a women’s 
subjective experiences by focusing her sample on a small group of Kashmiri women. Kazi 
purports to challenge dominant narratives of the experience of militarisation whereby the 
‘state is the subject of knowledge and where masculine (state vs male militants) 
experience is assumed as the dominant and valid experience of militarisation’ (2007: 18). 
Representation of the female in politics and in matters of the state have had the tendency 
to be highly essentialized or trivialized. In the South Asian context and in the Kashmir 
conflict in particular, the reclamation of female agency and of women’s histories have 
been overshadowed by a summation of experiences that seemingly portray women as 
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the supporting actors in an historical narrative. Stemming from the insurgency, but 
certainly continuing today, women in Kashmir have had a conventional role in the conflict 
as wives, mothers, and daughters. These traditional roles, however, have become 
‘politicized in the face of a gendered onslaught of the Indian state that centres on Kashmiri 
men’ (Kazi, 2007: 34). Women, while showing public support for azadi are also being 
politically marginalized, Kazi argues, as because of a ‘conservative and patriarchal social 
context’ (ibid.). Her argument follows that the loss of democratic rights felt by Kashmir as 
a society filter into the gendered dimension whereby women feel an acute loss of rights. 
This, is not only by way of becoming a collective target to inflict suffering on the Kashmiri 
male, but also due to an environment where she suffers from greater social policing and 
is subjected to more regressive versions of Islamic identity than is historically precedent 
in Kashmir (2007: 35).  
Meera Sehgal conducted an ethnography whereby she spent nearly two years 
researching a women’s organization associated with the Hindu right-wing movement 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) called Rashtra Sevika Samiti, or simply Samiti 
(2007). In her study, she found that conditioning women as symbols of nationalist 
struggles is embodied in the right-wing Hindu movements in India which conflate 
women’s personal self-defence with national self-defence in ways that transform these 
women into symbolic “border guards”…between Hindu and Muslim communities’ 
(Sehgal, 2007: 60). Discursive strategies by political entrepreneurs permits for the 
framing of the Muslim ‘Other’ in terms that threatens women, and thus the nation as a 
whole. A paradoxical positioning ensues whereby women, in order to be liberated from 
the threat of the Muslim male, she must submit to the demands of the Hindu male, and 
thus the Hindu nation. While undergoing a physical training program meant to stave off 
sexualized violence from the Muslim other in the public sphere, their attention is shifted 
away from violence in the private sphere such as patriarchy in Hindu families and 
subjugation from higher castes (ibid.: 61).  
 Hindu nationalist violence takes the form of pogroms or riots whereby not only 
Muslim men and property are targeted for destruction, but Muslim women become targets 
of sexualized violence, as violations of the female in Muslim communities is generally 
perceived as a symbolic violation of the whole community, as Seghal asserts (2007: 66). 
Women Hindu nationalists such as members of Samiti also participate in anti-Muslim 
117 
 
violence. Sometimes it is in the form of property destruction, prevention of aid to victims, 
or the clearing of blood spilled by Hindu men. But women are not only to be dependent 
upon a masculinized Hindu man for protection of their virtues against intrusive 
communities. They also undergo militarized self-defence training in order to ‘regain’ their 
position in Vedic society as powerful mothers able to defend themselves against outside 
perpetration.  
‘The threat of rape and sexual violence is the core motivation mobilized in the 
construction and activation of a feminized siege mentality. Attendant with physical 
fear and intense emotions of shame and horror at being raped in an upper-caste, 
Hindu patriarchal culture that blames women for being raped in the first place’ 
(Sehgal, 2007: 69). 
In the context of the Indian upper-caste family, a woman is constantly told how to present 
herself in a manner which will avert a sexual male gaze, especially from lower-caste or 
Muslim men. In this manner, failure to present oneself in a non-sexualized manner 
underpins a societal acceptance that a violation of a woman’s body is the women’s own 
fault. It is a powerful tool, indeed, to establish conflicting discourse whereby the violation 
of women’s bodies becomes the violation of the community as a whole; yet, the violation 
of a woman is her own fault. In this argument, women are meant to be protected by men, 
but simultaneously told they must protect themselves from other men. Women’s 
empowerment can never be accomplished if men are hailed for protecting women who 
have not been violated, but women are to blame when they are violated. The narratives 
surrounding ideals of virtue are abundant in Islamic traditions as well as omnipresent in 
secular, overarching notions of virtue arising from cultural conceptions in South Asia such 
as purdah. This purdah draws a curtain between men and women and defines what a 
women may do in public life. Even in diaspora populations, some forms of seclusion from 
other sexes may be observed and this further complicates the Kashmiri women’s 
resistance. Women must struggle not only with their roles as leaders and civic activists, 
but also their roles vis-à-vis Kashmiri men, both at home and abroad.   
Patriarchy and Occupation 
 
An academic speaker at the SOAS KSM event ‘Kashmir Women’s Resistance,’ Mir 
Fatimah Kanth, reflected upon the role of occupation as gendering both women and men. 
She claimed that state violence is patriarchal and that it ‘asserts certain masculinity as 
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Hindu fundamentalists [that] predates the Hindu nationalist government. Women are 
seen as our women and their women can be raped.’ She further purported that these 
patriarchal notions about violence which lead to the dishonouring and humiliation of 
women is made possible in the context of occupation. The acknowledgement of women 
as bearing the brunt of violence in conflict is omnipresent in literature on conflict and 
human rights. But the link made between academics and activists occur through 
acknowledging the connection between occupation and violence against women, as the 
military occupation provides the structure for the application of systematic violence. This 
idea has been reinforced by other speakers at this event and separately one year 
previously at an event in Edinburgh that was collaborated with the University of 
Edinburgh’s Feminist Society (FemSoc). The speaker for FemSoc similarly linked the 
experience of occupation with the prevalence of violence against women in the 
Palestinian context. During that event, a Kashmiri activist was Skyped in who reinforced 
that the occurrence of systematic violence against women was indisputably caused by 
the military occupation of Kashmir by Indian security forces. Like the separate event in 
London a year later with a completely different set of speakers, Azra’s argument also 
disputed the validity of hegemonic opinion on the Kashmir conflict as ‘reductionist.’ She 
claims that ‘sexual, institutionalized violence is a response of notions of power and 
dominance against Kashmiris’ resistance.’ She further identifies a problem with the notion 
of justice in Kashmir:  
‘the occupied state relies on an Indian judiciary which is not providing justice, 
ensuing in never-ending legal battles…the justice categorical portrayal of problems 
in Kashmir is a reductionist evaluation of Kashmir. This reduction leads to Kashmir 
being categorized as either a Law and Order problem or a Human rights problem – 
but it extends beyond these notions. The bedrock of Kashmiri resistance is azadi 
or freedom.’ 
 
Those listening to the talks who may have had trouble converting to supporting freedom 
for Palestine and/or Kashmir were now exposed to evidence that only through freedom 
could violence against women be ended, and this was framed in an academic perspective 
linked to activism. In this sense, the academic discussion of militarization having a 
negative impact on the lives of women became discursive narrative whereby violence 
against women is caused by India, the occupying force. Of course, this line of reasoning 
works best in the absence of militancy that was more dominant in the 1990s and early 
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2000s. Where civilian casualties and violence against women could be blamed on 
multiple sources – some non-Indian militants – this line of reasoning falls short. The 
occupation by India of Kashmir extends to the occupation of women when women appear 
to subject to a patriarchal society.  
A young woman whose family is from Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK), but 
has lived in the UK most of her life and regularly attended KSM Edinburgh meetings, 
‘Salena’ had quite a bit to say regarding women. Although she claimed that torture and 
rape were indeed a problem to be addressed in Kashmir, she emphasised more general 
concerns about how women were being treated in their day-to-day lives. ‘I really strong 
think women’s [situation] in Kashmir – but I suppose…in PAK in certain districts…has 
deteriorated…I haven’t seen women’s improvements, like basic medical requirements 
that Pakistani women get.’ In her observations from visits to Pakistan and Pakistan 
Administered Kashmir (PAK) or ‘Azad Kashmir,’ she finds discrepancies in government 
services. She also claims that ‘there’s no improvements in the infrastructure’ in PAK and 
that ‘less women and girls are getting educated.’ She admits this is a problem all over 
South Asia, but finds that ‘on the Indian side, women’s education seems to be so much 
better,’ and furthermore, women on the Indian side are ‘more informed about world 
affairs.’ These infrastructural problems seem to be linked in general to a patriarchal 
society. Perhaps continuing on these thoughts, when I asked Salena, ‘What does azadi 
mean to you,’ she replied: 
‘To me, it means, because I look at it from a woman’s perspective and women’s 
needs to be addressed – not only freedom from torture and rape, but freedom from 
patriarchal norms. Women that are abused feel the double sides of the 
administration. They feel it from the cultural impact of society like misogynistic views 
of society and the way they view women – freedom from not only torture but 
freedom from these notions.’ 
Salena reported that in her view, the occupation and the patriarchal society affects the 
other: 
‘The occupation affects the internal part, take for example a woman is raped by a 
military or army guy - rape in general has a stigma but because it’s in a culture 
where patriarchal views are ingrained…she’s raped not only by soldiers but the 
stigma is double abuse that she has to put up with.’ 
Much like the paradox of Hindu nationalist women in Seghal’s book (2007), women in 
Kashmir face stigmatization when she is abused by the immediate perpetrators (the army 
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guy), but also by her compatriots. It appears to be an increasingly accepted feminist 
prognosis that violence against women in South Asia is linked not only to a military 
occupation, but is linked to parochial notions which deny a women agency as a victim 
and then restores her agency in an effort to attribute blame for her not being virtuous. In 
a retweet by KSM SOAS, it is suggested that shaming women is a part of Indian state 
policy. Kashmir right’s activist, Khurram Parvez, is quoted in this example which is 
poignant to the discussion surrounding treatment of women under occupation, but also 
in society in general. He begins by claiming,  
‘They question the character of the women who were killed and raped. In Kashmir 
the character of the victim is always discussed by our oppressors as if it is legal for 
them to rape a women is she’s a prostitute, as if it is legal for them, if a women is 
involved in some promiscuity, to molest, or kill them…’ 
He continues to discuss how this line of thinking is sanctioned by an institution which 
protects perpetrators.  
 At the KSM SOAS event in February 2016 on women’s resistance, the issue of 
reporting rape and other violations is particularly challenging for women in the context of 
occupation. One of the speakers asks the question, ‘how do you report rape to the 
authorities that permit it?’ Furthermore, when rape is reported or if there is an attempt to 
seek justice, there is an accusation, the speaker argues, that the women alleging rape 
are ‘wives of terrorists,’ which she purports is a ‘damning statement linked to orders of 
state authority.’ This is particularly vexing since the ‘wife of a terrorist’ places the blame 
on the women - whether it is true or not – as an associate of an enemy other.  
Discussions surround whether or not a woman is being virtuous when she is 
victimized is often heated debate when there is a post, for example, of a woman yelling 
at an Indian soldier or of college girls throwing stones. These sorts of remarks tend to be 
absent from commentary among the transient students and their respective social media 
sites. The questions are only recently raised by some activists and academic-activists 
working on gender and development in Kashmir rather recently. Kashmiri Muslim women 
have not been the only victimized women in Kashmir. However, again, this is another 
topic that is left out of discussions. Kashmiri Pandit women as well have been framed as 
victims of insurgency. Although there is little in the way of empirical observation, it was 
noted at one KSM SOAS event that during the 1990s when Pandits felt forced from their 
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homes in the Valley, mosques were ‘blaring out threats they will take our women.’ In 
Ankur Datta’s (2011) research on Pandit refugees, there is indeed evidence that mosques 
were advertising killing Pandit men and kidnapping Pandit women. Most of my 
respondents would have been too young to recall vividly these calls if they were 
widespread outside of specific areas, and Pandit women were not brought up outside of 
this event.  
 Women in Kashmir are victimized in many ways, sometimes through physical 
assault and other times via misogynistic commentary. Women are also victims of the 
silence surrounding discussions of the role of patriarchy or the lack of freedom women in 
Kashmir may have. It is often perceived as a lack of freedom which is equivocal to the 
lack of freedom of the nation of Kashmir, however, it extends beyond to the lack of 
freedom or agency a woman has over her body, her dress, and actions.   
 
Rape as a Weapon of War 
 
Sexual violence as a result of conflict is not just a means to degrade another human, but 
is a means to degrade a human because of their ethnic or national identity, and thus 
becomes a systematic strategy intended to ‘not only harm and dominate individuals, but 
also their communities’ (Anjum, 2018: 48). Sexual violence in conflict situations is not just 
a matter of excess but can be considered a crime against humanity when it is systematic 
and intended to persecute a particular ethnic group. Violated women and girls in Kashmir 
often become a symbol of violence, Indian oppression, and subsequently a symbol of the 
freedom movement. Kunan Poshpura is probably the leading example of this. It is 
perhaps the most consistently raised issue and grievance, even though it occurred some 
years ago in February of 1991. Now, every year in February a slew of social media posts 
and discussions regarding sexual assault in Kashmir activates freedom activists to 
protest and write posts stating their solidarity with women in Kashmir to commemorate 
Kashmiri women’s resistance day on 23 February. KSM groups emphasise the 
anniversary by holding meetings and events which draw attention to women’s rights 
violations and recap eyewitness accounts of the night’s traumatic events. Nearly every 
incident of violence in Kashmir, including the soaring rate of eye injuries due to the wide 
use of pellet guns in the summer of 2016 had led to reflections on other injustices such 
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as Kunan Poshpura. Collective memories of violence are incomplete without reflections 
upon this tragedy.  
 The wording of the initial advertisement for KSM Edinburgh’s vigil on 5 February 
outside the Indian consulate was rather demonstrative of one of the most prominent ways 
the Kashmir freedom movement would be framed. In the small business-card slip of 
paper, the vigil aimed to protest ‘63 years of occupation by India and [sic] its human rights 
abuses…torture of Kashmiris, and rape being used as a weapon of war against women.’ 
Rape as a weapon of war is one of those phrases that is widely used in academia, 
activism, and used among United Nations organizations.12 The terminology has gained 
particular prominence to describe genocidal rape by perpetrators in Bosnia – especially 
against Muslim women.13 The analogy is not lost with the perpetration of predominately 
Hindu Indian security personnel as the purported perpetrators of rape as a weapon of 
war against predominately Muslim Kashmiri women. As described earlier, there is a clear 
link between gender and nation whereby Kashmiri female bodies are representative of 
the violated Kashmiri, and thus, their right to self-determination. It is not uncommon for 
activists to describe the situation in Kashmir as ‘genocidal,’ as prolific writer Mirza 
Waheed dubbed the Indian occupation in Kashmir during a public discussion at KSM 
SOAS whose main theme was that peace in South Asia could only be achieved if the 
Kashmir dispute was resolved.  
One of the narratives that recurs is the witnessing of tragedy and how it impacts 
someone. Muzzamil, an activist who spoke at several KSM SOAS events recounted the 
story of a young girl he encountered in an orphanage.  
 
12 Rape being framed as a weapon of war has occurred primarily in response to the high accounts 
of rape that happened during the conflicts that erupted after the breakup of Yugoslavia. In order 
to prosecute mass rape in the International Tribunal, rape needed to be considered a ‘crime 
against humanity’ or a tactic used as part of armed conflict. (see Buss, D. (2009) ‘Rethinking Rape 
as a Weapon of War.’ Feminist Legal Studies, 17 (2) Aug., pp. 145-163 SpringerLink and 
Stiglmayer (1995) Mass Rape: the War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina)  
13 ‘Genocidal rape’ was a term that gained more popular usage in attempts to bring those 
accountable for mass rape and sexual slavery that occurred during the Serbia and Bosnian 
conflicts. The victims were mostly Muslim women (although a large number of Croatian women 
suffered similar fates). The argument concluding the rape constituted genocide was because not 
only were Muslim men and boys targeted in an ethnic cleansing campaign, but Muslim women 
were detained and raped regularly in order to forces impregnation, thus breeding out the Bosnian 
Muslims. (see Engle (2015) ‘Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ The American Jounrnal of International Law, 99 (4) Oct., pp. 778-816 
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She was six years old when the army came in and they murdered her family and 
they gang raped her mother, her sister…and her grandmother who I think at the 
time, I remember was eighty years old. She was hiding and she witnessed these 
things. She witnessed them all. She was living in an orphanage because her 
grandmother…didn’t have the money so she lived in an orphanage. So, I used to 
come and go occasionally and I saw her. It was always that one kid. You know in 
the movies how there’s always that one kid…just wouldn’t play, wouldn’t talk, 
wouldn’t do anything. So I asked the lady, the manager what’s her story…So they 
explained. It was one of the worst things I’ve ever heard. 
He did not delve deeply into the circumstances or the outcomes of the rapes. However, 
this description serves to remind the audience of the vulnerability of women of all ages 
and the scars they will carry with them for the rest of their lives. Again, the perpetrators 
are quite clear: the army is to blame. It is suggestive that without the presence of the 
army, these things would not happen. They are out to attack Kashmiris and particularly, 
to take advantage of Kashmiri women. The Indian soldier as a perpetrator and the 
Kashmiri as the victim is often the dichotomy as framed in these discussions. It is, of 
course, more nuanced than this. This does, however, lead to one of the ways in which 
Kashmiri freedom activists speak about their movement. Through witnessing and 
accounting for atrocities, Kashmiris are utilizing the victimization frame, which can help 
outsider activists empathize with their movement. However, being a victim is a vulnerable 
state, which most activists would find uncomfortable. After claiming victimhood, it is then 
necessary for survivors and witnesses to embrace resistance in order to reclaim agency.  
 
Women’s Resistance to Occupation  
 
Goldie Osuri of the University of Warwick is a regular voice at academically-affiliated 
Kashmir events. In her article ‘Sovereignty, Postcoloniality, and Gendering Human 
Rights: Rape and Occupation’ (2015), it is easy to explore further the arguments 
presented at events regarding the logic that violence against women in Kashmir is 
intrinsically linked to the occupation and the heavy presence of the military in Kashmir. 
Osuri recognizes the promptness of retaliation against the perpetrators in the infamous 
Delhi rape case of December 2012, and subsequent amendments to embolden laws on 
rape in India. However, these laws, she argues are still patriarchal in nature and 
dismisses rape of a woman by her husband, penetration of a man by another man, and 
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upholds protections for security personnel posted in Kashmir and India’s Northeast where 
accusations of rape by military forces are widespread.  
Whether in the domestic or the public spheres, women’s bodies have been 
objectified. In one narrative, women are caught between the domestic and the public 
perpetrator. Papori Bora (2010) refers to this in an article analysing the violation of women 
in the Northeast and subsequent protests and leading to a change in feminist discourse 
which began to reference women’s rights in the Northeast as human rights. Bora (2010) 
refers to a 2005 report by the Northeast Network, Women in Armed Conflict Situations, 
which is no longer available online but is quoted as: 
‘Women experience greater violations being caught between different violators and 
in view of the fact that in such situations, patriarchal values are strongly reinforced. 
One the one hand, the state targets women and uses violence against them as a 
means of suppression and on the other the community is apathetic to the special 
problems faced by women’ (349).  
Bora (2010) asserts that the report argues ‘for recognizing women’s right as human rights 
within the armed conflicts in the Northeast...’ aligning itself to a ‘growing movement within 
the transnational human rights discourse’ (2010: 349). The discourse adapted by a local 
population struggling with autonomy from the Indian state echoes calls from Kashmir, 
and the struggle between patriarchy and occupation. Osuri (2015) interprets this segment 
of the 2005 report as framing women as ‘passive objects caught between the state and 
the community…’ and addressing ‘the category of gender in a unidimensional context of 
state violence in the Northeast’ (5). The way violence against women is framed can lend 
to the notion that violence against women is a condition of a backward, ‘tribal’ community 
who wishes to secede from India. In this manner, laws such as Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act (AFSPA) which implies immunity to uniformed perpetrators of violence in 
Kashmir and the Northeast are seen in the colonial and postcolonial context – as a 
consequence of the Quit India movement vis-à-vis British colonialism and uprisings in the 
borderlands such as the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement vis-à-vis Indian colonialism.  
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Osuri (2015) and Bora (2010) discuss some of the problems surrounding the 
current discourse on violence towards women, particularly with regards to their 
objectification. They are objects of an ‘Other’ male community, objects of a patriarchal 
community, objects of 
other people’s wars and 
battles for self-
determination. In July 
2004, after a woman 
arrested by Assam Rifles 
for suspected militancy 
was brutally tortured, 
raped, and her body was 
dumped near her home, a 
protest was formed 
whereby women would 
reclaim themselves as 
subjects. Around 100 women in Manipur came out in response to protest, shouting 
slogans at Kangla Fort in Imphal which dared the Indian army to come out and rape the 
women in a public place (Hussain, 2004). Hussain’s article was widely circulated on social 
media, and the event has been referenced during at least one KSM SOAS event on 
women resistance. Osuri, who happened to be present at that event wrote previously that 
the reason behind the wording, ‘Indian Army Rape Us,’ rather than ‘Indian Army Rapes 
Women,’ is an effort to reclaim women as the subject rather than as an object (2015: 7). 
Again, with reference to Bora (2010), it is also argued that ‘Us’ can also be interpreted 
with reference to the human rights argument surrounding AFSPA which was hotly 
contested during this time. Further the ‘us’ is meant to be not just ‘us women’ but meant 
to apply to the Northeast in general. The show of women in solidarity also has the capacity 
to extend to Kashmir. At the same KSM event, a young Indian woman proposed that 
regions affected by violence against women can stand in solidarity with one another in a 
united effort to thwart violence by Indian soldiers in all peripheral regions of India.  
Although the protest tactics have been quite different, incidences of brutal events 
in Kashmir such as the mass rape case of a small village in IAK, Kunan Poshpura, in 
Figure 3:1 Protest Against Rape, Assam, July 2004 
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1991 have led to a similar development. First, there is a demand for perpetrators to be 
punished and there is protest against legal impunity such as AFSPA implies for military 
personnel. As the Kunan Poshpura incident occurred during the height of the insurgency, 
it was probably exploited by jihadists, extremists, and secular freedom activists alike to 
recruit those to their cause, saving ‘their’ women; but, also saving their Kashmir from 
Indian occupation. The logic of violence against women being a circumstance of an 
occupation of a perceived colonial entity whose perpetrators enjoy legal impunity is 
further explored later with evidence drawn from events and discussions with activists. 
What is important to note in the case of women in the Northeast reclaiming their bodies 
as subjects rather than objects is an element explored now with reference to the roles of 
women in violent conflict in Kashmir, how it relates to the current struggles, and how it 
helps or hinders female actors in Kashmir reclaim agency – or their own self-
determination. 
Like Malik’s (2019) review of Kashmir women’s resistance over the many decades 
since partition and prior to partition, Mir Fatima Kanth (2018) also connects contemporary 
resistance by women in Kashmir to historical precedence. Kanth (2018) remarks how a 
protest led by college women in the 1970s was brushed off as a laughing matter and the 
protest by college women in 2017 throwing stones and demanding azadi was similarly 
met with ‘surprise, disapproval, and resentment’ (42). This response, she argues, 
effectively challenges the political agency that women have been expressing as though 
it was a wholly new development. Kanth (2018) asserts that women protesters during this 
time were seen as a spectacle and were framed in the Indian media as the radicalization 
of young women, whereas the local media framed the protests as ‘Kashmiri women 
“redefining” political agency’ (43). In either case, there is little attention to the fact that 
women were visible in the massive demonstrations of 2008 and 2010, or before this 
during the periods of insurgency when women demonstrated to demand justice for 
missing loved ones. Kanth (2018) asserts that ‘acts of everyday…dissent articulated by 
Kashmiri women through the 1990s became invisible when juxtaposed with spectacles 
of “stone pelting” street protests…by a “new generation” of young women’ (44). Women 
in Kashmir have been active, not passive, participants of resistance to occupation. This 
is a thread continued in the next sections of this chapter in the context of the 




Kashmir’s Contemporary Freedom Struggle 
 
In much the way that Kashmir’s Trails of Torture (2012) brought to life the human rights 
situation in Kashmir for an outside audience, Iffat Fatima’s Blood Leaves Its Trail (2015) 
brought to Indian and international audiences a real sense of the Kashmiri struggle from 
a perspective of families torn apart by enforced disappearances. It further stands as a 
documentary that attests to people of Kashmir’s resilience and especially to the role of 
women’s resistance in Kashmir. The memory of loved ones who have been disappeared 
and the perseverance of love ones and activists to seek justice presents Kashmiris as 
not just victims but as actors that have a voice in fighting oppression. The fight for justice 
is an act of defiance and a way to reclaim agency. This is a theme further explored in 
critical documentaries and art, including graffiti art, prose, and song lyrics.   
 
Women’s resistance in the Contemporary Azadi Movement 
 
It is a challenging balancing act negotiating between patriarchy and freedom from 
occupation, as tradition continues to factor into the contemporary azadi movement. The 
concept of honour and dignity are important attributes in Kashmir’s freedom movement, 
and in the narrative of female dissent. Van der Molen and Bal (2011) claim that the 
resistance movement, in the context of ‘widespread societal anxiety about ‘dishonour,’ 
young Kashmiris’ urge to reclaim dignity at once motivates them to practice dissent and 
narrows the scope for female dissidents’ capacity to act upon this drive overtly’ (93). 
Again, this paradox arises in the series of nonviolent protests and the evolution of a 
‘separatist’ struggle into a transnational social movement. Young people in particular are 
taking the opportunity to diffuse protest tactics from other transnational movements, 
adapting, and integrating them into a movement that is quite their own. But in this context, 
female dissidents are often perceived to have very different roles than their male 
counterparts – at least in Kashmir. Van der Molen and Bal, through an ethnographic study 
of youth mobilization in Kashmir, uncover a sort of division of labour between the genders 
when it comes to acts of resistance. Young women, according to the van der Molen and 
Bal’s interlocuters are more likely to engage in ‘small, small acts’ of resistance which 
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contribute to the cause of justice such as writing poetry. These small acts of resistance 
are regarded with less importance than ‘active resistance’ as seen by young men that 
accordingly fill previous literature on Kashmir’s azadi movement. Going beyond these 
nuances, the authors cite the omnipresence of military and paramilitary troops, police and 
intelligence operative as greatly constraining the way young people are able to dissent 
(ibid.: 94). Women in particular may be reluctant to draw attention to themselves for fear 
of arrest and molestation. Given the documentation of sexual assault on women in 
Kashmir and the reticence to investigate these crimes, as Van der Molen and Bal (2011) 
argue, may be an even bigger reason for women’s limited roles in overt resistance than 
stigma from a patriarchal culture. When men are beaten and detained, they earn respect 
as a sort of right of passage. When women are detained, however, there is always the 
fear of sexual assault, which would bring dishonour. Although sexual assault of men and 
boys has occurred, it is assumed to occur much less often, or at least it is reported at a 
significantly lower rate. Women protest within Kashmir may not always be visible, but the 
respondents in van der Molen and Bal’s study claim that every act that they do, whether 
sitting in a class or writing poetry or articles, is to be an act of dignity. Reclaiming dignity 
or agency through small acts of resistance does, I would argue, lead to more visible acts 
of resistance where the opportunity exists. 
Today, female azadi activists are front and centre in advocating for rights for 
Kashmiris as well as rights for women in general. They are indispensable and, in my 
experience, have been the face of the movement abroad. They are posting, blogging, 
organizing, and staging small and large incidences of resistance against the perceived 
occupation of their homeland. They are also becoming more visible in the contemporary 
azadi movement. Since 2010, women have been the stars of photojournalism. Kaul 
accounts how even middle aged ‘took to the streets in protest, part of the tens of 
thousands of Kashmiris who defied curfews…’ (2011: 195). A cross-section of society is 
protesting, from various classes, young and old, women and men. This is sadly in 
response to the large percentage of the population that has witnessed violence in 
Kashmir. Women, like men are determined to articulate their grievances against an Indian 
state which is perceived as being uncaring and security forces which are responsible for 
murdering civilians (ibid: 195-6). There is a lot more literature coming out from journalists, 
academics, and advocates alike regarding the contemporary resistance movement, 
129 
 
which locate women as a much stronger and more autonomous force than in earlier 
literature. A recent article (2017) which was distributed on social media, ‘Not submissive, 
but combative: Kashmir’s superwomen,’ aptly defines the move for Kashmir’s female 
resisters to claim more visibility in the valley itself. The article, found late in the writing up 
of this thesis, also explores the role of women in militancy and in ‘protecting’ Kashmir 
from tribal invasion in the wake of Partition. After the historical review, it then continues 
by asserting the role of women in contemporary protests in Kashmir. Breaking out fairly 
recently, the acknowledgement of the role women have had on the contemporary and 
historical azadi movements are becoming more mainstream. The debates are also 
becoming more nuanced. A hotly debated picture of girls throwing stones at security 
forces with one girl having ‘a basketball in one hand and a stone in the other,’ has made 
it’s rounds on social media with mixed feedback of patronizing and supportive 
commentary. The article’s author claims that women have always been at the forefront 
of the azadi movement, but that these days it is being more widely reported (Gazi: 2017). 
Ather Zia heads her article ‘Resistance is a way of life for Kashmir’s youth’ (2017) with 
the image of the young women protesting. Writing in April, 2017, Zia asserts that this is 
the first time that students in Kashmir have demonstrated in such a collective manner. 
The cause of the swell in protests, Zia claims, was a solidarity response to force used 
against students in Pulwama. As women of the 1950s and 1960s took to the streets in 
protest, so are the women of today. Women also suffer as directly or indirectly being part 
of the resistance against Indian forces. Zia (2017) describes a fourteen-year old girl who 
was blinded after being near a protest (but not a part of it) when sprayed with a pellet gun 
at close range. Faisal Khan (2017), also focusing on women’s resistance in the college 
protests, displays photos of young women and girls throwing stones, shouting slogans, 
and kicking a truck of a security force officer. Also reported is a girl in the hospital with a 
fractured skull and a woman lying on the ground after being exposed to tear gas (Khan, 
2017). Although this was a particularly active period in resistance, it demonstrates how 
crucial women’s involvement in the resistance is.  
I would argue that this is due to the increase in international awareness and the 
broadening of the framing of the azadi movement in terms of women and human rights, 
and to the extension of the framing of the movement to outsiders. Authors such as Inshah 
Malik (2019) are reclaiming women’s roles throughout the Kashmir movement, making 
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them more visible historically as well as today. This is done in part by casting away the 
impression of the freedom movement as a movement for the freedom of the Kashmiri 
man alone. It is not the Kashmiri man speaking on behalf of the Kashmiri woman that 
reaches across transnational divides, but the Kashmiri woman who speaks for herself 
that draws international attention to her own rights. This is assisted through the lens of 
the academic speaker at KSM, the photojournalist in IAK, and via documentary films 
which raise awareness of the resistance of Kashmiri women.  
 Women are more visible in the azadi movement today for several reasons. First, 
as the review of literature and history of the role of women in Kashmir have shown, 
women have always played a significant role in the azadi movement. Second, the 
evolution of the azadi movement from one a domestic to a transnational social movement 
has provided the space for women to have more significant roles in the freedom 
movement. Third, women have seized opportunities in Kashmir and abroad in 
professions which permit for them to work with international NGOs and transnational 
organizations allowing for a more dominant voice in contemporary framings of the 
movement, e.g. a human rights movement, women’s rights, etc. Finally, the connection 
and ability to travel abroad and communicate on social media has provided the 
opportunity to openly and visibly dissent without threats to their dignity or person; and, 
without the direct supervision or guidance of a male superior. Thus, women are taking up 
leadership positions and organizing societies such as the KSM. Both Edinburgh and 
SOAS sites have been organized and have been led by women. One of the former 
Presidents of Edinburgh KSM has been labelled the ‘backbone’ of the society. Female 
organizers from PAK and IAK have organized or participated in the organization of 
societies in the UK, but also inspired female leadership in Kashmir. 
Many women seen protesting in public are the ones that continue to press for 
answers as to the whereabouts of their missing sons and husbands. Parveena Ahangar, 
founder of the Association of Parents for Disappeared Persons (APDP) Kashmir, has 
become a symbol of loss in the conflict in Kashmir as well as a symbol of hope and 
resistance. ADPD was founded in August 1990 in response to Ahangar’s eighteen-year 
old son was arrested and went missing shortly thereafter under dubious circumstances 
(Butalia, 2002; Malik, 2019: 93). The APDP is probably the most well-known and 
publicized outside of Kashmir. The organization has now become a symbol of the 
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contemporary movement for justice and closure in Kashmir. In its beginnings, however, 
the APDP was more of a support network, creating space for members to help one 
another with legal matters such as court visits and strategizing transportation (Mailk, 
2019: 94). The organization quickly expanded its milieu to include developing a database 
for forcibly disappeared persons, performing mourning protests, and public gatherings 
which occur monthly in a park (Malik, 2019: 94). All of these actions help to keep the 
memories of loved ones alive in lieu of permanent closure as well as raise awareness of 
the ‘more than 8000 disappeared people in Kashmir’ (ibid.). Deepti Misri (2014) further 
theorizes that this very public display as a way of memory-keeping is a challenge to the 
state’s desire to see these disappearances forgotten. The ‘performance’ of this protest 
can be seen as an act of resistance against state violence which acts in impunity. The 
visual display of photos and grieving family members is a challenge to the authority’s 
ability to choose what can be seen or heard. 
Documentaries and imagery of women protesting and holding vigils for lost loved 
ones have become a staple of the resistance movement. One documentary maker, Iffat 
Fatima recently created the film Blood Leaves Its Trail (2015) which critically engages 
with the notion that memories are a ‘mode of resistance’ through ‘confronting reality and 
morphing from the personal to the political’ (filmsouthasia.org, 2015). Prior to this, she 
created an earlier documentary freely available on YouTube, Where have you hidden my 
new moon crescent? (2009), which follows Mughal Mase who lost her only son after he 
was unlawfully abducted and disappeared. The documentary follows Mase’s story who 
recalls how she searched everywhere, filed a report, and still came up empty-handed. 
She met Parveena and is now active with ADPD. The documentary also gives viewers a 
background of the Kashmir resistance against Indian occupation with inclusive video of 
people protesting in large crowds, possibly from 2008 footage. Included in the footage 
are women shouting freedom slogans in English as well as other local languages. Mase, 
and women like her, are not just victims in the struggle to find their lost loved ones, but 
actively resist Indian occupation, albeit in a variety of ways.   
Parveena, before becoming an activist was a self-described ‘illiterate housewife’ 
(Best and Hussey, 2005: 12). The disappearance of her son, however, turned her into a 
‘political agent and key mobilising figure in the revival of civil society political activism for 
peace’ (ibid). The term ‘illiterate housewife’ was used in February 2016 at a KSM event 
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taking place at the new Kings College London KSM (KSM KCL). The speaker, a spoken 
word artist and activist also used this language to describe her not in a demeaning way 
but in a way to reveal the stark contrast between a non-activist and an activist. It was a 
way to place importance on the life before becoming politicized in some way as though 
coming from innocence and being transformed into a necessary fighter, in response to 
the wrongdoing. This is an analogy that links many Kashmiris together: the boy who was 
killed by a teargas cannister on his way home from school becomes a martyr; the girl who 
is shot by a stray bullet after passing an open window in her home becomes a rallying 
point for protest; the boy who was beaten by security forces becomes the face of renewed 
militant resistance; the woman who loses her son to an enforced disappearance becomes 
a world-famous activist. As soon as a Kashmiri becomes a victim, they are called to 
become an activist in a quest for freedom against an oppressor. This reclaims agency 
and restores honour. One such woman, Parveena Ahangar, together with others like her 
who have been missing loved ones have formed the Association of Parents of 
Disappeared Persons (APDP). She, along with other activists such as human rights 
lawyer, Parvez Imroz – who appears prominently in BBC’s documentary Kashmir’s 
Torture Trail (2012) – routinely interview and compile the stories of those who have lost 
loved ones.  
‘Sammy’ told Parveena’s story to a crowd at Kings College London (KCL’s) 
inaugural event in February 2016. Sammy claims that she is not an academic or a 
historian as the other speaker, but that she was speaking as a ‘storyteller.’ She begins 
by telling the audience that Pareena’s son was taken from their home in 1990: 
‘Three Indian soldiers came and he was never returned. At the time, she was 
illiterate and never had anything to do outside of their own house. She went to 
prisons, everywhere you wouldn’t want your mother to go to in order to search for 
her son…She never stopped and she continued to search and she learned that 
other families were searching for their sons, fathers, brothers and subjected to 
disappearances. She set up APDP in order to demand justice for those men who 
were taken. It wasn’t taken to civilian court but to a military tribunal. One of the 
people said that if you stop asking for these men they will pay you money but she 
didn’t want money just her son.’ 
 
A gradual shift from a more passive to a more active role in collective mobilisation 
occurred when one woman whose son was disappeared by Indian security forces worked 
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in collaboration with other women and human rights advocates in order to establish the 
APDP. The narrative of the story as told by Sammy shows how Parveena is exposed to 
these places where ‘you wouldn’t want your mother to go’ in an effort to recover her son. 
She is transformed from an illiterate housewife to a prominent activist. The narrative of 
the victimized women becoming empowered through resistance is an ongoing theme 
through many discussions involving female activism in Kashmir.  
 Essar Batool, co-author of the book Do You Remember Kunan Poshpura? (2016), 
Skyped in to the 16 February 2016 event ‘Women’s Resistance in Kashmir.’ She gave a 
summation of what transpired there on 23rd February 1991: 
‘In one of the most militarized districts in Kashmir, on the night of 23rd February, 
Indian forces cordoned off both villages before a crackdown – usually there is an 
announcement before a crackdown, but not this time. The men and women were 
segregated. The men were tortured the whole night in storehouses and the women 
were raped all night inside their own homes. The youngest was thirteen years old 
and the oldest eighty years of age. We don’t have a consistent number because of 
the stigma attached to rape. Many were younger, unmarried women.’ 
Batool asserted that what happened in Kunan Poshpura was a symbol of impunity by the 
armed forces and the subsequent cover-ups after the villagers tried to seek justice and 
the way survivors were treated were further humiliating. They had to travel long distances 
to hearings, were called by name at a public hearing, and their legal representation was 
constantly intimidated. Activists such as Essar claimed that despite being afraid while re-
investigating the case 23 years later in 2012, that is was a necessary ‘act of resistance 
by women of Kashmir.’  
One member of KSM and former journalist in Kashmir, ‘Jasmin,’ also spoke at the event:  
‘When it comes to Kashmir, [Kashmiris] are always telling personal stories – “Oh 
yeah that thing happened there…” but for me it’s something I’ve seen with my own 
eyes. I was born in the 90s - we are [called] children of conflict. I have grown up 
listening to stories of resistance from my mother and my grandmother. Kashmiri 
women have been very brave. There are innumerable stories of resistance.’  
Departing momentarily from violence, she demonstrates the resolve of Kashmiris with 
reference to the floods of 2014. In a recurring example of Kashmiris’ strength at meetings, 
she noted how when the floods happened, India did not help, nor did India permit external 
organizations to help. ‘Some areas were badly occupied under water, women used to 
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cook for hundreds and thousands, and did work side-by-side with men.’ Returning to 
violence, she cites her mother’s resolve when she was a little girl: 
‘When I was two years old I went to get some vaccinations [with my mother’ and 
there was some [bomb] blast and she just kept running and running with me in her 
arms to take shelter in a farmers’ field. She managed to keep me safe and brought 
me back home in a milk truck… When I was just four years old - when there was a 
siege in my home - we left. I remember asking if I could take toys and she (my 
mother) said ‘Don’t worry, we are coming back!’ She never allowed that fear to grow 
inside me. Kashmiri woman played a very crucial role…While men went out to [fight] 
women also carried arms and ammunition and would cook food and nurse the 
militants. Nothing could break their courage.’ 
 
Women, whether half-widows, mothers protecting their children, or arms smuggler – are 
viewed with great reverence in Kashmir. One of the committee members, Nabila, claims 
the rise of prominence of women in the Kashmir conflict is in part due to the generation, 
as Jasmin and other respondents have referenced it – ‘children of conflict.’ The 
experience of growing up surrounded by conflict and having women often taking up more 
roles related to resistance has perhaps extended the role women have in the 
contemporary Kashmir freedom movement. 
Reclaiming Agency 
 
The reclamation of agency of women whose bodies have been violated and the 
reclamation of agency by the nation that has been violated go hand-in-hand 
metaphorically. When injustices go without conclusion for so long such as the mass 
raping of a small village in IAK, Kunan Poshpura, the Kashmiri nation itself is not 
permitted to heal. Unlike merely re-hashing the narrative ‘If we men can protect our 
women, then we are a strong nation,’ the disappearances of men and the rise of women 
to fill a vacuum of power encapsulated an emergent narrative: ‘Our nation is strong when 
our women are strong.’ This is particularly poignant when placed in the context of human 
rights narratives which have been diffused from other movements, but with the 
specificities of the Kashmir freedom movement. On the one hand, the narrative of framing 
techniques of the contemporary transnational women’s rights movements has permitted 
for the emerging activists to adopt this frame in discourse in order to branch out to a wider 
audience. On the other hand, the contextualization of the dominance of women in political 
power and as leaders in the transnational freedom movement permits for the diffusion of 
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such a frame or narrative to have the powerful potential to re-frame the struggle of the 
man in regaining honour by reclaiming the nation to incorporate the importance of and 
blurring the roles of men and women in the Kashmir freedom movement. This rather 
progressive turn from a male-dominated insurgency of the 1990s whereby women were 
passive bystanders in a war to a freedom movement whereby women take active stances 
itself plays to a more universal framing of human rights that an international audience is 
more likely to have sympathy. Further, and perhaps one of the most important 
contributions of reaching out to academic and activist communities is presenting the 
human rights violations as a direct consequence of India as an occupying nation presents 
a clear and for many logical path to support Kashmir’s independence movement. In the 
absence of external militant forces from Pakistan, the alleged perpetrators become 
clearer as Indian security forces can be permitted to take the blame. The only solution, 
or prognosis is complete independence of Kashmir.  
The dominance of female leadership in the KSM and the prominence of 
outspoken women and progressive youths today could be seen as resembling earlier 
women’s movements in the state. The historical memory of women taking up arms to 
defend democracy is relived today in depictions of women resisting and in the titles of 
KSM events. There is still a romantic heroism of the Kashmiri woman defending her 
domicile with a gun in hand. Figure 4 is a 9 March 2016 post on the University of 
Birmingham version of KSM, the ‘Kashmir Awareness Society’ Facebook page. The post 
shows a young Pahari woman wielding 
an assault rifle and is accompanied by 
the caption ‘A bit late but Happy 
International Women’s Day!’ Pride in 
the ability of Kashmiri women to defend 
her homeland continues and is 
perhaps even more pertinent today 
than it was when the WSDC was 
distributing pamphlets of women 
armed with rifles. Also interesting to 
note in figure 3:2 is that the caption 
describes the woman and her family 




being threatened by militants. Specifically, the woman is protecting her family and her 
virtue by avoiding a ‘forced marriage proposal by a militia commander.’ This young 
Kashmiri woman becomes an ideal image of what a woman should be in the resistance 
movement. She is empowered as well as virtuous. Stemming from Misra’s recollections 
and Whitehead’s research on the earlier roles of women in Kashmir, women have 
continued the tradition of defending the Kashmiri people and reclaiming their own agency 
as actors in their own battles.  
Women’s rights in general and women’s empowerment were side topics in a few 
conversations with respondents. One woman who had married into a Kashmiri family, but 
is not herself from South Asia, discussed with her husband how they were involved in a 
women’s project for ‘women’s empowerment in Kashmir.’ The project was described as 
a small social enterprise where women would design and develop projects that would be 
brought to the UK.  
 Concern for the welfare of women and their empowerment in general were mixed. 
Many of the KSM activists indeed seemed to be aware of some pertinent feminist topics. 
It was rather interpreted differently. For some, gendered interpretations of the Kashmiri 
freedom movement did not extend beyond grievances over violations that have happened 
to women and the desire to end them. For others, there was an inextricable link between 
violence against women and the militarized occupation of Kashmir. And yet, for others 
gender empowerment was something that needed to happen within Kashmir society, 
regardless of its territorial sovereignty.  
 
Not your parents’ social movement: Progressive Youth Culture 
 
The KSM can be seen as representative of a youthful, progressive contemporary 
movement. It is largely distinguishable from the JKLF, whose members tend to be older 
and male. KSM, on the other hand, thrives on female leadership and is guided by youths. 
Even where older, more experienced activists lend their expertise, they tend to give the 
floor to their younger, Kashmiri counterparts. One of my respondents, a second-
generation Kashmiri, claimed that she felt out of place when politics was being discussed 
by her father and her uncle. The JKLF was referred to as ‘outdated’ by a KSM SOAS 
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member, and when referenced during a KSM Scotland meeting, the head of JKLF, Yasin 
Malik, was met with ambivalence. The younger generation of Kashmiri activists clearly 
try to separate themselves from previous incarnations of the azadi movement. KSM and 
the contemporary freedom movement was more representative of the new generation of 
Kashmiris – the transient, international, contemporary, the tweeters, and arguably the 
‘hipsters’.14 Youths seem to clearly distinguish ‘politics’ from whatever it is they are 
doing. One activist, Rubina, who claims that her being Kashmiri had a huge impact on 
organizing KSM in London also claimed she was not a ‘politician’ or ‘associated with any 
politics.’ ‘We’re just normal people,’ she asserted, ‘’just doing small awareness raising 
about unemployment, corruption, development, terrorism, everything is an issue.’ They 
are apathetic towards the political establishment in the UK and India, including the elected 
leaders in Jammu and Kashmir. For many young Kashmiri activists, politics is associated 
with being part of the corruption Rabina complains about.  
Despite letter-writing and postcard campaigns to MPs and MSPs (Scotland) and 
the UN, there was little direct involvement in governmental affairs. Many of the 
respondents were not affiliated with a political party. There were, however, two 
respondents from Pakistan who claimed to have previously been involved in the political 
party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Further, Imran Khan, the former chairman of the 
PTI and now Prime Minister of Pakistan, has been praised on numerous occasions during 
KSM meetings at the Edinburgh site. One member of KSM SOAS, who came from IAK 
did claim to support the party but did not specify to what extent they were involved. 
Another member, born in the UK, claimed to be a Labour party supporter. What was 
perhaps most interesting wasn’t just the lack of clear identification with a political party, 
but the explicit denial of political involvement, despite active engagement in KSM. Several 
KSM respondents claimed to be ‘apolitical,’ instead viewing their involvement in KSM to 
be a sort of post-political involvement. Human rights, in their perspective, was beyond 
polemical debate.  
Traditional identity markers are rejected or avoided by some activists. Some of 
the respondents for this study explicitly requested not referencing their religion; a couple 
 
14 ‘Hipsters’ is a term used by a writer for the independent news source Kashmir Walla depicting 
those who refused to attend a demonstration for Kashmir organized by a prominent politician from 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Ahmed, 2014). 
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of people affiliated with KSM had no religion. Others saw absolutely no correlation 
between their religious affiliations and their support for the freedom movement. One 
respondent claimed his spiritual beliefs made him much less likely to be politically active. 
Despite the practice bringing about some dissent, religious institutions have, for the most 
part, been a source of organization, recruitment, and/or educating in a safe space, which 
certainly impacted the numbers of participants through collaboration efforts with Isoc. 
Collaborative events and meetings have taken place with many other societies, however, 
and plays a role in extending the scope of the movement to be, perhaps, more focused 
universal conceptions of human rights, freedom of speech and movement, etc.    
Perhaps the shift is reliance on an organized political movement to a ‘new’ 
grassroots movement is best depicted by the ambivalent attitude many younger members 
of Kashmir’s freedom movement have towards the JKLF. The JKLF seems to have lost 
some relevance, at least for the younger generation of Kashmiri activists in the UK. This 
was depicted in a microcosm from observations at the November 2015 anti-Modi protest. 
I attended the event with a couple of young women and only one male from KSM SOAS, 
although there was representation of a mixed-gender attendance by some other SOAS 
students who may have been affiliated with other groups at the event. The lack of female 
representation of the JKLF and the group for which they stood by at the protest 
(supporting the rights of Sikhs), was stark in contrast to the usual composition of the KSM 
events. Although fliers were passed between representatives of KSM, JKLF and other 
nominated constituents, fruitful discussion or networking between groups was 
overshadowed by incessant selfie-taking of the gathered crowd. The protest itself was 
less cohesive of a unified front as was observed at the KSM Edinburgh vigil described 
previously, than it seemed to be more of a parade whereby there were separate 
contingents of partially-organized groups who varied on a spectrum of liking each other 
a lot to wanting to be as far away from one another as possible. There was a simultaneous 
confliction of individual groups as causes fighting with one another for publicity as well as 
the sense that there is a possibility of unity in such diversity faced with a common enemy. 
One notable observation at the protest was seeing how the political contingents generally 
kept to their groups. Meanwhile, the younger KSM members went from group to group, 
passing out fliers, waving anti-Modi placards hand-written in colourful letters and mingling 
with one another much as you would see at a more informal gathering. 
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The KSM distinguishes itself from the older generation of organized parties not 
through the exclusion, but through the inclusion of representatives of the JKLF and others 
at their events. The JKLF speaker at a KSM event in London was a male who read from 
a prepared script which was later sent out in an email newsletter from the organization. 
It was a carefully prepared script for the events held in Kashmir solidarity week of 
February 2016, ‘Jammu and Kashmir: Conflicting Perspectives.’ The other panellists 
were University of Westminster academic Dibyesh Anand, Kashmir activist and advocate, 
Muzzamil Thakur, and a medical doctor whose arguments drew attention to the displaced 
Kashmir Pandit community. The diversity of the panellists represents the diversity of 
opinions and how the Kashmir issue has been framed from its pre-Partition grievances 
through to the present-day protest mobilization in IAK. Another event panellist included 
academic Andrew Whitehead, author of Mission in Kashmir (2007), speaking along with 
a Kashmir activist and spoken word artist. This is of course indicative rather than 
exhaustive, but it reveals a new direction of Kashmir freedom activists from older 
generations. There is inclusion of various ideas and dialogue and a greater presence of 
women, whose roles in the Kashmir freedom movement have been rather marginalized 
previously.    
Regardless of political party affiliations, all respondents seem to highlight that 
human rights were a universal ideal and rose above political affiliations and the proposed 
territorial resolutions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This undercurrent was 
perhaps best articulated when someone who spoke at a couple KSM events was 
discussing the Kunan Poshpura tragedy in Kashmir at an event titled ‘Jammu and 
Kashmir: Conflicting Perspectives’: 
‘An entire village of women were raped, while the men were hung or tied and made 
to watch. And then burned…alive. That’s the reality of Kashmir. So when we hear 
about India and Pakistan, I don’t give a shit…of what their conflicting perspectives 
are. I don’t care what their economic policies are. I don’t care about the political 
situation. I don’t care about who they wanted to trade with…’ (18 Feb 2016)   
There is express disillusionment with political processes in and regarding to Kashmir. 
There is historical precedence for the disillusionment. Election rigging and the dismissal 
of elected officials in the state have been well-documented affairs (Akbar, 1985; 
Schofield, 2010; Bose, 2005). Fighting the system from a grassroots perspective has 
gained traction in the activist communities within and out-with Kashmir. The role identities 
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play in gaining sympathy from an international audience and the role they have in 
recruiting more members also plays a role. Perhaps most meaningful is how traditional 
identity markers such as nationalism and religion have given way to social values 
identities such as human rights and women’s rights, leading to more rhetorically 
universalist calls for democratic and legal reforms.  
A good example of extending the Kashmiri freedom movement to those outside 
of Kashmir was the school project-turned-campaign-video, ‘We are Kashmir’ (Mehmoud, 
2013). The YouTube video, 
which has gone viral, depicts 
people holding up signs saying 
‘Free Kashmir,’ or ‘You will be 
free.’ Signs and slogans often 
involve ‘End the (Indian) 
occupation.’ A few signs further 
read, ‘Remembrance is 
resistance.’ The project 
involved sending out requests 
to groups and individuals who 
supported the Kashmir 
freedom movement all over the 
globe. The response was rather 
demographically diverse, with 
people holding up signs in 
pictures from cities in England, 
Scotland, and the United States 
to Malaysia, Pakistan, India, 
Azad Kashmir, Poonch District, Jordan, Gaza, and Afghanistan. One of the messages 
from Poonch, a district that straddles the LoC is, ‘No one can divide us.’ From Gaza, 
young children hold up colourful signs alleging that Gaza stands with Kashmir. In Azad 
Kashmir, a sign claims ‘We want freedom,’ in addition to a message comparing Indian-
held ‘Curfewed Kashmir’ to ‘Gitmo,’ the controversial US detention centre in Cuba, 
Guantanamo Bay. Below a poster board with some statistics on Kashmir can be found 
 
Figure 3:3: Photos from the Anti-Modi demonstration in front of 
Downing Street, KSM SOAS Twitter page 
 
 




the hashtags #Viva La Azadi and #Viva La Kashmir. In one five-minute video, it is 
depicted that the Kashmir issue is a concern for everyone in the world. The title, ‘We are 
Kashmir,’ says it all. The campaigners want to express solidarity with other movements 
and want others to relate to the Kashmir issue, using populist references and universal 
rallying cries. For both KSM Edinburgh and SOAS, young women play important 
leadership roles, including in the establishment and continuation of the societies over the 
years. Young women were also important advocates and were prominent guests and 
speakers at events and meetings. Quite a few of the women have had professional 
backgrounds in journalism, social work, academia, and more. In both Edinburgh and 
London, female academics and activists were invited to speak via Skype at meetings 
from the United States as well as from within IAK. Young women are often the subjects 
of pictures on the Facebook pages of KSM SOAS and Edinburgh. This is contrasted with 
pictures, for example, of older crowds gathered at the Modi protest. The photos in Figure 
3:3 were shared on the Twitter page of KSM SOAS. They are meant to demonstrate 
evidence of various groups coming together on the common grounds of being against 
the prime Minister of India’s purported discrimination. In contrast to an older generation 
of protesters dominated by South Asian men, pictures of KSM protests reveal young, 
often smiling people of diverse backgrounds. On the Kashmir Students’ Campaign Twitter 
feed, they display pictures of protesters gathered outside the Indian High Commission in 
London in February of 2015 protesting sexual violence in Kashmir. The following year, 
KSM SOAS participants were photographed protesting the alleged molesting of a 
schoolgirl in Handwara 
(figure 3:4). For these 
demonstrations, rather 
than stencilled black signs, 
student protests usually 
depict people holding a 
myriad of colourful, hand-
written and drawn signs, 
especially in the case of 
short-notice gatherings, or 
gatherings protesting a 
Figure 3:4 Photo from KSM SOAS May 2016 protest of the alleged sexual 
assault of a minor girl in Handwara, IAK, KSM SOAS Facebook page 
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specific or recent issue or event.  
The real contrast is perhaps starker when comparing images from JKLF meetings 
to pictures of KSM meetings. Pictures on the JKLF website depict an overwhelmingly 
male audience, while depictions of audience attendance at KSM meetings is mixed. The 
cover photo for KSM Edinburgh’s Facebook page as well as their Twitter account display 
a heterogeneous group of activists (this thesis, figure 6:2, p. 190). Both accounts, which 
are publicly accessible, are often the first introduction to the KSM for those accessing 
information on the group online. The depictions of a more youthful, more equal gender 
ratio can offer much in the way of positive first impressions for potential female 
participants. Women in both groups have taken prominent leadership positions and have 
been critical in the organization and expansion of the societies to other campuses across 
the UK. Women have been described as the ‘backbone of the society’ and have been 
described as essential for moving the Kashmiri freedom movement forward both within 
and outside of Kashmir.  
Young men and women alike have expressed great reverence to the position of 
women in Kashmir who have, in their perspectives, persevered despite the 
disappearance of their husband and sons, despite years and years of conflict and trying 
to raise their children under often precarious conditions of intervals of strikes and curfews, 
militant threats, and the very real threats of security forces overstepping their bounds, 
causing harm to civilians. It is common on Facebook groups to share photos and stories 
which give praise to the strong Kashmiri woman – the sisters and mothers of Kashmir. 
Depictions of strength in the face of adversity tend to be framed in a ‘resistance’ master 
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frame and can coincide with stories of youth throwing stones, protest rock videos, or 
women with guns. It is seemingly meant to distinguish the contemporary freedom 
movement from some 
older generation of 
freedom supporters 
which have passed the 
torch over to the next 
generation of freedom 
activists, whose 
resistance has grown 
bold and widespread, 
from the 2008 attempt to 
march to the border or 
2010s uprisings that 
continue without 
specific leadership 
(Kaul, 2013). The 
resistance frame 
speaks out in both non-violent and aggressive acts. Youths throwing stones is an act of 
defiance, with their occupiers wielding loaded guns while they are only armed with stones. 
The Kashmiri woman is depicted almost as often as young stone pelters, approaching 
heavily-armed trained military men with nothing but anger and exasperation, desperately 
pointing and yelling at them. In other heavily-shared posts, a woman is depicted holding 
a gun and she is praised for fighting back at the oppressors. In figure 3:5, an event poster, 
‘On Occupation and Resistance,’ depicts a lone Kashmiri woman armed only with a stone 
facing off armoured vehicles and about a dozen armed security personnel. The title itself 
could be a tribute to Fahad Shah’s (2013) On Occupation and Resistance, a collection of 
writings from Kashmir, written by Kashmiris of their personal experiences living under 
occupation. Although the picture probably cuts out a larger protest happening behind the 
woman, the photo and the corresponding title of the event implies that the strong woman 
(Kashmir), armed only with a stone, is willing to fight for the freedom from her occupiers 
(India). The Kashmir woman simultaneously represents strength and perseverance, while 
also appealing to the sympathy of a cause not our own. The new generation of Kashmiris 
Figure 3:5 KSM SOAS event poster March 2016 
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express that they will succeed where preceding generations failed. They will fight for their 
freedom at all costs. The new generation provides strength and hope for a future 
independent Kashmir, and this is not restricted to militancy, 
 
What does Azadi mean for Kashmir Freedom Activists? 
 
Interview respondents all referenced the importance of identifying with the human rights 
situation in IAK. Some highlighted the women’s human rights while others highlighted 
freedom of movement or speech. Those coming to the UK from IAK have a sense of 
freedom that they may have never experienced anywhere in India. In a conversation with 
one of my respondents, former university student in Edinburgh, he also made it a point 
of reference for a place where one can truly be free; there are no checkpoints, no curfews. 
When asked ‘what does azadi mean to you?’ his reply involved a descriptive scene where 
he could freely ‘wear a Che Guevara t-shirt and raise the Kashmiri flag in Lal Chowk.’ 
Freedom of movement and omnipresent curfews during times of conflict in IAK impact 
the local economy greatly. One respondent was recounting how curfews can sometimes 
go on for weeks, giving people a very small window with which to purchase their basic 
essentials. And even during those times, people are allegedly attacked arbitrarily. The 
respondent, a young man currently studying in the UK, had described an event in which 
he witnessed security forces beating people who were buying goods at a market outside 
of a mosque during one of these periods of curfew relaxation. Curfews have other impacts 
on economic development in the Valley. During a trip to Srinagar in May 2013, I was 
having a casual conversation with one of the KSM Scotland members who had studied 
in Edinburgh prior to returning to Kashmir. Having completed a business-related degree, 
he mentioned in perhaps a casual, reflective way how he would love to open up a 
McDonald’s in Kashmir. ‘The people here would go crazy,’ he mused. But he quickly 
dismissed the thought since he would not be able to pay the franchise costs reliably with 
constant curfews and bandhs (strikes). Expressing some seemingly banal concerns such 
as wearing a controversial article of clothing or having an available source of McDonald’s 
French fries close by makes the Kashmir freedom cause perhaps more digestible for the 
average sympathizer in Western countries. Expressing grievances in these terms could 
suggest that Kashmiri youths are interested in a modern and perhaps more globalized 
Kashmir. Azadi has historical precedent and thus forms part of the cultural repertoire of 
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the youth activist. Azadi also has modern constructions. These constructions are often 
displayed in contemporary forms of art and film. 
In November 2013, I attended a KSM Edinburgh meeting where a documentary 
was being shown. After an opening statement by one of the committee members about 
the historical context of the conflict, she went on to discuss human rights violations in 
Kashmir. The documentary by Sanjay Kak (2007) which was freely available online was 
entitled Jashn-e-Azadi, or ‘How We Celebrate Freedom.’15 The rather artistic introduction 
in the film shows the 
view of Kashmir from 
behind barbed wire, 
a scene often 
imitated in artistic 
photos and flyers 
displayed or passed 
out at events. This 
imagery of people 
trapped behind 
barbed wire or of 
Kashmiris being 
‘caged’ as the corresponding flyer depicts is further explored in poetic verse and popular 
hip-hop songs. Jashn-e-Azadi in particular juxtaposes the zeal that Indian soldiers 
celebrate Indian Independence Day with the lacklustre that Kashmiris celebrate it. Instead 
of proudly observing the day, the usually bustling streets of central Srinagar are empty 
during the processions, as Sanjay Kak demonstrates in the documentary. In addition to 
documentary, Kak has displayed Kashmir through the photojournalist lens. Although not 
available in the UK at the time of this writing, Kak released a book Witness/Kashmir 1986-
2016 (2017) which has been well-received in India. According to a reviewer in Hindustan 
Times, Manjula Narayan (2017), the book forces the Indian middle class to consider the 
roll of the Indian state in Kashmir, to ‘make us think about what’s happening there 
because we’ve bought into the idea that the ends justify the means, the brutalization…’ 
 
15 Jashn-e-Azadi (2007) can be viewed freely on YouTube. Here is one stable link: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j74IKRnPR7Y 
Figure 3: 6 Jashn-e-Azadi flyer, KSM Edinburgh 2 Nov. 2013 
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The images in the book, Kak is quoted as saying, is meant to “trigger a conversation 
about the place of creative practices in this world of conflict” (Narayan, 2017). The review 
is not the best replacement for a hardbound copy of the book, but it does give exemplary 
images, some of which can be found on other sites as well. More importantly, it is meant 
as a vivid conversation piece. It is art, but it is art that demands to be engaged with. 
Documentaries, photojournalism, and contemporary music as well as more traditional 
verse and dance infuses contemporary re-imaginings of Kashmiri culture.  
          The hip-hop artist MC Kash was often mentioned at meetings and excerpts 
occasionally posted in the Facebook groups. The group’s videos, mostly in English, are 
shared widely among activists on social media and aimed at raising awareness of the 
violations in IAK. KSM SOAS publicized the group’s visit to a small venue in Manchester 
for a live show named #RebelRepublik after their similarly named album, advertised on 
KSM Edinburgh’s page as ‘Kashmir’s first mainstream English hip-hop album’ which 
serves as a ‘remembrance of anguish of Kashmir’s forgotten infliction, and of resistance 
against an unrelenting conflict.’ MC Kash is not alone in providing an alternative form of 
musical resistance. Mehak Ashraf, with the stage name Menime is a young female rapper 
from Kashmir. I never heard of her through the KSM but in a short video I discovered on 
YouTube, she explains that she finds it difficult to be accepted as a rapper in conservative 
Kashmir (The Quint, 2018). Coinciding themes of identity, art, and resistance remain as 
key topics for popular events at KSM SOAS. 




The Figure 3:7 photo exhibition was during ‘Kashmir week’ in February 2016 and included 
several academic and roundtable discussions. The exhibition of photos which displayed 
themes of occupation, subjugation, and resistance carried on the week after the 
roundtables finished in the campus building housing art exhibitions. Graffiti art captures 
a public view of art and can be seen in Kashmir, often in spaces where people frequent, 
and can be displayed further abroad and reinterpreted or framed differently for different 
crowds. The recurrent theme in photographic and graffiti art is resistance. KSM Edinburgh 
posted an article on their site in November 2012 which proclaims that ‘Graffiti shows 
hope…hope is resistance.’ During my visit to IAK, I snapped a few pictures of graffiti art 
displayed on walls of buildings on a riverwalk in Srinagar. Figure 7 shows two images. 
The first one, ‘Revolution is Loading…’ is used quite often in other photo opportunities. 
Standing alone, the expression leads us to believe that Kashmiris are waiting for the right 
time to stand up and fight against their perceived oppressors. The other phrase ‘Breaking 
Kalashnikovs,’ I am assuming is tagged by the same artist, as the same logo appears 
alongside both images. ‘Breaking Kalashnikovs’ is an interesting expression because we 
don’t know whether the writer wants to break security force personnel weapons or wants 
to retaliate with weapons. Essentially, 
these two images taken together further 
the story of Kashmiri youth mobilisation: 
they desire change, but there is 
uncertainty on how to achieve this 
revolution.   
  After my six months stay in 
London, KSM SOAs continued to host 
events which explicitly addressed 
Kashmiri identity and resistance as 
expressed in art. A post on their 
Facebook page advertising an event 
in November 2016: ‘Creative art forms, 
including poetry, fiction, and music, 
are integral to know Kashmiris, both in 
Kashmir and in diaspora, make sense 
Figure 3:8: Graffiti art, Srinagar May 2013 
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of identity while imagining a better future.’ The post provides an Eventbrite link with an 
attached image of the word ‘Azadi’ in graffiti on a dilapidated brick wall, presumably in 
Indian Kashmir. During the same month, the group again wished to highlight the 
‘cultural dimension to the struggle of Kashmiris…through poetry.’ The verses spoken 
in a combination of Urdu, Kashmiri, and English ‘over chai and Kashmiri music’ 
highlights the reimagining of historical traditions into contemporary culture of 
resistance. Numerous other poetry nights have been advertised and even where 
events are more academic in nature, there is often a guest speaker reciting poetry or 
performing spoken word.  
 The KSM Edinburgh group also hosted events which highlighted Kashmiri 
culture in addition to raising awareness for the conflict there. As the KSM Edinburgh 
group was much smaller in comparison to KSM SOAS, they had to often rely on joint 
activities with other groups. During my time with KSM Edinburgh, a rather well-
attended ‘cultural event’ was held in early December 2014. During the preceding 
meeting in November, it was decided that they would invite Students for Justice in 
Palestine (SJP), the Tibet society, and the Marx society to attend and perhaps say 
something cross-promotional about their campaigns. The conclusion was an event 
entitled ‘Cultures of Resistance’ and members of several other societies came to 
network. However, the event was definitively about Kashmir. With a small entrance 
donation, there was some food and Kashmiri tea followed by the usual introductory 
statement about the Kashmir conflict. The main feature of the night, however, was not 
the mini speech by representatives of the SJP of ‘Sonny’ of KSM, but the traditional 
representation of Sufi dance by a dance student at the University, a European student 
playing guitar and singing a song about resistance, and the poetry readings that were 
both traditional verse as well as more contemporary poetry about the conflict. It should 
be noted that I obliged to read one of the English poems that spoke of flowers blooming 
in Kashmir, while a committee member read another poem in English by the 
contemporary Agha Shahid Ali. This poem recounts the tragedy of Gawkadal Bridge 
whereby protesters trapped on a bridge were shot by Indian paramilitary forces. The 
surreal nature of the poem has a presumably young man shot on the bridge returning 
to a loved one, perhaps in a dream:  
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‘Don’t tell my father I have died,” he says, 
and I follow him through blood on the road 
and hundreds of pairs of shoes the mourners 
left behind, as they ran from the funeral, 
victims of the firing. From windows we hear 
grieving mothers, and snow begins to fall 
on us, like ash. Black on edges of flames, 
it cannot extinguish the neighborhoods, 
the homes set ablaze by midnight soldiers. 
Kashmir is burning…’ 
 
‘Kashmir is burning’ is the same phrase a Kashmiri journalist had used when he 
described events unfolding that led eventually to the crackdown by Indian security 
forces on militant activity. His phrasing, expressed from the perspective of a Kashmiri 
Pandit, was an eerie prelude or warning about the resurgence of militant activity that 
would result in yet another conflict escalation. This history of protest, security force 
backlash, and reinvigorated militancy is a warning of darker days to come if peaceful 




In this chapter, I explored the new Kashmir freedom movement, with the intention of 
capturing the perspective of the Kashmiri activist. To this end, I gave an overview of the 
strategies of the new movement, including its special attention to using social media as 
a medium for drawing attention to the Kashmir conflict. Often this is done in English and 
aimed at raising awareness for the Kashmiri cause in order to increase its presence in a 
crowded international campaigns arena. Specifically, one of the key elements in 
mobilisation for Kashmiris and to gain international sympathy for azadi is the scholarship 
on the role militarization has in making the valley prime ground for abuses to occur. In 
literature on Kashmir and more generally, militarization is seen as an acceptance of a 
patriarchal role in society. Naturally, this line of thinking is followed through analysis of 
the women’s roles in resisting both patriarchy and occupation. Although women have 
been active in resistance to Indian occupation (and promoting their own human rights as 
women), this has become much more publicized. Photos of schoolgirls throwing stones 
have circulated the internet causing both backlash and praise.  
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 There is a grand analogy between women being subjugated by a patriarchal force 
and Kashmiris being subjugated by an occupying force. In both instances, it is necessary 
to resist this oppression to reclaim agency. The contemporary azadi resistance, although 
primarily nonviolent, is indeed aimed at overcoming a greater foe through, in some 
instances, small acts of resistance. The youths in Kashmir and the transient youths in the 
UK that I have worked with have expressed their resistance in several ways. For some, 
it has been through prose and art or hip hop, with lyrics and verses that denounce Indian 
occupation. For others it is attending protests, holding placards, speaking out against 
Indian actions in Kashmir through lobbying and by exposing security force brutalities on 
Facebook. The youths are quick to react to events in Kashmir and are sure to use a 
universal language of human rights in order to express their grievances to the world. 
Perhaps most intriguing for the new movement is the role of women in the movement. 
Young women are very active in leading KSM groups and protests within Kashmir as well 
as in establishing new groups. Azadi for many Kashmiris is the freedom to live without 
fear of oppression, the ability to live without curfews, the ability to speak freely and openly 
even when they are dissenting authority. For women, this is also the freedom to pursue 
the careers they wish, even if it is to become a rapper. For the new generation of azadi 





















Internationalization of the Struggles for a Free Kashmir 
 
The new azadi movement has been influenced by and evolved from the previous phases 
of the azadi movement, with activism from pre-Partition against the Dogra regime to 
mobilizing in support of a plebiscite on Kashmir to mixed support for a militant option 
against what has been perceived as an Indian occupation of the State. As reviewed in 
the previous chapter, ‘The New Kashmiri Freedom Movement,’ the contemporary 
movement is one marked by nonviolent opposition to an oppressive security force which 
meets protesters with a heavy hand and often without punishment from a legal system 
that is slow to provide justice for victims of security force abuse. Often this abuse is 
sanctioned through draconian laws such as the Public Safety Act which permits for the 
incarceration of those suspected of disturbing the peace for up to two years without 
release, even if the accused is not officially sentenced. This space opens up for further 
abuse through extorting bribes from people to secure their release, slow action to exhume 
remains in mass graves, abuse of prisoner cover-ups, intimidating and ‘roughing up’ 
civilians, abusing women during unwarranted searches, no restitution for lost wages or 
physical harm for innocents locked away, and even the false labelling of civilians as 
militants in order to escape retribution for extrajudicial killings. These are all consequence 
of a long-term and high military presence in Kashmir.  
 Given everything that Kashmiris have experienced, the freedom movement has 
been sustained over the generations and passed to a new generation in order to fight for 
justice and reclaim agency as an independent country. For many, as long as they are 
under the rule of India, abuses will inevitably continue. Kashmiris, however, are no longer 
alone in their quest for independence. They have support from and have gained 
strategies of resistance from other parts of the world such as the Palestine movement 
against Israel or the Kurdish movement for self-determination. In addition to other self-
determination movements, such entities such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have acknowledged the atrocities that Kashmiris have faced. 
Documentaries such as Kashmir’s Trails of Torture and Inshallah Kashmir have brought 
the reality of Kashmiri struggles to the outside world. One of the most important outlets 
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for the new azadi movement has been social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook 
which offer Kashmiris a voice in an international forum that would otherwise be drowned 
out by the nationalist India and Pakistan media sources with their own particular stand on 
the resolution of the Kashmir conflict – often which does not provide for the option of a 
free Kashmir. Like the Arab Spring, the 2010 summer of unrest revealed to an 
international audience the story of the Kashmiri rather than the story of those who would 
be perceived as the oppressor or the occupying force.  
 This chapter moves on from understanding the new Kashmir movement with a 
particular emphasis on Kashmiris themselves and aims to see just how what was largely 
perceived as a separatist movement in the West became to be seen as a freedom 
movement against occupation. The internationalization of the Kashmir freedom cause 
began with Kashmiris but was quickly taken on by other people in South Asia and other 
people out-with South Asia. The chapter first puts into perspective how the Kashmir 
movement has gone international through a vignette about a vigil held outside the Indian 
consulate in Edinburgh. It then zooms out from this specific example of mobilisation in 
Edinburgh by examining the transnational mobilisation efforts of Kashmiris in the diaspora 
from both the Indian and Pakistan Administered sides and notes the rise of mobilization 
outside of Kashmir, through activation of the diaspora.  
 
Kashmir’s freedom movement Abroad 
 
On 5 February 2013, the first Kashmir Solidarity Movement (KSM) Edinburgh vigil was 
held outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh. I arrived at the event and was asked to 
assist with the re-lighting of the candles that framed pictures of young Kashmiris who 
have died in clashes with Indian security forces in what is often argued to have been 
peaceful protests. After others settled in, gathering around in larger than anticipated 
numbers despite the cold, the speeches began. The first speech was one of the 
organizers of the KSM in Edinburgh. He was a seasoned activist, probably in his forties 
and originally from Pakistan. He introduced one of the committee members, a University 
student who began to speak about Kashmir. The speeches weren’t just from Kashmiris 
or from people from South Asia, nor was Kashmir the only topic. Pre-empting the Scottish 
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referendum that would be happening in less than two years’ time, there was a Scottish 
man who spoke out against India, against England, against Israel and against the United 
States. The issue wasn’t Kashmir alone, but it was about the evils of capitalism and 
imperialism and about waging wars in other countries. The focus extended beyond 
Kashmir to Scotland, Palestine, and Tibet. The gathering served as a statement about 
every nation’s purported right to self-determination. But, the issues went beyond self-
determination, separatism, and secessionism. Representatives from Stop the War 
movement were there as well as Scotland Against Criminalizing Communities (SACC). 
Although the different organizations may have had their ‘pet’ cause or overarching 
campaign, the combination of groups formed a tenuous link to one another. 
The Scottish pro-independence movement was picking up momentum in the lead-
up to the September 2014 referendum. This served to provide a representative, local 
cause within which to compare to a range of campaigns of local and global significance 
to a range of actors and interest groups. For Kashmiri activists, the Scottish referendum 
provided a unique opportunity to raise awareness and solicit support for Kashmir self-
determination by framing Kashmir independence as a right akin to Scottish 
independence. This setting extended the range of participants to those directly related to 
the Kashmir freedom, or azadi, movement to incorporate a rather diverse and more 
loosely related set of activists. There were the supporters of an independent Scotland 
who stood in solidarity with another nation’s right to self-determination, there were those 
who were opposed to Westminster’s involvement in foreign wars which they perceive to 
only harm innocent people. After the speeches were over, the lead organizer handed a 
letter to the consulate stating grievances against India regarding Kashmir. They claim 
that Kashmir is the most militarized zone in the world with estimated troop levels of around 
700,000 according to many activists. This claim is reflected on numerous fliers and widely 
distributed via social media and in popular YouTube videos as well (Mahmoud, 2013). 
Observations of the heterogeneous gatherings of diverse populations and 
representation from various activist groups, it was clear that KSM was a transnational 
social movement and could only rightly be studied as such. Analysing separatist 
movements as social movements is not novel but is particularly evident in the 
contemporary context of transnational student and youth-driven movements. The youth 
who assemble abroad reflect the youths on the streets in their respective locations, 
155 
 
shouting slogans, waving placards, and throwing stones. But how does one reconcile 
identitarian claims inherent in a movement for one’s own homeland with the desire to 
collectively mobilize diverse populations? How do they perceive the movement for 
themselves as Kashmiri or South Asian activists and how do they alternatively ‘sell’ the 
movement to out-group activists in an effort to turn their domestic transgressions into a 
meaningful transnational call to action? These processes may begin in a loosely defined 
diaspora population with direct stakes to the Kashmir conflict or with some other 
associated ties to a distant homeland. However, these campaigns cannot work as 
isolated acts of activism, but must respond to developments that unfold over time. 
Diaspora populations need to be flexible in responding to events and how they interpret 
them for a diaspora community of activists as well as for affiliate causes and campaigns. 
Before taking a closer look at how Kashmiri activism has evolved into a transnational 
cause affiliated with human rights groups and other self-determination campaigns, I will 
survey some of the literature that helps to describe what diaspora activism is and how it 
can develop into transnational activism. 
 
Diaspora Activism and Transnational Mobilisation 
 
Diaspora activism and indigenous collective mobilisation movements depend on a group 
of peoples’ identification with a community as either a pre-existing or formulate condition 
for mobilisation. Literature on the transnational diaspora has looked closely at the various 
activities of migrant communities and how and why they mobilize. Assuming that Benedict 
Anderson’s assessment that a nation is an imagined, and rather malleable community 
which may be subject to evolution and reactionary interpretations; a community of people 
in forced or voluntary exile may be interpreted as Sokefield (2006) proposes ‘imagined 
transnational communities.’ Literature on imagined transnational communities, or for the 
sake of ease ‘transnational diaspora,’ tends to reference the activation of groups of 
migrants living abroad or the process of becoming a collectivity through shared 
experiences of suffering. Such is argued to be the case with scholarly works on those 
living in refugee camps or in forced exile due to war and conflict. Of particular note are 
the frequent associations of politically-conscious diaspora communities of South Asian 
descent engaging in ethnonationalist movements as is the case of Tamils (Fuglerud, 
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1999), Sikh/Punjabi religio-ethnic mobilisation as discussed by Tatla (1999) and a 
glimpse into the transition of Pakistan’s Mirpuri migrants in Britain to perceive themselves 
as Kashmiris (Ballard, 1991; Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011). Features and 
commonalities of ethnic awareness in the diaspora also seem to apply to refugee 
communities closer to their native homeland as is discussed by Sayigh (1979) and 
Knudsen (2005) who worked with displaced Palestinians in Lebanon. Research on 
diaspora Tamil communities also tend to focus on engagement with homeland politics 
and the reciprocal impact the conflict situation ‘back home’ has on fomenting their ethnic 
identities abroad (Thiranagama, 2014; Vidanage, 2009). Adamson asserts that 
diasporas, like other normative terms are ‘social constructs.’ Adamson argues that 
diaspora can be ‘…viewed as the products or outcomes of transnational mobilization 
activities by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction’ 
(2012: 25-6). In this lens, diaspora inherently take on a political connotation and are 
perceived as rational actors. As much as there exists literature on how diaspora 
communities abroad develop a strong sense of national identity, Jaffrelot and Therwath 
(2007) argue that especially for nation-states with high amounts of nationals living abroad 
temporarily or permanently, there is as much ‘reverse long-distance nationalism.’ In this 
case, rather than a diaspora population attempting to influence politics ‘back home,’ 
‘political entrepreneurs from the mainland generat[e] nationalist aspirations among the 
diaspora’ (Jaffrelot and Therwath, 2007: 2).  
Diaspora populations are rational actors, but they are also perceived to be as 
actors who base their decisions on more primordial motives. Anderson (1998) asserts 
that there is the desire for diaspora populations to re-connect to one’s displaced 
homeland, even one that has never been directly experienced before, as in the case of 
second and third generation diaspora. Here Anderson reflects upon the concept of the 
‘colonial’ as an instance of where we begin to see a longing for a homeland, even where 
one may not go to the motherland (1998: 62). Anderson points to the importance of print 
media and long-distance travel capabilities as facilitating the rise of nationalism (ibid.). 
He further blames European economic integration for instigating the rise of (or renewal 
of) extreme nationalist parties, ‘for the thrust of their propaganda is essentially to draw a 
sharp line between the political nation and the putative original ethnos’ (ibid: 72). The 
other type of ‘ethnicization of political life’ occurs when a community is apart from their 
homeland, as Anderson notes is the case for Indians living in ‘wealthy, post-industrial 
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states [where] long-distance nationalism is visibly emerging’ (ibid: 73). Here Anderson 
cites the destruction of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya as a contributing factor for Hindus 
abroad to donate large sums of money to the World Hindu Council.  
Jaffrelot and Therwath (2007) make explicit in their argument that it is not just 
diaspora that influence politics in the motherland but that often political entrepreneurs 
attempt to influence diaspora populations living abroad. The authors introduce the 
concept by noting campaigns for the ‘re-Islamization of Muslims that have migrated to the 
West,’ but move on to draw specific attention to the ‘ethno-religious nationalism’ of the 
Hindu far right in India (2007: 2). The RSS in India has penetrated many communities 
with different factions involved in social engagement in impoverished communities, 
training youth wings with militant-style drills, and developing attachments to universities 
via an Indian Student Association (ibid: 3). The World Hindu Council has provided the de 
facto structure for these various bodies and the RSS have offered ideological framings of 
a united Hindu ‘brotherhood’ through the use of ‘Sangh Parivar’ for uniting the family of 
Hindu organizations. Local branches, or shakhas, formed in various locations where 
diaspora populations were from East Africa to the United States and Canada. In the 
United Kingdom, a variation of the RSS, the HSS (the Hindu Volunteer Corps) was formed 
and shakhas quickly multiplied among diaspora cleavages in Birmingham and Bradford 
(Jaffrelot and Therwath, 2007: 6). Despite several affiliate organizations operating abroad 
– sometimes due to trying to not be overtly connected to the controversial RSS – the RSS 
still holds the reigns on ideology in the Hindu nationalist movements abroad. Jaffrelot and 
Therwath detail the ways in which the organization gets funding through illicit channels, 
for example, and how a unified Hindu ideology gains traction abroad through religious 
leaders travelling and giving talks, holding summer camps, and raising temples that 
display deities across the Hindu pantheon (2007: 10-11). Present in the Neasden Temple 
in Northwest London is a permanent exhibition on Hinduism which, framed in a nationalist 
manner, purport that Hindus have invented ‘geometry, astronomy, plastic surgery and 
quantum physics’ (ibid: 11).  
Beyond general hubris of the superiority of the ways of Hinduism and glorifying a 
reimagined history of greatness, a unified Hindutva ideology generally means an 
opposition to monotheism, particularly Islam. Not only did a Hindu brotherhood gain 
support for the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, but it also managed to raise 
revenue from affluent members of the Hindu diaspora in order to build (or as they claim 
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to re-build) the Ram Mandir (Jaffrelot and Therwath, 2007: 13). The threat of the ‘Other’ 
grew into a sustained effort to combat the spread of Islam. This was due to events in 
India such as the Shah Bano verdict and the conversion to Islam by Dalits as well as 
circumstances abroad which saw the intermingling of faiths in university and inter-faith 
marriages (ibid: 17). Unification against the other was also made possible due to 
discrimination faced abroad in ‘Christian’ countries by right-wing conservatives such as 
Pat Robertson in the States and everyday discrimination despite an ideological appeal to 
multiculturalism in the West (ibid: 19).  
Long-distance nationalism and diaspora mobilization are not altogether new 
processes. However, a journey that once took months to take can take only hours and a 
message can be sent in an instant. Contemporary long-distance nationalism may be part 
of a wider process of modernization: processes of globalization, technological advances, 
and better access to education can all provide the means and structures to mobilize. 
Modernization processes can bring about societal convergence which is perhaps best 
juxtaposed in Barber’s (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld, whereby he purports that the world is 
coming together and falling apart at the same time. To put it simply, the point he makes 
is that the forces of globalization are pitted against the forces of tribalism. Although these 
forces are opposed to one another, they often use the same methods for achieving their 
ends. Barber’s usage of Jihad is not one which safeguards Islam or Muslims but refers 
to the term as ‘disintegrated tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism’ which is in 
opposition to but simultaneously dependent upon ‘integrative modernization and 
aggressive economic and cultural globalization’ (Barber, 1996: 12). Pragmatism dictates 
that even the most conservative of religious sects use the internet to raise funds, promote 
their cause, and recruit sympathizers as well as actors in their cause – be that violent or 
nonviolent support. McWorld is a homogenizing influence which includes Internet, 
satellite television, smart phones and iconic soda pops. All of these items are used in 
transnational diaspora activism, regardless of the aim of the cause.  
For Fuglerud (1992), like Anderson, certain facets of modernity seem to highlight 
the tilt towards endemic nationalism. Paradoxically, nationalism appears to be a facet of 
modernity, but ethnonationalism seems to be a return to a sort of backward, primordial 
order. Fuglerud juxtaposes this by reporting a differentiation in conceptions of 
nationalism, whereby the ‘old’ form of nationalism is depicted as ‘Western, territorial, 
rational, lateral and civic versus Eastern, ethnic, organic, vertical and genealogical 
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nationalism’ (1999:12). Much literature on the Kashmir conflict seems to highlight the 
latter sort of nationalism, depicting the Kashmiri separatist movement as ethnically and/or 
religiously motivated in spite of circumstantial evidence that points to the more 
‘rationalized’ version of nationalism. Furthermore, this rigid narrative of ethnonationalism 
does not account for non-Kashmiris supporting a free, autonomous or independent 
Kashmir.  
Nationalism, although seen as a consequence of modernity, has its roots in 
history. Fuglerud (1999) recounts the rise of Tamil nationalism and Tatla (1999) recounts 
the rise of Sikh nationalism, both facilitated by colonial and postcolonial conditions. 
Kashmiris, Tamils, and Sikhs all trace their origins abroad to well before they became a 
politicized ‘diaspora’ community. Early migrants left for work opportunities and their 
linkages back home were less ‘political’ as it was economic, social and cultural. Sikh 
communities, for example, still practices endogamy by calling brides and bridegrooms 
over from Punjab (Tatla, 1999: 66). Tamil migrants to Norway went for work and then for 
educational opportunities once visa restrictions didn’t permit this type of immigration 
(Fuglerud, 1999: 57). Kashmiris migrated early on to Britain to work in the shipping 
industry (Ballard, 1991). However, this relatively relaxed flow of migration drastically 
changed due to critical events back home. Tamils in Norway were able to avoid getting 
sent back home due to a civil war going on in Sri Lanka (Fuglerud, 1999: 56). Kashmiris 
on the Indian side during Partition fled to the Pakistan side due to partition and 
subsequent wars, with a massive influx of Mirpuri-Kashmiris migrating to Britain after 
Pakistan built a dam that ruined their livelihoods (Ballard: 1991). Palestinians were 
evicted from their land by Zionists and scattered around to live in refugee camps in 
various locations in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon (Sayigh, 1979; Knudsen, 
2005). These relocating communities, with their various reasons for relocation, both 
increased and contributed to economic ‘chain migration’ as well as being influenced by 
political events found themselves in new locations forming ‘new’ communities there. 
Political events can be interpreted by diaspora populations differently and may be 
responded to in a variety of ways. Vertovec (2009) highlights the varying dimensions of 
homeland politics as generally, diasporic politics of an established migrant community, 
lobbying efforts and financial support to political parties ‘back home,’ support for and 
financing of subversive activities, or facilitating peace efforts and reconstruction in post-
conflict situations. Lastly, he identifies ‘mass protest and consciousness-raising,’ citing a 
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model of the organization of worldwide protests among Kurds which successfully brought 
‘Kurdish issues to global attention’ (2009: 95). Although international consciousness-
raising has been recognized as an activity of migrant communities, diaspora research 
tends to focus on transnational links with the homeland. Sokefeld and Bolognani define 
a diaspora as ‘an imagination of transnational community, that is, an imagination of 
community that refers to an elsewhere, which unites people in distant places and bridges 
different geographical and, by implication political spaces’ (2011: 114). Political spaces, 
however, may comprise of various ‘communities’ working in conjunction with one another. 
Tatla (1999), for example, notes the support for Khalistan by Kashmiris abroad. As far as 
diaspora Kashmiris are concerned, Sokefeld and Bolognani (2001) and Brubaker (1998) 
offer some of the few contributions on the topic. Sokefeld and Bolognani, though not 
necessarily the aim of their research, only cursorily mention interaction between Kashmiri 
groups and civic organizations such as movements for workers’ rights (2011). 
Nationalism, and ethnonationalism at once separate communities as well as bind 
disparate communities abroad into an ‘overarching’ community whereby one identity is 
more salient than another. Refugees and displaced peoples simultaneously seek 
acceptance and similar rights from their host communities while being strong advocates 
for retaining their native languages and traditional customs. It is in this context that we 
can see the Kashmir Workers Association affirming the right to be distinguished as a 
nation vis-à-vis India or Pakistan, but erstwhile condoning the essence of all South Asians 
in Britain the right to equal access to work and education as other ethnic groups in Britain. 
Identity markers influence participation in campaigns in a variety of ways and it is 
no different for Kashmir activists. Understanding and interpreting the ways in which these 
identities motivate participation is a nuanced exercise. Identity markers are salient and 
malleable. They are largely not pre-determined, static factors but always in the process 
of being re-evaluated in the new circumstances and contexts that transient populations 
find themselves. Ethnonational literature and scholarly works on homeland politics offer 
a way to begin to understand these dynamics but do not wholly apply to modern transient, 
often heterogeneous communities such as global rights activists. Essentially it is a 
combination of findings from this body of literature along with literature that homes in 
activist communities that better begin to understand the transnational activist 
communities which support a free Kashmir. This next section highlights the type of 
literature which lay at the intersection between homeland politics and transnational 
161 
 
activism before moving towards social movements which, I assert more accurately 
characterizes the contemporary azadi movement than isolating these bodies of literature 
can do.  
 
Activating Transnational Communities 
 
The literature on long-distance nationalism generally references either the activation of a 
group of migrants living abroad or the process of becoming a collectivity through shared 
experiences of suffering, as is the case with literature on those living in refugee camps 
or in forced exile due to war or conflict. This literature, unlike strictly ethnonational 
literature, takes into account the formation and transformation of ethnic and other 
communities living outside of their ‘homeland.’ In Adamson’s analysis, she re-visits the 
articulation of transnational networks as outlined by Keck and Sikkink in their book 
Activists Beyond Borders (1998). Here she describes transnational networks as either 
having essentially ‘instrumental goals,’ ‘shared causal ideas,’ or ‘shared principled ideas 
or values’ (Adamson, 2012: 32). She continues to raise the issue that some transnational 
networks are essentially ‘…defined primarily by a shared collective 
identity…marker…such as ethnic, national or religious identity’ (ibid.). Raising the issue 
of national identity or a collective sense of belonging can indeed serve to unite diaspora 
communities. As a case in point, she reflects on how the Tibetan national movement was 
essentially started by exiled and ex-patriot ‘political entrepreneurs’ (ibid: 35).   
This body of literature also attempts to describe the rise of nationalism due to 
contextual and event-linked circumstances. One of the common findings articulated in 
these works are what Vidanage (2009) discovered while working on the impact the Tamil 
diaspora had on home communities and is highlighted in Tatla’s (1999) work on the Sikh 
diaspora, is that a ‘critical moment’ is required in order to strengthen the communal bonds 
of a diaspora community. Already having established roots with some cohesion in the 
community, be it via sending remittances or making marriage connections, the ‘critical 
event’ activates the diaspora (and in some literature, the community thus ‘becomes’ a 
diaspora). Gayer purports that the ‘transformation of overseas Sikh and Kashmiri 
communities into diasporas illustrate vividly the volatility of constructions of otherness 
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among overseas South Asians’ (2007: 4). This volatility is seen as reflective upon ‘political 
turmoil in the homeland or socio-economic conflicts in the country of residence…’ (ibid.).  
Tatla discusses the importance of the ‘critical event’ for strengthening and 
reinforcing an ethnic consciousness that has already been fostering. Tatla asks three 
questions relevant to my own research: ‘first, the parameters within which a diaspora 
mobilizes; secondly, the characteristic nature of discourse on the Sikh homeland; and 
thirdly, the impact of a “traumatic event” upon ethnic consciousness and collective loyalty’ 
(183). Tatla’s and the other research on the list has leaned toward the idea that certain 
circumstances tend to be present when ethnic consciousness is most salient and leads 
to mobilization. ‘The Indian army’s action in the Golden Temple, sudden and unexpected 
as it was, is one of those “critical events”, whose impact is likely to last far longer. It has 
already punctured Sikhs’ patriotic fervour towards India, leaving a permanent scar on 
their minds’ (Tatla, 1999: 184). Tatla portrays that, for the most part up until the events of 
1984, the Sikhs were loyal to India, but after the event, a Sikh consciousness was 
permitted to awaken with a renewed fervour for a demand for Khalistan:  
‘The dishonour and hurt felt by Sikhs led to a spontaneous response in the 
diaspora, with protest marches and various other developments that generated 
anger against Indian officials and an outcry for independence – part of the Sikh 
collective consciousness, but an idea that needed no expression before June 1984’ 
(1999: 197). 
 
Perhaps one of the best examples of a critical event becoming a rallying cry for dissidents 
was the Palestinian ‘Disaster’ of 1948. Sayigh describes this as the point whereby 
ordinary ‘peasants’ were transformed into a politically active community (Sayigh, 1979: 
5). When Palestinian peasants were rooted from their homes and land and massacred in 
a mosque despite reports of surrendering, the peasantry found themselves in a situation 
where their livelihoods depended on opposing the Zionist aggression.  
Tatla does reflect upon several conditions for mobilizing the diaspora 
communities. He claims that unlike the diaspora being mobilized based around events 
that quickly fade out, the event of the Golden Temple was more lasting. For Kashmiris 
abroad, mobilization has been dotted with a series of events which seem to ‘remind’ 
Kashmiris of their Kashmiri-ness. These events, however, can be interpreted rather 
differently depending on the timing, who is involved, what other communities can 
sympathize, etc. Sokefeld and Bolognani noted Kashmiri mobilization when their 
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ethnic/national identity was seen as ‘threatened’ through de facto classification as 
Pakistani or Indian as opposed to Kashmiri, as well as the reaction to human rights 
abuses in Kashmir. Kashmiri involvement with Labour campaigns in pursuit of workers’ 
rights may seem like a more banal depiction of consciousness-raising in comparison. 
However, connections to socialism date back to pre-Partition Kashmir and the connection 
is again current when KSM on more than one occasion coordinates an event with the 
university socialist society. Social welfare, a tenet of Islam – is this an extension of the 
Kashmiri identity or a convenient ally used as and when desired for positive public 
relations? 
Sokefeld and Bolognani define a diaspora as ‘an imagination of transnational 
community, that is, an imagination of community that refers to an elsewhere, which unites 
people in distant places and bridges different geographical and, by implication political 
spaces’ (2011: 114). According to them, the process of living outside of one’s homeland, 
even within a community of kin does not constitute a diaspora. Literature on the Kashmiri 
diaspora does often point to Birmingham and Luton as sites for Kashmir political 
organizing abroad as these were sites of Bolognani’s fieldwork (2011) and Birmingham 
was the initial home of the JKLF abroad (Sokefeld, 2016). Despite being a site for Kashmir 
mobilisation, the concept of diaspora is more fluid and what constitutes the Kashmir 
community is more a reaction to events or situations than a concrete fact. Sokefeld and 
Bolognani (2011), for instance, point to Mirpuris as not actively identifying themselves as 
‘Kashmiris’ until the launch of the Kashmir National Identity Campaign in Britain in the 
late 1990s (14). Just like the Sikh migrants to Britain, these migrants were ‘activated’ 
under the pretence of some political issue or crisis situation. One campaign alone cannot 
account for the activation of any particular community but must also be seen in the context 
of other events and campaigns which may have at least some tenuous links to these 
campaigns.  
Essentially, Kashmiris in the diaspora have probably been influenced as much by 
identifying with ‘homeland’ and ‘kin’ as they are by other social and political movements 
with which they identify as somehow being ‘a part of.’ Sokefeld and Bolognani discuss 
Kashmiri identity in Britain as growing more in relation to events and campaigns than as 
a consequence of an inherent Kashmiri community in Britain (2012). In fact, migrants 
from Mirpuri and those from the adjoining Kotli districts in present-day PAK, began a cycle 
of migration to Britain after skilled seamen working for the British eventually began to 
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settle in the country and bring their families, well before Partition (Ballard, 1991). A 
Kashmiri identity in Britain enters much later, as does the support for a free Kashmir. The 
building of the Mangla Dam led to the displacement of Mirpuri Kashmiris and many did 
re-locate to Britain. An affiliation to Kashmiris was not so much the effect of a people 
being displaced, but a people who had suffered the consequences of the dam being built, 
one that is a primary source of hydroelectric power for Pakistan ‘proper,’ at the cost to 
‘Mirpuris who have had to witness the disappearance of much of their most fertile 
agricultural land, as well as the district’s two market towns…beneath the waters of the 
lake…’ (Ballard, 1991: 514). Although differing quite drastically in terms of language, 
culture, and even religious views historically, Mirpuris, argued Ballard, tended to be 
‘…enthusiastic supporters of a Kashmiri entity which would be entirely independent of 
both India and Pakistan’ (1991: 513). Ballard attributed this less to the region’s affiliation 
with Indian Kashmiris, and more ‘…as a consequence of disillusionment about the way 
in which Pakistan has treated them’ (ibid).  
Orjuela argues that transnational diaspora activism can be ambivalent. ‘Home,’ 
she remarks, ‘can be a source of pride or embarrassment, a romanticized place for return 
or a place that conjures up feelings of alienation’ (2012: 96). This seems to be particularly 
true for the Mirpur community who are often not regarded as equals by other Pakistani 
migrants to the UK, and recently, have begun to assert a distinct identity in separation 
from Punjabis and/or Pakistanis (Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011: 115). This pride in being 
‘Kashmiri’ may not necessarily be solely aimed at an identity construction of a nation 
without its own state, however. Although there are clearly activists who claim to seek a 
reunited independent Kashmir (especially since the militant uprising of the late 1980s), 
much of the affiliations between British Kashmiris and those from the subcontinent are 
familial and charitable in nature – seeking social ties, potential marriage connections, etc. 
(Sokefeld and Bolognani, 2011: 126).  
Kashmiriyat, or Kashmiri-ness referred to earlier, has been argued as a very real 
communal identity for all those hailing from Kashmir, regardless of which side of the LoC 
they have or currently reside, religious affiliation, or in some instances even mother 
tongue. Equally, it has been attacked as being an artificial monolithic representation of 
the plural communities of Kashmir (Aggarwal, 2008). Kashmiris from the Valley were not 
only at odds with Jammuites and Punjabis for historical accounts of oppression and 
discrimination, but also had clear divides from before partition. ‘At the time of accession, 
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the portion of the state where the creation of Pakistan had its strongest public support lay 
not in the Kashmir Valley but across the Pir Panjal…’ (a mountain range along the border 
of present-day IAK) ‘…in Mirpur and the old Poonch principality…’ (Habibullah, 2008: 20). 
Quite notably, many transnational activists in Britain today are second and third 
generation Mirpuris. Although it would seem that there is a strong movement from this 
diaspora for a reunited independent Jammu and Kashmir, there is still hostility and 
distrust from Kashmiris in IAK today. The question of impact and influence the Kashmiri 
diaspora community has on this new transnational social movement is one I hope to 
address in my study. As Della Porta and Tarrow point out, ‘…more transgressive forms 
of diasporic nationalism…have exacerbated ethnic and linguistic conflicts…’ (2005: 8). 
Despite the large volume of literature which analyzes Kashmir identity along religious, 
nationalistic, ethnic, and other identity markers, none of the aforementioned authors 
addresses the divisions Kashmiris have amongst themselves – that is, Indian Kashmiris 
vis-à-vis Pakistani Kashmiris.  
Pakistani Kashmiris and Indian Kashmiris do not always believe that they have 
the same culture nor are their visions of a future independent Kashmir the same. And 
thus, Pakistanis or activist groups led by Pakistanis might not be highly representative of 
Indian Kashmiris. Further attesting to this fact, was a study on Usenet and yahoo groups, 
with a case study on a group in 2001 whereby a respondent referred to the large 
community of Pakistani Kashmiris from the district of Mirpur who have relocated to Britain. 
This Kashmiri expressed concern that they would buy all their land, that they were violent, 
and generally not ‘true’ Kashmiris (Rao et.al., 2011: 275) This perspective also points to 
the initial split in Muslim Conference/National Conference whereby Sheikh Abdullah 
(largely supported in IAK) would rather have been in a secular India that supported his 
socialist reforms than in a Pakistan that was opposed to Sufism and would be ruled by 
large land-holding elites which have been subjugating Kashmiri Muslims since before 
British colonialism (Akbar, 1985; Schofield, 2010). Issues of conflicting identities of those 
on either side of the LoC are also echoed by Ellis and Khan (2001) in their work with 
Kashmir diaspora. Speaking generally, they echo Vertovec’s definition of 
transnationalism which is broadly defined as ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people 
or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (1999: 447). They identify Kashmiris 
as a transnational community, highlighting that ‘[t]he processes and activities involve 
significant proportions of the relevant communities and have stability and continuity over 
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time and across borders’ (2001:169. Given the substantial diaspora of Kashmiris from 
Azad, or ‘Free’ Kashmir in PAK in the United Kingdom, their work focuses on this 
community. As Vidanage notes, ‘According to Vertovec, the emergence of 
‘transnationalism’ as a central concept in understanding how global identities are 
constructed ‘from below’ and ‘on the above’ has been a key feature in the contemporary 
efforts in theorizing diaspora’ (2009: 54). 
For migrant Pakistanis and Kashmiris in the UK and their children and 
grandchildren, connections to the ‘homeland’ are not necessarily a given. Much research 
on diaspora supports the notion that diasporan identities are constantly in flux, live with 
mixed feelings towards their adopted homeland and the homeland of their ancestors or 
their birth (Lyons and Mandaville, 2012: 19). This is certainly true for even those second-
generation Kashmiris who may not be very politically active, as Cressey (2006) observed 
through interviews with youths in Birmingham born in the UK to Pakistani and Kashmiri 
parents. The attitude of home-not-home resonates in the diaspora during periods of 
contention. Kashmiris in the diaspora re-connecting to their homeland identity in the UK 
has happened, for example, in response to violence to Kashmiris by Indian security forces 
(Sokefeld, 2006: 277). Transnational networks also help to establish ties between the 
motherland and the adopted homeland through the diffusion of liberation ideologies and 
organizations such as the JKLF (Ellis and Khan, 2003: 535). For younger Kashmiris, and 
especially for one young woman studying in London, the KSM offers a more comfortable 
atmosphere for learning about Kashmir and for engaging with other Kashmiris than 
groups such as the JKLF which may be male-dominated and comprise of her father and 
grandfather’s generation. 
Gayer (2007) highlights how conflicts and fissures in the broader diaspora 
community raise tensions. He demonstrates how a community is constantly re-
negotiating its identity in relation to developments at home as well as in their adopted 
domiciles. For example, he reflects upon the rise of the British National Party in Britain 
as contributing to racial tensions in Southall leading to riots, which subsequently brought 
left-leaning political activists closer to minority communities in Britain (2007: 6). Under 
circumstances such as these, an event may bring disparate communities together, 
however, under other circumstances, divisions seem to be highlighted more. Gayer notes 
that a ‘Punjabi’ community that was inherently multi-religious was the norm in Southall 
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pre-dating the rise of a ‘Sikh’ identity which explicitly detached itself from an ‘Indian’ 
identity after the attack on the Golden Temple in 1984 (2007: 9). 
Ramamurthy (2013) points to a striking example of the collaboration efforts of 
Asian youths and the Black Power movement of the late 1970s and 1980s which forged 
alliances against the perceived discrimination, racial injustices, and police brutality 
experienced by non-whites in English towns. While recognizing cultural differences, they 
also highlighted a strength in solidarity to combat these injustices as well as to affirm 
support for Third-World liberation movements (2002: 2). Numerous branches of Indian 
Workers Associations (IWA) sprang up across England and became platforms for leftist 
politics, including taking on board the anti-racist platform of the youth movements. 
Communist, socialist, and leftist parties have added to their ranks through the promotion 
of equal opportunities for workers of all backgrounds. The Kashmir Workers Association 
(KWA) formation served as not only a rebuke against Indian and Pakistani Workers 
Associations in an effort to claim their own identity, but also as an inferred affirmation of 
leftist and anti-racist policies. As observed in dialogue at KSM meetings, the Kashmir 
Identity Campaign was not simply a matter of recognizing Kashmir as an ethnic or 
national group on a census form, but also served to uphold the right of Kashmiris to 
oppose an imperialist framework which led to their discrimination.   
Since the influx of migrants from Kashmir, and especially from Pakistan 
Administered Kashmir (PAK) after the Mangla Dam was built, dislocating a large portion 
of Mirpuris, Kashmiri associations popped up around the UK. Although primarily focused 
on local community issues, some Kashmiri organisations were launched with the support 
of labour movements; other Kashmiris were mobilised as part of a Kashmir Identity 
campaign. In recent years, however, there has been a stronger push to raise awareness 
of the Kashmir issue, culminating in the creation of the Kashmir awareness Forum and 
several university societies which may also have an affiliation to the Kashmir Students 
Campaign UK. These organizations differ in their approaches and their demographics 
than what may be considered more hard-line organizations such as the JKLF and 
Tehreek-e-Kashmir UK which appear to be more focused on the question of a separate 
Kashmir and other matters of territorial politics. The latter organisations also tend to relay 
their messages in Urdu and their members tend towards older men. This does not, 
however, prevent Tehreek e Kashmir from affiliating with a KSM vigil, for example; nor, 
the JKLF from posing for pictures with members of KSM at a protest.  
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There are clear linkages between seemingly disparate campaigns, however, 
much of the literature on diaspora activism cease to address how or why people 
participate or sympathize with diaspora activism who are not part of the same ethnic or 
national unit – unless ‘diaspora’ activism may be conceived of in a rather different way. 
Within much of the literature on transnational diaspora activism and long-distance 
nationalism, there is little that would relate a transnational social movement to 
transnational diaspora mobilisation – despite references in this literature for collaborative 
efforts in voicing common grievances such as the Sikhs and Kashmiris who Tatla (1999) 
references as at least standing in solidarity with the other movement, is not working in 
tandem for common goals. However, the phenomenon of a wide range of activists coming 
together and assisting those they relate to or support in some way – even if it is a self-
determination movement – is clearly visible on many university campuses.  
 As I have purported previously, re-assessing the Kashmir movement as a social 
movement may bridge the gap in previous literature on the azadi movement. The next 
section takes a closer look as to how this is done through the lens of student solidarity, 
which provides an outlet for diaspora and sympathizer mobilization efforts abroad.  
 
 
Diaspora and Domestic mobilization and student solidarity  
 
The summer of 2010 probably represents more than other periods in IAK the turning point 
from a domestic movement to a transnational social movement. Haley Duschinski and 
Bruce Hoffman (2011) have emphasised the role legal advocacy has had on influencing 
this change after the events in 2010 in IAK. The specific critical event that really kicked 
off the spiral of protest and subsequent retaliation by security forces was the killing of 17-
year-old student, Tufail Ahmad Matoo, after he was shot in the head with a tear gas 
canister. Although the youth’s death may not have been intentional, it still spurred on 
massive protests as it raised questions about what a valid use of force against protesting 
masses in Kashmir was. By October, over 100 people were killed - mostly youths – and 
many more were detained on grounds of the Public Safety Act (PSA) Kashmir. The PSA, 
initiated as a ‘preventive-detention’ measure, was used in the arrest of the president of 
the Kashmir Bar Association (KBA), Mian Qayoom, who went on trial for charges of 
sedition. ‘Taking place in the Indian state’s own court of law, Qayoom’s judicial hearing 
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furnished the opportunity for lawyers to protest against the state in an officially sanctioned 
space’ (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011: 8). To show their support for Qayoom, over a 
hundred KBA members navigated the heavily-patrolled streets to fill the court and in order 
to petition the withdrawal of charges and other demands (ibid.). Beyond the show of 
solidarity in a high-profile case, KBA members extend their legal expertise to Kashmir 
civil society at large by providing legal counsel, coordinating demonstrations, and even 
mediating among various stakeholders of the separatist movement (ibid.). Duschinski and 
Hoffman further argue that their status as belonging to part of an institution, yet outside 
of the executive branches of government provides for a key alternative juridical space. 
This space permits for the tenuous act of advocacy, despite efforts to quiet this sort of 
resistance. What is perhaps most crucial is the ability legal advocates have in being civil 
society ‘translators’ between ‘local and global groups, introducing international 
frameworks of human rights and humanitarian law and justice processes ‘down’ into local 
protest movements…’ and ‘reframing local protest movements ‘up’ to cosmopolitan 
actors in ways that might earn their support’ (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011: 11). This 
analysis shows that legal advocates do offer a bridge between institutional power and the 
grassroots movements of self-determination supporters. The links are made by the 
authors between legal advocacy and the movement for self-determination but offer little 
in the way of supportive evidence between traditional separatists (JKLF and APHC) and 
legal advocacy. It is not clear in the authors’ analysis which stakeholders benefit other 
than vaguely articulated references to victims in general. The conclusion is perhaps that 
the authors are focusing upon the relations legal advocates have to street-level protests. 
After the petition for the release of Qayoom fell flat, the KBA opted for a strike, only 
covering cases of human rights and illegal detention in an effort to expose the faults within 
the Indian legal system in Kashmir (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011: 12). In effect, it is 
unclear how committed the advocates are at the movement for self-determination as 
opposed to moving towards reforms within the state. The translation between global and 
local actors by legal advocates as reported by the authors is a valid and critical 
development of the transnational azadi movement, however, I would argue the adoption 
of legal framings by grassroots activists played a more critical factor than the 
institutionalized resistance. This represents a further element of translation of legal 
advocacy to promote the Kashmir struggle for human rights to outside activists. The case 
of Qayoom offered an indispensable opportunity to mobilize with professional and legal 
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advocates within and out-with Kashmir and provided the opportunity for framing dissent 
in a fairly straightforward legal framework rather than a divisive political context.  
Transnational mobilization for KSM and affiliated causes are assisted by the 
transient nature of participants. Many of the students from IAK for KSM Edinburgh and 
SOAS are often visiting students or on short-term (and some longer-term) degree 
courses. Some of the students are on a one or two-year program in the UK. This transient 
nature has surely impacted the society. On the one hand, the students are drawn together 
because they are seeking to socialize and look for a community outside of their courses, 
sometimes for personal as well as professional networking purposes. On the other hand, 
they may be eager to engage in political activities they felt were difficult to access back 
home, due to the relative freedom they experience in the UK compared to India. Some 
have had direct links to legal processes and activism within IAK and take their expertise 
with them when advocating for human rights and azadi in Kashmir.   
Throughout the literature on Kashmir, there is reference to engaging with the 
diaspora community in the UK and elsewhere and ‘activating’ the diaspora community in 
response to particularly contentious events. Sokefeld and Bolognani (2011) discuss the 
activation of the Kashmiri community in response to events in Kashmir and during the 
Kashmir Identity Campaign and Ballard (1991) discusses how some Kashmiris from the 
Pakistani side demonstrated a pro-freedom stance after the government of Pakistan 
made some unpopular decisions which displaced many Kashmiris to the UK. In addition, 
it is often noted in observations of meetings or online content that there is a will to engage 
with the diaspora community and to activate them – to spur them to action. From time to 
time, in the UK and elsewhere, we see a call for Kashmiris to come together in protest 
and there have been several specific movements and groups that attempt to facilitate 
coordination and dialogue. These are not, however, without controversy.  
In October 2014, there was a march held in London which originated in Trafalgar 
Square and ended at Downing Street. The march was supported by an amalgamation of 
pro-freedom and pro-Pakistani Kashmiris and activists and led by the former Prime 
Minister of Azad Kashmir, Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry. Chaudhry, however, was 
also the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) leader. Although the messages on sites promoting 
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the event such as millionmarchlondon.com (2014)16 expressed a message of petition 
against Indian security force abuses, politicians took advantage of the rally and were 
greeted with mixed support and opposition from the crowds that gathered. When PPP’s 
Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zadari spoke, he was interrupted by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 
(PTI) supporters who shouted slogans in protest and launched water bottles at the 
speaker. Overall, the event received mixed reviews. On the one hand, a large crowd did 
gather and the event did muster press coverage. On the other hand, the event seemed 
like a large rally aimed at garnering support for Pakistani politicians. 
On 26 October 2014, the gathering of the presumptively-named ‘Million march’ 
saw a gathering of around only an estimated 5000 Kashmiris despite the claim that there 
are nearly one million first, second, and third generation Kashmiris currently residing in 
the UK. The event was organized by former Azad Jammu and Kashmir prime minister 
and Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) leader, Barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry (Dawn, 
2014).  The Million march was publicized as being aimed at raising awareness of the 
long-standing Kashmir dispute; however, as one article reflects, it could have been 
misconstrued as a politicization tool for Pakistan political parties. The Kashmir Walla, an 
independent news source, ran an article authored by two members of the Kashmir 
Students Campaign UK - later shared on their Facebook page - regarding the conflicting 
ideals of the march. The argument against attending the event was quite clearly along 
the lines that an event organized and publicized by the former prime minister of Azad 
Kashmir and PPP leader could not be in the favour of Kashmiris since the event sends 
the wrong message to an international audience which it is purportedly one of its primary 
purposes. The dissenting author, Rabia Khan, claimed that although a ‘welcome step in 
pushing for greater dialogue,’ ‘international solidarity for our cause will be hard to muster, 
when some supposed proponents of self-determination are themselves so ingrained in 
the political systems of the occupying states’ (2014). Instead of relying on the political 
parties that may be perceived as not furthering the case of Kashmir independence, Rabia 
expresses hope for a ‘grassroots march for Kashmir with sincere intentions, initiated by 
those without a tarnished representation’ (ibid.). 
 
16 This website no longer exists, but archived news of the march can be found in ‘Kashmir million march 
to go on despite Indian efforts,’ (2014) Dawn, https://www.dawn.com/news/1139207 
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The argument in the second half of the article for ‘Why I attended the ‘million 
march for Kashmir,’ was laden with criticism for both the ‘self-professed progressive 
British-educated generation,’ who may have not attended due to the assumption of the 
march being used as a rally for PPP to garner votes in the UK, as well as the ‘older and 
backward generation,’ (2014). Abdul Ahmed claimed that although he does not swear 
‘fealty to the organizers of the event as their sincerity has yet to be proven,’ he argues 
against the march being a pro-Pakistani event. While at the march, he observed that ‘[n]o 
political party or Pakistani flags were displayed, no political slogans were chanted, 
Kashmir and Kashmir alone was the focus’ (ibid.). While the arguments for the attendance 
of the event dished out criticism on a lacklustre response from the ‘young hipster activists 
who regard themselves as artistic martyrs,’ (Ahmed, 2014), what is clear from both 
accounts is that there is a distrust of political parties and a questioning of sincerity from 
those engaging with the political system. There is a sense that raising awareness about 
Kashmir is a good thing, however, that this should be accomplished by a grassroots 
movement that is not actively trying to achieve political gains or garner votes.  
The ‘Million’ march initiated in November of 2014 was held in London as an 
attempt to show what has been estimated by some as nearly a million ethnic Kashmiris 
currently residing in the UK. As per the Kashmir Identity Campaign, there was an attempt 
to overcome the only options on nationality ‘tick box’ forms which only had the option of 
being from Pakistan or from India (Sokefeld and Bolognani (2011). The one argument 
follows the logic that since Kashmir continues to be disputed territory, there should be 
the option of coming from Kashmir. The Kashmir Identity Campaign was brought up and 
discussed in relation to the quandary of getting more participants involved that self-
identified as Kashmiri. One of the speakers at the KSM SOAS Meet and Greet in October 
of 2015 was discussing at one point how ‘millions had come to the streets to protest after 
the Amarnath event.’ This, he placed in the context of ‘the relative failure of the Million 
march where only 5000 Kashmiris came out to protest in 2014, despite there being a 
million Kashmiris in Britain.’ There was some debate over the number of Kashmiris in the 
UK by a few audience members at the event. The identity campaign continued in the form 
of lobbying of social media sites such as Facebook for the option of identifying oneself 
as being from Kashmir. A Kashmir identity is a strong reason for mobilising abroad, but 
not all purported Kashmiris are activated. Those that are, do not reflect a homogenised 
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identity and have different motivations for participation and different interactions with 





This chapter has looked at the internationalization of the Kashmiri movement with 
emphasis on the more traditional lens of homeland politics and transnational 
mobilisations. Even in the context of more traditional mobilisations, however, it is clear 
that connections to other movements, such as with the Sikhs and Palestinians have been 
forged over time. The chapter first put into perspective how the Kashmir movement has 
gone international through a vignette about a vigil held outside the Indian consulate in 
Edinburgh in 2013. It ends with reference to the million march in 2016, with rather polemic 
conditions arising from the march. In juxtaposing two young people’s opinion for going or 
for not attending, it demonstrates that there is division in the South Asian diaspora when 
in connection to the perception of particular political party involvement. For the vigil, 
however, there was a greater diversity of campaigns standing in solidarity with one 
another outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh on a cold Scottish evening. The 
internationalization of the struggle for a free Kashmir goes beyond a homogenized 
diaspora. It connects disparate individuals for a unified cause, even if this is a fleeting 
connection. The next chapter looks more closely at this development of a transnational 
activism and how solidarities have formed, particularly in the case of student and 












Transnational Activism and Movements: Identity 
Transformation and Solidarity 
 
‘The ideal movement strategy is one that is convincing with respect to the political 
authorities, legitimate with respect to potential political supporters, rewarding with 
respect to those already active in the movement, and novel in the eyes of the mass 
media. These are not entirely compatible demands…’ (Rochon, 1988:109) 
 
Among other challenges facing a transnational Kashmir movement, the challenge of 
competing demands arises from various members within and out-with the movement in 
general or with KSM in particular. Rochon (1988) quoted in the epigraph juxtaposes the 
dilemmas facing transnational movement activists with how it is perceived, promoted or 
retaliated against by the media and the government. Organizations such as KSM abroad 
of APDP in IAK is rather limited in its ability to use ‘unconventional tactics’ which may 
‘expose the movement to criticism or repression’ (110). In IAK the ability to publicly 
assemble for a protest is greatly restricted. Even in other parts of India it can be 
dangerous to conduct protests so even less contentious forms of public protest and 
demonstrations may be ripe for the Army to attempt to disperse, arrests on grounds of 
sedition, or use of more harmful crowd control measures such as pellet guns. Youths 
throwing stones at security personnel shouting pro-freedom slogans is an unconventional 
act of protest which does garner more press, especially when there is property 
destruction from Molotov cocktails, for example. Marsh (1977) contributes to the 
quandary surrounding unconventional protest as a form of deviant behavior. He argues 
that protest, although a potential problem to the authorities, is not intrinsically a deviant 
behaviour but a ‘necessary part of the democratic system’ (15). Marsh purports it is not 
simply free people enacting their right to protest that can impact social change. He argues 
that the ‘threat of violence’ and even ‘occasional outbreak[s] of violence’ may lend to the 
credibility of those dissidents attempting to enforce social change (Marsh, 1977: 15).  
 Kashmir solidarity groups are located in countries where there is generally the 
ability to conduct peaceful protests such as the UK and Canada. An illegal protest that 
might be dispersed and turn into newsworthy stories such as protester retaliation or 
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injuries is suddenly a boring story that may not draw much attention. Unconventional 
tactics from solidarity groups abroad may not be seen as necessary as the target 
audience is India. Even holding a vigil outside the Edinburgh Indian consulate, for 
example, is not particularly contentious in the context of Scotland. KSM and groups like 
it are at once freed from the confines of immediate oppression from a government seeking 
to repress dissent and simultaneously finding it difficult to make big enough statements 
to draw in larger numbers of supporters. In this manner, KSM must both try to advocate 
azadi for its core constituents while focusing on narrowing in on specific concrete issues 
that are relatable to a broad number of potential supporters. Kashmiri freedom activists 
must at times tone down the calls for outright azadi or support for hero militants that defy 
Indian occupation if they are to bring in those that sympathize with the trauma and 
oppression that Kashmiris have and continue to face. This is not an easy feat when the 
occupation itself is blamed for setting the scene for abuses to occur. The transnational 
azadi movement and KSM as a representation of this abroad must negotiate between 
alienating potential supporters through the adoption of unconventional tactics and 
alienating those who support more direct action, even to the extent of supporting force 
against Kashmir’s oppressors.  
Having looked more closely at transnational mobilisation of the diaspora and 
some of the disagreements that can arise from homeland politics, this chapter reflects 
back on the traditional identity markers, but looks at these from the perspective of the 
contemporary Kashmiri freedom activist. Being part of a transnational movement that 
adopts frames of other campaigns for human rights has led to the re-negotiating or 
transformation of identity. This chapter argues that these individual identities have 
transformed in a way which permits for the saliency of group solidarities as a 
consequence of going international. Overarching collective identities based on feelings 
of subjugation has led to the possibility of linking campaigns – or bridging them in framing 
terms. This extends the Kashmir movement to be one which can be in solidarity with 






Ethnic, National, Cultural, or Solidarity Identity? 
 
Religious, national, ethnic, and other identities of Kashmiri freedom supporters are fluid 
and dynamic; and, perhaps more so because of the diversity of backgrounds and the 
common ‘solidarity’ participants have in the call to action. This, of course, does not mean 
that individual or even group ethnic identity does not exist. All of the Kashmiris 
interviewed individually claimed that being Kashmiri had a huge impact on participating 
in the society, as well in the decisions to help establish a wing of the society. Likewise, 
many of the participants involved in the KSM are involved in Islamic organizations or 
societies, on and off-campus. Identity markers are intertwined in relation to mobilization 
and cannot be analysed in isolation from other identifying qualities, namely an affiliation 
to unifying social or political identities. A social movements interpretation that factors in 
the role of identity in mobilization is a more useful tack than ethnic and national 
interpretations currently permit. This is a reflection of new movements which exhibit the 
contemporaneity of the digital and globalised age with the rhetoric and concepts that span 
across various geopolitical spaces and movements. In short, this chapter demonstrates 
the assertion that it is not ethnic, national, or religious motivations which cause someone 
to support azadi for Kashmir; but, it is a reinterpretation of what it means to be Kashmiri 
in the context of a contemporary and digital age where one is exposed to transnational 
movements and universalist interpretations of rights.  
To reiterate some of the discussion previously on ethnonationalism, a key element 
to understanding ethnic nationalism theoretically and how it is used in this thesis, is the 
notion that the idea of nation is a constructed concept open for interpretation. This 
imagination of nation, with reference to Anderson (1983) infers the notion of the nation 
as a sovereign entity (6). If indeed the essence of an ethnic national community, however 
conceptualised, is that it is inherently sovereign, then it would follow that self-perceived 
nations would seek autonomy and independence in some fashion. Many Kashmir 
scholars inevitably deduce the importance of Kashmiri nationalism in mobilizing towards 
an independent Kashmir, often despite reasonings that attribute the turn to militancy, for 
example, to a ‘democratic deficit,’ as interpreted by Ganguly (1997) and Bose (2003). 
With Kashmiris supporting Scottish, Palestinian, Tibetan, and other independence 
movements, and with non-Kashmiri freedom supporters also supporting anti-war, anti-
hate, and human rights campaigns, it would be best not to assume that ethnic/national 
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identities are prima facie when lending support to a self-determination movement. The 
notion of sovereignty then may extend beyond the notion of a perceived inherently 
sovereign ethnic community but be more representative of a perceived inherently 
sovereign political community. The sovereign political community representing a 
sovereign imagined nation, is then not limited to a singular ethnic or religious grouping 
but may be perceived as representing a more heterogenous population.  
What it means to be Kashmiri, and what it would mean to belong to an imagined 
political community named Kashmir is a malleable construction of identity left to 
reinterpretation. According to Snow et. al. (2013), ‘social movements contribute to the 
alteration or reaffirmation of culture’ (225). Social movement entrepreneurs may 
selectively choose from cultural resources that may serve to better link to their 
movements as the movement itself is transformed from a domestic to a transnational one. 
Likewise, activists may in turn reference aspects of their individual and collective 
identities in an effort to relate this in some way which links culture to their chosen 
movement participation. Different cultural elements may be fused together in a manner 
which revitalizes cultural elements. These emergent cultural elements are thus ‘linked to 
and facilitated by the interpretive processes of frame articulation and elaboration’ (Snow 
et al., 2013: 225). Frame articulation is defined by the authors as ‘the process through 
which the elements constitutive of a frame are assembled and integrated in a meaningful 
fashion’ (ibid.: 229). Frame elaboration, on the other hand is taking the incorporated 
elements and according a different value or ‘weighting’ to them in a sort of hierarchy of 
cultural elements. Elements naturally overlap and hold greater weight in some contexts 
than others. In this manner, social movements become ‘cultural innovators.’ Instead of 
challenging the status quo power or hegemon as social movements are often depicted 
as doing, Snow et al. (2013) interprets the social movement of challenging the status quo 
interpretations of cultural resources and symbols. For the entrepreneur, this provides a 
set of symbols to pool from to frame a movement in a way that is culturally resonant with 
a targeted audience in mind. For the individual activist, cultural symbols can be used to 
link perceived cultural identities with movements they support. There, is, however, a 
constant push and pull between perceived individual and collective identities. As identities 
are more abstract rather than concrete components of an individual, it is rather difficult to 
define or to make into a set of typologies (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). For this study, 
however, thematic features emerged which demonstrated these processes of frame 
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articulation and elaboration. Before elaborating on the more empirical findings from work 
with the KSM, the next section discusses how activists negotiate with their religious 
identity in the context of the contemporary azadi movement. 
 
Negotiating (Religious) Cultural Identities 
 
As a nuance of identitarian motivations for mobilisation, religious interpretations have 
certainly been highlighted during Kashmir’s phases of militancy. Communal violence has 
been an unfortunate reality of South Asia as has been demonstrated in the horrors of 
Partition. Whether these encounters with religiously-motivated violence are explicitly due 
to spiritual or sectarian divides – or more so by exploitations of political entrepreneurs 
has always been debatable. For the purposes of this study, however, there is an 
assumption that religion is part of one’s cultural repository and therefore an identity which 
may be ‘reinterpreted’ or reimagined as Snow et al. (2013) asserted.  
Before the mass conversions to Islam during the Moghul period in Kashmir, 
Buddhism and variants of Hinduism were widely held beliefs across the state (Malik, 
2005: 12; Chowdhary, 2010: 4). Today, the portion of Jammu and Kashmir known as Leh 
is dominated by the path of the Buddha, Jammu by variants Hinduism, and Kashmir by 
Islam. This represents only the majorities, however. Throughout the state, there is a rich 
diversity of adherents to Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, and various sects of Islam. 
Spiritual and religious practices are further nuanced by the colourful diversity of cultures, 
languages, traditions, taboos, dress, history of ruling regimes, and more (Behera, 2006; 
Puri, 2010). The women of Kashmir today personify the adoption and adaptation of 
cultural and popular dress. Today in Kashmir, as I observed on my visit there, you can 
find Muslim women dressed in black burqas, university students wearing jeans and a 
modern hijab, or draped in colourful shalwar kameez. The youths of the valley like in 
many other places in the world enjoy some of the traditions of their ancestors, as well as 
cricket, rock music, Hollywood movies, Indian soap operas, and regularly use Twitter and 
Facebook. The embrace of the ‘western’ alongside their own cultural norms was 
something I expected from those traveling internationally, but not as much for those who 
have never left India during my first visit to the country. The mix of ancestral tradition and 
modernity is also present among second and third generation Kashmiris living abroad. 
Some women at meetings wear hijab; others do not. One of my respondents, though from 
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a ‘liberal’ family, discussed how her family had the tradition of arranged marriage. She 
claims that her mother would prefer for her to marry a Kashmiri. The young female 
respondent is not alone in trying to connect to her roots as a Kashmiri, keep connected 
with her faith, and also pursue an advanced degree in modern science. All of these 
identities, to her, are an important composition of her being. That being said, there is a 
real draw to connecting with others who share one or more of your identarian affiliations. 
Seeking social ties and connections with others in their community is indeed one 
of the attractions Kashmiris may have for KSM. Indian, South Asian Diaspora, and 
Pakistan societies are all common societal affiliations in the university. Kashmir social 
organizations, however, are not widely represented on campuses across the United 
Kingdom. This is perhaps one draw to KSM movements. KSM is a place to meet 
Kashmiris. They don’t always feel like South Asian, Indian, or Pakistani societies are a 
great fit. Islamic societies are a way for them to find community with others that isn’t 
based on an ethnic or national identity. Islamic societies in particular are a great source 
of networking across national and ethnic divides. Beyond a source of recruitment and 
organizational capacity inherent in religious institutions, there is indeed the opportunity to 
politicize (and historical precedence of politicization) of an Islamic identity. 
Thousands of Kashmiris have come to the streets in protest for political reasons, 
human rights infringements, and for ‘attacks’ on Islam. This can surely confuse the issue, 
as protests arising from perceivably unrelated issues can result in calls for azadi. This 
was the case, for instance, in response to the threat of burning a Quran by a pastor in 
Florida (The Irish Times, 2010). This does not mean that there is a correlation between 
Quran burning and Kashmiri mobilisation for freedom. 2010 was a volatile year in the 
Valley since the killing of Tufail Matoo and events such as these merely add fuel to the 
fire already burning in Kashmir. In the Channel four documentary, Parvez, a human rights 
lawyer, explains that his planned march on a day recognizing international torture was 
banned due to legislation in the state, ‘They’ve invoked Article 144 which means five or 
more people cannot assemble. Under these powers if we even go outside, they will arrest 
us and take us to court’ (Kashmir’s Torture Trail, 2012). With other avenues of assembly 
unavailable to Kashmiris, the mosque has become a place for organization. And, 
especially ‘after Friday prayers, demonstrations often flare up, especially around the 
Jamia Masjid, Srinagar’s most important mosque’ (ibid.). In social movement theory, 
‘…the political opportunity perspective is that activists’ prospects for advancing particular 
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claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent’ (Meyer, 
2002: 126). For many Kashmiris, the Mosque is a prime place for networking, socializing, 
and community. Further, since circumstances forbid the assembly of dissidents, the 
mosque becomes a place of sanctuary where supporters of similar causes can voice their 
dissent. Frustration over lack of mobilizing opportunities during other times may make 
‘Islamic’ issues more salient, but there is no reason to suggest that an ‘Islamic’ identity is 
the reason for mobilization. Congregating at a religious facility may simply present the 
opportunity for mobilizing. 
 A look into this critical dynamic can shed light on these manifestations in the 
transnational movement. Although Kashmiri freedom supporters in the UK are permitted 
to openly assemble; to hold protest marches and to raise freedom slogans, the mosque 
and Islamic societies continue to have a huge impact on organizing, fundraising, and for 
the promotion of KSM activities. For KSM Edinburgh, the campus-based Islamic society 
has been critical for recruitment. Although not all of the attendees of meetings or events 
have been involved in the Islamic Society (Isoc), the majority of those involved in KSM 
are either casual or regular members of the society. Many that I interviewed one-on-one 
claimed that they first came to hear about KSM through Isoc, including via a well-attended 
joint event aimed at raising awareness about Kashmir where I introduced my ongoing 
research, ‘Kashmir not a Sweater’ (4 Nov 2014).17 KSM members would often visit Isoc 
meetings and advertise events and try to recruit new members. Some events offer a 
cultural component which often relies on donations of food from halal kebab shops and 
the popular economical eatery, the Mosque Kitchen, located around the corner from a 
mosque facing the University of Edinburgh. That mosque has also played a role in giving 
permissions to KSM for advertising community events. The majority religion of KSM 
members plays a role in more banal ways, for example, by affecting the timing of 
meetings and events to work around evening prayer times for devotees.  
 The Islamic faith has had other impacts in the types of campaigns with which the 
KSM is involved. One of my respondents, Richard, is an organizer with Scotland Against 
 
17 The title for the event was inspired at a KSM Edinburgh meeting whereby I offered an anecdote 
portraying the difficulties in disseminating my research to my sister whom when I said my research was 
on ‘Kashmir,’ her response was, ‘Like the sweater?’ The committee members thought this was a good 
analogy on how Kashmir seems to be an unknown conflict and opted to use the title ‘Kashmir not a 
Sweater’ for the event.  
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Criminalizing Communities (SACC). Although he only attended a couple of events with 
KSM Edinburgh, he has had a history of campaign work with the Muslim communities of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. In the joint ‘action’ event between KSM and SACC, one of 
KSM’s committee members had given an update on the situation in Kashmir which was 
followed by ‘the planning [of] our response to the enactment of the outrageous Counter-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act and the extension of the Prevent programme’ to be 
enforced in Scotland.’ Richard reported that the legislation, meant to prevent terrorism, 
‘unjustly targets minority communities and lends itself to an increase, rather than a 
decrease in radicalization among targeted communities.’  
Identity framing becomes particularly important for re-interpreting the Kashmiri 
conflict to reflect a progressive vision of a more democratic Kashmir that both provides 
sanctions for the Muslim majority but that simultaneously calls for a secular acceptance 
of all other religions. Sometimes this is based on a common conception of who is a 
Kashmiri, whereby it is reflected in the literature, online, and as one of my young Kashmiri 
respondents claimed, ‘We don’t want Pandits or Sikh to leave - they are Kashmiris like 
us’. Support for an independent Kashmir goes beyond connections based on faith alone, 
especially where it is pertinent to a particular argument or brought about in a particular 
context. During a rally against Islamaphobia, someone may strongly identify with their 
Muslim brethren, but when faced with evidence of human rights abuses by Chinese 
soldiers of Tibetans, they form a different sort of bond based on the perceived similarities 
in their struggles.  
 
Collective Identities of Oppression and Subaltern Solidarity 
 
Cockell (2000) reflects on a nuanced version of subaltern studies’ theory, describing how 
an ethnonational ‘subaltern’ identity has developed due to a shared experience of 
subjugation. Cockell argues that the Kashmiri ethno-nationalist movement has been 
fuelled not only by an historical affiliation with an ethnic or religious group, but through 
historic oppression of the group. Zutshi (2004), in turn, argues that the oft-quoted 
Kashmiriyat (or Kashmiri-ness) was a link to a Kashmiri identity that was politicized and 
used in mobilizing the people only around the time of Partition, during a period where 
other groups tried to claim their own independent state from Pakistan and India. Post-
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Partition grievances and the perception of Kashmiris as a subaltern, oppressed people 
could have certainly assisted in the engineering of an ethno-nationalist movement. As 
Cockell (2000) and Zutshi (2004) assert, a sustained period of subjugation of Kashmiris 
may have led to an increase in a collective subaltern consciousness. An appeal to a 
subjugated subaltern identity is a uniquely salient feature of the Kashmir freedom 
movement that carries the potential to draw in an extended support base. Even without 
explicitly or consciously extending the frame to incorporate other disaffected minorities, 
people have been attracted to the Kashmir freedom movement through a shared sense 
of subjugation. One respondent, a Christian whose parents came from the subcontinent 
claims that he was attracted to KSM because of his own family’s experience of suffering 
as a minority religion in India. This clearly suggests that there exists the potential for a 
space to come together along these grounds. It is a tenuous link, however. The same 
respondent that was attracted to the KSM as a historically oppressed religious minority 
felt that there was little space to be heard as a non-Muslim. This could be presented as 
a distinction between the KSM SOAS and Scotland groups. Although the majority in 
attendance was indeed Muslim, there were other regular members who were not.  
 In addition to appealing to other subjugated religious minorities, there also lies the 
potential to extend the frame to those who identified as a subjugated ‘other.’ This was 
most apparent at the joint KSM SOAS event ‘We Need to talk about Modi.’ At this event, 
the situation of minority castes was highlighted. Modi, whose picture was placed adjacent 
to that of Hitler, was depicted much as he was described by the crowd: as a racist, fascist, 
and ultra-right-wing Hindutva force clearly at odds with a subaltern underclass in India. 
The hatred against Modi extended beyond the highlighted topic of his purported guilt as 
a perpetrator of the Gujarat riots which implicitly places a Muslim community at odds with 
the Prime Minister, to his guilt as someone who spreads the doctrine of a Hindu 
supremacy in India. Being opposed to Hindutva or to a perceived elite caste18 does not 
necessarily pit Muslims against Hindus. During the event ‘We Need to talk about Modi,’ 
the subject of caste and the perceived continued oppression and prejudice by the elite of 
the Dalit communities were highlighted. In particular, the oppression of Muslims as a 
 
18 Although there are generally accepted hierarches of caste as explored by Dumont (1966), other 
more nuanced versions of caste hierarchy are asserted by Gupta (2000) for example. Therefore, 
business classes, such as is the case in Narendra Modi’s background in Gujarat may be 
considered elite or ‘high’ on a perceived hierarchy, as a Brahmin may in other regions.  
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minority, underrepresented community in India was a point of reference for those of 
underrepresented ‘backwards’ castes. The linkages between the causes were quite clear 
for the audience in attendance, although there were a few Modi supporters who dissented 
with this conclusion.   
 The highlight of the event was, perhaps, the showing of a YouTube video, aiming 
to offer proof of Modi’s support and involvement in instigating the Gujarat attacks on 
Muslims. It is of poor quality and shows a few people apparently close to Modi who 
praised Modi for giving the ‘Hindus’ and BJP a ‘free hand to act for three days’ without 
prosecution or detention (The Viral Videos, 2014). The video is framed as a sort of sting 
operation with a hidden camera and someone interviewing the people. The video, 
‘Compelling Evidence proves – Narendra Modi Ordered Gujarat Riots 2002,’ has over 
200,000 views on YouTube (The Viral Videos, 2014). 19 
The event, officially hosted by the South Asian Diaspora Society at SOAS was 
also featured in the SOAS Spirit, the school newspaper. Pandya summarizes the nature 
of the queries asked about ‘gender violence, neo-liberalism, Islamaphobia, casteism, 
occupation, and the role of the Indian diaspora in supporting Hindu supremacism and 
countering it’ (2015). The event highlighted these topics which remain prominent in social 
media discourse via shared posts and links to news stories, blogs, and articles. One thing 
that was picked up in the paper was a reflection on the way discussants were keen to 
change the dialogue, but that they found it difficult to engage in the discussion or for their 
voices to be heard. This sort of discourse is omnipresent when engaging an extended 
audience.  
Modi’s visits are highlighted in the news articles and his program for a ‘digital 
India,’ has been hailed as a sort of harbinger of technology to the masses by way of 
making it easier for those living in rural communities to access the Internet and 
government services. The move seems contradictory to the practice of disabling internet 
and SMS services to parts of India experiencing protest for fear of ‘spreading 
propaganda.’ Text messaging in Kashmir has been banned and there are frequent 
citations of social media ‘watchdogs’ seeking to end the online calls for separatism. This 
is among a larger frame in India and in Kashmir for intimidating the media into ‘spun’ 
 
19 It is undetermined how many views it had at that time; however, as of September 2016, it has 
over 200,000 views. 
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versions of the news, as has been suggested by interviews with several journalists in a 
May 2013 visit to Kashmir, and highlighted in numerous personal interviews of KSM 
respondents, as well as echoed in popular literature on Kashmir such as Ali et al. (2011) 
Kashmir’s Case for Freedom. The case for spinning or altering news stories to make them 
suitable for publishing in India is regarded as the only way to publish anything in a country 
that Reporters without Borders ranked 140th out of 180 countries for free speech 
(Muzzling Speech in India, 2014). As one senior journalist of a major news outlet in 
Kashmir reported to me during a visit to Srinagar in 2013, it is very difficult to be an 
independent media source in Kashmir. He reported that Indian authorities are constantly 
monitoring ‘independent’ news sources and offered anecdotal evidence of being spied 
on. He recalled that after receiving a phone call originating in America, his home was 
ransacked and burned, presumably for fear of spreading ‘propaganda’ to foreign news 
agencies. With documented restrictions on news outlets in Kashmir and with reports of 
‘self-censoring’ of news in Kashmir to avoid harassment, social media becomes a crucial 
medium for organizing and for getting news for Kashmiris inside and outside of India. 
After some Facebook profiles were suspended for purportedly ‘glorifying terrorism,’ and 
with a newspaper ban across the Valley for three days, activists turned to Twitter.  
 Freedom of speech has been one of the more unifying causes among students, 
academics, and others who feel like they do not have a voice in today’s India. A case 
regarding the detention and hanging of Afzal Guru exemplified the pitfalls of the Indian 
legal process. Afzal was convicted of being an accomplice in the attack on Indian 
Parliament in 2001. There was no doubt in the evidence found that linked him 
suspiciously to the terrorists through material support and being in continuous contact 
with them, however, as Roy (2013) reports this evidence is rather dubious at best and 
probably fabricated. Although the nature of his links to those involved have been a matter 
of debate, the real controversy was over his access to legal representation while 
incarcerated, the dubious appeals process, and the conditions of his sentence being 
carried out early in the morning, without his legal representative or family being made 
aware (Live Law News Network, 2014). Human rights lawyer, Nandita Haksar has spoken 
out against the death sentence of Afzal Guru being carried out. She warned that it would 
set an unwanted precedent of securing ‘justice’ in a way that emboldens Hindu 
nationalists and strengthens authoritarianism in India (2006). Haksar further purports that 
the execution of Afzal Guru would only serve to disrupt the peace process in Kashmir 
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(ibid). All of these points have served to be true if the response to the hanging by azadi 
activists and the retaliation to protests are indicators.  
As is a sort of standard operating procedure for any kind of events that can pre-
empt protest in Kashmir, the valley went into lockdown with no access to the internet, 
mobile service suspended, and curfews in place for several days after – as well as on the 
anniversary of the date since. SAR Geelani, also arrested in connection with the 
parliament attacks but later acquitted and released was again arrested this past year 
(February 2016) after his role in arranging protests at JNU on the anniversary of the 
hanging of Afzal Guru. He and others, including the student union leader, were arrested 
on charges of sedition, prompting further protests over the arrests of the students and 
the Delhi University lecturer (Daniyal, 2016). The arrests amplify the case that anyone, 
even university professors or students, that speak out on behalf of Kashmir will be 
charged with sedition. The showing of solidarity of university students in India was met 
with support transnationally. With the whole process being publicized on Twitter, the 
incident spurred on more protests across Delhi and Srinagar and activated academics 
(especially those with departmental affiliations with India). Perhaps the pressure from not 
just within India, but from outside academics may have spurred the release of many of 
the students affiliated with the arrest.  
 The timing of the JNU protests and arrests coincided with KSM SOAS’s ‘Kashmir 
Awareness Week’ (London, 2016) and were widely referenced during meetings and 
events during that time and there was heightened internet activity during that time. 
Ironically, the JNU issue online was framed more as a freedom of speech issue than in 
connection to Kashmiri freedom. In a sample of over 400 tweets with the hashtag 
#standwithjnu, Kashmir was specifically mentioned fewer than 20 times, and the result 
was skewed because Kashmir was in the username. There was, however, a show of 
‘solidarity’ from academics and students from Brown University, Cornell, the University of 
Hawaii, St. Joseph’s College of Bangalore, Jamia Millia Islamia (Delhi), Princeton, Exeter, 
and Oxford. As this is a sample, it is not an exhaustive list; however, it is clear that 
regardless of one’s stance on a territorial resolution, an international academic 
community will take up the fight against the perceived silencing of speech. A stand in 
solidarity with Kashmir, therefore, is a loaded statement that can mean many different 
things from the perspective of those claiming this view.   
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Student and academic solidarity has been expressed in response to what has 
been largely argued to be a return to heavy-handed tactics by Indian security forces 
against protesting civilians, arguably perceived to be a repeat of Kashmir’s ‘summer of 
unrest’ of 2010. On 8 July 2016, Burhan Wani, the popular militant commander of the 
Hizb-ul Mujahedin (HM) was killed in a crackdown of militant-related activity by Indian 
security forces. The group, rather than target civilians, targets Indian security forces; thus, 
acting more like a rebel group than a terrorist organization. It was actually unclear whether 
or not Wani, a social media publicist, was actually involved in violence. After his death, 
there was a massive gathering in Kashmir, rallying around who was considered to be a 
fallen martyr. The death also sparked protests across the Valley, resulting in many 
injuries by pellet guns and casualties, purportedly at the hands of the Indian security 
forces (BBC, 2016) As an act of protest and to pay respects for the fallen Wani and, 
arguably those civilian Kashmiris who were injured or killed whilst protesting his death, 
many changed their profile photos on Facebook to Wani. Claiming to be glorifying 
terrorism, Facebook took down the profiles of these people. Others, who posted images 
with the intention of raising discussions regarding security force backlash against 
protests, including several academics such as Dibyesh Anand of the University of 
Westminster and Huma Dar, an academic in California, were equally censored. News of 
Facebook profile blocking was shared on Twitter, and as purported in a Tweet by Nitasha 
Kaul of the University of Westminster, a frequent guest speaker at KSM and other 
Kashmir-related events, Facebook’s act of censorship is ‘condemnable.’ In her Tweet, 
she links to a Guardian article that reports ‘Dibyesh Anand, an academic at the University 
of Westminster, had his posts removed, and was blocked from using Facebook for 24 
hours twice after he posted about Wani’s death’ (Doshi, 2016). Although some of these 
actions were later recanted by Facebook, administrators confirmed the reasons behind 
the actions in a statement which claims ‘We welcome discussions on [the subject of 
terrorism] but any terrorist content has to be clearly put in context which condemns these 
organizations and their violent activities’ (ibid.). Discourses on terrorism as an 
unforgiveable evil is often revisited at events and often juxtaposed with state-sponsored 
terrorism of the Indian state. For a rather large segment of the azadi movement which 
has become rather clear after Wani’s death was that many activists view Wani as a 
freedom fighter against an occupying force, and that occupying force as the terrorist 
organization.    
187 
 
In death, Wani had a hero’s funeral which attracted large numbers of mourners. 
The mass gathering of people – as they often do in Kashmir – led to a renewed cycle of 
protests against the Indian security forces and the subsequent calls for azadi led security 
forces stationed in Kashmir to be summoned for crowd control. According to a letter 
distributed on social media networks, ‘since the 8th of July…[m]ore than 50 people have 
been killed on the pretext of crowd control,’ and more ‘than 100 eye surgeries have been 
performed,’ due to the use of “non-lethal pellet guns” (Scroll.in, 2016). The link to the site 
where activists can sign the petition can be found on the KSM SOAS Facebook page, 
who proudly announces that:  
‘Solidarity is building from both within and beyond India.  
The solidarity letter for Kashmir and Kashmiris was signed by over 800 people, 
including Prof. Noam Chomsky, Mirza Waheed, Nitasha Kaul,Kamila 
Shamsie, Basharat Peer, Prof. Dibyesh Anand and Dr. Goldie Osuri’ (July 2016). 
The listing of prominent writers and academics lends credibility to the azadi movement 
through raising awareness of the abuses of security personnel who have been authorized 
to use pellet guns for crowd dispersal. Although protests were initially sparked by Wani, 
the pellet guns used in retaliation to an unarmed crowd of dissidents marks the ever-
growing reality that today’s azadi movement is not a terrorist threat. Academics and 
activists which have spoken out against abuses in solidarity was lacking during the time 
of the insurgency when it was clear that militants were targeting civilians and it was widely 
accepted that Pakistan’s intelligence agency played a role in funding and arming militant 
groups (Mahmud, 2012). Support for Burhan Wani may be perceived as support for a 
terrorist if he is portrayed as such in particular media; however, Wani was viewed instead 
as a hero by azadi activists who resisted Indian occupation.  
Solidarity and Mobilizing around Minority 
 
The demographics of the KSM reflect a diverse community, and thus the bonds that unite 
one another may be based on a sense of solidarity in terms of being on the same team 
for a campaign or cause. Often this solidarity is inextricably linked to the university. There 
is a great sense of student solidarity that is experienced and seems to span across ethnic, 
national, or religious divides. It is widely publicized on online forums when there is a 
student protest on behalf of Kashmiris, whether in Kashmir or Delhi and there is often 
subsequent calls to action. Many respondents said they get most of their news about 
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Kashmir or first came to know about the KSM from Facebook or being sent a link on a 
social media platform or an invite to an event on Facebook. Since many are used to 
getting their news and updates on Kashmir this way, whenever there is a media blackout 
it is also widely publicized. This further results in an increasing number of blogs and 
independent news sites on Kashmir.  
  Transnational mobilization for KSM and affiliated causes are assisted by the 
transient nature of participants. Many of the students from IAK for KSM Edinburgh and 
SOAS are often visiting students or on short-term (and some longer-term) degree 
courses. Some of the students are on a one or two-year program in the UK. This transient 
nature has surely impacted the society. On the one hand, the students are drawn together 
because they are seeking to socialize and look for a community outside of their courses, 
sometimes for personal as well as professional networking purposes. On the other hand, 
they may be eager to engage in political activities they felt were difficult to access back 
home, due to the relative freedom they experience in the UK compared to India. Many 
from the Indian-held territories have never encountered Kashmiris from the Pakistani 
side, and they use their time in the UK to connect to their ‘lost kin.’  
Acting as a united voice for students in the UK with an interest in the Kashmir 
conflict, the Kashmir Students Campaign UK often bridge the frames between student 
rights, freedom of speech and the Kashmir freedom campaign. On its Facebook page, 
the group denounces the UK’s former Home Secretary and current Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s ‘threatening to kick out international students.’ Although the posted article 
does not reference policy on students studying in the UK on a visa, the group makes the 
connection between stricter limitations on international students and the purported 
xenophobic quality of discourse used by politicians and found in documents on the 
promotion of ‘British values’ and frameworks on ‘integration,’ (New Statesman, 2014). 
The perceived attack on minorities in the UK and the heightened discourse on 
xenophobia that surrounds anti-terror legislation such as Prevent are frequently relatable 
issues to the student activist. Arguably, the insecurities felt by legislation targeting 
international students is felt by minority and non-minority groups alike but, perhaps it is 
further exasperating for a non-white community. The framings of these issues and 
integration of these topics into a larger discourse on a free Kashmir is a tenuous, albeit 
tenable position as they are representative of the many values and concerns of student 
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and minority life in the UK. The group’s aim is to encourage grassroots activism, but they 
do this through the lens of not just their Kashmiri identity but as expressed through their 
identity as an ‘other’ in the UK.  
The Kashmir Students Campaign UK wrote in a post, dated 18 July 2014:  
‘Welcome to the UK Kashmiri Students campaign. Around 70% of British Pakistanis 
are from Kashmir20, there is also a small but significant amount of Kashmiri’s [sic] 
from the Indian side who live in the UK, or who come to the UK to study. This 
campaign is to highlight the issues of Kashmiris in the UK affecting their homeland 
and themselves, and to engage with their campuses and wider communities, in 
grass-roots activism’  
The Kashmir Students Campaign UK hosts a publicly accessible Facebook site whereby 
it posts and shares articles as well as events co-sponsored or sponsored by individual 
Kashmir societies across the UK, namely KSM SOAS, Scotland, the newly-created Kings 
College London (KCL) KSM, and the University of Birmingham’s Kashmir Awareness 
Society. Shortly after the initial post, acting as a call for Kashmiris in the diaspora to unite, 
the group shared Kashmir Monitor’s post about a 15-year old who was ‘shot dead in India-
occupied Kashmir for protesting against Israel imperialism’ (21 July 2014). It is quite 
common on these sites and for individual activists to promote peripheral causes or 
campaign they see as relevant to their own. It is an effort to on the one hand, express 
solidarity and to support someone else’s cause and on the other hand to promote 
awareness in one’s own cause and participation in one’s events. Again, highlighting the 
group’s apparent commitment to minority rights and subaltern causes, on its fourth day 
of existence the group expressed its solidarity with other non-white peoples. On 22 July 
2014, the group posted the following comment:  
‘ONLY 85 out of nearly 20,000 professors in the UK are Black, A similar number 
are from South Asian backgrounds, I wonder how many professors are Kashmiri? 
These numbers are disproportionate considering our population in the UK…So it is 
not correct to say we don't go to university and…there aren't many professors like 
us, there is no intellectual deficiency here. The other day we participated in a video 




This statistic is taken from a chapter in an academic text, Sokefeld, M. and Bolognani, M. (2011) 
‘Kashmiris in Britain: A Political Project or a Social Reality?’ These statistics are widely publicized 
and used in everyday parlance by activists.  
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Aspiration formation lost in the corridors of higher education, absent concepts of 
our own disrupted identity - our cultural construct given no real validity. Galton’s 
theories, small brains and low IQ’s, presented as fact - meaning we can’t challenge 
these views. We’re talking about education and having ability – specifically 
academia, seems like you gotta be nobility… 
 
[Chorus] 
Just 85 professors in nearly 20 thousand 
The stats don’t lie they’re so profound and 
So why is it - my professor isn’t black? 
Let’s open the debate – and start to change that…’ 
 
 
Figure 5:1: Kashmir Student Campaign UK show solidarity with minority rights movement 
 
In less than one week from the initial post of the group, which suggests the activation of 
the UK Kashmiri diaspora, the group expanded its frame to reflect upon solidarity with 
Palestinian resistance and upon minority representation in the UK at higher education 
institutions. The song lyrics, above, have been shortened, but they also include reference 
to structured inequalities present in the UK, which is often implied in much resistance 
dialogue found in academic literature as well as by activists participating in campaigns 
for equality. On the one hand, the KSM groups wish to raise awareness about the plight 
of Kashmiris; on the other hand, they wish to stand in solidarity with other perceived 
injustices. In this sense, the network expands, as well as the inclusivity of what may 
otherwise be perceived as an ethnonational or homogenous movement. ‘We Kashmiris’ 
include ‘we the minority,’ ‘we the underrepresented,’ ‘we the downtrodden masses,’ etc. 
The focal point of the groups remains Kashmir-centric, with most of the posts directly 
relating to Kashmir. However, the connections are often made between Palestine and 
other freedom movements such as for an independent Kurdish or Scottish state and 
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Kashmir’s azadi movement. Other movements or campaigns are constantly made of 
relevance or significance to the Kashmir cause. Further, there is reflection upon other 
campaigns’ support for Kashmir independence. Taken from a post on 18 September 
2014, Kashmir Students Campaign UK shares these thoughts: 
‘Yesterday there was a great turnout at the #YesHope, around 3,000 people 
attended this Edinburgh gathering. We’re all part of something historical here! 
People from various countries showing their solidarity. VP for KSM got to speak 
about Kashmir and our own struggle for independence, it was amazing to have the 
audience chant along at the end Kashmir’s famous slogan: Hum kya chaahte? 
Azaaaadi – We want freedom!!! 
 
So many people expressed their solidarity with the Kashmiri people. Hope over 
fear. Our dear brothers and sisters in Kashmir know that you are not forgotten 
#ScotlandstandswithKashmir  




Hum kye chaate? Azadi! Is translated to ‘What do we want? Freedom!’ It’s the slogan 
most often shouted at protests within and outside of Kashmir and can be heard chanted 
at events and meetings. Further, it is an overwhelming sense of pride when a non-
Kashmiri chants it, as in my own first-hand experience. Repeating the words of freedom 
in the local tongue makes someone ‘part-Kashmiri.’ Getting a crowd of non-Kashmiris in 





This chapter looks more into how Kashmir freedom activists link to other campaign in a 
show of solidarity, which naturally leads to the reciprocity of solidarity with Kashmiris in 
their struggle against occupation. There are instances where non-Kashmiris identify with 
the Kashmir freedom movement due to a shared sense of being an ‘other’ – a subaltern, 
minority, displaced person, or promoting what may be perceived as a similar cause for 
self-determination. There are also clear correlations between developments in the 
homeland in the contemporary azadi movement. However, it is not solely Kashmiri 
political developments that impact discourse on the transnational movement. Diverse 
identities may become salient in response to one’s environment, exposure to and 
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collaboration with many other campaigns, societies, and causes. This has thus likely 
contributed to the evolution of the Kashmiri freedom movement. There is a wide reach of 
student activists from various universities and backgrounds. There is a lot of South Asian 
involvement, as highlighted by the collaboration activities of KSM with Pakistan and South 
Asian and Diaspora societies; however, it is certainly not limited to South Asian 
involvement. Student solidarity finds many linkages. From black power movements of the 
1970s to #blacklivesmatters movements of today, KSM members have not only 
internalized the feelings of being part of a minority group, but they have developed 
strategies and tactics of such groups, including reflecting upon these feelings in the 
wordings of and relation to these movements. Other anti-Indian and anti-imperialist 
movements have had a significant impact on the KSM. They have channelled the 
indignations of other campaigns and have been adopting this language of ‘occupation’ 
and ‘imperialism’ for some time. Racial linkages are common, with KSM Edinburgh, for 
example, participating in Black History Month events on campus. These movements are 
often highlighted in shared articles on the groups’ Facebook sites. Respondents have 
been involved in anti-racial campaigns such as in response to the Ferguson, Missouri 
police shooting of an unarmed black man. After the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom led 
to the purported rise in racism across parts of England, articles and links to articles have 
flooded the walls of Facebook users connecting to their minority status, with 
#kashmirilivesmatter becoming an increasingly common hashtag among Kashmiri 
freedom activists. There is a constant engagement between causes and campaigns that, 
perhaps, is more so conducive due to the way in which student societies operate; and, 


























KSM Edinburgh: Origin, Participants, and Core Issues 
 
‘We stand in solidarity with the Kashmiri people. We aim to raise awareness of their 
struggles and of the occupation of Kashmir. Everyone welcome!’ (KSM Edinburgh, 2012) 
 
The phenomena of globalizing a social movement almost inherently widens the circle of 
potential participants. For Kashmir, although the globalization of the post-insurgency 
movement really had its footing in the massive protests of 2008 and 2010, these events 
only became crucial to the internationalization of the Kashmiri movement after the release 
of BBC’s documentary Kashmir’s Torture Trail in 2012. Although scores of reports and 
books portray the human rights abuses and widespread torture of Indian Kashmiris, this 
documentary gave easy access to credible information regarding the situation. The 
screening of this documentary led to the formation of KSM Edinburgh in September 2012. 
The KSM is an open group of activists of varying levels of interest and a plurality 
of motivations for involvement. The group formed in October 2012 and shortly afterwards 
became an official student society affiliated with the University of Edinburgh. Although 
the society is no longer active as of 2019, KSM Edinburgh members have helped to 
facilitate the opening of other societies associated with universities in the United Kingdom 
with links to KSM SOAS, established in 2015. KSM SOAS member then assisted with the 
creation of the Kings College London (KCL) division in 2016. I am aware of KSM societies 
in the United States and Canada but do not know how direct these links are. KSM 
affiliates have attracted students, sympathetic members of the public, and general 
activists involved in other movements.  
This chapter introduces KSM in general but will focus on Kashmir Solidarity 
Movement Edinburgh which was active between 2012 and 2017. KSM SOAS, which 
formed in 2015 and continues to be active in 2019 will be discussed more in depth in the 
following chapter. More specifically, I discuss the groups in chronological order of 
fieldwork. As my 2013 visit to Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) was brief, these 
conversations and encounters are drawn out in other chapters. In 2014 and 2015 while 
being based in Edinburgh, I regularly attended meetings and events and conducted more 
formal semi-structured interviews with participants. My journey with KSM, however, 
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began in October 2012 at that first documentary viewing and therefore reflections from 
piloting the research are also included in this chapter on KSM Edinburgh. The periods of 
2015 and 2016 fieldwork in London are the focus of the chapter which follows on KSM 
SOAS. 
 
KSM Edinburgh: Origin 
 
I began attending meetings of the KSM since its inaugural showing of the documentary. 
Afterwards, I continued to actively participate and observe, piloting several interviews and 
fieldwork observations for research methodology courses. I have drawn from a sample 
of meetings and events since September 2012, but specifically targeted the period 
between January 2015 and May 2015 for one-on-one interviews with activists. The 
activists ranged from those attending twice over the course of a few months to those 
more active for a longer duration including committee members. The demographics, as 
outlined previously, were a mixture of Kashmiri, other Asian, and non-Asian ethnicities 
and have been active in a variety of causes besides KSM. The groups conduct regularly 
scheduled planning committee meetings and holds events aimed at raising awareness 
such as documentary screenings, vigils, and somewhat more ‘culturally-centered’ events 
with food and poetry. The group also sends drafts letters to government officials, press 
releases, updates their Facebook page, and encouraged delegates to attend activist 
‘training’ sessions and seminars for better efficacy as well as networking opportunities. 
The primary strategic goal of KSM appears to be raising awareness about the Kashmir 
issue and appears to devote much of its budget to that effect.  
One of the first major events of KSM Edinburgh after its inauguration was the 
holding of a vigil outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh commemorating Kashmir 
Solidary Day, observed on 5 February in Pakistan and by Kashmiris on both sides of the 
LoC and abroad. In anticipation of the event, there was a lot of advertisement both at the 
meetings of KSM Edinburgh as well as liaising with other groups who came along to 
support the Kashmiri freedom cause, but also to promote their own campaigns. A week 
before the vigil a planning meeting took place that, I feel, would be rather indicative of the 
groups’ strategies. The first contact for the group was the local mosque in Edinburgh 
which is adjacent to the main campus of the University of Edinburgh. The mosque 
permitted the group to put up posters inside as well as permitted for the announcement 
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of the vigil after Friday prayers and the distribution of leaflets. Some of the other items on 
the agenda was the need to print out the banner ‘End the Occupation’ (held in figure 6:2), 
confirm speakers, and a chair for the event which would be held outside with the 
assistance of a megaphone. In addition to these routine activities, they also discussed 
the statement that would be handed to the Indian consulate the day of the vigil as well as 
the content of the press releases, which it was argues would need to be very short. 
Complaints were raised at the meeting regarding the lack of response from MSPSs 
(members of the Scottish Parliament) to take on a motion regarding the mistreatment of 
Kashmiris in IAK. None acknowledged receiving the request. A member of the European 
Parliament, however, had expressed sympathy for Kashmir and thus could be a potential 
connection for the group, they had surmised.  
The remainder of the meeting was going over details of who was bringing this or 
that an to ensure that there was enough publicity and people to show support for the 
Kashmir cause. To this end, they discussed how members of the Kashmir community in 
Glasgow were being bussed in, and how they had reached out to the Students for Justice 
in Palestine (SJP) for their support and attendance. It was also at this meeting with the 
core participants that I made myself known as a researcher conducting, at the time, a 
pilot study. At the end of the meeting, as normally happened, was the advertisement of 
future events and meetings with the group such as a movie screening, poetry reading 
event, and the promotion of an Islamic Society (iSoc) event the following week. Lastly, 
there were discussions on potential events celebrating International Women’s Day which 
would connect issues of sexual violence in Kashmir with the New Delhi gang rape which 
spurred discussions on combating sexual violence in India. This last feature of the 
discussion would prove to be a very powerful rallying point for the case of human rights 
in Kashmir. In attempts to spread the network that KSM works with wider, themes of Islam 
or connections with the Islamic society or the mosque tended to be confined to the 
meetings. What was focused on in more diverse forms were discussions on human rights, 
which included themes of demilitarization, resisting occupation, and resistance to security 
forces torturing and sexually assaulting Kashmiri civilians.   
Handed out on business-sized slips of paper to advertise the vigil relayed what a 




Torture & Rape in Kashmir 
Tuesday, 5th February is 
Kashmir Solidarity Day 
 
Kashmir Solidarity Movement will be holding a 
vigil/demo outside the Indian Consulate 
Protesting 63 years of occupation by India & its human 
rights abuses; torture of Kashmiri[sic]s & rape being used as 
a weapon of war against women. 
 
Indian Consulate 
17 Rutland Sq, Edin EH1 2BB 
Tuesday 5th February at 
4:30-6:00pm. Speeches 5:30pm to 6pm 
 
This rather simplistic advertisement, I assert, gave early indication of the direction the 
KSM would like to go, and perhaps more importantly, demonstrate how it would like to be 
perceived by non-Kashmiris. The very first lines of this vigil which would be host to such 
a wide variety of interest groups immediately places the Kashmir conflict within a human 
rights frame. ‘Torture and Rape in Kashmir’ does not immediately suggest a link to a 
movement aligning itself with any primordial identity claims. As discussed previously in 
reflection on Snow and Benford (1997; 2000) the card is using the human rights frame 
as a frame alignment tactic to the proposed self-determination groups but also as a frame 
bridging tactic which frames the Kashmir cause as also a cause for ending occupation 
and demilitarization which can bridge the framing tactics to Stop the War Coalition in 
attendance. 
Despite being a typical wintry Scottish day in February, there was a fantastic 
turnout for the vigil. I arrived shortly after the gathering start time and well before the 
speakers began so I assisted with lighting candles by the posters of those who have lost 
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their lives in Kashmir. The main point of the vigil seemed to be remembering those that 
have lost their lives or disappeared under Indian occupation. There were also plenty of 
placards which were premade and readily available to hold while standing outside the 
consulate with more political messages of resistance. The messages on the placards 
(Figure 6:1) were focused on how an Indian occupation has enabled the torture and 
abuse of Kashmiris, leading to the deaths of thousands, which a particular emphasis on 
the young people that have lost their lives in recent demonstrations in the summer of 
2010. They call for demilitarization and freedom but also aim to educate people less 
familiar with the freedom struggle as to why freedom was so important to Kashmiris.  
 
 
The vigil was attended by more than just Kashmiris and South Asians in Edinburgh or 
bussed in from Glasgow (See Figure 6:2). Present were those in support of a free 
Scotland, anti-war coalitions, and other interested groups who saw the case of Kashmir 
as at least an affiliated movement for freedom or ending war or occupation that they could 
align with.  





Figure 6:2 Photo of the vigil outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh 5 Feb 2013 
 
KSM Edinburgh had gotten off to a great start. The meetings were regularly 
attended by not only a core group of Kashmiri nationals and immigrants but also human 
rights activists from other parts of South Asia and beyond. The photo of the vigil landed 
on the group’s Facebook and Twitter page as the first introduction to the world who and 
what KSM is. KSM was not such Kashmiris or South Asians and KSM was not simply 
meant as an identitarian movement. KSM was meant to be a cause that anyone could 
rally behind. One of the best demonstrations of this was a campaign advertised in June 
2013 – the time that this screenshot above (figure 6:2) was taken. Less than a year in 
operation and this small pro-Kashmiri freedom group in Scotland had almost 300 
followers. Not only did KSM take advantage of that but other groups were continuing to 
advertise on the Facebook site.  
A young woman that would become affiliated with the KSM SOAS division 
conducted a digital campaign that evolved from a school project to create a video using 
images from all over the world of people supporting Kashmir’s cause for freedom from 
Indian occupation. Members of KSM Edinburgh gathered on Edinburgh’s popular Calton 
Hill which offers a stunning backdrop of the Scottish city. I assisted with taking pictures 
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of the group holding a banner and a flag of Azad Kashmir, but refrained from being 
included in the photos myself as I had a pending visit to India.  
The final product ‘We are Kashmir’ (Mahmoud, 2013) was placed on YouTube 
later that summer (2013) and was widely distributed. The campaign was well-received by 
supporters across the globe and was exemplary for the extension of the Kashmiri 
freedom movement to those outside of Kashmir. The YouTube video, which has gone 
viral, depicts people holding up signs saying ‘Free Kashmir,’ or ‘You will be free.’ Signs 
and slogans often involve ‘End the (Indian) occupation.’ A few signs further read, 
‘Remembrance is resistance.’ The project involved sending out requests to groups and 
individuals who supported the Kashmir freedom movement all over the globe. As usual, 
the key was to have the request extend to as many places as possible to encourage a 
wide array of participants but it was also an effort to develop what could turn out to be a 
positive promotional piece. 
The screenshot (figure 6:3) shows a sole man holding a sign urging for the end of 
Indian occupation in Kashmir. He is standing outside Independence Hall in Philadelphia 
where the United States Declaration of Independence was signed, demonstrating 
solidarity in the desire for self-determination as well as signaling that non-South Asian 
communities also care about Kashmiris. The response overall was rather 




demographically diverse, with people holding up signs in pictures from cities in England, 
Scotland, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Azad Kashmir, Poonch District, Jordan, Gaza, and 
Afghanistan. One of the messages from Poonch, a district that straddles the LoC is, ‘No 
one can divide us.’ From Gaza, young children hold up colourful signs alleging that Gaza 
stands with Kashmir. In Azad Kashmir, a sign claims ‘We want freedom,’ in addition to a 
message comparing Indian-held ‘Curfewed Kashmir’ to ‘Gitmo,’ the controversial US 
detention centre in Cuba, Guantanamo Bay. Below a poster board with some statistics 
on Kashmir can be found the hashtags #Viva La Azadi and #Viva La Kashmir. In one five-
minute video, it is depicted that the Kashmir issue is a concern for everyone in the world. 
The title, ‘We are Kashmir,’ says it all. The campaigners want to express solidarity with 
other movements and want others to relate to the Kashmir issue, using populist 
references and universal rallying cries. 
 
Core Issues and Strategies: Framing Human Rights  
 
One of the best ways to demonstrate the strategies of framing the Kashmir movement in 
terms of human rights is by looking more closely at the strategies explored for promoting 
the group during its meetings. Many of the meetings at either site may only have a fraction 
of those who attend larger scale events; however, the more administrative devices can 
be seen. From proposing speakers and movie screenings to the number of flyers used in 
distribution and the locations for promoting events are discussed at meetings. Many of 
these conversations happen with the intention of finding a way to bring in more members 
and raising the group’s profile. Quite a lot of time is spent in weekly or bi-weekly smaller 
meetings on organizing, preparing events, and expressing goals for the group. There is 
quite a lot of nuanced micro-activity regarding where to put up flyers, posters, what size 
they should be, and if they should be in colour or black and white. The number one goal 
for both Edinburgh and SOAS KSM was in raising awareness and the discussions 
revolved around how they would do that the best. These discussions involved asking 
which film to show or if they can attract a speaker that will draw in a big crowd. Drawing 
in larger crowds was always a concern for Edinburgh KSM so if they were to show 
strength in numbers, the events would normally have to be in collaboration with other, 
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bigger societies. The smallest event I attended only drew in two people other than myself 
and the organizers, which was a showing of the Kashmir movie, Valley of Saints (2012).  
 KSM Edinburgh regularly stressed the importance of being a presence at key 
societies they could collaborate with, whether through affiliation as a society representing 
a minority, human rights, or self-determination. This meant alignment with societies as 
different as the Islamic Society, the Marxist society, the feminist society, Students for 
Justice in Palestine, and the Tibet society. At the first regular meeting in 2013, committee 
members discussed the following major topics: 
• Film screening suggestions 
• Collaborations with other South Asian societies 
• Collaborations with the Islamic society 
• Collaborations with all the solidarity groups with specific mention to have a regular 
presence at the society for Tibet, Students for Justice with Palestine, and Amnesty 
International 
• Funding for the group, especially funding for speakers 
• Inviting speakers that will draw a crowd, whether popular academics or activists 
• Possibly taking part in the World Justice Festival 
 
As this was the start of year, this meeting would set the tone for the following year. The 
meeting also reflected regular participants and attitudes towards other societies. The 
meeting further raised questions about the suitability of particular groups at advancing 
their cause. For this particular meeting, someone questioned whether or not the Pakistan 
Society might be too ‘stuck up’ to collaborate with Kashmiris. Although the KSM made an 
attempt to collaborate with the South Asian Students Association (SASA), they reflected 
not being very welcomed at meetings, citing that it was ‘mostly Indians’ on one occasion 
and on others that it was ‘more of a party society.’ The ambivalence for the Pakistan 
Society, PakSoc was removed as more collaborations took place over the years I spent 
with KSM Edinburgh. The society with perhaps the most impact, even despite not always 
collaborating with KSM, was Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), or the Palestinian 
solidarity movements more generally. At one of the very first meetings of KSM Edinburgh 
in January 2013, a committee member suggested ‘plastering posters with facts and 
figures’ as ‘SJP does around campus.’ Tactics of SJP were reiterated frequently. At a 
planning meeting in September 2014 for an October event meant to both raise money for 
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floods in Kashmir as well as promote awareness about the struggles of Kashmiris, a 
young woman who had been active in SJP had suggested selling cheap badges as a 
means to raise money with the Kashmir flag which states ‘Free Kashmir.’ 
Again, mimicking a tactic of SJP, committee members at a meeting later in the 
semester sought to pass a resolution at Edinburgh University Students Association 
(EUSA) to ‘be in solidarity with Kashmir.’ Although no specific action would be taken 
against India, the motion would ‘officially’ condemn the actions of India by EUSA and, 
perhaps more importantly, require a vote by the student council which comprises of 
representatives from every school in the university. This would serve more to raise 
awareness of the Kashmir cause, and again frame violations against the Kashmir people 
as human rights violations. Figure 6:4 utilizes several tactics adopted and adapted by  
KSM in order to advertise a protest on the symbolic Kashmir ‘Black Day.’ Flyers such as 
this and others male use of ‘facts and figures’ to show the gravity of the situation in 
Kashmir. Note, that this flyer does not specifically call for separation from India, but 




instead calls ‘out to all humanity’ to ‘Support the oppressed Kashmiris’ and it is further 
emphasized that ‘leading Human Rights Activists’ will be speaking out.  
Edinburgh KSM has been active in a few concrete ways for Kashmir as well as 
for other issues. Specifically, funds have been raised for humanitarian relief due to 
flooding in Kashmir. But, on the local level in the UK, there has been engagement with 
MPs (members of the UK Parliament) and MSPs (members of the Scottish Parliament), 
lobbying for support and attempting to educate local legislators about the situation in 
Kashmir. Letter-writing and petition-signing are also tools for activists in Scotland as well 
as in England, but these are probably better-equipped and more widely distributed on 
social media feeds 
At the end of year general meeting for Edinburgh KSM for 2014/15, one of the 
committee members gave an overview of the year. He described the pros and cons of 
the meetings and events, which ones were good and which drew a larger crowd. He had 
expressed disappointment in not being able to ‘pull enough people.’ He lamented the fact 
that they could not retain enough members that wanted to become actively involved, ‘We 
need all members to get involved rather than just the committee members doing that.’ He 
recognized that collaboration with other societies raised Kashmir awareness and was 
pleased that students showed up to protest in front of the Indian consulate with Kashmiris. 
He further pointed to the amount of likes that the Facebook page was getting, which he 
claimed has a reach of over 3000 people. For all the positives and negatives surrounding 
getting people together on behalf of Kashmir’s freedom movement, he argued that the 
overall result is positive: 
‘visible the message, it matters that we are playing the part, standing up against 
injustice in any part of the world. We should not think just about results, but slowly 
rise up. KSM branches are opening up at other universities. There is KSM SOAS, 
the Kashmir Awareness Society. Different branches and affiliations – we can work 
together and share ideas.’ 
As this was my last meeting with Edinburgh KSM, it seemed to have ended on a rather 
positive note, but uncertain of its future. Without keeping up momentum and devising 
strategies for attracting supporters, it could very well have ended there. The group 
remained active on Facebook through 2017, but participation, like social media posts ebb 
and flow, with major events or crises generally increasing activity. The group no longer 




KSM Edinburgh: Participants 
 
My first exposure to KSM Edinburgh was at the film screening Kashmir’s Trails of Torture. 
I was somewhat surprised to find such an interest in Kashmir. Often you hear from 
respondents or read in literature and articles on Kashmir that the Kashmir conflict ad 
especially the sufferings of the Kashmiri people are very often left underreported. It was 
exciting to see so much interest. The room booked was an auditorium style lecture hall 
that could have seated around 200. Certainly not all of those seats were filled. But about 
40 of them were, and that was marked progress in raising awareness for the issue. As 
one of the organizers was a member of SJP, it was clear that there was some cross-
advertising through those channels. I heard about the event through a Pakistani 
colleague also in South Asian studies at the university, so it was also advertised to 
postgraduates focusing on South Asia. In practice, those that attended were mostly South 
Asian, from India or Pakistan with only two members actually from Indian Kashmir. I did 
not have the ability to canvas the whole room for ethnic or national background, so these 
observations were made after the film viewing when questions were being asked and 
many people volunteered some background information. The age range was diverse, 
with some undergraduate, postgraduate, and non-students in attendance, including an 
older Indian couple who claimed that they visited Kashmir on their honeymoon many 
years ago. As this was a fledgling society, I was very interested in what it was that 
attracted people to the KSM.  
 The film spurred on the beginnings of KSM Edinburgh and shortly after they had 
regular meetings. People from South Asia (India, Pakistan and Kashmir) proved to be the 
majority. But there were also non-South Asians that were regularly present. It was rare 
that I was the only Caucasian in the room. The British (South Asian and non-South Asian) 
and European participants were brought there presumably due to other affiliations and 
their expertise was often sought. One young woman, for example, was involved with 
Amnesty International and offered feedback on strategies for organising events such as 
the vigil. Another couple of young women were involved in the Palestine society. They 
were from various backgrounds, including Middle Eastern. A core group of participants 
for meetings in the first year of the society was around eight to ten people. Of these eight 
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people there were two young women who were born in Pakistan Kashmir but came to 
the UK when they were very little, two young male Kashmiri students from the Indian side, 
around three other non-Kashmiri South Asians and three more non-South Asian activists, 
including myself. There tended to be more men than women, but not by a large margin, 
and for the duration of time I was there, women always had leadership roles. This 
demographic did not change much as my time with the group continued. KSM Edinburgh 
never had a packed-out event, but when they held joint events, they always had a good 
turnout – or at least as good as they anticipated. Events were diverse but were dominated 
more by students than members of the community, diaspora or otherwise. The vigil which 
has been previously referenced in addition to events that were meant to not only raise 
awareness for the Kashmir conflict but also for its culture were well-attended and rather 
diverse. The events which offered food (that had been donated by a local restaurant) in 
exchange for a small donation (£2-£5) were always well-received.  
From the initial meeting, but particularly after the vigil, I became interested in what 
other activities KSM members were involved with and what other activities brought 
outside activists to KSM events and meetings. The KSM Edinburgh group regularly saw 
attendance from those involved in a myriad other campaigns and societies. Those 
responding to one-on-one interviews alone reported involvement in the Tibet society, 
SJP, the Pakistan society, South Asian Students Association (SASA), the University’s 
feminist group (Femsoc), Amnesty International, Engineers without Borders, SACC, Stop 
the War, Radical Independence, and reported affiliations to inter-faith organizations, 
youth organizations, pro-Scottish independence campaign, art-based, community 
involvement, professional organizations, and other Kashmiri associations. This is along 
the same findings other social movement theorists have noted whereby activists simply 
tend to be more ‘active,’ or have the disposition to be involved in campaigns or causes 
(see Oleson, 2011). Non-Kashmiris were likely to be involved in rights-based campaigns 
such as lobbying against anti-terrorism legislation or participation in anti-racist 
demonstrations. 
Before I began fieldwork officially with KSM Edinburgh, I interviewed a few 
participants early on. The first year in Edinburgh (2012-13) I interviewed three young men 
studying in Scotland who were from Indian Kashmir. Although two of the women involved 
in the KSM were from Kashmir, they came to the UK as very small children and have 
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family in the Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK). Since the troubles were more 
prevalent on the Indian side, I thought it would give me the best direction for my thesis. 
There were no women from IAK involved in Edinburgh KSM to my knowledge. There 
were, however, a number of women represented at regular meetings and events from 
different parts of South Asia, Europe21 and Southeast Asia. Male participants were also 
from different parts of South Asia and Europe. 
 I have purported that it is important and necessary to frame the Kashmir freedom 
movement as a human rights issue. Despite initial interviews focusing on how Kashmiris 
mobilize and the importance of social media, the respondents always drew the interview 
back to core issues of human rights. This was true whether discussing more legal issues 
such as the implementation of the plebiscite or the violation of Article 370 by the central 
government. The violations of legal rights were framed as the violation of human rights, 
and this included the right to self-determination. In two separate interviews, the article 
was cited as being violated by the transfer of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board, the 
board that facilitates an annual Hindu yatra, or pilgrimage. 
Wasim and Mahmud, both young men from IAK studying in Scotland connected 
human rights violations to the huge protests of 2008 and beyond. For me, it initially 
seemed almost tangential, as the question I asked Mahmud was regarding access to 
Facebook as a medium of protest. He claimed that prior to 2008, the majority of Kashmiris 
relied on newspapers or the radio for news, but that after 2008, ‘when the Amarnath land 
grab issue happened when…63 acres of land transferred to the Shrine board which was 
against the Article 370 [sic] there was a huge uproar about that and the medium used at 
the time by the separatists was Internet.’ It was after this violation of article 370 (as 
perceived by activists) that separatists and activists began to rely more on Facebook and 
individual websites. This was due to media censorship, but was also a convenient way to 
organize and publicize protests. Wasim, also invoked article 370 as being violated when 
the land was transferred to the Shrine board. He did ensure to specify that Hindu pilgrims 
were welcome to come to Kashmir, but that it was not legal to sell land to outsiders. 
Wasim described the event:  
 
21 For purposes of this study, the United Kingdom is considered part of Europe. 
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‘The government tried to transfer a large chunk of land to the Shrine Board. This is 
obviously not good to do in disputed territory, so we started protesting. And then 
they started killing people – the Indian security forces, CPRF – they shot people 
from point blank range – shot to kill.’ 
Wasim described the cycle of protest and retaliation as a ‘domino effect’ which led to 
severe limitations in mobility due to the increase in checkpoints and curfews.  
 Protesting the violation of Article 370, regardless of the accuracy in interpretations 
of the legislation by activists, did lead to the cycle of protest and security force retaliation 
which is familiar to anyone with an interest in the contemporary Kashmir conflict. What is 
interesting is the common occurrence to invoke this specific Article and violation thereof 
as a sort of flashpoint for conflict. It should be noted that neither Wasim nor Mahmud 
were studying law or journalism, yet they both chose to engage with legal issues within 
which to frame their grievances. 
To demonstrate how young Kashmiris reported the situation in Kashmir in relation 
to a larger frame of human rights, the same person who discussed the UN mandate to 
me above, Wasim, also reflected upon the wider human rights frame at the end of our 
discussion when I asked him a more general question regarding what sort of research he 
would like to see done on Kashmir. His response was a reflection of the anger that I saw 
build up during the interview so was rather passionate but also clearly framed in terms of 
the person – a female researcher – he was speaking with: 
‘All the human rights violations especially against women. You would be appalled 
at how India uses rape as a weapon of war against women in Kashmir. If you look 
into it, you’ll know what they’ve been doing all these years and would be surprised. 
You’ll see why people are against India.’ 
Another other young Kashmiri male I spoke with early on in my research in 2013 also 
connected the right to self-determination with human rights in general. Sharif, who has 
been quoted elsewhere regarding human rights violations that have happened to people 
he is close to, additionally discussed with me the need for the referendum to take place 
in Kashmir. Like Wasim, he agrees that azadi cannot happen so long as there are Indian 
forces in Kashmir. He complains that security in Kashmir inhibit daily activities such as 
commuting to school or work and compares this to Scotland, where he is able to come 
and go from places as he pleases without passing checkpoints.  
‘In my place, I have to cross…army…I have to give everyday my identity card, even 
though they know who I am…But I have to pass everyday. I can’t go after 10. If I 
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go after 10, I will not be able to go to my home because I have to pass that check 
post.’ 
Sharif uses the example of checkpoints and claims that there are ‘one million army’ in 
Kashmir that inhibit free movement. He connects this grievance to other, more grave 
abuses of human rights in Kashmir when I asked him if he thought that Kashmir could 
only achieve this sort of azadi – freedom of movement – as an independent country. His 
response made it clear that he saw no resolution inside an India. He got upset and 
declared that after the murder of ‘200,000 persons, I don’t want to be with India, 
obviously.’ As an outsider, it is challenging to make the connections between checkpoints 
and the murder of 200,000 people. But, this connection is easily made as they are 
perceived to be both a consequence of an occupation. With a large amount of soldiers 
present, it is difficult to separate a ‘lesser’ human rights violation with a ‘greater’ human 
rights violation. Whether murdering or inhibiting the flow of people, Indian security forces 
are seen as an evil to be removed and again, the solution can only be independence.   
Earlier in the thesis, I discussed the collective suffering and collective memory of 
suffering of the Kashmiri people. When the sufferer is a young person he or she suffers 
in a very particular way. The victim must carry the weight of their suffering into adulthood 
and sometimes harbouring ill feelings towards what is perceived to be the reason for your 
suffering (India), makes diplomatic solutions less likely. Concessions cannot be made. 
Only freedom will permit the sufferer a way out of misery. This is one point that was made 
quite evident when asking a respondent early on in my research whether or not Kashmiris 
would accept autonomy as a solution. Sharif responded to a query about the acceptance 
of autonomy within India as opposed to the freedom option:  
‘Look, I don’t know what happened in 90s so – at the time, my ideology may have 
been different, maybe I would be friendly with India and Pakistan. But right now it’s 
post-90, it’s post 2007, it’s post 2011, and it’s post- after murder of 2000 people – 
200,000 persons. I don’t want to be with India, obviously.’  
Sharif, an engineering student from IAK who was affiliated with KSM Edinburgh 
when it first began, also shared his experience of victimization by recounting how his 
friend was shot coming home after playing cricket: 
‘My friend, he was paralyzed back home in his bed. He’s just 20. We were playing 
cricket in 2007 – 2008…And we were just coming from playing cricket and he was 
shot from backside and he’s still in his bed and he can’t move…this is just my story. 
Every Kashmiri has this kind of story…’ 
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Sharif begins his answer to the question of autonomy by relating to the communal 
suffering of all Kashmiri people before he continues by relating more specific grievances, 
things he has witnessed personally.  
‘What they have done to me – my cousin was shot dead. His kidneys were taken 
out…His kidneys were cut from his body and he was so brutally mutilated – he was 
killed. After everything that happened, I won’t be with India.’  
 
In Sharif’s case, it seems that the victims here are not just Sharif’s cousin or friend or 
Sharif himself as a witness to these atrocities, but all Kashmiris. The discourse is similarly 
found from the senior journalist’s perspective as well: everyone in Kashmir has suffered 
loss. 
 
Core Issue: Plebiscite and Right to Self-Determination  
 
One of the most common themes across all samples of interviews and re-visited during 
meetings are the right to self-determination as a human right which is commonly 
referenced in international forums such as the United Nations and repeated by activists 
for self-determination of Kashmir, Tibet, Palestine, Scotland, and others. The most 
common terminology used in Edinburgh in 2012-2013 and highlighted in interviews was 
the term ‘plebiscite,’ which has been commonly used in activist literature on Kashmir, in 
academic literature and encapsulated by the Plebiscite Front, one of the first well-
organized non-violent attempts to lobby for the implementation of the UN mandate for a 
plebiscite. All Kashmiris are familiar with the UN mandate for a plebiscite and regularly 
breach this as evidence of right to self-determination and hotly contend that India has 
been denying Kashmir’s rights through not implementing the plebiscite. Since 2014, it 
has become much more common to refer to the plebiscite as a referendum – the same 
discourse used to describe the legislation which would see Scottish become independent. 
The referendum, which took place but did not pass in September 2014 was and continues 
to be used as exemplary evidence of how to democratically resolve long-standing 
territorial issues. As a small sample of the shift in usage, the term ‘referendum’ was more 
widely used across all samples (interviews, events, and workshops), however, the term 
‘plebiscite’ was more frequently used at events with older activists with some ties to the 
JKLF. Students and youths had much more of a preference to use the term ‘referendum.’ 
211 
 
This could be because it was used more often in the UK and the term ‘plebiscite’ could 
have seemed to be more antiquated; or, it could be a way to consciously relate the 
Kashmir freedom movement to Scotland’s movement for separation from the United 
Kingdom. Richard, an organizer for SACC, regularly collaborates with minority 
communities in Scotland, and addresses the recent call for a referendum in Scotland and 
its relevance to Kashmir. He claims that campaigning ‘in and around the referendum in 
Scotland became such a strong focus for political activity…’ and that ‘KSM made the 
point that Scotland has had their referendum and India has systematically over 60 years 
refused a referendum for Kashmir.’ Although Richard acknowledges that Scotland has 
not been under the same sort of oppression found in Kashmir by India rule, he does 
emphasise that it brings the opportunity for campaigning around the issue.  
            The key distinctions between the campaign for an independent Scotland and the 
campaign for an independent Kashmir, or Tibet, or Palestine, is the perception of the 
residents of the latter territories to be under occupation. The presence of a large force of 
armed personnel makes on the streets of Kashmir, the presence and nuisance of 
checkpoints and curfews, makes for a compelling case for independence. The logic is 
generally that Kashmiris cannot experience freedom or enjoy democratic rights under 
such imperilled living conditions.  
In early Spring 2013 at a campus café in Edinburgh, I asked Wasim what he 
thought could be an ideal long-term solution to the situation in Kashmir.   
‘The long-term solution is to demilitarize Kashmir, start an investigation for all 
human rights violations, killings, the disappearances, custodial killings, rapes – 
everything. Those people [sic] should be punished, whether it’s CRPF, Indian Army, 
whoever is responsible…’ 
The link between the right to self-determination and the militarization of Kashmir (often 
referred to as an occupation) is equally habitual. A desire for justice and the scepticism 
around the likelihood of perpetrators being punished is also commonly expressed. This 
young man’s expressions when he claimed ‘Those people [sic] should be punished…’ 
clearly denoted a level of scepticism. But it was followed up with is seen as the only 
reliable long-term solution to the problems of justice-seekers in Kashmir: 
‘The most important thing is to hold UN-monitored referendum. That is want we 
want. We’re not asking for freedom straight away. We have been given a right to 
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self-determination promised to us. It’s better for India to start being honest with 
Kashmir.’ 
Mahmud, in a previous meeting also framed Kashmir in the context of international 
organizations. He gave a bit longer of a historical synopsis from the partition of India and 
Pakistan but framed his support for a referendum in a very simple manner: 
‘…So, we are not just saying that when we want this right to self-determination or 
freedom, we just want freedom from both India and Pakistan…the UN Security 
Council resolution was, there should be a tripartite talk and it should be. Say, the 
referendum should be ‘Do you want to go with India, with Pakistan, or be 
independent?’ Let’s see which one gets most. If independence gets most, go to 
independence, if Pakistan gets most, go with Pakistan, if India gets most go with 
India. Cause by that we know that majority wants to go with this thing. And everyone 
has to respect that majority whether it’s India or Pakistan or us Kashmiris.’ 
He acknowledges that the situation in Kashmir is complex, but also purports that even if 
the outcome of a plebiscite goes awry and Pakistan invades and occupies Kashmir that 
international organizations should step in: 
Yes, there might be a chance, Pakistan will come and say ‘we don’t respect the 
laws and we will try to occupy the land. That’s why… Why do we have NATO and 
the UN Security Council meet? That’s why they meet - they are there to help out if 
a situation arises…NATO’s bombing Pakistan. They can bomb them again if they 
try to come and occupy Kashmir…’  
Kashmiris actually seem quite well-disposed to the idea of international intervention on 
Kashmir. Almost every respondent – arguably every respondent from Kashmir – has 
mentioned that the UN has mandated a plebiscite (or referendum) to be held to determine 
the fate of the Kashmir people. Not giving the people the option to choose has been a big 
grievance. It is also an argument visited when discussing the Kashmir conflict to those 
outside of Kashmir. It is assumed that not a lot of people outside of South Asia are familiar 
with the historical contexts of the UN mandate and during my visit, the story of Kashmir 
and the denial of the plebiscite was retold to me by several different people during open-
ended discussions. The re-telling of the story was very similar to the next narrative with 
similar elements. These are repeated in the communities abroad, but the stories 
produced added more depth as the people I worked with knew I was familiar with the 
situation. The stories shifted from narratives about Kashmir’s political history to 
highlighting particular aspects of this history and relating it to me – the outsider – in a way 
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that would garner some form of sympathy, or to consciously frame the situation in a way 
another activist would understand.  
The voice for the reformer of Indian Kashmir is often overshadowed by the 
strength of the voices claiming that Kashmir can only achieve peace within its borders if 
it rids itself of India, perceived as an occupying force. Empathy is expressed by non-
Kashmiris in this regard. It is clear than non-Kashmiris support Kashmir’s right to an 
independent state. Mumtaz, a young woman from Pakistan who went to two events in 
Edinburgh claimed in response to the question regarding the most important issues, that 
Kashmiris  
‘want their independence and this is something they’re not getting…they keep 
fighting for it and they are suffering a lot. They want to live freely and happily and 
they are tired of this conflict and of Pakistan and India…they are tired of not getting 
independence…’  
Mumtaz, here, emphasized the lengthy struggle for freedom and implying that the only 
way to end the long-term conflict is with a settlement resulting in an independent Kashmir. 
The motivational framing of the issue is also again approached, and again often tied to 
issues surrounding themes of justice. In response to a question ‘What would you say 
motivates others to participate,’ Mumtaz, claimed, ‘As a human, you can’t see people 
suffer…they’re just left there without a state and people would like to stand up for justice 
and against suffering.’  
When I asked Richard, the campaigner for SACC, if he supported Kashmir 
independence, he was hesitant to respond. He claimed that he supported ‘self-
determination’ of Kashmiris and believed that azadi, for many Kashmiris, did mean 
independence from India. This was a similar response from Salena, a second-generation 
Kashmiri studying in Scotland. She claimed to support the implementation of the UN 
resolution. As she was living in the UK today, she felt she could not impose a solution of 









For KSM Edinburgh, the pro-freedom movement in Scotland and local organizations and 
campaigns proved to be sources of solidarity. The right to self-determination was 
particularly salient at KSM Edinburgh, in part, due to the Scottish referendum coinciding 
with the time I spent with the group. Chapter five (p.181) reflects upon a rally held in 
favour of an independent Scotland during which members of the crowd also lent support 
for a free Kashmir. KSM representatives made their campaign for a free Kashmir known 
at a pro-freedom rally for Scotland, and pro-Scottish independence activists spoke of their 
campaign vividly at the 5 February 2013 vigil outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh 
(page 142). Throughout my time with KSM Edinburgh, I also noticed the influence of the 
Scottish call for a ‘referendum’ on what had previously been referred to as a ‘plebiscite’ 
by Kashmiri activists, particularly in literature prior to 2013. The leaflet (figure 6:5) draws 
attention to the lack of a referendum for Kashmir, despite the recent referendum for   
Scottish 
independence. It further explains the UN mandate for a referendum (rather than a 
Figure 6:5 Leaflet urging support for a referendum for Kashmir, 2014 
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‘plebiscite’) and offers a link to the UNSC Resolution 47 regarding the call for the 
implementation of a ‘free and impartial plebiscite’ (unscr.com).  
Richard, a spokesperson for Scotland Against Criminalising Communities (SACC) 
has been involved in many campaigns that affect minority communities in the UK. When 
I asked him about the impact of the Scottish referendum on KSM, he commented that the 
campaign had become ‘such a strong focus for progressive political activity…’ and that 
KSM in particular had ‘made the point that Scotland had their referendum [but] India has 
systematically over sixty years refused a referendum for Kashmir.’ Although the 
referendum had done well to raise awareness for other self-determination movements 
such as Kashmir, Richard also argued against a close comparison of the two movements. 
Scotland was a part of British imperialism for one, who had been advocating for their 
independence for a long time. Kashmir, on the other hand had been suffering much more 
significant oppression vis-à-vis India than Scotland vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. 
Richard, like many other outsider activists, learned of KSM after involvement working with 
Palestinians whom he argues has the right to self-determination. Other people at each 
site who were not from South Asia and/or Kashmir also regularly expressed involvement 
in other freedom movements such as Tibet and Palestine. 
In addition to the solidarity surrounding self-determination movements, KSM 
Edinburgh was also impacted by more localized campaigns. Again, Richard’s SAAC 
organization worked in collaboration with minority communities in order to prevent the 
extension of legislation into Scotland such as Prevent, which unfairly targets Muslim 
communities. In a KSM meeting on 16 March 2015, Richard asserted that Prevent was 
‘training propaganda in support of the War on Terror’ and discussed the ways that the 
terrorism legislation would be rolled out in Scotland and ways to mobilize against the 
legislation. One of the leaflets handed out at the 5 February 2013 vigil, encouraging an 
end to Muslim bashing, was an advertisement for an Islamaphobia Awareness 
Conference of which SAAC was one of the co-sponsors.  
Solidarities forged around cultures of resistance have been reflected in the types 
of collaborative events that KSM has had with the inclusion of other organizations such 
as SJP, chapter three (p. 138). Support for other self-determination movements is also 
reflected on the KSM Facebook page through displays of pro-Palestinian graffiti or the 
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sharing of articles expressing support for Palestine. Within KSM, there were several 
members also active in SJP. 
 
Figure 6:6 Article demonstration appreciation for show of solidarity with Palestine 20 Aug 2014 shared on KSM 
Edinburgh Facebook 
 
Figure 6:7  Free Gaza graffiti shared on KSM Facebook 2014 
 
Solidarity between KSM and IAK was proposed on my visit to IAK in 2013, where 
a senior journalist called Abdul suggested how the international community or an 
organization such as KSM could lobby for rights in the Valley. Sitting in a room with two 
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young men who had been imprisoned for attending protests while at university, he 
suggested international pressure could alleviate some problems immediately for detained 
youths like Rafi and Farooq, whom I speak about more at length in chapter eight. 
Specifically, KSM and affiliates could lobby for the restoration of passports so that youths 
picked up for protesting could be permitted to travel. Secondly, they could restore their 
permissions to obtain government employment in Kashmir, since private employment or 
running one’s own business are tenuous especially under the pressures of curfews, 




The small card advertising the vigil in the beginning of this chapter suggests that the 
reason for the human rights violations in Kashmir is due to an ‘occupation’ by ‘India.’ 
Viewed in this perspective, it is easy to make a tenuous link between movements in 
opposition to perceived ‘colonialism’ or ‘imperialism,’ as was observed at the vigil. It could 
be noted, however, that the ‘Kashmiri’ is a separate entity from the ‘Indian.’ In this sense, 
the Kashmiri is the occupied and the Indian is the occupying force could suggest an ethnic 
movement; however, as Cockell (2000) had reported, the Kashmir identity has developed 
as a result of shared experiences of suffering; in relation to torture, human rights 
violations, and rape being used as a weapon of war. A movement being in opposition to 
torture, human rights violations, and rape being used as a weapon of war is indeed not a 
hugely controversial concept. It serves as a universal rallying point that others, especially 
other activists can get behind. Interview respondents all referenced some aspect of 
human rights. Some highlighted the women’s human rights while others highlighted 










KSM SOAS: Origin, Participants, and Core Issues  
 
‘SOAS Kashmir Solidarity Movement is a society dedicated to promoting and 
raising awareness of the Kashmir conflict; as well as working with respect to and 
interest of self-determination of the Kashmiri people’ (KSM SOAS, 2014) 
 
London has a much larger Kashmir diaspora than Edinburgh and has a more established 
history of community and political Kashmiri organizations. For one, the JKLF ‘…is located 
in Luton where its founder, Amanullah Khan, has relatives and a wide support base in 
the local Kashmiri diaspora’ (Webb, 2014: 260). Luton, to the north of London, has a 
substantial diaspora of Kashmiris. Aside from Luton, London provides a forum for 
collective action from not only student and workers’ associations, but is an active site for 
protests, lobbying, and other activist activities, including the million march discussed in 
chapter four of this thesis. For activist movements such as KSM, the march was seen as 
a success, however, they refrained from commenting on the march in detail. This further 
raises questions about whether these organizations try to separate themselves from 
these marches, or whether these events, held close to the SOAS division of KSM, have 
a firm influence on the group. When I first came to do fieldwork in London in 2015, I 
anticipated more diaspora involvement and perhaps some friction between long-ter 
diaspora and the transient student population. Although members of the diaspora may 
have shown up to some events, I did not feel comfortable walking up to people I had 
never seen before with a notebook for fear that it would deter then from coming to future 
events. Access was more easily available to those who attended the meetings for one on 
one interviews and as this was the focus of my research in Edinburgh, I decided this was 
the best approach. 
The period for fieldwork with KSM SOAS group was from late September 2015 
through mid-February 2016 to coordinate with the what I anticipated to be the most active 
time of the semesters for the group. This time period has included observations, 
attendance at meetings and events, and qualitative interviews as with the first site. Being 
an unwaged student also limited my duration of field study and further constrained me to 
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commute to the SOAS campus rather than try to venture further to Luton in any attempt 
to reach out to the diaspora This would perhaps be more practical for a funded study.  
 
KSM SOAS: Origin 
 
On 22 November 2014, the Kashmir Solidarity Movement division at the University of 
London School of Oriental and African Studies was officially born. It was hailed as a mark 
of progress for the Kashmir movement in the UK, with London being an epicenter of social 
action. A committee member, from outside London inferred that she had a hand in setting 
up the division but declined to interview with me so I was never able to learn more about 
this or plans for further opening of or collaboration with societies in other parts of the UK.  
 
Figure 7:1 KSM Edinburgh promotes new society in London 
 
On 22 November 2014, KSM SOAS already had 823 followers. It was evident that the 
promotion of the new group was widely distributed, bit I also suspected the popularity in 
contrast to KSM Edinburgh was due to its London location and the presence of a greater 
Kashmir community in proximity. On 26 November KSM SOAS held its first meeting, a 
meet and greet advertised on its Facebook page which got 117 RSVPs. As I was not 
there, I could not vouch for the numbers of actual attendees, but it did show significant 
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interest early on. Based on Facebook posts, group continued to be very active its first 
year in existence holding organizational meetings, film screenings, campaigning 
information, news from Kashmir on both sides of the LoC, and more significant annual 
events such as Kashmir Solidarity Day (5 February) and Kashmiri Women’s Resistance 
Day (23 February). Being well-connected in London there was another event in March on 
occupation and resistance featuring keynote academics and civil rights activists. As with 
KSM Edinburgh, the group was quiet after the end of the semester with irregular postings. 
Towards the end of the summer, however there was a lot of activity denouncing enforced 
disappearances, with posts relaying demonstrations against disappearances in IAK. Just 
before the beginning of the semester on 9 September 2016 the group posted an 
advertisement for Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JK SCCS) who released a 
report on human rights abuses in IAK. The report, available at jkccs.net reports on 
documented ‘enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, sexual violence and torture 
with 927 identified alleged perpetrators’ (KSM SOAS 2015). The report was widely 
anticipated among those aware of its impending release in Edinburgh and was widely 
distributed across social media and affiliated networks. A Guardian article released 
shortly after attested to the wide distribution and lent to the immediacy of the problems of 
systemic abuse in Kashmir. It was in this context that in late September I began fieldwork 
in London with KSM SOAS.  
The first event I attended with KSM SOAS was SOAS Freshers Fayre. I 
introduced myself to two members of the KSM at their booth. As I was previously in 
contact with them, they were aware that I would be coming to London to attend meetings 
and conduct some interviews. For the first few months, I did not conduct one-on-one 
interviews, but played the role of a participant observer. I did help them with passing out 
some flyers and leaflets. One of the leaflets is analysed more closely later in comparison 
to KSM Edinburgh’s primary leaflet on Kashmir. These leaflets primarily outline some 
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basic facts about the Kashmir conflict. The back of the leaflet for KSM SOAS was 
interesting in that it 
immediately tells the reader 
that the Kashmir conflict is not 
just an Indian issue, but it 
draws attention to geopolitical 
underpinnings of the conflict 
between China, Pakistan, and 
India. It further draws attention 
to areas under Pakistani 
control (formerly Gilgit 
Baltistan) which were 
integrated with Pakistan rather 
than with Azad Kashmir. 
Further, there is an enhanced 
version of the mission 
statement calling for raising 
awareness and standing ‘in 
solidarity with the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir’ as well 
as contact details to get in 
touch with committee members 
of the group. The attention paid to areas outwith IAK were my immediate takeaway from 
the flyers as this issue is not immediately stressed on the flyers for KSM Edinburgh. 
Those flyers report on the ceding of a tract of land from Pakistan to China, but this is 
merely part of the timeline on the rear of the flyer rather than highlighted in the same 
manner.  
Also available at the Fresher’s stall for SOAS KSM were postcards with Mir 
Suhail’s political artwork on the front side with the rear, white side addressed to the United 
Nations High Commission for Human Rights. This was an interesting lobbying tactic 
which combined protest art with traditional letter-writing. Like many messages from 
Kashmir activists, this one is framed in terms of human rights and relies on numbers to 
help advocate the injustices surrounding the Indian occupation of Kashmir: 
 
Figure 7:2 Rear of handout of SOAS KSM, September 2015 
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‘Jammu and Kashmir is the most militarized zone in the world with an estimated 
presence of 7,00,000 armed forces personnel. This has resulted in 70,000 deaths, 
8000+ enforced disappearances, 7000+ unknown, unmarked and mass graves and 
widespread and systematic torture and sexual violence.’ 
 
Mir Suhail’s cartoons joins political photographers and other ‘artivist’ work which is often 
on display at meetings at SOAS KSM, or distributed on social media. 
 
 
Figure 7:4 Rear of postcard addressed to UN High Commission for 





Like KSM Edinburgh, KSM SOAS participants were demographically diverse. There was, 
however, a much greater concentration on Kashmiris, and especially Kashmiris from the 
Indian side of Kashmir were in greater numbers. Meetings were typically small, with only 
around eight to twelve core group members attending regularly. It was more common for 
me to find myself the only non-South Asian in the room during these meetings, but within 
the group they were diverse in other ways. The gender dynamic was skewed in favour of 
women with only two or three males in attendance. The age gap was not significant. 
Some were undergraduate and others postgraduate students, with the overall age range 




from late teens to early thirties. Most came from Muslim backgrounds but at least one 
active participant was Christian. (I have not included myself in this summary as I was in 
my mid-thirties and identify as Pagan). For some meetings, I was not the only non-Asian 
female, with one student attending KSM meetings after coming to know about Kashmir 
during involvement with the Palestine society. The events certainly had a much larger 
turnout and it was much more diverse. The Inshallah Football (2010) screening had a 
packed room with a much more diverse age range. I would have been overwhelmed to 
canvas everyone for their ethnic identity, but it was my assumption that members of the 
South Asian diaspora, including Kashmiris were in attendance. Most of this group was 
never seen again at other events, including the similarly packed out initial meet and greet. 
The meet and greet was more representative of most of the events I had experienced in 
my time spent with KSM Edinburgh. This meeting drew people from activist and academic 
background and also saw some interested students. Again, some of the students were 
similarly involved in other societies but some were also interested due to their studies in 
a related discipline such as politics. Unlike some of the later panel discussions, the meet 
and greet was less about academics than it was about activism and raising awareness 
for Kashmir – as well as promoting the society in general.   
From my time spent with KSM Edinburgh, I was also interested in what sorts of 
activities those in KSM SOAS were also involved in, which could contextualize the type 
of person attracted to KSM and also begin to answer questions as to how they became 
involved. Those respondents from KSM SOAS reported involvement in other Kashmir 
societies, the Association for Disappeared Persons (Kashmir), Islamic Help, Water Aid, 
the Model UN, UNICEF, Palestine society, a Dance society, Akkhira Project, Oxfam, as 
well as working on campaigns for women’s empowerment, relief for Syrian refugees, 
education programs for Iraqi refugees, spoken word, and even engagement in lobbying 
the UK MPs on the All Parties Kashmir group. Despite the small sample, some trends do 
seem to be apparent. It is notable that on average, most respondents were involved in 
two or three other activities.  
SOAS KSM in particular had strong links to organizations in IAK and promoted 
and raised funds for APDP at their events. On 30 August 2015 they held an event with a 
public display in central London regarding enforced disappearance of Kashmiris. In 
publicizing the event, they proclaimed, as often is referenced in other events. One post 
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summarizes the condition of enforced disappearances in IAK and the role APDP has: 
‘Since 1989 it is estimated that over 10,000 Kashmiris have been [sic] disappeared by 
the Indian state. APDP Kashmir work hard to document these cases and their loved ones’ 
(SOAS KSM Facebook 19 August 2015).  
A young woman going by the name ‘Sami’ for interview purposes is a spoken 
word poet as well as active in the Association for Disappeared Persons (APDP) and the 
Kashmir Institute of International Affairs. She combines her professional advocacy with 
her art in order to highlight some of the ongoing issues in Kashmir. She is a student 
outside of SOAS, but helps when she can. One of the ways she engages other activists 
outside of Kashmir is by relating the conflict in Kashmir to other conflicts in the world. She 
claims that a strong reason those with no South Asian affiliation participate is because 
‘it’s a kind of human issue.’ She asserts that KSM focuses on human rights violations and 
that it  
‘touches a nerve because it’s a human tragedy on the ground and I feel like it 
appeals to people’s sense of humanity and [sic] they feel they should get involved 
and…talk about human rights and…about occupation so people draw parallels to 
their own struggles and despite being a far off place in the mountains it is so similar 
to other issues…’ 
KSM, she notes, often serves as an introductory point for people to learn about 
Kashmir. But for many organizers, she would like to see more action and mobilisation 
happening than KSM currently does, which is more about ‘education’ and raising 
awareness. Sami, like many other KSM organizers may have an academic background 
outside of politics but have become in their own ways professional advocates who liaise 
with a number of transnational organizations that connect Kashmir to other transnational 
conflicts. Using their professional expertise, they are often able to gain sympathizers from 
other movements, but this does beg the question of how transnational Kashmir 
organizations could solicit the support of international activists and it what ways would be 
most effective a response to violations in Kashmir.  
Other testimony of respondents was representative of the human rights framing 
tactic. It was not necessarily a conscious effort, but nevertheless the narrative presented 
personal stories of rights violations. Zeeshan, a Kashmiri in his thirties works full time in 
London and sends remittances home to his family in IAK, which he hasn’t seen since he 
was a boy. His parents sent him away to Azad Kashmir because, he claims, during that 
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time in the 1990s, boys were targeted by security forces. He recounted his experiences 
back then, before leaving IAK: 
‘everything was shut in the government sector…the education sector was shut…for 
three months we were off, there was no school, everything in the government 
sectors was shut to control the youths from twelve to eighteen years…so that there 
would be no one to fight... They started arresting (them) and young boys started to 
go missing. They found graves with 200-500 plus, mass graves – we believe they 
were those guys that started to go missing.’ 
In the conversation with Zeeshan, he recounts a sort of level of victimization and fear that 
grew during his experiences. Initially, he described how schools were closed and there 
were restrictions to movement. But then, he describes preventive detainment in order to 
keep young men and boys from adding numbers to the militancy. From here, the 
victimization grows to mass graves and his experiences of people he knew and knew of 
disappearing. The final stages of victimization before, it seems, there is a decision to fight 
back or try to escape was recounting not just physical abuse but the threat and fear of 
being abused sexually by Indian soldiers. 
‘One day when we were playing cricket...they [Indian soldiers] were coming and 
doing a raid there. They were…there were serious cases of rape of young boys. 
We were scared to go out, especially for rape cases. Finally, I went to the Pakistani 
side and had been living there…’ (Zeeshan, 2016) 
Witness testimony like this is framed in that sub-frame of victimization, which was 
asserted previously is an aspect of that collective master frame of human rights.   
  
Core Issues and Strategies 
 
In addition to the brief epigraph in the beginning of this chapter outlining SOAS KSM’s 
mission statement, the group’s aims and objectives are displayed on their student union 
page, reproduced in figure 7:5. Awareness raising seems to be the primary activity or 
goal in the initial stages of the society. This inherently means that it is the aim of KSM to 
educate the public on Kashmir, from where it is to the historical origins of the conflict to 





KSM SOAS, more strategically located in London and in closer proximity to a larger South 
Asian diaspora community, tends to have less difficulties attracting large crowds to its 
events. Although the duration of time spent with KSM SOAS was limited to around six 
months, some themes did emerge that point to a similar direction being taken as KSM 
Edinburgh in the way the society tries to frame its message in terms of human rights. 
First, there was also intent discussion over target audience and how best to promote the 
society. It was suggested, for example, to put up posters at all universities in the area, as 
SOAS was part of the University of London system, and other universities were within the 
vicinity as well. Further, it was reinforced that the society should promote themselves 
across a range of social media platforms and to disseminate with other networks, ‘not just 
students’ and ‘not just Pakistanis.’ In addition to who to bring in to events and meetings, 
the first meeting after the society’s Meet and Greet also included debate over what to put 
on the KSM SOAS banner. There was a suggestion to place the popular freedom slogan 
Hum Kya Chahte? Azadi! Or ‘What do we want? Freedom!’ It was not outright rejected, 
but after a tangential discussion it was simply agreed that the slogan which would be 
ultimately approved would have to be ‘politically correct.’ Like KSM Edinburgh, the 
• To highlight and raise awareness of the issues affecting the former princely state of Jammu & 
Kashmir, including the origins and history of the conflict, as well as human rights abuses 
carried out by the occupying forces of India and Pakistan 
• To stand in solidarity with the Kashmiri people 
• The society aims to study the Kashmir conflict through various means, including hosting 
political, historical and cultural events. The society will focus on the entire region of Kashmir 
from Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir, to Indian-Controlled Kashmir and Chinese-controlled 
Kashmir. 
• The society intends to mobilise students in order to achieve a positive settlement for the 
Kashmiri people, by organising campaigns, fundraising and lobbying relevant bodies to uphold 
international human rights law. 
• Promoting a non-partisan approach to resolving the conflict by focusing on the Kashmiri 
peoples’ right to self-determination. 
• Collaborating with both national and international communities groups to build a broad 
awareness campaign. 
 
Figure 7:5 KSM SOAS Aims and objectives, soasunion.org/activities/society/ksmsoas  
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meeting also made suggestions that were based upon strategies used in the Palestinian 
movement such as emphasizing themes of occupation in international law and non-
violent resistance. There was further a call to network with other solidarity campaigns, 
more generally. Like KSM Edinburgh, KSM SOAS also chose to draw attention to the 
Kashmir conflict through the frame of human rights and via utilizing facts and figures. 
Figure 7:2 demonstrates in a 
flyer passed out during SOAS 
Fresher’s events and meetings. 
The flyer offers a brief 
background, highlighting that 
Jammu and Kashmir as a 
whole is occupied by three 
states, before highlighting the 
numbers of victims in IAK, or as 
it is referenced here Indian 
Occupied Kashmir (IOK). The 
bottom of the hand out includes 
a quote by an Amnesty 
International report which 
asserts that India is responsible 
for human rights violations in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The 
highlighting of key points 
through using variation in 
colour reiterates some 
numbers found across samples 
used by activists when describing the intensity of the Kashmir conflict. Of further note, is 
the discrepancy in numbers in the first flyer and the second, although of consistency is 
an overall number of killed that is often purported to be somewhere between 70,000 and 
100,000. An earlier flyer shown in figure 5 distributed by KSM Edinburgh in 2013 claims 




the number killed is 80,000. 
What is consistent here is the 
number of Indian soldiers, 
claimed to be 700,000 in both 
Edinburgh and SOAS handouts. 
What is interesting to note about 
the flyer from 2014 is that it not 
only demonstrates the relevance 
of Kashmir to other movements, 
but it claims to be worse than 
either Tibet or Palestine. It is 
unclear whether this claim was 
strategically abandoned in later 
advertisements, but it is clear 
these comparisons are 
strategically made in an effort to 
appeal to human rights activists 
across a range of campaigns and 
movements. To this effect, 
strategies have been adopted 
that not only raise awareness about the struggles of ordinary Kashmiris, but also to honor 
the memory of Kashmiris by offering specific examples of people who have suffered, 
often at the hands of security forces who act without care of legal discourse. This sort of 
connection makes it possible to mobilize in support of Kashmiris who are treated unjustly 
while the inevitably desired territorial resolution seems out of reach for the moment. 
Muzzammil Thakur, president of the World Kashmir Freedom Movement and 
frequent guest speaker at KSM events in London, expressed his interest in bridging the 
divide between those experiencing human rights infractions on the ground and the larger 
politics of solving the territorial dispute of India and Pakistan (KSM Meet and Greet 2015). 
His frustration regarding the traditional resistance leadership in JKLF has been expressed 
at a talk at Kings College London in February 2016 and later in an article in Al Jazeera 
whereby he claims that the youths are questioning the leadership as ineffective (Kanjwal, 
Figure 7:7 KSM Edinburgh flyer handed out during events in 2014 
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2016: 4). Working with youths in Kashmir and abroad – and being a relatively young man 
himself – he and others have expressed grief at the lack of progress made at ending 
injustices in Kashmir. Unlike other presenters at events which are more academic in 
nature, who rely on PowerPoint slides or pre-written essays for talking points, his talks 
may be perceived as more shocking. They reflect personal experience, first-hand 
testimonies, and graphic images of dead youths, which he acknowledged can be 
shocking but necessary to fully understand the crisis in Kashmir. Although there is not a 
clear leader or group strategy for today’s contemporary (transnational) azadi movement, 
Muzzamil’s strategies, I argue, are rather representative of what the movement would 
like to be: activism and straightforwardness over high politics and academic dispute. 
Muzzammil had embraced a transnational approach to the Kashmir freedom movement, 
with special emphasis on raising international awareness, connecting the struggles 
between IAK and diaspora abroad through frequent travel between countries, and 
seeking justice for those who have suffered. Like pictures meant to move an audience to 
empathy, his Twitter feed is an open letter for modern Kashmir activism with its posts and 
re-posting of videos, pictures, and articles which juxtapose tragedy with hope. Joined by 
academics and activists, he spoke in London again on the United Nations International 
Human Rights Day, 10 December 2016 for an event by the Justice Foundation – Kashmir 
Institute of International Affairs (KIIA), another affiliation of his. The event was publicized 
by SOAS KSM on Facebook to ‘highlight the gross human rights violations taking place 
in Indian occupied Jammu & Kashmir by more than 700,000 modern day armed 
occupational forces.’  
 Holding an event that highlights torture and abuse on International Human Rights 
Day or on the missing or disappeared Kashmiris on an International Day of the 
Disappeared and exposing incidents of rape on or around International Women’s Day 
largely represents a slightly different approach to mobilization than simply observing days 
of historical significance to the azadi cause. Mobilization surrounding symbolic ‘black 
days’ by staging strikes on notable days of importance for Kashmir’s freedom movement 
are largely observed, however they represent a more ethnically or regionally-aligned 
(Kashmir or South Asian) context. By holding events on days recognized and celebrated 
globally, again it highlights the desire to frame the Kashmir cause in the context of 
international norms. Whenever there is an argument based around the rights of 
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Kashmiris, from the right of self-determination to human rights, women’s rights, and legal 
rights, there is a clear attempt to contextualize the experience of Kashmiris to 
experiences of a more global community of legal advocacy and activism. Professional 
advocates such as lawyers, NGO and NPO workers, journalists, academics, artivists, and 
seasoned activists of all sorts are the backbone of the transnational Kashmiri freedom 
movement. They connect the home-grown advocacy groups with a global audience and 
generally provide the structure and facilities that make mobilization outside (and it could 
be argued inside) of Kashmir possible. As the occurrence of injustices in the world far 
outweighs the occurrence of social activist mobilization, there needs to be not only a 
subjective component, or framing of the issue that provides for the alignment of ideals in 
order to mobilize, but there also needs to be some kind of structure in place to facilitate 
action. This goes beyond the physical location or ICTs that provide these resources for 
protest calendars or promoting events. This chapter first reviews literature surrounding 
legal advocacy and activism in Kashmir with a focus on recent trends and studies. This 
literature is located within broader literature on social movements and ethnonationalism, 
with the focus on appeals to identity markers and framing these in legal advocacy. 
Secondly, this chapter then moves to an analysis of data gained from interviews and 
discussions with activists and analyses the types of KSM events, who is attracted to them 
and why. Finally, this chapter discusses how in-group activists are drawn to mobilize 
around legal advocacy as it can offer a source of closure. Meanwhile, out-group activists 
(non-Kashmiris/South Asians) respond to legal advocacy as concrete ways for achieving 
success and/or contributing to a movement they empathise and support. Universalist 
framings and discourse around legal activism thus permits for a bridge between in-group 
and out-group activists and a stable way to sustain mobilization efforts.   
 
Legal Advocacy and Interpretations of Kashmir Activists  
 
Human rights, broadly interpreted, can be applicable to many aspects of the Kashmiri 
freedom movement. As interpreted by individual activists and defined in memos and 
publications by the groups themselves, human rights in some form is widely used as a 
meta-frame. But here, I would like to home in on the aspects which are even more explicit 
in regard to legal framings and terminology as expressed in interviews with respondents. 
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In many of the discussions with activists, it is clearly obvious that legal advocates and 
legal framings of the Kashmir freedom movement have had an impact on how the 
movement is perceived and interpreted by activists. Some of the comments may overlap 
with themes of victimization, but the purpose here is to highlight where the respondents 
have emphasised and used particular ‘key’ words such as impunity and justice. Use of 
such language is seen as a strong indicator that human rights and legal advocacy are 
reasons to participate in KSM activities. This further indicates the general framing of the 
Kashmir azadi movement as a movement which is akin to seeking justice and attaining 
closure for victims. Essentially, respondents have, in their own words, diagnosed the 
problem, attributed blame, and then offered some way to fix the problem. As it is often 
perceived that justice for Kashmir and Kashmir being under Indian control are mutually 
exclusive, the solution is often that Kashmir should become an independent entity.   
Salena, who was born in PAK but has lived in the UK most of her life, has been 
present at the majority of meetings and events since Edinburgh KSM had begun. In 
March 2015 when I conducted an interview with her, she had claimed in response to my 
question regarding the most important issues in Kashmir: 
‘I definitely would have to say torture…and more importantly, I think there needs to 
be an investigation of an independent body from a human rights organization like 
Amnesty and they would find out there’s torture happening, about the rapes that 
took place in the 1990s – to bring justice to those raped and the mass graves that 
came out needs to be dealt with.’  
The issue of justice and closure is very near to those who have spent the majority of their 
lives in IAK. A male respondent from IAK who worked as a journalist offered a more 
personalised story when discussing these questions. For him, justice is a personal matter 
based on experiences he has faced throughout the 1990s. He separates himself from 
some of the other members of SOAS KSM in that he is a bit older than they are and has 
spent his first 25 years in Kashmir. In response to asking him why he participates in KSM, 
he replies with reference to his experiences returning home after being away for work: 
‘…it’s ironic that as soon as I reached the place I lived, I needed to recharge my 
phone…in a shop where this counterinsurgency guy came in and was harassing 
the shop keeper. That incident rejuvenated that anger within me. It’s about justice! 
It’s about what is right!’ 
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This story is but one account of Irshad’s experiences. He expressed resentment over the 
heavy presence of military forces in Kashmir, which affects everyday activities. 
Something as simple as charging a phone can become connected to an encounter with 
security forces. These encounters represent more than a nuisance for Irshad, who also 
recounted experiences of processions of people when a person is killed in his locality 
where ‘thousands were coming out.’ He also informed me that ‘half’ of his family was 
deported from Kashmir ‘because they were considered pro-Pakistan.’ When moving on 
to why he felt others were moved to participate in KSM events, he felt they were for similar 
reasons as for himself participating. Like many other respondents, he referred to the 
human rights situation. He further referenced the continued suffering of the Kashmiri 
people. Unlike the young woman from Pakistan who expressed sympathy for their 
suffering, his voice was filled with expressions of resentment at how his Kashmir has 
changed over the years: ‘…when I go back I see people traumatized…the kind of anger 
I saw in people…before people were still laughing and smiling and warm to each other – 
that no longer exists. The whole aura is like that.’ Moving from accounts of his personal 
experiences, he then frames some issues surrounding police accountability to what is 
perceived to be a common practice of extortion: 
‘My uncle was telling me about the PSA and stuff about the police...The police 
would pick up a guy - a student - would pick him up and their family would come 
based on a suspicion…[sic] and still tell their families they were caught and that 
there was evidence against him, so if want to save your son can still work out 
something with the station officer. Give us 20,000 rupees and we will try to save 
him. It’s a sort of extortion, then the family would be sure this child doesn’t remain 
there, they would be sent to the Middle East or somewhere else in India and police 
will target someone else. The Police station is notorious in doing these things, 
families that have the financial capacity will lend to people, to friends. It becomes a 
business.’ 
This is still in response to the question about what motivates others to participate. Again, 
qualitative interviews can lead to more tangential discussions, but there does seem to be 
a conscious effort to relate his personal accounts to the publicised draconian laws and 
how this affects Kashmiris on the ground. His experiences reflect upon his return to 
Kashmir after being away for five years and his perception about the situation is in relation 
to that as well as accounts from his family who becomes an authority on Kashmir matters 
in his absence about what is going on – in this case his uncle – who reports to him a 
bleak situation about the abuse of power by the police. In his account, the diagnosis goes 
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beyond the morality of police officers who purportedly abuse their power and blame is 




Zeeshan, and others like him, recount their traumatic experiences and will often compare 
them to Palestine. Although they recognize the trauma that those in Palestine may face, 
there is a sense of indignation at the apparent ignorance of Kashmir trauma. When asked 
why he attends KSM events, it leads back to not just his personal suffering, but the 
purported fact that the suffering of Kashmiris goes unannounced.  
‘…mostly people they know about the [Kashmir] issue, but nowadays there are 
different issues about world so our voice is still in bottom now. In Afghanistan, there 
is a war they didn’t lose as many people (as us Kashmiris). We lost almost 6000 
people in this period if you compare us with Palestine, we lost more life. Second, I 
am Kashmiri, I am a victim that’s why I try to go everywhere and hope people will 
talk about us. 
 
In this sense, the international reach of the Palestinian freedom movement is something 
that Kashmiri freedom activists hope to emulate. Raising awareness about the suffering 
of the Kashmiri people goes hand-in-hand with gaining advances towards a resolution of 
Kashmir. If people know what is going on there, they will be moved and want to take 
action, just like those active on Palestinian campaigns. It also acts as a sort of protection 
or buffer for Kashmiri activists. One presenter who suggested that Kashmir didn’t have 
enough international attention claimed that ‘one stone in Palestine can’t be moved without 
the world hearing about it.’ If there is more pressure on the Indian government, perhaps 
there is the possibility of reform. If the world will not tolerate abuse of Kashmiris, the logic 
follows that the security forces must curb their tactics for more nonviolent approaches.  
 
Non-Kashmiris were likely to be involved in rights-based campaigns such as 
lobbying against anti-terrorism legislation or participation in anti-racist demonstrations. 
Two of those interviewed also expressed empathy with the Kashmiris as an oppressed 
people. One of these people, Jay, claimed that his family experienced oppression living 
in India as a minority Christian faith. Being a minority ethnic and religious group, he 
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shared empathy with their cause, and was drawn to the society both as a means to 
reconnect to his South Asian heritage, and as an expression of solidarity for minority 
groups in India.  
Another young woman, Fatin, expressed empathy for Kashmiris as someone who 
has faced prejudice as a Malay in an international school.  
‘I didn’t join societies back home. Some of them were prejudiced against 
Malaysians…Here [in the UK] I feel like they are more open-minded to me. I studied 
at an international university, so most of my friends were from South Asia or the 
Middle East.’ 
Fatin did not have the opportunity to participate very much in societies due to her 
demanding schedule, but she chose to come to a few meetings at KSM Ediburgh, which 
to some extent, may reflect how she prioritized the cause of Kashmir. She was also a 
strong advocate for a free Kashmir. She felt that it was Kashmiris’ best interests to have 
their own state to avoid further persecution. 
 
How people collaborate and identify with one another was seen beyond the 
university at other types of events. Attending protest rallies, it is easily observable which 
groups cluster together. During an anti-Modi demonstration in London in (November 
2016), I observed the pro-freedom group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
standing close to a contingent of pro-Khalistan demonstrators. In a brief conversation 
with a Sikh woman attending the event, she told me that they view their - Kashmir and 
Sikh - cause as similar to one another and therefore offer one another support. Forming 
a unique bond around shared experiences of suffering has the power to deepen the 
sense of solidarity found between two otherwise distinct groups. This is a common find 
across all sources of data; online, field-based in the UK, and my visit to India. Even very 
tenuous links can be highlighted and rallied behind. This can bridge the gap even 
between police officers and protesters in a conflict where everyone has experience loss 
of one form or another. 
There are a few advocacy organizations inside of IAK. These organizations and 
agencies often take inspiration from international organizations, are influenced by them, 
and often affiliated in some way to them. However, like many indigenous organizations, 
they are always negotiating between personalized cultural repertoires and those 
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repertoires inspired by other movements and agencies out-with IAK. The Association of 
Parents for Disappeared Persons (APDP) Kashmir, founded by the mother of a 
disappeared son in August 1990, Parveena Ahangar (Butalia, 2002),  is probably the 
most well-known and publicized rights organization outside of Kashmir. The APDP has 
now become a symbol of the contemporary movement for justice and closure in Kashmir. 
It has also provided a structure for women to mobilise who would not have otherwise 
have the facilities to do so. Parveena, a purported ‘illiterate housewife’ in literature and 
by a KSM speaker as well was turned into a ‘political agent and key mobilising figure in 
the revival of civil society political activism for peace’ Best and Hussey (2005: 12). SOAS 
KSM in particular had strong links to organizations in IAK and promoted and raised funds 
for APDP at their events. On 30 August 2015 they held an event with a public display in 
central London regarding enforced disappearance of Kashmiris. In publicizing the event, 
they proclaimed, as often is referenced in other events. One post summarizes the 
condition of enforced disappearances in IAK and the role APDP has: ‘Since 1989 it is 
estimated that over 10,000 Kashmiris have been [sic] disappeared by the Indian state. 
APDP Kashmir work hard to document these cases and their loved ones’ (SOAS KSM 
Facebook 19 August 2015).  
Contention and Resolution 
 
Although it was the general consensus that Kashmir should be free from India, there were 
alternative interpretations of the what azadi for Kashmir should look like. One man from 
IAK who was not a student, but a professional came with his wife to one of the meetings 
at KSM SOAS in February 2016. He claimed that in the beginning, even before Partition, 
he would have worked to make the country one India rather than a separate India from 
Pakistan. He claims that the Partition complicated matters and was a catalyst for religious 
and sectarian divides. Now, he claims, if India left Kashmir, it would leave Kashmir 
vulnerable to Pakistan or Chinese interference: ‘If India leaves us…Pakistan would raise 
an insurgent army and the Chinese borders are so sensitive because Kashmir doesn’t 
have the capacity to defend itself and the country so we need Indian soldiers to defend 
the streets and border…’ However, he further commented on the ‘irony’ of relying on 
Indian soldiers to defend Kashmir because they are there to protect the people but that 
‘the Kashmiri people get caught up between two gunmen: militants in uniform and 
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soldiers.’ He claims it is innocent people that suffer and would like to see a Kashmir where 
people of all faiths can live in peace. What is most unusual, however, about his 
interpretation is that he not only asserts that ‘it doesn’t matter if we are divided into smaller 
parts and someone else comes in to occupy’ but he claims the best solution is ‘to work 
to make India and Pakistan one country so we don’t fight over a small piece of land and 
Kashmir will be OK because we will be one country.’ Reuniting India and Pakistan, for 
him, is the best long-term resolution for peace for Kashmir. Although he did not address 
feasibility, he does raise an interesting argument that posits the main cause of conflict in 
Kashmir is due to the separation of Pakistan and India and rejects further separation as 
an all-in-one resolution. He claims empathy for people’s pain at losing loved ones, but 
also seems to be more positive than most respondents that Indian reforms could lead to 
Kashmiris living a better life, thus reducing the need for an independent state.  
The voice for the reformer of Indian Kashmir is often overshadowed by the 
strength of the voices claiming that Kashmir can only achieve peace within its borders if 
it rids itself of India, perceived as an occupying force. The strength of this perception is 
often related in the way in which Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) is often referred to 
as Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) in discourse and in literature. Activist perspectives will 
often refer to Kashmir as occupied territory on the Indian side, Pakistan side, of both. 
 
PAK or POK? IAK or IOK?  
 
KSM Edinburgh and KSM SOAS were established in 2012 and 2014 respectively. There 
is sometimes assistance offered in the setting up of a branch of KSM by committee 
members of other KSM Societies, but as each branch is generally autonomous. Kashmir 
Students Campaign UK does not seem to have any more than casual connections. There 
is not a singular united manifesto and the correspondence between the groups is rather 
limited to sharing events on one another’s Facebook groups. Without a clear line of 
communication, there is no board or overarching head of the groups that dictate the sorts 
of images and language permitted in official email correspondence with members or on 
printed materials such as fliers and posters hung up during events and meetings. It is 
therefore up to the individual branch to determine its own official discourse or to simply 
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make the decision to not have an official stance. It was the desire for KSM SOAS to have 
an officially recognised term when referencing the Indian side of Kashmir.  
On 30 October 2015, KSM SOAS held a meeting whereby the second item on the 
agenda was ‘Discuss KSM Policy on usage of ‘occupied’ vs ‘administered’. And other 
terms that can be controversial.’ Although there were a few other items on the agenda, 
the IOK versus IAK discussion sparked the most heated debate. Nine people were in 
attendance, including myself and a representative of the Palestine society at SOAS, 
whom sided with those in favour of using the term ‘occupied,’ with a clear similarity drawn 
between the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the Indian occupation of Kashmir. Those 
in favour of using Administered over Occupied were in the minority. The official count 
after voting was: two for administered and six for occupied, with myself abstaining. To 
use the term occupied in official documents, as one member pointed argued, would make 
it appear as though there was an inherent bias in the group toward India, but not Pakistan. 
One of the committee members agreed that as most of the events did focus on the Indian 
side, there was danger of this. However, she argued that officially there are ‘three nuclear 
powers all occupying Kashmir. Kashmir is occupied by [sic] Pakistan, India, and China.’ 
The argument is nuanced in such a matter that although many freedom supporters would 
agree that Kashmir is occupied by multiple countries, there is special emphasis on India 
being the most at fault. By continuing to refer to Indian Administered Kashmir as Indian 
Occupied Kashmir, there is, as one attendee noted a danger of only attracting those who 
were already ‘converts’ to the Kashmiri freedom movement. People could be 
automatically put off by the usage of the term occupied. A non-Kashmiri Indian in 
attendance retorted that Indians would be turned away rather than feel welcomed to 
events. In a later interview with him, he elaborated on the feelings that Indians would feel 
unwelcome at the event. As a non-Kashmiri, ‘I felt I had no voice.’ 
The non-Kashmiri Indian was joined by a Kashmiri Indian in as a dissenting 
opinion. His argument was less on the possibilities of exclusion as they were with others 
viewing the freedom activists as unbalanced. Coming from a background in journalism, 
his argument was that the term administered should be used for both Pakistan and India. 
Not appearing biased or unbalanced was not a strong enough argument for those in 
support of ‘occupied.’ One person claimed that even journalists used the term occupied, 
and there were no problems associated with its use. Another person argued that by 
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describing the situation in Kashmir as an occupation better represents the ‘truth on the 
ground,’ that this is the view that society uses in general. He further purported that the 
KSM were not journalists nor academics and therefore did not need to remain balanced. 
It should be noted that I have personally taken the stance that referring to the territories 
as administrative districts is indeed the best possible position I can take as an academic, 
and I am therefore continuing the use of IAK and PAK. This is not meant to vindicate or 
vilify any party, but rather a simple designation of the actual designated control of territory 
on either side of the LoC.  
Despite the adoption of the term ‘occupied’ officially, KSM members and guest 
speakers alike both continued to use the terms occupied and administered rather 
interchangeably. The very first handout I received when visiting the group’s Fresher Fair 
stand in September 2015, there is a section titled ‘Issues in Indian-held Kashmir’ and 
another slightly smaller section below it titled ‘Issues in Pakistan-held Kashmir.’ The 
prominent placement of PAK on the first handout most prospective supporters receive 
that year can be perceived as a stance of KSM SOAS that they mean to represent 
perceived suffering and injustices on both sides rather than on the one. Equally, KSM 
SOAS’s Facebook page claims that the society ‘will focus on the entire region in Kashmir 
from Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir, to Indian-Controlled Kashmir and Chinese-Controlled 
Kashmir.’ Although the subject of the meeting was regarding the ‘official’ usage of 
occupied versus administered, in practice there is no clear reconciliation of the matter. 
What is clear, however, is that the majority of participants agreed that it was reasonable 
to use the term occupied as for them, this is a clear reflection of the reality of the situation.  
In the official fliers of KSM Edinburgh, there is no great emphasis on PAK. There 
is certainly no praise for Pakistan in the fliers, as they point to Pakistan’s ceding of a tract 
of disputed territory to China, the failure of both Pakistan and India at implementing UN 
resolutions, and they blame both countries for lack of resolution of Kashmir which has led 
to a ‘conventional and nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan bleeding their 
economies’ (Kashmir Conflict Timeline, 2014). Despite the relatively equal blame for the 
lack of resolution, KSM Edinburgh does not tend to refer to the part of Kashmir 
administered by Pakistan as ‘occupied’ territory. There is equally no avoidance of the 
issue as there are no marked attempts to place the issue on the agenda. The dialogue 
for both societies tended to lean towards the majority of PAK being under the 
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administration of Pakistan but relatively autonomous with the exception of the Northern 
Areas or Gilgit Baltistan which are now fully under the administration of Pakistan. This 
area (excluding Gilgit Baltistan) is referred to in texts and echoed during meetings as 
Azad (Free) Kashmir. There is a general sense that ‘people over there live free,’ which is 
contrasted with the current state of IAK where there is a presence of large numbers of 
military personnel, curfews, checkpoints, and bunkers. From everyday drudgery to the 
periods of tension that naturally occur when there are high levels of military stationed in 





SOAS KSM certainly had less troubles in attracting a crowd. As with Edinburgh KSM, 
their first objective was to raise awareness about the ongoing conflict in Kashmir and the 
perceived military occupation. However, they were also interested in going beyond raising 
awareness and striving to see practical ways forward. During the week of events in 
February 2016, they were to have one event at the end of the week which would discuss 
these things. An advertisement was made on Facebook asking for interest, but it was 
suggested that it was by invitation only. When I inquired about the event, I was told I 
would not be able to come and observe the event as I have come to the other meetings. 
It would be difficult to know if any specific measures may have been discussed, but 
certainly it would seem to have been the direction the group was heading towards when 
it was time to leave the field. This society is certainly positioned well in London and 
affiliated with a university well-known for student activism. The position of the society in 
a hub of activism of London and of SOAS makes it more likely to be sustainable for a 
longer duration than KSM Edinburgh, which was no longer active as of 2018. The close 
proximity of a larger diaspora population makes it more likely to be able to promote the 
KSM to members of the diaspora, but this was not the most strategic goal of the group. 
The aim of reaching out to an international audience despite the closer proximity of a 
larger South Asian community was evident in the attraction to KSM by other campaigns 
and groups in the university community. Despite the clear aim to raise awareness for 
KSM to non-South Asians, however, there was clearly a large South Asian presence in 
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meetings and at events. Further, the group was able to draw upon its London location to 
bring in members of the academic, activist and diaspora community for speaking 























































Human Rights and Political Issues 
 
The introduction of this thesis introduced the puzzle of relying on ethnonational 
interpretations of a conflict which, after preliminary investigation appeared to be an 
asymmetrical conflict between an overzealous security apparatus and a largely 
nonviolent collective mobilisation of Kashmiri civilians. I was also curious by the 
willingness of those with no stake in the outcome of such a conflict to be such fervent 
supporters of Kashmiri azadi. What I found under my period of investigation that made 
the Kashmiri struggle for independence more internationally known were when the 
activists framed their fight for self-determination as a human right. This was easy to do 
given the recent attempts to document all those who have experience torture and other 
abuses by security personnel in IAK such as the report Alleged Perpetrators (Imroz et al, 
2012). Disappearances, violations of women and mass graves have been documented 
and Kashmiri activists and legal advocates on their behalf have been trying to seek justice 
despite the draconian laws of PSA and AFSPA, introduced previously in this thesis (47). 
There are a lot of legitimate reasons to support a free Kashmir independent of India, given 
these abuses are more likely to happen under an aura of occupation, as asserted by 
Osuri (2015) and Azra (this thesis, 107). Legitimate reasons for Kashmiri pro-freedom 
activism are overshadowed, however, when the troubles in Kashmir are blamed on 
Pakistan interference or ‘misguided youths’ (Choudhary, 2010).  
 This chapter analyses how the Kashmir freedom movement has now become 
expressed as a human rights movement, and how it is now becoming widely viewed as 
a human rights issue by not only Kashmiris, but a broader international audience. In 
particular, I begin this chapter with an overview of the Kashmir movement as a human 
rights movement through the perspective on some of those I have spoken with in 
Kashmir, by reflecting on reports widely distributed, and the distribution of images 
denouncing human rights abused in Kashmir on social media, available in English and to 
a wider, international audience. I reflect upon the fear sown by decades of conflict, 
curfews, and daily lives interrupted by violence and occupation. I analyse how Kashmiris, 
as victims, enable the use of a victimization frame in order to reach out to a sympathetic 
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audience, but also how they use resistance as a means to reclaim their agency. Although 
this was already revealed in chapter three with special attention to women’s human rights 
sub-frame, this chapter focuses more on victimization as a collective memory 
scholastically, and later offers empirical evidence from my own research. I further look 
towards the ways that framing techniques help to bridge the gaps between advocacy and 
activism. Legal framing of the Kashmir issue connects to Gamson et. al (1982) injustice 
frames, introduced in this thesis (90) and discussed in relation to advocacy witnessed 
during fieldwork in London (chapter seven). These tactics of framing are not concrete, 
but malleable and there is overlap with intersectional motivations for supporting azadi, 
which is discussed at the close of this chapter. 
 
The Kashmir freedom movement as a human rights movement 
 
The first introduction many people have had to KSM has been via a film viewing. The film 
most widely screened since the KSM as a university society is the BBC documentary 
‘Kashmir’s Trails of Torture.’ The documentary cites very specific examples of torture and 
shows Parvez Imroz, a human rights lawyer, traversing Kashmir and taking testimony of 
torture survivors. Many of the incidences of torture from interrogation during the 1990s 
were very visible. Older men are missing limbs and still carry burn scars and scars from 
other types of injuries sustained under internment. One of the more popular memes 
shared on Twitter during the ‘Twitter Storm’22 advertised by Kashmir Students Campaign 
UK for 27 October 2014, with the hashtag ‘#27octblackday’ depicts one of Imroz’s 
respondents, Qalandar Khatana.  
 
22 A ‘Twitter Storm’ generally refers to attempt to flood Twitter with a large quantity of posts 
bearing particular hashtag labels. In this case, transnational activists called for a Twitter Storm of 
#27octblackday in order to raise awareness or draw attention to the human rights abuses in India. 
27 October 1947 was the day that the Instrument of Accession was signed which signified, for 




Figure 8:1 'Face of Human Rights in Kashmir', shared on Twitter 27 Oct. 2014 
Khatana’s case represents, perhaps, one of the more disturbing cases of torture that was 
experienced during the height of the militancy. In the film, he details how parts of his 
fleshed was removed, seasoned with chili, and that he was forced to eat it (Kashmir’s 
Torture Trail, 2012). This was not the limit of gruesome details of torture in IAK relayed 
in the documentary. There were other tales, some originating during the heights of the 
insurgency such as Khatana’s as well as less gruesome, but nonetheless disturbing 
incidents that have occurred more recently such as two young men who suffered abuse 
during detention after posting pro-freedom slogans on Facebook.  
 
Fear and Loathing in Kashmir 
 
Surinder Oberoi (2001) describes the state of false normalcy in Kashmir that came once 
the threat of militancy began to die down in an article ‘Fear and Loathing in Kashmir.’ The 
article emphasises that even when things in Kashmir seem to be going well, there is an 
acute sense of anxiety. Between two nuclear-armed neighbours and the omnipresent 
military and sandbag bunkers dotted throughout Kashmir mohallas are constant 
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reminders that Srinagar is a city for from normal. Although the militarized state of Kashmir 
is intended for the long-term security of the nation vis-à-vis Pakistan, the use of security 
forces for domestic oppression increases the sense of insecurity among Kashmiri citizens 
and delegitimizes India as a democratic state. The sense of fear and insecurity felt by 
Kashmiris and relayed specifically during interviews is striking considering the initial 
intention of such a show of military posturing is meant to protect one’s country from 
external threat – be that an official incursion of Pakistan’s army or an unofficial incursion 
of Pakistani-supported militants. Oberoi (2001) writes about fear and loathing in Kashmir 
in the context of a waning, but still active militancy – a time when Kashmiris were tiring of 
violence. Militants had proven ineffective at ousting India and India and Pakistan seem 
unwilling to compromise on any long-term solution. Average Kashmiris suffer the long-
term effective of living under these conditions and fear reigns in their hearts. 
It is a common occurrence to juxtapose children playing sports or innocently 
walking past a protest when they are caught in the crossfire. During the summer of 2010, 
more than fifteen years after Zeeshan’s recollections, the incident that really kicked off 
the spiral of protest and subsequent retaliation by security forces was the killing of 
teenage student, Tufail Ahmad Matoo, who was walking home from a park when he was 
fatally shot in the head with a teargas canister. 
During my own visit to IAK, I met with two young men who were both detained on 
separate occasions after attending a protest. At the time, there were both college-aged 
and considered to be ‘youths’ in their younger twenties. Rafi describes how he was 
uprooted from his home in the middle of the night in August 2010. At the police station, 
he reveals that:  
‘They beat us in the police station and asked for the names of other people there, 
but everyone was in the street. I didn’t know them. When they weren’t happy with 
that, they beat me some more. After two or three months I was released.’ 
Farooq, the other young man, was arrested while attending a protest also in August of 
2010. He claimed that he was in the same area near a hotel that’s known to be a trouble 
spot, The ‘Gaza of Kashmir.’ Farooq had heard of a nine-year-old boy who was killed in 
his locality, but this time he was there protesting the killing of a 16-year-old boy. ‘I knew 
him. He was killed in shelling, by a tear gas shell. He was deliberately shot. He was 
playing cricket in a stadium nearby…’ He also verifies his experience of being beaten and 
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recalls the indiscriminate detention of boys ‘some as young as eight, nine-year-old boys 
on up I’ve seen in custody.’  
The meeting with Rafi and Farooq was arranged and facilitated by a senior 
journalist of a prominent newspaper in IAK. He expressed concern over the 
consequences of exposing young Kashmiris to physical and mental harm which may 
pursue some of them to retaliate by taking up arms: 
‘People are killed – they’re crushed at the receiving end. Agitational terrorism will 
happen when peaceful means don’t work…When they Impose curfew, you don’t 
know how many days you won’t get essential commodities. Basic facilities are not 
provided to citizens. The situation in Kashmir not cosy, but has declined. 60% of 
the population has PTSD and other psychiatric problems. They have witnessed 
horrible things. Hundreds of people have been killed; there have been so many 
blasts. This has a big impact on someone 19 years old.’  
 
Here journalist ‘M’ discusses how 
PTSD and psychiatry problems are 
not a consequence of any single 
incident, but the experience of many 
hardships over time. From the feeling 
of being trapped in ‘the most beautiful 
prison’ to the experience of loss of 
loved ones, friends and neighbours 
collectively create an eternal state of 
fear. The things that the journalist had 
to emphasize in our discussion is 
reinforced in social media postings. 
On the KSM Edinburgh Facebook 
site, a post was shared with an 
accompanying photo which states ‘Children of Heaven…Subjected to Hell.’ Just weeks 
before meeting with the journalist on 25 April, 2013, an excerpt from the post reads: 
‘There are even reported cases of 'Forced Sodomy' in these police stations which 
were filmed with phone cameras…Sometimes these children are put into prisons 
with fugitives and criminals which puts them under greater danger. The 
psychological trauma that is thrusted upon these teenagers is immense (Kashmir 
has one of the highest rates of Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) 
Figure 8:2 Indian soldier leading Kashmiri boy Facebook 




These teenagers are the future of our nation which has been under severe 
militarization (Kashmir holds the World Record For the Highest Militarization). And 
protesting against this military occupation would be an obvious thought of any 
growing up kid. But in Kashmir they are branded as 'agitational terrorists'. 
 
Here is an emphasis on the experience of trauma by young people, and again a repeated 
reference to high rates of PTSD and branding peaceful protesters as ‘agitational 
terrorists.’ An image of a man in military uniform leading a child accompanies the post. 
Although it is not quite clear what is happening from the image alone, the framing of the 
message implies that the child is being harassed in some way. As with the other 
messages, it again is suggested that there are few options to alleviate suffering in 
Kashmir, especially for the young. Using an appeal to the human rights of children and a 
call to end their suffering, again the diagnosis of azadi is reiterated. Everyone has lost 
someone. A police officer I became acquainted with during my trip to Kashmir explained 
to me how he lost his sister after she was in the vicinity of a bomb exploded by a militant 
group in the early 2000s. She was only 18. The individual stories of Kashmiris who claim 
to have experienced traumatic events is endless.  
 Most of the people I have spoken with have been fortunate enough to avoid 
detention or torture, despite the constant and imminent fear of this. Rafi and Farooq, 
however, provided an opportunity in my short visit to hear more details about the 
experiences of detained youths since the summer of 2010. Together, the two recount 
similar conditions during their time in jail. Rafi began by saying that ‘in jail, you are limited 
to only 60 Rupees a day to arrange everything…’ 60 Indian Rupees is roughly equivalent 
to just over 60 pence, or about one US dollar. Rafi says it is not enough, save on the 
occasions you can get food from home. The journalist present went further to protest the 
conditions of jail by emphasizing that during the winter, the conditions were more difficult. 
‘There’s no proper heating…and in the summers it’s too hot, small, and not hygienic.’ 
This latter point emphasized a comment made previously by Farooq who recalled that in 
the summertime, prisoners are shifted to Jammu which the journalist claims is ‘the hottest 
place in Northern India.’ To exasperate the discomfort provided by the heat, Farooq also 
chimed in by saying that there are as many as ‘six or seven people in one jail cell’ and he 
reflected that you had to remain there after 5pm. Rafi concurred and added that the 
dimensions of the jail cell were approximately ‘10 by 12 feet for six people and they all 
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have to sleep on the hard ground without beds…just some blankets and sheets.’ It was 
not just the lack of food or clean bedding or the heat or the mosquitoes that disturbed 
Rafi and Farooq. Both claimed to have experienced beatings. Rafi agrees with Farooq 
when he announced that ‘They tie up your legs and arms and beat you with sticks. This 
continues for days…’ Rafi sums up his experience in jail by comparing it to a 
concentration camp: ‘Once you are put behind bars, it’s a closed case. You’re screams 
can’t be heard by anybody – it was like a concentration camp.’ 
 Since my own background knowledge in torture stems from studies on the 
Russian gulags or from the BBC documentary ‘Kashmir’s trails of torture,’ I probe a little 
further in the specifics on the abuse, requesting the two to only tell me what they feel 
comfortable with. It is relayed to me that although there are some specific techniques 
such as rollers being used on some of the prisoners and others suffering from being 
burned or electrically shocked. For the two respondents, however, they claimed to mostly 
suffer from constant beatings. Rafi claimed, ‘They give you just enough food to keep you 
alive. They keep you in a dark room so you don’t even know when it’s light or day.’ I 
inquired whether they were prevented from sleeping during the time spent under 
interrogation. Rafi replied, ‘They beat you so much, you can’t help but sleep.’ 
Many of these reports of abuse come from or are about youths. However, equally 
victimized are perceived to be the innocent Kashmiris living along the LoC who suffer not 
from preventive detainment or disappearances, but from cross-border shelling between 
India and Pakistan. I did not spend enough time in Kashmir, nor would I have been 
permitted to enter the border region, to gain a significant sample of interviews with the 
rural residents of IAK. I did, however, have the opportunity to speak with one. I met Nazir 
Ahmed at the Bemina Rehabilitation Centre outside Srinagar in Kashmir. After a tour of 
the spinal injury unit where one woman attends due to a bullet injury, my translator and I 
were led to the limb replacement facility. Nazir Ahmed, a labourer from Churanda near 
the LoC who lost his right leg from the knee down because it had to be amputated due to 
sustaining injuries from cross-border shelling. He was simply in the area, he claimed, 
when he was shot from the Pakistani side in 2000. Finally, in 2013, he was to be fitted 
with an artificial limb. It was a very happy day for him, but there would be no compensation 
or reparations for his suffering, loss of limb and stable employment from Pakistan or India. 
It was the international Red Cross that sponsored his artificial limb after thirteen years 
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without. In the conversation with him with the help of a translator, I discovered that his 
area near the border, a sparsely populated mountainous region of only around 230 
people or so – nearly 20-30 people have also suffered loss of limb and a similar number 
of people have lost their lives over the years due to cross-border shelling between 
Pakistan and Indian forces. It is his hope that a permanent solution for Jammu and 
Kashmir would end this. As for any political preferences, he is a ‘simple man’ and has ‘no 
such political leanings.’  
 Nazir confirms that for people living in rural communities, especially those so 
close to the LoC, they are not so concerned with the political, territorial resolutions of the 
Pakistan-Indian conflict, but wish that they can carry out their lives unhindered by the 
conflict, where one stray bullet can mean life or death, or loss of limb and livelihood. 
Although Nazir is not an activist and his recollection of personal experiences seem just 
as likely to be exploited by social movement entrepreneurs or shared in activist circles, 
stories such as these are rarely shared. Access to more remote and rural areas, 
especially those close to the LoC are highly restricted. For the time being, I can only 
hypothesise that there are many other stories similar to Nazir’s that could serve to better 
understand how the conflict affects lower classes and rural communities who are often 
left underrepresented in activist circles. 
 
Practical Implication of living under occupation  
 
Earlier in the meeting with the Rafi and Farooq, the senior journalist, Abdul, refers 
specifically to the PSA and AFSPA as being abused by security forces and as the ultimate 
cause for so many unwarranted arrests during the protests of 2008 (against land transfer) 
and the summer protests of 2010 and 2011. Abdul, like many other advocates, uses 
numbers to illustrate the severity of the situation: ‘There were huge protests…they 
suppressed them heavy-handed…110 youths were killed [in 2010]…the second aspect 
is that 7-10,000 – ‘officially’ 4000 behind bars.’ Abdul further contextualizes the impact of 
these arrests by saying that the youths’ lives are ‘shattered’ since they cannot join 
government services or seek permission to travel. Many of the youths, he explains, have 
their passports taken away and they are not permitted to work in the government sector. 
The latter is particularly important since the government sector jobs are the most lucrative 
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for college graduates and offer the most reliability since government employees are paid 
regardless of whether there is a curfew or strike in Kashmir, a frequent occurrence and 
the bane of private industry in the state. 
 My friend and contact in Kashmir, Sharif, highlighted this aspect when he 
portrayed his commute to work. He worked in a university in another part of Kashmir to 
his home and he claimed that if he left work late, he would be stopped at a checkpoint 
and not be allowed to enter his home district. I had also referred to him previously as 
jesting about opening a McDonald’s in Kashmir. He maintained that if it weren’t for the 
curfews and strikes, investments such as fast food franchises would be a good idea. It 
was not possible under occupation.  
 Private business and everyday livelihoods suffered due to life under occupation. 
Obtaining a passport in Kashmir can have a myriad of obstacles, as Abdul mentioned 
The problem is so pervasive that it was subject of the documentary by Ashvin Kumar 
Inshallah Football (2010). The main character of the documentary is a young football 
(soccer) player who is accepted to train at a prestigious academy in Brazil. He is barred 
from obtaining a passport, however, because his father was a former militant. After much 
lobbying, the student is eventually permitted to travel. The film also reflects upon the 
youth’s father, who had rejected militancy and was now a successful entrepreneur in 
Kashmir. Without having the option to obtain government employment, he had to enter 
the private market and against difficult odds, he managed to be successful. Both of these 
facets were reported by Abdul, the journalist I spoke with in IAK. He suggested that 
issuing passports and restoring the right to take government employment in Kashmir 
were key issues which could be addressed to alleviate some of the suffering young 




Discourse from activists involved in Kashmir’s freedom movement alternate between 
narratives of victimhood, survival, and resistance. The framing changes as well from 
praise for non-violent forms of resistance to praise for more disruptive and violent forms 
of resistance. The roles of those who resist in the Kashmir freedom narrative is complex 
and fluid, subject to emerging events and individual actors’ and subsidiary groups’ 
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perceptions of the actions taken in relation to emerging events. The somewhat circular 
narrative usually begins with accusations of widespread and systematic torture by Indian 
security forces, encapsulated in the well-distributed report, Alleged Perpetrators (Imroz 
et al, 2012). A post on Kashmir Solidarity Movement Scotland’s Facebook page dated 15 
December 2012 reads: 
 
‘JAMMU and KASHMIR: Leading human rights groups release new report 
examining 214 cases of human rights violations and, for the first time, the role of 
500 alleged perpetrators in these crimes…Cases presented in this report reveal 
that there is a policy not to genuinely investigate or prosecute the armed forces for 
human rights violations…. On the contrary, alleged perpetrators of crimes are 
awarded, rewarded and promoted by the State.’23 
Reports such as Alleged Perpetrators (2012) and documentaries such ‘Kashmir’s Trails 
of Torture’ (2012) serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the communal, social suffering of 
Kashmiris as well as to highlight this suffering in an appeal to gain sympathizers with the 
victimized Kashmiri. In social movement studies, this is more generally conceived of as 
a sort of framing process – here the human rights frame. But digging deeper into the 
development of the human rights frame, we can identify the more abstract constructions 
of the trauma experienced that leads to victimization. This then must lead to the 
mobilization of a popular movement to construct an appeal for resisting the victimization. 
Without broad appeal, there would be no acknowledgment of the oppressed peoples. The 
human rights frame offers a ready conduit with which to make suffering known to a wider 
public.  
 
            One way to elevate the human rights of a community is to portray the community 
as suffering as a whole. Fassin and Rechtman (2009) purport that trauma should be 
understood both in the ‘restricted sense’ as it is widely used in the mental health field as 
well as its ‘more widespread, popular usage (an open wound in the collective memory)…’ 
(2). Trauma can be experienced as an individual or as a nation; as a psychological shock 
or as a tragic event widely covered in the media (ibid.). The authors survey the experience 
of trauma in contemporary settings ranging from psychological debriefings in local 
 
23  The quote additionally provides a link to the article for their readers to access easily: ‘Alleged 




settings such as industrial accidents, hostage situations, and incidences of school 
violence to trauma experienced more collectively through natural disasters or significant 
terror attacks such as 9/11. Fassin and Rechtman explore how a community of people 
can come to perceive their people as victimized, rather than just their person: 
‘The slave, the colonized, the subjugated, the oppressed, the survivor, the accident 
victim, the refugee – these are concrete images of the vanquished whose history, 
far from disappearing along with their experience of defeat and misfortune, is reborn 
in the memory of subsequent generations’ (2009:16). 
 
Collective remembrance happens gradually, though academic and perhaps more so 
through survivors’ accounts as was the case for addressing the trauma of the Holocaust. 
The authors assert the Holocaust has become somewhat of a paradigm for collective 
trauma. To summarize, the Holocaust acts as a representation of extreme violence 
followed by a period of silence which is commonplace after traumatic experience. The 
link between the collective and the individual is the heart of the politics of trauma: ‘the 
collective event supplies the substance of the trauma which will be articulated in individual 
experience; in return, individual suffering bears witness to the traumatic aspect of the 
collective trauma’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009: 18). A testament to the greyness of 
victimhood, collective trauma is referenced for both the people of Israel as well as the 
people of Palestine, who have undergone prolonged exposure to conflict, and as many 
would argue, occupation by the Israeli people. In addition to receiving medical supplies 
by INGOs such as Doctors without Borders, there is regular and often quickly deployed 
psychological counselling or debriefing, which the authors imply is a reaction to traumatic 
events in Paris as much as in the West Bank. These experiences of psychological trauma 
and the reactions to traumatic events permit for the empathizing of one community for 
another, as there is a connection made between traumatic events experienced on an 
individual level and traumatic events experienced on a collective level. Fassin and 
Rechtman (2009) assert that there is a connection between culture and psyche, arguing 
that ‘the collective event supplies the substance of the trauma which will be articulated in 
individual experience; in return, individual suffering bears witness to the traumatic aspect 
of the collective trauma’ (18).  
 
          Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), often referenced in handouts and 
documentaries on Kashmir, assist in framing the Kashmir experience of trauma as 
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collective experiences. The PTSD classification, adopted in 1980 by the American 
Psychiatric Association includes a wide range of symptoms which were previously 
referred to as ‘shell shock, combat stress, delayed stress syndrome, and traumatic 
neurosis, and referred to responses in both human and natural catastrophes’ (Caruth, 
1995: 3). The broad adoption of circumstances and lack of precise definition point to the 
limits of the field surrounding trauma. Despite these difficulties, Caruth does offer a 
description of PTSD which is generally agreed upon:  
‘there is a response, sometimes delayed, to an overwhelming event or events, 
which takes the form of repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts or 
behaviors stemming from the event, along with numbing that may have begun 
during or after the experience, and possibly also increased arousal to (and 
avoidance of) stimuli recalling the event’ (1995: 4). 
 
Although acknowledging these generalities, Caruth also attempts to veer from the notion 
that trauma is mere repression of memory, but that it is a temporal delay in the experience 
of the event, permitting for the survival of the traumatic experience (1995: 10). The 
immediate act of survival of the trauma permits for the bearing witness of the trauma. 
Caruth reflects upon the survivors of one catastrophe addressing survivors of a 
catastrophe of another culture, such as survivors of the Holocaust or of the bombings of 
Hiroshima. She claims that this ‘speaking and this listening…from the site of trauma does 
not rely…on what we simply know of each other, but on what we don’t yet know of our 
own traumatic pasts’ (1995: 11) She continues by claiming that: ‘In a catastrophic 
age…trauma itself may provide the very link between cultures: not as a simple 
understanding of the pasts of others but rather, within the traumas of contemporary 
history…’ (ibid.). It is with these connections that individual and collective histories of 
trauma are understood and may be reflected upon in contexts that extend beyond a 
narrowly defined conception of trauma. The bearing of witness and the listening to 
survivor testimonies permit for the empathy of others. Within the context of a transnational 
movement, the dissemination of testimony can be more efficient. I would argue that this 
dissemination, especially from one perceived trauma survivor to another – as in the 
Palestinian or Kurdish activist to the Kashmiri activist – assist in not only gaining 





             Public reaction to traumatic events can be a source of solidarity among disparate 
organizations and causes. However, there needs to be public acceptance that the 
wrongdoing is actually something that we ought to care about. Herman’s Trauma and 
Recovery: From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (2001) examines the similar 
dimensions between domestic and sexual abuse and the trauma experienced by war 
combatants. She traces the development of studies on trauma to Freudian 
psychoanalysis and other European studies on ‘hysteria,’ deemed to be a ‘female’ 
problem in the 19th century. Herman argues that as there was no popular women’s rights 
movement until later on, findings on links between sexual abuse and PTSD were 
disregarded. Later, during the First World War, trauma and PTSD studies were revisited 
in the context of war combatants who suffered from what was called at the time ‘shell 
shock.’ Again, trauma was seen as a feminine experienced, one that perhaps 
emasculated the male. As there was a will to publicly study the experience of trauma and 
what would become known later as PTSD, it was able to be accepted by the academic 
and medical communities, rather than tucked away. It is suggestive, and I would purport 
that the examination of the male suffering from trauma was taken more seriously during 
the very public war than female trauma, which was confined to a much more private 
sphere. As Herman asserts, it was not until women’s suffering became much better 
known in the public sphere during the 1970s women’s liberation movement that the 
relation between sexual trauma and PTSD could finally begin to be explored in earnest. 
She further asserts that ‘the study of psychological trauma is an inherently political 
enterprise because it calls attention to the experience of oppressed people’ (Herman, 
2001: 237).  
Social movements relying on the public engaging with victims of trauma, I purport, 
can permit for the adoption of the human rights frame. The identification of those suffering 
from trauma, whether men drafted to fight a war or women who have been sexually 
abused can all be perceived as oppressed people. But acknowledgement of the suffering 
of people does not automatically equate to public engagement or mobilization. Again, 
referencing Herman, the mobilization of people in promotion of the elevation of oppressed 
peoples is linked to a ‘global political movement for human rights [which] could ultimately 
sustain our ability to speak about unspeakable things’ (Herman, 2001:237). The question 
that arises for outsiders to a conflict for those bearing witness is whether they will side 
with the victim or the perpetrator. This is not a matter of not sympathizing with victim 
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testimony, but a refusal to speak on behalf of the victim. ‘It is very tempting to take the 
side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing…The 
victim, on the contrary, asks the bystanders to share the burden of pain. The victim 
demands action, engagement, and remembering’ (ibid.: 7). If there is an absence of a 
lapse in bearing witness, this will inevitably lead to forgetting.  
 Kleinman et. al.(1997) also address historic memories of suffering. On the South 
Asian subcontinent in particular, historic memories of collective suffering are shared 
traumatic experiences of the partition. Collective memories of partition have been 
enshrined in popular movies, arts, and literature but only in the last few decades, purports 
the authors, memories of historic suffering become of interest in the social sciences. The 
horrors of partition cannot easily escape historical memory. A conservative estimate of a 
quarter of a million people died as a result of partition-related violence and a further 
estimation by the Indian Constituent Assembly of 33,000 Hindu or Sikh women abducted 
by Muslims and an estimation from Pakistan of 50,000 Muslim women abducted by Hindu 
or Sikh men (Kleinman et. al.,1997: xv).24 The resultant violence of partition has led to 
nationalistic historical readings by Pakistan and India which read like story narratives 
complete with heroes, villains, and a plot (Bannerjee, 1998). Rather than an interpretation 
of South Asians suffering from the subjugation of British colonialism which could have a 
solidaristic effect, the interpretations were of communal suffering of Muslims and Hindus; 
Pakistanis and Indians.25 In a strategic effort, communal suffering could be exploited for 
political gain. In another context, recognition of victimhood can be exploited for 
mobilization and for garnering support for a cause. As Kleinman and Kleinman discuss in 
a deliberation on the moral ambiguities of the role of the photojournalist capturing images 
of famine in the Sudan, the issue of sympathy can be a double-edged debate whereby 
lack of ability to care for oneself may increase the ability to gain moral and financial 
assistance, but may also be a denouncement of a victim’s agency. Self-labelled 
victimhood is a contentious tactic. On the one hand, to label oneself as a victim threatens 
 
24 This may be a low estimate. Elsewhere, Veena Das cites as an early estimate of abducted 
women from both sides of the new borders as ‘close to one hundred thousand’ (1997: 67) 
25 Although time and space constraints do not permit for further analysing thus thread, the ways that the 
creation stories of India and Pakistan have been exploited and framed to produce pro-India and pro-
Pakistan narratives through histories favouring the subsequent nations. An example of this is Krishna 
Kumar’s (2002) Prejudice and Pride, which shows how either nation permanently sowed the seed of 
hostility through narrative constructions. 
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to endanger one’s agency. On the other hand, labelling oneself as a victim can be 
perceived as a strategic political tool for evading blame. ‘Victimhood can be a prime way 
of suspending or attempting to suspend the political through an appeal to something non-
agentive and “beyond” or “before” politics, such as poverty or suffering…’ (Jeffery and 
Candea, 2006: 289). For political entrepreneurs or for those activists trying to increase 
international awareness of their cause, there is a difficult balancing act between gaining 
sympathy while retaining dignity. 
Victims and perpetrators may be contentious and mutable categories and were 
particularly blurred during the early 2000s. However, as the insurgency waned, it made it 
much easier to perceive the Kashmir people as the victims. They were the victims of 
militants, the victims of Indian and Pakistani posturing, the victims of security forces, and 
even the victims of media portrayal of Kashmiris as extremists. Fassin and Rechtman’s 
processes of addressing communal trauma is a first step in the process of mobilizing a 
community of victims. Recognition of the victimized community as legitimate and bearing 
witness provides for a sustainable movement, assuming that such a movement may be 
deemed ‘acceptable’ and in a context which resonates with larger movements. The 
human rights frame provides just the context necessary for outside activists to find 
resonance with victimized, inside actors.   
 
Framing of Legal Advocacy 
 
The adoption of frames of social movements on the grounds of human rights and other 
progressive, universalist values have been adopted by many of the world’s nation-states 
and is enshrined in national legal documents as well as international legislation. One of 
the most important documents for relating the rights of one’s nation to the universalist 
conception of human rights is the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights as 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (un.org). This 
document has been adopted by most of the countries in the world. However, the 
signatories to the declaration have adopted sections piecemeal. On the one hand, the 
document is often referenced in conjunction with international norms of rights for all 
people in the world but is limited in the interpretations of individual nation-states. As an 
example, the article forbidding torture was not ratified by states as different as the United 
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States and India; and, this continues to be a hotly debated topic today. It is, however, 
referenced as the norm even if individual states have not adopted this particular article. 
Just as international legal documents are referenced when framing arguments opposing 
torture, illegal detention, and other crimes as violations of human rights, national 
documents, bills, and articles have been referenced in order to bolster the argument of 
the legal advocate and the social movement entrepreneur alike.  
Martha Davis (2011) sheds some light on how legal representation of public 
interest groups translate activist discourse into legal discourse; and, how this legal 
framing is adopted and adapted by activists in everyday parlance. Legal framing of issues 
such as welfare and poverty are rather salient in western democracies, especially the 
United States. Davis notes how the framing of welfare, for instance, ranges from 
‘government entitlement’ to ‘handouts’ and how these frames are reflected in not only 
public opinion on the matter, but in ‘litigation strategies, complaints, briefs, and judicial 
opinions’ (2011: 365). A legal advocate can become an invaluable and ad hoc 
spokesperson for a social movement, adding a sense of legitimacy and offering a 
professional avenue for influencing opinions. ‘Sometimes deliberately and sometimes 
unintentionally,’ she reports:  
‘lawyers have played a role in the framing processes of social movements. These 
processes are the means by which movements set boundaries and construct 
shared understandings concerning their methods, visions, and goals’ (Davis, 2011: 
363).  
The contribution lawyers can make to social movements is an invaluable resource for not 
only progressive litigation tactics, but because it allows them to engage more directly with 
social movement groups, relating ‘clientele’ experiences to broader, transnational norms 
of human rights. Human rights provide a strong platform within which to mobilize whether 
located in the global north or the global south and can provide strong transnational 
mobilization linkages between movements.  
 Recurring themes in discourse stemming from minority communities in South Asia 
surround democratization and rights to representation. Dalit communities have mobilized 
in protests but have also focused efforts to gain direct access to Parliamentary processes. 
From in-group activists, there may be more abstract concepts to mobilize such as dignity 
and closure from past transgressions against members of their communities. But for 
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reaching outward to transnational communities, there may be a greater sense of urgency 
to frame their movement in terms of human rights. Such cases of movements grabbing 
international attention are those such as the Dalit movements in India. Dalit, stemming 
from the Marathi term to refer to the ‘oppressed or downtrodden’ have mobilised in 
support of forcing the government of India into implementation of democracy to all 
peoples. Hugo Gorringe (2005) found that there were over being 70 different Dalit factions 
across the state. However, some common themes seemed to emerge from his research 
than could have led to an increase in solidarity among various factions. One was the 
theme of dignity. As Gorringe reports, many of the activists he worked with claimed that 
their struggle was ‘vital to establishing their dignity as human beings’ and further that 
society could only be liberated through Dalit equality (2005: 114).  
How a lack of dignity as perceived to be a local grievance translates into the more 
universalist ‘human right’ is a topic Bob Clifford (2007) visits. Although it is pointed out 
that Dalit concerns have become internationally recognized as an international human 
rights concern by the late 1990s, it was previously not treated as a human rights issue by 
the United Nations or other NGOs (Clifford, 2007: 168). Clifford purports that one of the 
leading causes for internationalization of the caste issue was the growing number of Dalit 
civil society activists that were located not just within South Asia but also abroad. Initially, 
their successes were rather limited, but these advocates certainly did get the 
conversation started in international organizations and arguing the international 
significance of local discrimination at international conferences and fora. Clifford argues 
that it was a Human Rights Watch report written by Smita Narula, a Harvard-educated 
lawyer, that had the biggest initial impact which led to sustained domestic and 
international mobilisation against Dalit oppression (2007: 178). The Human Rights Watch 
report, Broken People: Caste violence against India’s “Untouchables” (1999) outlined the 
subjugation of the Dalits and purported that much of the abuse by higher-caste groups 
and police was sanctioned or ignored by the state. The publishing of the report 
precipitated more grant funding, resulting in the capacity for more international advocacy 
and lobbying of the UN as well as the Indian government to amend international 
declarations and the national constitution to reflect legal recognition of caste-based 
discrimination. As this example illustrates, legal advocacy offers a bridge for domestic 
activists to reach an international audience, often with reference to more universalist 
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language which may not always be expressed in such terms prior to the 
transnationalisation of a movement.  
The foremost goal of KSM has been raising awareness about the suffering of 
Kashmiris. In raising awareness of the suffering of Kashmiris, victims’ experiences are 
highlighted and present as human rights abuses. Universal discourse that is shared with 
global solidarity and rights movements is used in order to present the injustices in terms 
that are easily grasped by a broad range of interested constituents. This is a framing 
process that describes the condition of Kashmiris through diagnostic and prognostic 
framing techniques which permit for the victimization of Kashmiris and the vilification of 
India, especially Indian security forces stationed in IAK. The way issued are framed are 
often reactionary to events and events are often utilized as a means to support 
sympathizers and the Kashmir diaspora to mobilise. After an event is framed in a 
particular way to mobilize, more specific actions may be called for. This may involve 
campaigns and strategies drawn from a transnational protest repertoire that may be 
familiar to a broad range of activists and may involve: 
• Letter writing or sending of postcards to government representatives, officials, or agencies 
• Picketing in front of government buildings and offices 
• Shouting slogans, reciting poetry, singing or playing protest songs 
• Public demonstrations or marches, often accompanied by speeches and placards 
• Public art or photo exhibitions or publicly located graffiti (often in English) 
• Social media campaigns such as ‘Twitter Storms’ or online petition distribution 
 
The call to action is again often framed in a universal discourse of justice and rights and 
draws in a variety of supporters from a cross-section of affiliations and campaigns. The 
interactions between insider and outsider activists redefine the Kashmir freedom 
movement, including redefining contemporary Kashmiri culture through the lens of rights, 
justice, and resistance. The emphasis on resistance takes on new meanings as not only 
resisting a perceived Indian occupation, but the perception of oppression from some 
traditions which may be perceived to be out-dated. Of special note is the women’s 
resistance, which expresses itself not only as a resistance to Indian occupation but as 
resistance to patriarchy. To essentialize here, resistance is the answer to reclaiming 




Plebiscite and Right to Self-Determination  
 
One of the most common themes across all samples of interviews and re-visited during 
meetings are the right to self-determination as a human right which is commonly 
referenced in international forums such as the United Nations and repeated by activists 
for self-determination of Kashmir, Tibet, Palestine, Scotland, and others. The most 
common terminology used in Edinburgh in 2012-2013 and highlighted in interviews was 
the term ‘plebiscite,’ which has been commonly used in activist literature on Kashmir, in 
academic literature and encapsulated by the Plebiscite Front, one of the first well-
organized non-violent attempts to lobby for the implementation of the UN mandate for a 
plebiscite. All Kashmiris are familiar with the UN mandate for a plebiscite and regularly 
breach this as evidence of right to self-determination and hotly contend that India has 
been denying Kashmir’s rights through not implementing the plebiscite. Since 2014, it 
has become much more common to refer to the plebiscite as a referendum – the same 
discourse used to describe the legislation which would see Scottish become independent. 
The referendum, which took place but did not pass in September 2014 was and continues 
to be used as exemplary evidence of how to democratically resolve long-standing 
territorial issues. As a small sample of the shift in usage, the term ‘referendum’ was more 
widely used across all samples (interviews, events, and workshops), however, the term 
‘plebiscite’ was more frequently used at events with older activists with some ties to the 
JKLF. Students and youths had much more of a preference to use the term ‘referendum.’ 
This could be because it was used more often in the UK and the term ‘plebiscite’ could 
have seemed to be more antiquated; or, it could be a way to consciously relate the 
Kashmir freedom movement to Scotland’s movement for separation from the United 
Kingdom. Richard, an organizer for SACC, regularly collaborates with minority 
communities in Scotland, and addresses the recent call for a referendum in Scotland and 
its relevance to Kashmir. He claims that campaigning ‘in and around the referendum in 
Scotland became such a strong focus for political activity…’ and that ‘KSM made the 
point that Scotland has had their referendum and India has systematically over 60 years 
refused a referendum for Kashmir.’ Although Richard acknowledges that Scotland has 
not been under the same sort of oppression found in Kashmir by India rule, he does 
emphasize that it brings the opportunity for campaigning around the issue.  
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            The key distinctions between the campaign for an independent Scotland and the 
campaign for an independent Kashmir, or Tibet, or Palestine, is the perception of the 
residents of the latter territories to be under occupation. The presence of a large force of 
armed personnel makes on the streets of Kashmir, the presence and nuisance of 
checkpoints and curfews, makes for a compelling case for independence. The logic is 
generally that Kashmiris cannot experience freedom or enjoy democratic rights under 
such imperilled living conditions.  
 
Intersectional motivations for supporting azadi 
 
The first chapter of this thesis examines how competing narratives regarding the azadi 
movement have led to the case that the azadi movement may have prior to 2008 been 
perceived as more based on identitarian claims than on human rights and justice claims. 
I further this thread in chapter five by examining ethnic, national, cultural, religious, and 
solidarity identities. These identities overlap, and indeed I made the argument that for the 
purposes of transnational mobilisation, it may be a solidarity or a new cultural identity that 
may emerge as more salient than individual identities. Indeed, collective mobilisation 
means that one must find solidarity in a cause or campaign that supersedes (or is not 
indirect conflict) with individual identities. This does not mean, however, that ethnic, 
national, religious, or other individual identities do not have an influence on decisions to 
support or oppose a movement. Identities are fluid, complex and there is never an easy 
way to measure the impact of individual identities. I will do my best in this section, 
however, to discuss some of the findings of this project regarding the impact of these 
individual identities to support group, or collective identities.  
 
A Resistance Identity 
 
One of the events held by KSM Edinburgh that was mentioned in chapter three was called 
‘Cultures of Resistance,’ which showcased Kashmir poetry, Sufi dancing, songs of 
resistance, and also had a speaker which discussed Palestinian resistance. Resistance, 
for Kashmir, Palestine, Tibet, and other societies often represented at these events has 
become a part of one’s culture – just as traditional dance or literature. Photo exhibitions 
and protest art and cartoons are regularly featured at events and displayed on social 
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media platforms. SOAS even hosts a ‘cultures of resistance’ scholarship for foreign 
students to come study in the UK, with Kashmir a ‘high priority country,’ (KSM SOAS 
Facebook). There is a sense of camaraderie with students supporting other self-
determination movements on campus, with Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) at the 
University of Edinburgh and the Palestinian Society at SOAS providing moral and 
technical support in addition to offering a reliable pool of like-minded, sympathetic 
participants to the other groups.  
 As Dibyesh Anand, a University of Westminster academic put it, he came to 
Kashmir ‘via Tibet.’ As academics or journalists may come to find linkages between case 
studies, activists easily find connections between campaigns. Several of the committee 
members of KSM Edinburgh also held committee positions in other societies. Aside from 
Isoc, the most referenced societies were the ones related to ‘cultures of resistance,’ most 
notably the Palestinian societies. There were frequently held joint events at both sites for 
Palestine and Kashmir, and it could be argued that the Palestinian cause is perhaps the 
most influential cause on the contemporary freedom movement. It can be further argued 
that the desire to bring in an international audience is due to the popularity that the 
Palestinian movement enjoys abroad, which brings international attention. During 
presentations the comparison between Kashmir and Palestine is often made.  
Zeeshan, who is represented in the chapter already on KSM SOAS and others 
like him, recount their traumatic experiences and will often compare them to Palestine. 
Although they recognize the trauma that those in Palestine may face, there is a sense of 
indignation at the apparent ignorance of Kashmir trauma. When asked why he attends 
KSM events, it leads back to not just his personal suffering, but the purported fact that 
the suffering of Kashmiris goes unannounced.  
‘…mostly people they know about the [Kashmir] issue, but nowadays there are 
different issues about world so our voice is still in bottom now. In Afghanistan, there 
is a war they didn’t lose as many people (as us Kashmiris). We lost almost 6000 
people in this period if you compare us with Palestine, we lost more life. Second, I 
am Kashmiri, I am a victim that’s why I try to go everywhere and hope people will 
talk about us. 
In this sense, the international reach of the Palestinian freedom movement is something 
that Kashmiri freedom activists hope to emulate. Raising awareness about the suffering 
of the Kashmiri people goes hand-in-hand with gaining advances towards a resolution of 
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Kashmir. If people know what is going on there, they will be moved and want to take 
action, just like those active on Palestinian campaigns. It also acts as a sort of protection 
or buffer for Kashmiri activists. One presenter who suggested that Kashmir didn’t have 
enough international attention claimed that ‘one stone in Palestine can’t be moved without 
the world hearing about it.’ Despite the seeming apprehension here, I did not get the 
overall sense that people were upset with Palestinian activists. They simply seemed 
apprehensive that they were getting more attention than Kashmir suffering. They also 
saw the Palestine movements such as SJP at Edinburgh as opportunities for solidarity. 
The two campaigns could benefit and support one another. 
 Almost as a means of explicitly stating the solidarity among cultures of resistance, 
SOAS formed a consortium group duly named ‘Oppressed Peoples in Solidarity.’ As 
labelled on their Facebook page, the group is ‘A committee made up of representatives 
of SOAS Tamil, Kurdish, Palestinian Societies, and the KSM, working together to build 
bridges and unite’ (2015). The Facebook group appeared to only hold one explicitly joint 
function, which was collecting donations for refugees stranded in Calais; but, it has 
shared major events of the other societies in the consortium in addition to publicizing 
ongoing developments through sharing articles and re-posts. This then brings this 
analysis to the next point on sharing a sense of solidarity based on being a perceived 
minority or other subjugated group. 
An ’Other’ Identity 
 
Kashmiris whom I interviewed had no reluctance to attesting to being drawn to the KSM 
or being prompted to start a new KSM group because they are Kashmiri. One of the 
questions I asked in my interviews was ‘How much influence is you’re being 
Kashmiri/South Asian on your decision to attend?’ The response was mostly as 
anticipated – Kashmiris were absolutely motivated to participate due to them identifying 
as Kashmiri. One respondent from KSM SOAS responded: 
‘Of course it will impact! That’s why we started the society. It’s a personal case, a 
personal thing. We want to tell people the story of your life and want to raise 
awareness of Kashmir. No one can do that better than themselves.’ 
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As many of my respondents from KSM SOAS were themselves Kashmiris, this response 
was echoed by other respondents. Another member of KSM SOAS responded similarly:  
‘[Being] Kashmiri has a lot of influence, especially in the UK, a lot of people don’t 
know about Kashmir so it fuels my motivation to change it. I think being Kashmiri 
has everything to do with it. With a lot of other conflict around world so similar to 
Kashmir has a lot of engagement with no personal reason to, but a lot of people 
that are involved (in Kashmir) are Kashmiris themselves. 
 
For ‘Sami,’ being Kashmiri also has a major impact in getting involved in the society. Sami 
also addresses an underlying issue, that other conflicts similar to Kashmir have ‘a lot of 
engagement with no personal reason to.’ When I probed further, again Sami uses 
Palestine as an example of a cause people are involved in but have no affiliation to.  
 Other responses to the question of how much influence being Kashmir has had 
on wanting to attend events or become involved in the society were along similar lines. If 
they were Kashmir, this was definitely a reason, but they also expressed an interest in 
other people unaffiliated directly to Kashmir to become involved in a show of solidarity. 
There were not so many active Kashmiris abroad that they could sustain a movement or 
have impact without non-Kashmiris knowing about the Kashmir conflict. For many 
Kashmiris, it was their duty to inform them.  
 This brings this discussion to the strategy of how to gain support from non-
Kashmiris for a Kashmiri cause. The notion of an ‘other’ identity has been addressed at 
various times throughout this thesis. I first drew attention to this in the introduction on 
social movements and reflect upon pre and post partition mobilization in response to 
being treated as a subaltern vis-à-vis Dogra. The subaltern status of Kashmiris are again 
brought up in relation to Indians in the Quit Kashmir and Plebiscite Movements and 
continue to be a rallying point in response to election interference which led to massive 
protests in 1989. Being a subjugated minority explains, at least in part, motivations for 
joining the militancy in the 1990s, but also explains the call to militancy today for 
disaffected youths such as Wani. Being a subaltern is a facet of emergent identities in 
the new Kashmiri freedom movement and it is reflected in master frames which make a 
connection between minority subjugation and mobilizing for human rights in Kashmir. In 
the discussions on legal advocacy, it becomes clear that the rule of law does not apply 
to all Indian citizens equally. So long as PSA and AFSPA remain, they give legal impunity 
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to those security officers who abuse their powers and attack innocents. Young boys and 
girls as well as older men and women have been subjected to torture and rape and 
Kashmiris suffer PTSD at alarming rates along with scars and blindness from pellet guns.  
 Chapter five shows how Kashmir suffering can be related to other peoples’ 
suffering and how this has the capacity to become a mutual rallying point for mobilization. 
Kashmiris suffer as do Palestinians and Tibetans, for example as oppressed and 
occupied peoples. But further, we see solidarity around minority. Kashmir Students UK, 
for example, posted regarding issues of minority underrepresentation in UK universities, 
asking ‘Why is my professor not black?’ Asian youths in the UK have a history of standing 
in solidarity with one another, but also with blacks as well, in a common effort to fight 
racism in the country. Similarly, Kashmiris as Muslims have come together with other 
Muslims in the UK to fight ‘anti-terror’ legislation such as Prevent which unfairly targets 
adherents of Islam. Islam was not a significant reason for one Christian respondent who 
I interviewed, however, who attended KSM meetings because his grandparents were 
targeted for being Christian in Hindu India.  
 Having an identity as an ‘other’ is an important, and I will argue more important 
signifier of wanting to support another movement whereby its adherents also identify 
themselves as ‘others.’ Ethnic and other traditional identity markers may impact one’s 
influence to participate, but they do not sustain the movement. The movement must be 
sustained through those framing tactics explored previously. Frame alignment tactics, 
explored in the introduction of this thesis is a tactic used inevitably for drawing in a wider, 
more diverse spectrum of activists that can further your own cause. This, thus defines the 




Transnational legal advocacy and activism serve as the link to bridge the gap between 
those who mobilize because they believe themselves to be oppressed and those who 
mobilize on behalf of the oppressed. The adoption of frames of social movements on the 
grounds of human rights and other progressive values have been adopted by many of 
the world’s nation-states and is enshrined in national and international legislation. Even 
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where not adopted entirely, they are referenced as international norms. These 
international standards of rights are then used by legal advocates and activists when 
framing arguments opposing torture, illegal detention, and other crimes as violations of 
human rights. Somewhat generalising, advocacy can assist in the portrayal of human 
rights abuses in Kashmir by Indian security forces. Attributing blame to Indian security 
forces permits for the prognosis of the problem being Indian occupation of Kashmir. The 
general solution is independence from India. Although the motivations for wanting an 
independent Kashmir may differ somewhat between immediate stakeholders and out-
group activists, the framing of abuses in Kashmir in this manner lead many to conclude 
that azadi for Kashmir is the logical conclusion.  
 So many people from so many different backgrounds are interested in a free 
Kashmir. This is not based on identity affiliation to the Kashmir conflict in all cases, but is 
based on some other overarching identity, In this chapter, I proposed that an framing the 
Kashmir conflict in terms of human rights and specifically utilizing injustice and 
victimization frames permits for the mobilisation of those in affiliated campaigns. Some 
campaigns that also may be viewed as affiliated may be for a free Palestine of Tibet, but 
other this logic has the capacity to extend to other liberation movements and movements 
against patriarchy. Framing protests, stone throwing, or simply being outspoken against 
Indian occupation can lead to an identity of resistance that serves both to reclaim agency 
for the victimized Kashmiri but also to bind other campaigns together. Kashmiris may feel 
an obligation to participate of start KSM societies, but they see their cause as a fight 
anyone can join in. They spend a lot of time earnestly trying to educate people about the 
Kashmir conflict and the suffering of Kashmiris. They do well to compare their movement 
to others and will align and support other resistance movements. As a consequence of 
this, a sort of ‘other’ identity emerges for the Kashmiri freedom activist. Kashmiris may 
see themselves as subjugated and oppressed minorities and may also be in support of 
other minority movements. An ‘other’ identity, that of a subaltern or minority is a powerful 
means of presenting kinship among those that would otherwise not be perceived as kin 
biologically or ethnically. This has the ability to bond movements such as black rights with 
the rights of Kashmiris. KSM has honed this relationship through participation in Black 
History Month and other campaigns aimed at ending discrimination of ethnic or religious 
minorities. These strategies, in turn, facilitate the reaching out to a greater international 
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audience, but also permits for the resonating of frames from one movement or campaign 




























This thesis has explored the transnational Kashmir freedom movement from the 
perspective of activists living abroad. These activists, some of them self-defining as 
Kashmiri, and others not, are raising awareness for the Kashmir conflict and its human 
toll, with particular focus on the human rights abuses that have been documented as 
occurring on the Indian side of the Line of Control. These activists have collaborated with 
other campaigns and stood in solidarity with other movements for similarly aligned causes 
such as the Palestinian case for self-determination. For freedom activists, they do not 
perceive themselves as leading a separatist movement from India, but rather a self-
determination movement based on human rights. In order to distance themselves from 
previous literature on Kashmir asserting that their movement is identitarian-based, or 
from Indian media that the freedom movement is similarly based on ethnic, national, or 
religious identities of Kashmiris, have framed their movement in terms of human rights. 
This thesis has explored how Kashmiri freedom activists have framed their movement 
through engagement with Kashmir Solidarity Movement (KSM) in Edinburgh and in 
London. This thesis also draws from interviews held in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) 
and from social media sources affiliated with the KSM students’ campaigns in the UK and 
in examining promotional documents for the groups. Using KSM as a case study, I have 
come to some conclusions about the nature of the new Kashmiri freedom movement and 
how transnational solidarities can further the freedom and justice cause in Kashmir.  
 Despite the appearance of nonviolent protest tactics and social movement 
organization and transnational campaigning since the 1930s at least, Kashmir’s azadi 
movement has been marred by the perception of being a movement based on identitarian 
claims. Kashmir activists who struggle for freedom are pitted against oppression by 
security forces immune to punishment. Although the freedom activists raise very real 
grievances against an Indian state, literature stemming from the 1980s militancy in 
Kashmir reflects the notion that grievances are based on identity markers such as religion 
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or nationalism.  If this is the case, then naturally conflict resolution tactics would be an 
effort at better understanding how ideological differences can be overcome and 
compromises can be negotiated. Although ethnic and religious tensions may exacerbate 
the conflict in Kashmir, the reality of Kashmir’s conflict is that it is asymmetric and thus 
cannot be fixed merely by conflict resolution tactics which resolve to better understand 
ideological differences of the different actors in the conflict. The Kashmir Valley has very 
little autonomy to decide for itself how to govern itself. The streets are littered with bunkers 
and soldiers are active across the region in the tens of thousands. Kashmir is under de 
facto occupation by the central government of India. The Kashmir freedom activists I have 
spoken deny that Kashmir is part of India and that peace can only be achieved if the area 
is demilitarized. Resistance to such an occupation is accordingly justified. 
 The introduction of this thesis makes these claims as relevant findings. In order 
to carry out the research that led to these realities, I knew I had to examine the Kashmir 
conflict in a way that was distinct from previous research. For this, instead of relying on 
literature that focused on ethnonational identity motivations for resistance to India, or 
even to diaspora mobilisation which could be rather homogenising in its analyses, I turned 
to social movements theory. Specifically, I look at examine the framing processes and 
introduce the uncovered frames as witnessed during my fieldwork. The master frame is 
a sort of all-inclusive meta-package of human rights. From this stems several frames 
within this umbrella, outlined in the methodology.  
As the historical overview in chapter one reflects, the Kashmir freedom movement 
is rooted in collective mobilization tactics against the Dogra, and then the Indian 
government. Historiography is quick to identify how collective action has been made 
possible through a shared identity of subjugation (Zutshi, 2004; Cockelll, 2001), which is 
a powerful element of motivation for mobilization. However, works such as Malik (2019) 
offer a revision of history which contemplates more vividly the role of early activists, 
particularly the critical role that women have played in the resistance movements in 
Kashmir. After a brief introduction on how this leads up to the contemporary azadi 
movement, I examine some ethnonational literature more generally. The conflict in 
Kashmir must go beyond the presentation that it is a battle of ideologies or an India-
Pakistan conflict as scholars such as Kaul (2011) assert. Although there has been room 
for the historical precedent of a unified Kashmiriyat, the Kashmir identity is one that has 
been salient and often in relation to events in the homeland (Ballard, 1991; Sokefeld and 
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Bolognani, 2011; Robsinson, 2013). Looking towards the contemporary azadi movement, 
we see nonviolent tactics and displays of solidarity with others struggling for freedom 
such as graffiti art (Kak, 2017). This is an aspect of a larger movement that sees itself as 
a freedom movement, often in solidarity with other movements, rather than identity based. 
In chapter two, I give a broader explanation of my research questions and detail 
the methods for conducting research. An initial pilot study with Kashmir freedom activists 
in Scotland presented a clustering of activists from a broad range of campaigns and 
causes with seemingly tenuous linkages. This led to my initial research question which 
explored why such a diverse range of activists were drawn to the Kashmir freedom cause. 
This chapter outlines my approach to research as one that is intrepretivistic, relying on 
understanding the perceptions of Kashmiris. It also connects this approach to the process 
of data collection whereby, in addition to a short time spent in IAK, I spent a longer time 
as a participant observer in KSM at their Edinburgh and London sites.  It became clear 
that Kashmiri’s right to self-determination could be anchored to one overarching 
ideological feature: human rights. The rights frame is a master, overarching link between 
campaigns. This overarching human rights frame is split into categories which are distinct 
but sometimes overlap: women’s rights frames, victimization frames, injustice frames, 
minority frames, and resistance frames. Despite how clearly the Kashmir movement 
linked itself with this growing international activist network of human rights advocates, 
little scholarship on Kashmir has been focused on the recognition that the contemporary 
movement can rightly be assessed as a transnational social movement. 
 Chapter three is where I expand on the new Kashmiri freedom movement, and 
how it is distinct from previous incarnations of the Kashmir freedom movement. I begin 
with an overview of the strategies of the new movement, the use of social media to raise 
awareness for the Kashmir movement and to publicize events in Kashmir and abroad. In 
addition to the language of English, the new movement uses the language of human 
rights to express their grievances and to demand attention to their cause and 
subsequently justice. This chapter examines the role of militarization and its catastrophic 
consequences on women’s human rights. I make the analogy that women’s rights as 
subjugated are linked to the general Kashmiri population as subjugated by India. 
Resistance to this subjugation is a way to reclaim autonomy and agency over oneself 
and one’s people. Women’s resistance has been critical and recently become more 
dominant within Kashmir and abroad. The youths of Kashmir are using modern tactics 
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blended with traditional ones in order to resistance Indian rule. Resistance is found in 
photo exhibitions, song lyrics, as graffiti on walls in Kashmir. The resistance identity has 
become a part of contemporary Kashmir culture.  
 Chapter four looked at the internationalization of the Kashmiri movement with 
emphasis on the more traditional lens of homeland politics, however, connections to other 
movements such as with the Sikhs and Palestinians have been forged over time. The 
chapter put into perspective how the Kashmir movement has gone international through 
a vignette about a vigil held outside the Indian consulate in Edinburgh in 2013. It ends 
with reference to the Million March in 2016, with rather polemic conditions arising from 
the march. In juxtaposing two young persons’ perception of political party obstruction. 
There was a greater diversity of campaigns standing in solidarity with one another outside 
the Indian consulate in the cold for the vigil in Edinburgh. The internationalization of the 
struggle for a free Kashmir goes beyond a homogenized diaspora. It connects disparate 
individuals for a unified cause in some way, even if it is only temporary.  
Chapter five continued from this as it looks more closely at this development of 
transnational activism and how this has led to the transformation of identities of the 
Kashmir activist as the transformation of the movement from domestic to transnational 
have evolved. This transformation has led to solidarities being formed across groups and 
campaigns, particularly in the case of student and university involvement and promotion. 
This chapter looked again at traditional identity markers and how emergency identities 
have formed that act as a unifying force. In contemporary liberal movements, this is often 
represented as solidarity. This solidarity between cause is particularly salient when the 
causes are presented as a minority group standing in resistance to an oppressive force. 
This has the capacity to unite such disparate causes as Black Lives Matters with the 
Kashmir movement as is demonstrated by the proliferation of the hashtag 
#kashmirilivesmatters.  
Chapter six is the case study chapter of KSM Edinburgh. Although reference is 
made throughout this thesis to KSM Edinburgh, this chapter zooms in on the society, its 
origin, how I came to become a participant observer with the group, and it examines more 
closely its core issues and strategies.  
Chapter seven continues from the KSM Edinburgh as a case to focus on KSM 
SOAS. As in the previous chapter, I examine its origin, how I became involved, who the 
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participants are, and what their core issues and strategies are. I further take into account 
how the group resolves issues.  
Chapter eight brings together how human rights is used as a master frame for 
promoting and raising awareness for the movement and also zooms in on particular 
injustice and legal frames that also help to concretely connect the movement to other 
campaigns for human rights and the restoration of justice. Legal advocates work together 
with activists in an effort to bridge the gap of promotion and attempting to achieve specific 
goals. This chapter also explores the victimization frame as a means to gain sympathy 
for the movement. It is also used as a way to raise awareness in the form of 
documentaries being shown and distributed across countries and further explores the 
role social media has in connecting activists across borders. I also reflect upon personal 
interviews conducted in Kashmir with people who have suffered injustices and have 
become victims of abuse. I connect these individuals to the stories of respondents who 
have lived in Kashmir and how they negotiate everyday life under curfew and in a state 
of fear. Out of this, however, emerges resistance identities and the will to stand in 
opposition to Indian oppression in Kashmir. Kashmiris, in this sense, express hope that 
their situations – no matter how grim – may some day improve if they keep the pressure 
on.  
 
Answering Research Questions 
 
What drives people in the KSM to engage in a campaign for a free Kashmir?  
 
KSM has become a transnational social movement which sees itself as a vehicle in the 
fight for justice for Kashmiris. What drives people in KSM to engage in the campaign for 
azadi is a mixture of personal identitarian motivation and collective identitarian 
motivations. Individually, one may be motivated by personal affiliation as a stakeholder 
in the conflict. Collectively, one may be motivated if they are part of other human rights 
campaigns or part of an affiliated cause such as self-determination or human rights for 
another group or minority subgroup. How KSM and its participants have framed their 
movement in terms of human rights and other sub-frames such an women’s rights and 
minority rights lead me to infer that people in KSM are motivated through more than 
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personal identity affiliations. This is particularly true of those participants who hold no 
personal identity affiliation as a Kashmiri or South Asian. 
 
Do they engage because of the identitarian appeal of a free Kashmir or do they 
engage for different reasons? 
 
As outlined in chapters four, five, and eight on transnational activism and, the 
internationalization of the struggles, and intersectional motivations for supporting azadi, 
identity markers are a natural aspect of motivation for participation in organizations like 
the KSM and for sympathizing with the movement for a free Kashmir. However, 
overarching identities emerge that transcend ethnic, national, or religious barriers. 
Solidarity identities are salient for many liberal causes and organizations that generally 
align with the political left seemingly work often in conjunction with one another. By the 
KSM aligning itself with liberal causes through framing the movement in terms of self-
determination, justice, anti-imperialism and demilitarization, it extends the framing of the 
movement to one that is seemingly identity-based to one that is based on human rights.  
 
How are Kashmir freedom activists framing their movement in an effort to increase 
support from an international audience? 
 
Kashmir freedom activists are framing their movement within the master frame of human 
rights. This extends the movement to an international audience such as other self-
determination movements. As asserted in chapters five and eight, there is a more niche 
version of this rights movement that expresses itself as a minority community resisting a 
majority power. Sustained acts of resistance such as the Black Lives Matters campaign 
can empathize and work together with other campaigns who support one another’s 
struggle against oppression by a majority power. For many subaltern Kashmiri, this is vis-
à-vis India. This theme runs in a myriad of other campaigns and is also emphasized in 
the Palestinian struggle for freedom, which already has wide global support. Through 





Could it be possible that the KSM represents a broader Kashmir transnational 
activist movement? 
This question is difficult to answer more definitively without further evidence from IAK and 
PAK and perhaps by looking at newly formed KSM groups in the USA and Canada. It 
certainly would be a point of further investigation. On the basis of my data, I believe that 
the KSM is reflective of a broader Kashmir transnational activist movement. I have not 
worked extensively with the diaspora community in the UK. This lack of diaspora active 
in the KSM is actually supportive of the claim that the KSM is representative more of a 
transnational movement than of politicking domestically. The aims of the KSM were to 
engage an international audience, rather than preaching to the converted. This aim was 
voiced not by long-term members of the diaspora, but by a transient community, 
comprised of students and activists who often have had direct experience of activism 
within IAK itself. My two weeks in the valley also indicated that there was a desire for 
international activism to work in conjunction with domestic activism in order to achieve 
both long term goals such as azadi but also short-term goals such as the restoration of 
passports and ending impunity for security force corruption.  
 
Contributions of this Study 
 
This study adds to existing studies of transnational youth movements – a unique focus 
on Kashmir through the lens of the KSM. The KSM has the capacity to operate on a 
transnational level which activates not only diaspora representation but reaches across 
campaigns and causes to recruit participants, raise awareness and gains sympathy from 
an international audience, thus forming the potential for a larger pool of advocates and 
allies in their case for freedom. Thus far, studies of transnational solidarity have tended 
to focus on the Palestinian freedom movement (Abu-Ayyash, 2014) rather than Kashmir. 
Abu-Ayyah’s (2014) framing of the Palestinian movement as a human rights movement 
and my own findings of the Kashmir movement being framed in terms of human rights 
contributes to more generalizable theory about contemporary TSMOs. It is increasingly 
common practice and most likely an effective one to first, transform a domestic movement 
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into a transnational one, and secondly, frame that movement in terms of human rights in 
order to gain the largest and most diverse number of participants possible.  
What was noticeable in my initial literature review was the lack of literature 
available on transnational activism from the ‘Global South’ that is not seen as a relatively 
homogenous ‘diaspora’ mobilisation. Social movement studies have looked more at how 
the activists in one part of the word adopt strategies of activists in other parts of the world 
but there is a lacuna of specific studies that looks at how disparate campaigns 
collaborate. Long-term studies on transnational Kashmir youth solidarity movements 
have been previously non-existent, despite evidence that youth movements have been 
very active in Kashmir since pre-Partition. Social media drives the visibility of this today 
and western scholars have been able to conduct some studies regarding activism in 
Kashmir (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011; Van der Molen and Bal, 2011). More recently, 
some Kashmiri scholars have also begun to fill this space (Kak, 2011; Malik, 2019). The 
transnationalization of azadi activism as studied on the level of this thesis is up to now 
not available. 
The application of framing techniques was done in a microcosm on legal framing 
(Duschinski, 2009) and focused on developments within Kashmir, rather than activism on 
behalf of Kashmir happening abroad. Aiming to understand the framing of the movement 
on a transnational level which is aimed primarily at an international audience is unique to 
this study. The application of social movement frames to the transnational azadi 
movement can act on its own as contribution to social movement studies more generally 
as well. The findings of the sub-frames which are adapted from theoretical literature on 
social movements can assist in understanding which frames work in which contexts better 
if applied more rigorously and to other movements. The potential for applicability to other 
transnational and especially to traditionally non-Western movements is viable. This 
research, therefore, could progress the study of the transnational azadi movement and 
also explain how other non-Western movements are adapting their repertoires and 




Main Findings of Study 
 
The main findings of this study have been in understanding the ways in which in-group 
and out-group activists have become motivated to participate in Kashmir’s freedom 
movement transnationally. In-group, or ‘insider’ activists, those which have a direct stake 
in any permanent territorial resolution, are more inclined to participate or become 
motivated due to their direct affiliation with the region and direct stake in the conflict. Out-
group, or ‘outsider’ activists are those who do not have a direct stake and whose lives 
would not be directly impacted by any territorial resolution. Common ground may be 
reached among insider and outsider activists and thus they can work together in solidarity 
to achieve common goals. This common ground may vary as the diversity in affiliations 
of activists may vary, but common ground is often found with a shared belief of suffering 
of Kashmiris in addition to participation in a similar cause or campaign. There may also 
be other regional interests or a general desire to fight oppression or to contest hegemonic 
power. I have also found supporters to be specifically interested in or active in 
ideologically liberal causes. Transnational solidarities can help to sustain movements as 
there is a natural tendency for activism to have reciprocity. The solidarity appeal relies on 
showing support for one another’s cause so that both causes remain sustained, even as 
individual participation levels ebb and flow over time.  
 In order to facilitate the sustenance of the movement, it is necessary to involve 
professional advocates to coordinate with activists, domestically and transnationally. 
Intersecting discourses and narratives of activists impact one another and thus networks 
are built upon a diversity of strategies and divergent narratives become more concurrent 
and complementary to one another. Furthermore, those activists, legal advocates, 
journalists, and academics that go abroad where they can more freely communicate their 
dissent against the Indian government and compare notes within and out-with their 
Kashmiri, South Asian, and heterogeneous professional networks abroad may eventually 
return to Kashmir. Time spent abroad, even on a one-year study program permits for the 
kind of activity that is promoted in Western societies and on international campuses that 
they would not otherwise have the full opportunities to do along either side of the LoC. 
Specific links and networks are established and maintained abroad when they return 
home and those seeking to study abroad, say after the completion of a bachelor’s degree 
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in Kashmir may have had the opportunity to establish links via those affiliated to Kashmir 
universities in their activist networks or simply through social media sites. They may also 
gain exposure to professional networks prior to studying abroad or upon return. These 
networks naturally would benefit journalists and legal advocates, for example, but extend 
also to those pursuing unrelated fields such as engineering or medicine.  
One of the strongest connections Kashmir advocates find is in the legal 
frameworks that outline some of the main grievances Kashmiris have against a perceived 
imperial Indian state and furthermore offers talking points for advocacy experts and 
casual activists alike. Although framed in terms of justice and enhancing democracy in 
India, these notions are translated into the need for closure. There are a few advocacy 
organizations inside IAK such as the Association of Parents for Disappeared Persons 
(APDP) Kashmir, which has links to KSM SOAS as well, who have publicised the 
organization and help to raise funds at KSM events. Likewise links have occurred through 
the raising of funds for the Kashmir floods which took place in 2014 at KSM Edinburgh 
trough bake sales and also after the showing of Trails of Torture (2012) and a 
presentation on human rights in Kashmir.  
Further links are established, but not always actively engaged in specific 
campaigns. This would be an area of opportunity for the KSM and other groups 
advocating on behand of Kashmir justice abroad. Inshallah Football (2010) is another 
documentary often shown to KSM audiences. In that film, it is highlighted that passports 
are refused to certain youths to travel abroad simply because someone in their family 
was involved in militancy. When I went to Kashmir, I learned that passports were revoked 
even for those youths who showed up to pro-freedom protests, who were otherwise not 
engaged in any other political activities or stone throwing. 
In Kashmir today, the children of conflict and other youth generation coming 
behind them are exposed to curfews, checkpoints, subjected to blockages of food and 
goods at the whim of the Indian government and are subject to censorship. SMS 
messages are blocked, and the Internet is routinely taken down in IAK. India tows the 
line this is meant to prevent rumours from spreading, but the lack of communication with 
the outside world or knowing if there is turmoil in a neighbouring mohalla has people 
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constantly in fear for themselves and their loved ones. Hardships arising from curfews 
and hartals mean that people may not have access to basic food for days. Checkpoints 
make it difficult to travel freely from one part of the valley to the next, let alone from one 
part of the state to the next. This makes it difficult to accept work further away from home 
and considering the economic hardships of curfews work can be difficult to find. For those 
having been picked up for stone throwing or protesting as a youth, they can be blacklisted 
from the best government jobs  - even if they are highly qualified. All of these items have 
the opportunity to allow for transnational lobbying in order to ease some of the everyday 
suffering of the Kashmiris.    
For those Kashmiris who have other hardships such as pellet wounds, PTSD, 
experience or witness to traumatic events, more support could be made available to 
them. Groups such as KSM have raised awareness that has brought more international 
attention to the issues of blindness. They could be part of a wider campaign to end the 
use of pellet guns internationally as a crowd dispersal method. The role of KSM and other 
transnational activist groups for drawing attention to the abuses of security forces that 
have led to the disappearance, torture, rape, and murder of thousands of Kashmiri 
civilians has been critical to raising awareness for a conflict that lacks the media coverage 
of other conflicts of suffering peoples. On the other hand, knowing about the existence of 
a conflict does not lend itself to resolution. Small, small acts of resistance (van der Molen 
and Ball, (2011) for the domestic and transnational activist can eventually lead to the 
possibility for at least becoming a more globally known cause. Specific solutions and/or 
ways to approach lobbying can arise when transnational activists within and among other 
campaigns can work in solidarity with one another to achieve seemingly impossible ends 
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Appendix 1a: KSM Edinburgh Meetings and Events 
Date Meeting  Event Other 
18 October 2012  Film Screening:  
‘Kashmir’s Torture 
Trail’ followed by 
discussion and decision 
to start society 
 






- Awareness raising 
- Promotion 
  
29 January 2013 Planning Meeting 
- Films 









5 February 2013  Kashmir Solidarity 













27 June 2013   Contribution to ‘We 
Are Kashmir’ video 
Select KSM members went 
up Calton Hill in Edinburgh 
and held placards and 
banners taking pictures as a 
contribution in a video 
project 














(other society and 
other KSM) 
- Awareness raising 
- Lobbying efforts 
- Charity 
  
7 November 2013  Film Screening 
‘Jashn e Azadi’ 
‘How We Celebrate 
Freedom’ 
 





  KSM Joins rally for Yes 
vote on Scottish 
referendum. I could not 
attend but referenced posts 
and pictures from event; 









(other society and 
other KSM) 
- Awareness raising 





  Bake Sale  
Charity fundraiser for floods 
outside Main Library; 
promotion of Kashmir 








(other society and 
other KSM) 
- Culture 
- Awareness raising 
- Promotion (social 
media/flyers) 




20 October 2014  Film Screening and 
Dinner: 
‘Kashmir’s Torture 
Trail’ plus presentation 
and serving of food for 
donation to flood 
victims. I contributed 
with a brief 
presentation on my 
work and to make 
presence known. 
 








27 October 2014   Virtual Mobilization: 
Twitterstorm 
Promotion of Kashmir’s 
‘Black Day’ or day of 
accession to India 





- Awareness Raising 
  





in video  






4 November 2014  Joint event with 
iSoc: ‘Kashmir not a 
Sweater: An insight 





presentation and I 
gave brief presentation 
on Human rights in IAK 

























- Awareness raising 
- Lobbying 
  
2 December 2014  Cultures of 
Resistance 
Mix of presentations 
on Kashmir culture 
along with awareness 
raising of conflicts in 
IAK and Palestine (I 
read a cultural poem) 
 
2 February 2015 Planning Meeting 
- Events 
- Speakers  
- Culture 
- Collaborations (esp. 
FemSoc/SJP) 
- Awareness raising 






4 February 2015  KSM and FemSoc 
event ‘Institutional 
Sexual Violence in 
Kashmir’  
 

























5 March 2015  Film Screening  
‘Valley of Saints’ 
 
16 March 2015   Organizational meeting 
in conjunction with SACC: 
Update on IAK HR situation; 
Planning for joint event; 
Lobbying against Prevent 
Legislation 












(other society and 
other KSM) 
- Awareness raising 





Appendix 1b: SOAS Meetings and Event 
Date Meeting Event Other 
26 September 2015   SOAS Freshers Fayre 
Committee members 
handed out information 
about the society and 
postcards for a mail-in 
campaign against Human 
Rights abuses. I 
introduced myself and 
assisted. 
13 October 2015  KSM SOAS Meet and 
Greet 
Several presentations on 
Kashmir, exp. From 
different sides and 
poetry; discussion on 
what it means to be 
Kashmir, activism, etc. 
 
14 October 2015   Coffee meeting with 
member of 
committee – discussed 
my research and issues in 
Kashmir activism 










- Promotion (social 
media) 
  
27 October 2015  Film Screening: 
Inshallah Football  





30 October 2015 Planning Meeting 
- Events 
- Films 
- Promotion (soc 
media and 
physical) 





- Occupied vs. 
Administered 
  
10 November 2015  ‘We Need to Talk 
About Modi’ panel 
event from different 
societies and 
perspectives. Dalits and 
Subaltern solidarity; KSM 
rep; video shown 
incriminating Modi in 
Gujarat riots   
 
12 November 2015   Modi Not Welcome 
Very large demonstration 
and march from Downing 
Street in London. Reps 
from many org. I helped 
to make placards and to 
hold signs for KSM SOAS 
23 November 2015   Oppressed Peoples 
in Solidarity joint 
event, collections for 
Calais. (Kashmir, 
Kurdistan, Palestine, Tibet 
socs). During time I went, 
no KSM members but 
Palestine and Kurdistan 
reps discussed 
15 February 2016  Jammu and Kashmir: 
Past and Present 
Activist and academic 
discussion, this time in 
collaboration with King’s 




newly formed group – 
location at King’s College 
16 February 2016 
 
 Kashmir Women’s 
Resistance: A 
deliberation on the 
gendered nature of the 
conflict 
More academic but also 
activist discussion, paired 
with photo exhibition 
 
17 February 2016  Kashmir: Road to 
Peace in South Asia 
Academic and Activist 
discussion on how peace 
in SA can be achieved 
only through sustainable 
solutions on Kashmir 
 
18 February 2016  Jammu and Kashmir: 
Conflicting 
Perspectives 
Activist and Academic 


















Although mostly interviews were used in this thesis, the pilot study in 
Indian Administered Kashmir did produce the following encounters: 
14 May 2013 Met with Academic at Kashmir University 
- An unplanned meeting, the Professor gave me a vague background on the 
Kashmir conflict; recommended I attend a book launch 
15 May 2013 Book Launch by A.G. Noorani (2013) The Kashmir Dispute, 1947-2012 
at Nigeen Club  
- Required a translator. Praise for book and Great Kashmir newspaper 
17 May 2013 Meeting arranged at coffee shop in Srinagar Coffee Day 
- Met with two journalists who discussed intractability of conflict due to 
unwillingness and financial gain of some stakeholders; thought CBMs 
useless to ordinary people 
17 May 2013 Meeting with Senior journalist  
- More in-depth interview giving perspective of on-going conflict, 
suppression, and abuse by security forces. Took special interest in how 
youths have suffered 
18 May 2013 Meeting with a second Senior journalist 
- My contacts snowballed to be introduced to more journalists. This 
journalist discussed similarly to previous journalist who later joined. 
Themes were again youth volatility/witnessing conflict and huge protests. 
Also concern over conflict spillover from Afghanistan, support for 
militancy 
19 May 2013 An arranged elite meeting was canceled due to a house arrest.  
- Police interrogated myself and companion briefly in the street.  
- Later I ran into another officer I was acquainted with at a Chinese 
restaurant. Over soup, was an impromptu interview. The officer suggested 
a soft borders approach and claimed it could be done if political will 
existed. Described personal tragedy and defended police record. 
20 May 2013 Visit to Bemina Rehabilitation Center 
- My host took me to spinal injuries unit where a patient sought treatment 
from being shot by security officers. Later in limb rehabilitation unit, 
interviewed elderly man who receiving prosthetic leg from International 
Red Cross 10 years after losing it in cross border shelling. 
20 May 2013 Meeting with Journalist who gathered two young men for interview 
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- Meeting detailed in thesis – two youths detained describe their 
experiences of internment. 
20 May 2013 Met with Kashmir University scholars 
- Discussed research with some professors and a PhD student. They offered 
to permit me access to their facilities and encouraged me to apply for a 
longer visa to research. Claimed that Institute of Kashmir Studies was a 
think tank and any solution on Kashmir would come from it. Was 
suggested to apply for a visa under a different research topic. 
22 May 2013 Met with one more journalist 
- Already reaching saturation. The journalist discusses Kashmir conflict in 
general and intractability and unwillingness to negotiate settlement 
22 May 2013 Met with research student over lunch  
- was skeptical that an independent Kashmir would be Islamic or 
undemocratic 
- later took pictures of pro-azadi graffiti by the river.  
 
 
 
 
